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DEFENCES 



OF 



PHILADE LPHIA 



IN 



1777. 



COLLECTED AND EDITED BY 

WORTHINGTON CHAUNCEY FORD. 



BROOKLYN, N. Y. : 

HISTORICAL PRINTING CLUB. 
>897- 






IN EXCHANGI 
New r»rli Tuiiifc Lifcrary 

JaN 27 int2 



[From the " Pennsylvania Magazine of History and 
Biography," 1894-1897.] 



One Hundred Copies Printed. 
5^0 



NOTE. 



When I made a tender to the Pennsylvania Magazine of 
History and Biography of a few minutes of the Councils of 
"War held under Washington, I did not anticipate going 
outside of those records. Finding an abundance of new 
material bearing upon the operations in and around Phila- 
delphia in the fall of 1777, the plan was extended until the 
result is this volume of nearly three hundred pages, con- 
taining more than two hundred and twenty letters and 
opinions, uot five of which have before been in print. If 
only as an evidence of the unused materials for American 
history-, this collection has an interest ; and the interest is 
heightened by the personal touches these buried and for- 
gotten manuscripts give of the writers. It is not so much 
the importance of the military operations that appeals to 
us, as the unconscious and therefore free expression these 
leaders of the Continental army gave to their views and 
feelings. The campaign of 1777, with its hopes and dis- 
appointments, is laid before us with a vividness of detail 
that no historian could imitate. 

In such a wealth of new material it would not be possi- 
ble to direct attention to the more important pieces. I 
may, however, be pardoned for believing the record of the 
Board of War, printed on page 175, to be an important 
record because of the light it throws upon one of the lead- 
ing actors in the Conway cabal against Washington. 

I wish to express my appreciation of the courteous and 
untiring assistance rendered by the editors of the Pennsyl- 
vania Magazine of History and JBiograj^hy whWe these sheets 
were running through that magazine. It is not too much 
to say that the success of that publication is due to the 



iv Note. 

liberality of the Pennsylvania Historical Society to students 
of American history, and to the full and accurate knowledge 
of Pennsylvania history possessed by Mr. Frederick D. 
Stone and Mr. John W. Jordan, to whom my acknowl- 
edgments are specially tendered. 

WORTHINGTON ChAUNCEY FoRD. 
Washington, D. C, 29th Jii)y, 1897. 



CONTENTS. 



PAOB 

NoTK iii 

Council of War, 12 June, 1777 2 

Howe'a movements — Dofence of the Highlands — Rules of promo- 
tion. 

Opinion of Major-General Greene 5 

Importance of Philadelphia — Approaches to the city — Delaware 
difficult to navigate — Fort Mifflin and the chevaux-de-frise — Utility 
of fire-ships — Land batteries to defend the channel — Fortifications 
at Billingsport and Red Bank — Half-moon batteries suggested — 
Fortifying Darby Creek — Forts a disadvantage. 

Definitive Project of Du Coudray, 6 August, 1777 12 

Position of the floating batteries — The galleys and land battery — 
Lines of defence — Hog's Island — Billingsport the best to fortify — 
Needs of the service. 

Opinion of Major-General Wayne, 7 August, 1777 19 

Completion of the forts — Garrisons in the forts — Troops at Marcus 
Hook. 

Opinion of Joseph Reed, 7 August, 1777 20 

Howe's movement intended against Philadelphia — Must prevent 
the English from getting behind the army — Difficulty of effecting a 
landing in the face of an enemy — Probable place of landing — New 
Jersey not eligible — Advantages of Darby Creek — In case of re- 
treat — The river defence — Darby — Billingsport — Red Bank — Fort 
Island — Stock should be removed. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Knox, 9 August, 1777 29 

Fort Island should be strengthened — Red Bank, contracted — Bil- 
lingsport and the galleys — Works at Darby Creek and command of 
the channel. 

Washington to the President of Congress, 9 August, 1777 ... 30 
Puzzling movements of Howe — Concentrating strength at one 
point — Billingsport and Red Bank compared — Fort Island the 
principal dependence — Works recommended — Results will be for- 
midable — A military survey necessary — Du Coudray. 

Du Coudray to "Washington, 10 August, 1777 37 

Favors Fort Island — Width of river and shallow places — Examines 
Fort Island — The proposed survey. 

T 



vi Contents. 

PAGE 

Washington to the President of Congress, 15 August, 1777 . . 40 
Du Coudray's plan of the river — A weak point in Fort Island and 
its remedy. 

Council of "War, 21 August, 1777 41 

Sailing of British fleet against Charleston, as was thought — Army 
not to follow — Decided to move to North River. 

Dv Coudray's Memoir on Billingsport and Fort Island, 29 

August, 1777 42 

Fort Mifflin greatly exposed — Le Brun's projects — Chevaux-de- 
frise — Fortifying Billingsport — Workmen less costly than militia. 

Du Coudray to Washington, 30 August, 1777 45 

Sends his memorial— Militia engineers for map. 

Du Coudray to Congress, 7 September, 1777 45 

Survey of the river — Billingsport — Landing of the enemy at Chesa- 
peake — Fitness of station at Wilmington — Defence of river passes — 
Offer of service — Desires co-operation of Mifflin — Question of artil- 
lery — Casting of mortars. 

Council of War, 23 September, 1777 49 

Enemy has crossed the Schuylkill — Movements and plans of the 
Continental army — Damage by rains — Progress of the British — 
Decision to remain. 

Council OF War, 28 September, 1777 61 

Position and strength of the British — Detachments to join the Con- 
tinental army — Putnam ordered to send reinforcements — Immedi- 
ate attack not favored by majority — Opinion of the minority. 

Brigadier-General Forman to Washington, 20 October, 1777 . . 54 
A letter miscarries — Importance of fort at Red Bank — Slow gath- 
ering of militia — British occupy Province Island — Possible attack 
on Fort Mifflin — Colonel Greene sends reinforcements. 

LiKUTENANT-CoLONEL SMITH TO WASHINGTON, 26 October, 1777 . . 56 
111 health of Baron d'Arendt — Difference with Colonel Greene as 
to command — Want of artillerists — Commodore should co-operate — 
Position of the enemy — Need for clothing. 

Continental Navy Board to Washington, 26 October, 1777 ... 58 
Return of men on frigates — Safety of vessels in case of attack — 
Stores sent lo Easton. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Comstock to Washington, 27 October, 1777 69 
Garrison at Red Bank — Arms from Hessians — Intelligence from a 
prisoner and from Philadelphia — Militia not to be depended on — 
Cartridges. 

Washington to Lieutenant-Colonel Greene, 28 October, 1777 . 61 
Health of Baron d'Arendt — Question of command between Greene 
and Smith, 



Coyitents. vii 

PAGE 

Washington to Brigadier-General Forman, 28 October, 1777 . . 61 
Reinforcing Red Bank and Fort Mifflin — Secrecy to be observed. 

Instructions to Brigadier-Gbnerai. Varnum, 28 October, 1777 . 62 
Route to Woodbury — To reinforce forts— Caution against surprise. 

Washington to Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, 28 October, 1777 . . 63 
Question of command — Fort to be reinforced — Warning against 
jealousies — Banljs to be cut. 

Washington to Commodore Hazeltvood, 28 October, 1777 .... 64 
Number of sailors in tbe army — Mutual confidence and perfect un- 
derstanding enjoined — Ammunition — Guarding against surprise. 

Brigadier-General Forman to Washington, 29 October, 1777 . . 65 
Assembling the militia — Newcomb refuses to make a return — Rein- 
forcements — Strange conduct of Newcomb — Enemy's works at Bil- 
lingsport — Damage by rain — Province Island — Garrison in good 
spirits — Burgoyne. 

Council of War, 29 October, 1777 207 

Lord Stirling to Washington", 29 October, 1777 ........ 67 

Roads in bad order — Casualties — Necessity of harassing enemy — 
Battle should be avoided. 

Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 30 October, 1777 . . 69 
Situation of the enemy — The command of the ferries — Banks to be 
cut. 

Captain Lee to Washington, .31 October, 1777 69 

Strength of the force on Carpenter's Island — Means of getting pro- 
visions into Philadelphia — Illicit trade — Floods shut off communi- 
cation. 

Washington to Brigadier-General Varnum, 31 October, 1777 . 70 
Question of cannon — Crews on galleys. 

Washington to Brioadier-Gbneral Potter, 31 October, 1777 . . 71 
Breaking the road — -Dismantling flour mills — Disposition of flour — 
Banks to be kept open — Assistance from Lee. 

Washington to Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, 1 November, 1777 . 72 
Reinforcements and clothing — Suggests laying upper end of island 
under water. 

Washington to Commodore Hazelwood, 2 November, 1777 ... 73 
Safer to have distant combat with enemy — Part of the navy — 
Landing by night — Position of the galleys. 

Major Fleurt's Journal, 2 and 3 November, 1777 74 

Movements on Province Island — A battery on the ** Augusta's" 
hulk — Need of palisades — Obstacles to his plans. 

Lord Stirling to Washington, 3 November, 1777 76 

Objection to his plan — No freshet cuts off communication — Scow 
ferries — Position of Howe. 



viii Contents. 

PAGB 

Brioadier-Gbneral Potter to Washington, 3 November, 1777 . 77 
How the enemy obtnin provisions — Construction of floating bat- 
teries — The dismantling of mills — Distribution of guards. 

Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 3 November, 1777 78 
Want of confidence between Hazelwood and Smith — Strengthening 
garrison at Fort Mifllin — Militia of no consequence. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Smith to Washington, 3 November, 1777 . 78 
Need of clothing — The floating battery and proposed attaclt on 
Billingsport. 

Captain Lee to Washington, 3 November, 1777 79 

Interrupting illicit intercourse with the British — Some prisoners 
and intelligence — Enemy to make a push for Fort Mifllin — Ships 
blown up — Trade at New Castle. 

Major FLEtTRT's Journal, 3 and 4 November, 1777 80 

Communication between British fleet and Philadelphia — Battery 
on the *' Augusta." 

Washington to Colonel Greene, 4 November, 1777 81 

Defence of Fort Mercer — Bombproofs — Provisions for an investi- 
ture. 

Washington to Briqadier-General Varnum, 4 November, 1777 82 
Wishes for success— Jealousies among officers — Attempt against 
Billingsport. 

Washington to Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, 4 November, 1777 . 83 
Supplies of clothing — Fleury to serve as engineer. 

Washington to Commodore Hazelwood, 4 November, 1777 ... 83 
A free passage for boats — Means of closing. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Smith to Washington, 4 November, 1777 . 84 
Not a battery as supposed — Free commmunication open. 

Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 6 November, 1777 . 86 
Miscarriage of the move to dismantle mills — Arrest of the oflioer — 
Crawford's men. 

Washington to Brigadier-General Potter, 5 November, 1777 . 86 
Annoyance over the mills — Crawford's men may be discharged — 
Precaution against surprise. 

Brigadikr-Gkneral Varnum to Washington, 6 November, 1777 86 
Cannonading the British ships — What was accomplished — 
Poor conduct of the galleys — Great damage could be done — Bil- 
lingsport the key of the river — Remissness of the fleet and defence 
of the commodore — His character — Hospital service wanted — Plans 
of the enemy — Newcomb's troops — Clothing from Tory Quakers. 

Washington to Brigadier-General Varnum, 7 November, 1777 90 
Approaching attack on Fort Mifflin — Militia not to be placed in 
forts — Fort Mifllin to be reinforced. 



Contents. ix 

PiLOB 

Brioadibk-Gbnbral Forman to Washington, 7 November, 1777 90 
Council of Safety and Newcomb — Ncwcomb's retort — Distribution 
of troops — Charges against bim and his resignation — Clinton sails 
from New York. 

Washington to Major General Dickinson, 8 November, 1777 . 93 
Post at Red Bank — Oysters. 

Washington to Brigadier-Gknkral Varn0M, 8 November, 1777 94 
Cannot do more than is being done — Purposes of the British — 
Resolutions of Congress. 

Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 8 November, 1777 95 
Intelligence — Movement began— Routof the enemy's boats — Chan- 
nel to be closed — Expects success in repelling an attack. 

Captain Lee to Washington, 8 November, 1777 96 

Prisoners — Reports of the enemy's intentions — The floating bat- 
teries — Provisioning Philadelphia — Intercourse checked. 

Major Fleurt's Journal, 5-8 November, 1777 97 

His position in the fort— Possibility of intercepting communica- 
tions — Works on Province Island — British land batteries — Fascines 
wanted. 

Captain Craig to Washington, 8 November, 1777 99 

Movements of the enemy. 

Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 8 November, 1777 . 99 
Cannot attack — Baggage sent away — Scattered condition of hia 
force — Disposition of pickets— The millstones — Drowning of some 
Hessians. 

Council of War, 8 November, 1777 101 

Reinforcements on their way — Enemy to attack Fort MiflJin — De- 
cision against attacking enemy near Philadelphia. 

Washington to Navy Board, 9 November, 1777 lOl 

Resolutions of Congress — Frigates to be scuttled. 

Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 9 November, 1777 102 
Situation at Fort Mifllin — Floating batteries — Enemy's disposition 
— Danger of breaches — Newcomb and his militia — Commissaries — 
Sickness of Arendt — Intelligence. 

Colonel Smith to Washington, 9 November, 1777 106 

Relief of fort garrison — Need of provisions and men. 

Colonel Smith to Washington, 9 November, 1777 106 

Fieury's position — Works of the enemy — The resolution of Con- 
gress. 

Major Fleuby's Journal, 9 and 10 November, 1777 106 

Enemy about to open their battery — Loop-holes — Fixing a chain — 
Commodore's chain of little service — Firing begins — Damage to 
guns — No fascines or palisades — Fatigue of garrison. 



X Contents. 

PAGE 

Washington to Brigadier-General Varnum, 10 Kovembtr, 1777 108 
Words of cheer — Keinforceiuents from Fishkill. 

Continental Navy Board to Washington, 10 November, 1777 . 108 
Protection of fleet — Resolution of Congress — Frigates scuttled — 
Mishap to one — Morris's tobacco-ship — No wish to go contrary to 
orders. 

Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 10 November, 1777 110 
Bombardment by the British — Inclemency of the weather — Militia 
and ammunition — Cartridges for Fort Mifflin. 

Colonel Smith to Washington, 10 November, 1777 Ill 

Firing from the enemy and damage done — Constant fatigue of gar- 
rison — Defence of the chevaux-de-frise — Place will soon be reduced 
— Enemy obtains provisions. 

Washington to Brigadier-Generjil Varnum, 11 November, 1777 113 
Trusts he will check Howe — Ammunition not to be wasted — Potter 
to annoy the enemy. 

Brigadier-Genekal Potter to W-4shington, 11 November, 1777 113 
Intelligence of the British fleet — Firing from the enemy's batteries. 

Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 11 November, 1777 114 
Attack on Red Bank — Rankin's wager, 

Jonathan Rumford to Brigadier-General Potter, 11 Novem- 
ber, 1777 114 

Loss of an English ship. 

Major Evans to Brigadie;r-General Potter, 11 November, 1777 115 
A fleet with troops standing up the river. 

Jonathan Rumford to Brigadier-General Potter, 11 Novem- 
ber, 1777 116 

News of the fleet. 

Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 11 November, 1777 115 

Damage to the works at Red Bank— Will probably be forced to 

evacuate. 
Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 11 November, 1777 116 

Events at Fort Mifflin — An evacuation urged — Cannonade to he 

reopened — Bursting of gun — Baron d'Arendt. 

Colonel Smith to Brigadier-General Varnum, 11 November, 

1777 117 

Damage done to fort — Ammunition — Block-house to bo destroyed. 

Washington to Continental Navy Board, 12 November, 1777 . 118 
The sinking of the frigates — Disposing of the men. 

Bbigadier-Genkral Potter to Washington, 12 November, 1777 . 118 
Harassing the enemy — Interrupting bridge building— Communi- 
cating with Red Bank. 



Contents. si 

PAGE 

Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 12 November, 1777 . 119 
Ships passing the island- — Intelligence from the city — Trading- 
boats destroyed — Prisoners. 

Major Fleury to Washington, 12 November, 1777 120 

Situation at the fort — (garrison dispirited. 

Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 12 November, 1777 120 
Fatigued state of garrison — The command at the fort — JIust be 
lost if attack continues. 

Colonel Smith to Washington, 12 November, 1777 121 

Is wounded — Block-houses almost destroyed — An assault must take 
the fort. 

Washington to Brigadier-General Varnum, 13 November, 1777 122 
Copy of orders sent — Proposed descent on Province Island — Fort 
Mercer to be strengthened. 

MA.JOR Fleury's Journal, 13 and 14 November, 1777 123 

Repairing the damage done to the fort — Floating battery — Island 
m.ay be defended — Plan of preventing a storm — High hopes for the "*^ 

future — A new battery — Men needed — Cattery silenced — Deser- 
tions. 

Brigadier-General Varnu.m to Washington, 14 November, 1777 125 
The situation at the fort. 

Brigadier-General Varnu.m to Washington, 14 November, 1777 126 
Want of troops — AVhoIe company of artillery in the fort — The at- 
tempt upon Province Island. 

Major Thayer to Br[Qadier-General Varnum, 14 November, 

1777 127 

No danger from cannon — Deserters. 

Captain Lee to Washington, 14 November, 1777 127 

Intercourse between inhabitants and British fleet — .\rrival of ships 
from New York. 

Major-General Greene to Washington, 14 November, 1777 . . 128 
The situation at Darby — Ships coming up the Schuylkill — Obstruct- 
ing the channel — Chain of redoubts — Enemy discouraged. 

Commodore Hazelwood to Washington, 15 November, 1777 . . . 129 
Council of war — Could not drive British ships away — Good behavior 
in fort and ships — Minutes of the council. 

Captain Craig TO Washington, 15 November, 1777 131 

Attack fixed for the day — Enemy dread union with Northern army. 

Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 15 November, 1777 132 
Bulletin of the day — Major Thayer commended, 

Benjamin Kandolph to Washington, 15 November, 1777 .... 132 
In charge of a flag — Intelligence. 



xii Contents, 

PAGE 

Brtqadier-Genkral Vaunum to Washington, 16 November, 1777 133 
DamagG to fort by bombardment — General ofScer needed — Orer- 
burdened with work — Shipping may lead to evacuation. 

Washington to Brigadikr-Genkral Varnum, 15 November^ 1777 134 
Supplies for the fort — Disposition of guns — Obstructing the chan- 
nel — The enterprise against Province Island. 

Colonel Smith to Washington, 15 Novembei*, 1777 135 

Visits Fort Mifflin — Possibility of defending— Artillerymen wanted. 

Baron d'Arendt on Fort Mifflin 136 

Importance of the fort — Designs of the enemy — Preservation of 
the garrison — Relief parties — Repair of works — Cannon and pro- 
vision — Communication with the enemy — Opinion of Varnum. 

Colonel Greene to General Potter, 15 November, 1777 139 

Operations against the fort and their results — Desertions. 

Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 16 November, 1777 140 
Fort Mifflin abandoned. 

Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 16 November, 1777 140 
Evacuation of Fort Mifflin — Attempt to drive away the " Vigilant" — 
Annoyance to shipping from the land batteries — Fatigue of force — 
Conduct of the fleet. 

Colonel Smith to Washington, 16 November, 1777 142 

Incidents of the evaouation. 

Joseph Reed to Washington, 16 November, 1777 142 

Relief for the ports — Mode of annoying the enemy. 

Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 17 November, 1777 143 
Enemy easily obtains provisions — Troops from New York — Im- 
portance of Fort Mercer — ^Suggestions on troops and stations — 
Bravery of defence of Fort Mifflin. 

Captain Craig to Washington, 18 November, 1777 146 

Intelligence — Cornwallis in New Jersey. 

Lieutenant Heard to Washington, 18 November, 1777 146 

Intelligence. 
Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 18 November, 1777 146 

Movement of British announced. 

Joseph Rekd to Washington, 18 November, 1777 147 

A move against Red Bank — Cornwallis in command — Cadwalader's 
scheme frustrated. 

Washington to Briqadier-Genkral Vaknum, 18 November, 1777 148 
Enemy crosses the river — Warning against surprise — Reconnoitre 
by St. Clair, Knox, and Kalb. 

Washington to Brigadier-General Glover, 19 November, 1777 149 
Orders for his march. 



/ 



Contents. xiii 

PAGE 

Washington to the Commanding Officer of Poor's or Pater- 
son's Brigade, 19 November, 1777 149 

Directions for marching. 

Washington to Brigadier-General 'Varnum, 19 November, 1777 150 
Orders for conduct. 

Washington to Commodore Hazelwood, 19 November, 1777 . . 150 
Trusts all questions have been decided. 

Washington to Brigadier-General Varnum, 19 November, 1777 151 
Importance of keeping Red Banlt — Reinforcements ordered — Ro- 
moval of stores and protection of galleys. 

Captain Craig to Washington, 19 November, 1777 152 

Intelligence. 

Bbioadier-General Wayne to Washington, 19 November, 1777 152 
Has advanced somewhat. 

Bbioadier-General Varnum to Washington, 19 November, 1777 153 
Reasons for moving his flying camp — Enemy getting in the rear of 
the fort — Most of the troops have left Philadelphia — Force of the 
enemy — Now Jersey militia. 

Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 20 November, 1777 154 
Capture of one of his guards. 

Washington to Brigadier-General Poor, 20 November, 1777 . . 154 
New orders for his march. 

Washington to Brigadier-General Paterson, 20 November, 1777 155 
Orders for march. 

Captain McLane to Washington, 20 November, 1777 155 

Intelligence. 

Brigadier General Varnum to Washington, 20 November, 1777 156 
Situation at Red Bank — Powder scattered over the fort — Feint by 
the enemy — Stores taken away — -Why Howe did not attack earlier 
— Greene's arrival. 

Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 21 November, 1777 157 
Fort Mercer evacuated — At Mount Holley — -Distribution of force — 
Good prospects of an engagement. 

Majok-Gbnebal Greene to Washington, 21 November, 1777 . . 158 
Burning of the galleys — Delay in coming to the front — An attack 
on the enemy suggested — Reinforcements — Reflections on fleet. 

Intelligence from Philadelphia 159 

Major-Gbneral Greene to Washington, 22 November, 1777 . . 161 
Incidents of the retreat^Light-horse wanted — Militia. 

Washington to Major-General Greene, 22 November, 1777 . . 162 
The proposed attack on the enemy^ Glover's brigade — Lee's corps. 



xiv Contents. 

PAGE 

Washington TO Captain McLane, 22 November, 1777 163 

On selecting intelligencers. 

Washington to Brigadier-General Yarnum, 22 November, 1777 163 
To receive orders from Greene — On the destruction of the fort. 

Wasbinqton to Major-General Greene, 22 November, 1777 . . 164 
On attacking the enemy — Glover's brigade. 

Navy Board to Washington, 23 November, 1777 164 

Destruction of the fleet. 

Colonel Ellis to Major General Greene, 23 November, 1777 . 165 
Intelligence. 

Major-General Greene to Washington, 24 November, 1777 . . 165 
Position of the enemy — Militia of the State — Ready for an advance 
— Supplies — As to attacking the enemy — Censure and risks — Has 
felt Washington's displeasure — Poor condition of the hospitals. 

Colonel Ellis to Major-General Greene, 24 November, 1777 . 168 
Number of his force — Movements of the enemy. 

Brigadier-General Weedon to Major-General Greene, 24 No- 
vember, 1777 169 

Strength and situation of the enemy. 

Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 24 November, 1777 . 170 
Intelligence. 

Washington to Major-General Greene, 24 November, 1777 . . 171 
An important matter to be discussed. 

Editor's Note on Mifflin's Connection with the Board op War 172 
Report of the Board of War, 21 November, 1777 175 

ON ATTACKING BRITISH IN PHILADELPHIA. 

Opinion of Major General Greene, 24 November, 1777 .... 177 
Is opposed to attacking Philadelphia — Reasons for rash measures 
— Attacking Lord Cornvpallis. 

Opinion of Lord Stirling, 25 November, 1777 178 

Favors an attack — Outline of a plan. 

Opinion of Major-General Sullivan, 25 November, 1777 . . . 179 
The situation of the enemy — Strength and number of the redoubts 
— Ditficulties of passing them — Approaching the city by water — 
Experience against success — Dangers involved in a defeat — Rela- 
tive strength of the two armies — Attacks on villages. 

Opinion of Major-General Armstrong, 25 November, 1777 . . 185 
Does not approve of the suggested attack. 

Opinion of the Chevalier Du Portail, 25 November, 1777 . . 185 
Dangers of an attack — Possible destruction of the army — Plans 
criticised — Operations in New Jersey. 



Contents. xv 

PAQE 

Opinion of Baron de Kalb, 25 November, 1777 187 

Essential points to be determined in plan. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Irvine, 25 November, 1777 . . . 188 
Is not in favor of risking all in one engagement. 

Opinion of Briqadibb-Genkral Maxwell, 25 November, 1777 . 189 
Reasons for not favoring the enterprise. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Patkrson, 25 November, 1777 . 190 
Believes the attaci^ too hazardous. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Poor, 26 November, 1777 .... 190 
Is against the attacli. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Scott, 25 November, 1777 . . . 190 
Approves plan of Cadwalader — Suggested change. 

Opinion of Brigadibr-General Smallwood, 25 November, 1777 191 
Is opposed to the undertaking. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Watne, 25 November, 1777 . . 191 
Believes a battle to be a necessity — If Phil.adelphia be not attacked, 
redoubts to be constructed — Reasons for favoring the attack. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Woodford, 25 November, 1777 . 192 
Is in favor of the plan. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Knox, 26 November, 1777 . . . 193 
Many after military fame — AVashington's reputation not at stake — 
Bepreciation of the currency — Rules and maxims of war against 
the attack — Force of enemy and strength of his works — Examples 
from experience — Favors winter quarters. 

Washington to Major-General Gkkene, 25 November, 1777 . . 197 
Enemy's position very strong — Fears an attack — Orders him to join 
forces — Hospitals. 

Major-General Greene to Washington, 25 November, 1777 . . 198 
Advance upon the enemy's rear — Awaiting orders. 

Major-General Greene to Washington, 25 November, 1777 . . 199 
In doubt as to action. 

Colonel Comstock to Major-General Greene, 25 November, 

1777 200 

Intelligence. 

Colonel Comstock to Major-General Greene, 25 November, 

1777 200 

Information obtained from prisoners. 

Major-General Greene to Washington, 26 November, 1777 . . 201 
A fruitless march — Enemy strongly posted at Gloucester — A pro- 
posed attack rejected — Lafayette's good conduct — Obstructions in 
river removed — Disposition of brigades. 



xvi Contents, 

PAGB 

Major-Genkral Greene to Washington, 27 November, 1777 . . 203 
Risk of witlidrawing the troups from New Jersey — Protecting the 
hospitals — Move to Burlington. 

Captain Craig to Washington, 28 November, 1777 204 

Intelligence. 

Major-General Greene to Washington, 28 November, 1777 . . 204 
BrigaJes for head-qunrters — No magazines of flour — Tench Francis 
a prisoner — Intelligence. 

Navy Board to Washington, 28 November, 1777 205 

Care of the frigates. 

Washington to Navy Board, 29 November, 1777 206 

Frigates may be u?ed as barracks. 



QUESTION OF WINTER QUARTERS. 

Opinion of Major-Genkral Sullivan, 1 December, 1777 .... 212 
Intentions of the board — Situations proposed — Objeclions to hut- 
ting — Objections to Wilmington — Winter campaign to be avoided — 
Lancaster and disposition of army — Germantown the most proper 
place. 

Opinion of the Marquis de Lafayette 216 

Points to be considered — Favors the line from Reading to Lancas- 
ter — As to Wilmington. 

Opinion of Baron de Kalb, 1 December, 1777 218 

Wilmington not a good selection — Lancaster favored. 

Opinion of Major-General Greene 219 

Objects of cantoning — Pleasure and relaxation — Necessary to pro- 
tect the country — Enlistments and bounties — Discontent of officers 
— Proposed places for cantonments — Favors Wilmington. 

Opinion of Lord Stirling, 1 December, 1777 224 

Objections to Wilmington — An encampment at Tredyffrin. 

Opinion of Major-General Armstrong, 1 December, 1777 . . . 226 
Is opposed to wintering around Lancaster — Is in favor of Wil- 
mington. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Maxwell, 1 December, 1777 . . 227 
Covering the country — Disposition to be made of the army. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Smalltvood, 1 December, 1777 . 228 

Consideration of the places proposed — Favors Wilmington. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Knox, 1 December, 1777 .... 229 
Objects of winter quarters — Favors the line from Lancaster to 
Reading. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Poor, 1 December, 1777 .... 231 

Favors the Lancaster plan. 



Ch7itai{s, xvii 

PAGE 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Wayne, 1 December, 1777 . . . 231 
Objections to the Lancaster idea — Is in favor of Wilmington. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Varnum, 1 December, 1777 . . . 233 
III condition of the army — Urges the Lancaster plan. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General AVoodforb, 1 December, 1777 . . 235 
The Lancaster plan endorsed — Crowding of the vilhiges. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Weedon 236 

All plans open to objections — Condition of the army — 'U''iImington 
will expose the army — Necessity for providing for a new campaign. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Muhlenberg, 1 December, 1777 239 
Keasons for favoring Lancaster — Reconnoitring the country. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Scott, 1 December, 1777 .... 240 
Wilmington believed to be the best place. 

Opinion of Count Pulaski 240 

Advantages of continuing the campaign — Only invalids to retire. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Du Portail 241 

Exposing the country — Advantages of Wilmington — Better combat 
than disorder and desertion. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Irvine, 1 December, 1777 . . . 243 
In doubt as to better plan — Sheltering the army. 

Circular Letter from Washington, 3 Decenilier, 1777 244 

Question of a winter's campaign, and attacking the enemy in Phila- 
delphia. 

Opinion of Major-General Sullivan, 4 December, 1777 .... 244 
Is opposed to the attempt — III condition of the army — Alarming 
spirit of resignation among officers — Disaffection of the army — • 
Issue should not be on a single throw of the die — Dwindling of the 
army — Objection to a winter campaign. 

Opinion of Major-General Greene, December, 1777 248 

Cannot recommend the plan — Zeal and caution — Condition of the 
troops — Mortality of militia — Winter campaigns in Europe — Opera- 
tions of the last winter — Covering the army — Difficulty in obtain- 
ing militia — Delay in assembling — Essentials to success — AVeather 
must be favorable — Militia cannot attack a city — Consequences of a 
disappointment — Looks for disaster from a campaign. 

Opinion of Lord Stirling, 3 December, 1777 266 

Requirements of the array — Ice bridge necessary in an attack on 
Philadelphia — Is against the attempt. 

Opinion of the Marquis de Lafayette 258 

Cannot favor the suggestion — Re;u<!ons for his decision — As to an 
ice bridge — No dependence on militia^ — A rash and laughable expedi- 
tion — Precautions to be taken in case of attack — Recruiting the 
army. 



xviii Contents, 

PAGB 

Opinion of Baron de Kalb 262 

Measures of attack — Only if river can be crossed on ice — Steps for 
a winter's campaign. 

Opinion of Major-General Armstrong, 4 December, 1777 . . . 265 
Unhappy condition of Pennsylvania — Advantages of keepin,!^ army 
in field — Is not in favor of an attack on Philadelphia. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Maxwell, 4 December, 1777 . . 267 
A winter campaign ruinous — Should prepare for one in the spring. 

Opinion of Brioadier-General Smallwood, 4 December, 1777 . . 268 V 
Evil situation of the army — Distress among the officers — Is against 
a winter campaign — Militia of no service. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Knox, 3 December, 1777 269 

Reasons against a winter campaign. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Poor, 4 December, 1777 .... 270 
Little dependence upon militia — Advocates going into winter quar- 



Opinion of Brigadier-General Paterson, 4 December, 1777 . . 271 
Favors going into quarters — His own brigade in nu condition for a 
campaign. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Varnum, 3 December, 1777 . . . 272 
General consensus against winter campaigns — Americans have im- 
bibed the vices of Europe — Feeble state of army — No magazines of 
provisions — As to militia — Strength of the British position — Exam- 
ples from history — Consequences of a defeat — Uneasiness of officers. 

Opinion of Brioadier-Genkrl Woodford, 4 December, 1777 . . 276 
An attempt on Philadelphia out of the question. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Weedon, 4 December, 1777 . . . 277 
Not a single advantage to be gained from an attack — Force inade- 
quate and discontented — Difficulties of collecting and providing for 
the militia — Army cannot work miracles. 

Opinion of Brioadikr-Gkneral Muhlenberg, 4 December, 1777 , 279 
A winter's campaign impracticable — Is in favor of going into win- 
ter quarters. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Scott, 4 December, 1777 .... 281 
Has altered his opinion and is against an attack. 

Opinion of Brigadier-General Cadwalader, 3 December, 1777 281 
Needs of the army not to be controlled by military writers — Expec- 
tations of the people — Dangers of removing to a distance — The 
experience of the last winter — Clothing and quarters — Question of 
a favorable position for cantonments — Lancaster — Wilmington — 
Believes an attack will be successful. 



Contents. xix 

PAGE 

Opinion of Joseph Reed, 4 December, 1777 286 

Experience against a winter campaign — Political unrest and finan- 
cial disturbance — Force under Howe — Will strengthen his position 
— Division in classes — Disposition and objections — Answers and 
suggestions — Hospitals. 

Opinion of Brioadier-Genkral Du Portail, 3 December, 1777 . 291 
Quality of proofs to be considered — Militia fail under the test. 

Opinion of Briqadier-General Irvine, 4 December, 1777 . . . 293 
Favors a winter's campaign — Number of militia needed — Position 
of the army. 

Opinion of Briqadier-Genbral Potter, 4 December, 1777 . . . 294 
Cannot favor a winter campaign — No quarters in Pennsylvania — 
Wilmington to be selected for wintering — A suggestion for attack- 
ing Philadelphia. 

Opinion of Colonel Lutterloh, 1 December, 1777 296 

Provisions and magazines — Alarm posts and signals. 



DEFENCES OF PHILADELPHIA IN 1777. 



The following documents form a part of a volume I have 
for some years intended to complete, a full record of the 
councils of war held by Washington with his general offi- 
cers during the Revolution. Such a record would result in 
many surprises, as the councils were more productive of 
timidity and caution than of action, and came to be re- 
garded as the easiest method of attaining negative results. 
Hamilton more than once breaks into indignant speech on the 
conclusions of the usual council, and in time the instrument 
was discarded, and the general thrown more upon his own 
initiative and the advice of a few of his most trusted officers. 
For action, the advice of many was a hinderance; for infor- 
mation, such advice was of value. It is because the opinions 
given by the respective officers on the proper defences of 
Philadelphia belong to the latter that they have an histori- 
cal as well as a personal value and interest. 

On May 31, 1777, Washington wrote to Governor Patrick 
Henry of the expected sailing of a large fleet of the enemy 
— estimated at a hundred sail — from New York. What 
Howe's immediate object was could only be conjectured; 
but it is believed that he had one of two purposes : either to 
possess the Hudson River or to attack Philadelphia by way 
of the Delaware. For either of these operations his com- 
mand of the sea gave him peculiar advantage, as he could 
keep Washington in suspense at Middlebrook until his blow 
in either direction was ready to be struck. On the very day 
of writing to Governor Henry, Du Coudray, a French officer, 

1 



2 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

came into camp and presented to "Washington a contract 
signed by Silas Deane, practically giving him a rank above 
that of Greene, Sullivan, Knox, and others, and the com- 
mand of the artillery in the Continental army. The coinci- 
dence is worth noting, as Du Coudray was employed on the 
defences of Pliiladelphia some weeks later. The situation 
early in June is given in the following record : 

" At a Council of General Officers held at Head Q" at 
Middle Brook, the 12'" day of June 1777 
" Present 
" His Excellency, the Commander in Chief 

" Majors General Brigad" 

" [Nathaniel] Greene [William] Maxwell 

" Lord Stirling [Henry] Knox 

" [Adam] Stephen [James M.] Varnum 

" [Benjamin] Lincoln [Anthony] Wayne 

" [Peter] Muhlenberg 
" [George] Weedon 
" [William] Woodford 
" [Charles] Scott 
" [Thomas] Conway. 

" His Excellency, the Commander in Chief informed the 
Council, that from various intelligence and many concurring 
circumstances, it was evident. General Howe had collected 
nearly the whole of his Force at Brunswic in Jersey — That 
it appeared to him beyond doubt, that General Howe, had 
one of two objects in view — either the defeat of the Army 
under his immediate command — or to possess himself of 
Philadelphia — he stated the importance of the Highland 
passes & of the Fortifications on the North River, in & con- 
tiguous to the Highlands and then proposed the following 
Questions. 

" Question. Will it be expedient in the present conjuncture 
of things & from the information received, to draw any & 
what part of the Troops stationed at Peekskill near the 
Highlands, to reinforce this Array ? 

" Answer. All The Troops should be drawn from Peekskill 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 3 

to reinforce this Army in Jersey, except one thousand ef- 
fectives of the Continental Regiments — This Number with 
the Convalescents & such Militia as are there & can be oc- 
casionally drawn in, is esteemed Sufficient to defend the 
posts there under the present appearances of affairs. 

" Question. "Will it not be necessary to post Troops at Mor- 
ristown to preserve it, as a post of Communication ? — If it 
will, what number of men should be stationed there? 

" Atiswer. It will be necessary to maintain that post. — The 
Detachment of Connecticut Troops under Lieu' Col° Butler 
& the Two Wyoming Independent Companies should be 
employed in that Service. 

" Question. What will be the best mode of promotion of 
Feild & other (inferior) Officers in the Army ? 

" Ansiver. All officers below the rank of a Major, should 
rise regimentally. Officers of that rank superior should be 
promoted on a larger Scale, Viz on the line of their State. 
These Rules however, tho they should be observed in gen- 
eral cases, where there lies no objection, should not be es- 
tablished as conclusive, or prevent promotion for particular 
merit.' 

" Original Minutes 

" Rob. H. Harrison Sect/." 

The movement of the fleet, mentioned by Washington to 
Governor Henry, was premature, and for more than two 
weeks Howe remained at Brunswick, surprising his opponent 
by his inactivity, yet developing his plans to attack Phila- 
delphia by water. On the night of June 13 he moved a part 
of his force to Somerset Court-House, with the object of 
bringing Washington out of his safe position to a general 
engagement. Congress was more aiiected by Howe's ma- 
noeuvre than was Washington, and ordered Arnold, then 
guarding a pass at Coryell's Ferry, to take command of all 
the militia at Bristol and on every other part of the river to 
the eastward of Philadelphia. Four days later Howe had 

' See " Washington to the President of Congress," June 20, 1777, in 
my Writings of Washington, Vol. V. 446. 



4 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

retired not only from Somerset, but from Brunswick, falling 
back to Amboy, a step caused, as Washington supposed, by 
despair at finding the militia of Xew Jersey and Pennsyl- 
vania turning out to oppose them. The mystery of his 
intention deepened, and greatly perplexed AVashiugton. 
Burgoyne had appeared on the lake, and so threatened the 
passes of the Hudson River. Yet the American commander 
thought this might be only a feint, designed to draw his 
force to Peekskill, and thus leave Howe a free road to Phil- 
adelphia. The activity of the British on Staten Island 
pointed to a speedy embarkation of a considerable force, 
but for what purpose could not be ascertained. If it was 
for the North River, a junction with Burgoyne must be 
provided against. If it was for Philadelphia, that city must 
be strengthened. In this doubt, Washington sent a re-en- 
forcement to Peekskill, and moved the main avvaj to Mor- 
ristown, whence he could the more readily move in either 
direction as the plan of the enemy was unfolded. Days of 
anxiety followed, aggravated by the evacuation of Ticon- 
deroga and Mount Independence, uuder unexpected and sus- 
picious circumstances, by St. Clair.' Arnold was ordered to 
the Northern arm}-, leaving Philadelphia and its defences. 
" I think," wrote "Washington, on July 22, " the works at 
Billing's-Port well worthy of attention and it is expedient to 
effect their completion as soon as possible." 

At last something definite was obtained in secret intelli- 
gence. The sailing of a large fleet to the Hook could be 
seen ; the fact that Southern pilots were on board pointed to 
Philadelphia as the object. The American arm}' had been 
edging towards Peekskill, but now moved southward to 
Raruapaugh. On the 24th the British ships stood out to 
sea, and the Continental army began a march to Philadel- 
phia. At half-past nine on the morning of July 31, Wash- 

' Landon Carter, of Virginia, on learning of this event, wrote that he 
never expected much of St. Clair, as he was a Scotchman. The sentence 
is of interest as pointing to the prejudice among the Virginians against 
the Scotch, in whose hands the tobacco trade of the colony centred. 
Glasgow owes much of its importance to this commodity. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 5 

ington received an express from Congress announcing the 
ai'rival of the fleet at the capes of Delaware, leaving no 
doubt as to the action to be taken. At ten in the mornins: 
Washington and his aides were in Philadelphia and the army 
close behind him. Going farther to the southward, he was 
met at Chester by the annoying intelligence of the fleet 
again leaving the coast, and renewing the suspense. It was 
in this interval that the general asked for advice on the 
fortifications of Philadelphia, and received the following 
replies : 

OPINION OF MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE. 

[Undated.] 
" Philadelphia is an object of such magnitude, the preju- 
dices of the people in the surrounding States so strong, in 
its favor, as to its importance and consequence, the manu- 
factories and supplies for the army so numerous in that city, 
that the loss of it would so affect the country and the army 
that very great injury would arise to the common cause of 
America. To prevent so great an evil, it is necessary to fix 
upon some plan to guard the avenues leading to the City 
both by land and water, and as its security depends upon 
both being effectually obstructed, it requires a nice examina- 
tion into the natural strength of each and the force and 
obstruction necessary for both to be pointed out as far as 
possible. 

" The approaches to the City by land may be made so 
many difterent ways, the City so difficult to fortify from its 
natural situation, that the only security it can have by land 
is an equal or superior force to that of the enemy. If this 
be granted as it evidently must, then the plan of fortifica- 
tion upon the river should be so constructed as to draw the 
least possible force from the land army and render the ob- 
structions on the river so eftectual, as to make the approaches 
that way as difficult or more so than by land. The neces- 
sity of dividing your Excellency's attention to both objects 
is so obvious, and the folly of guarding one of the passages 
while the other is left open so evident that there need be no 



6 Defaices of Philadelphia in 1777. 

arguments to prove howe'er secure the river passage may be 
rendered, they all must fall of course unless our force proves 
superior to the enemy in the field. Having premised these 
few things, I shall briefly give my opinion respecting the 
fortification upon tlje river with some remarks upon strong 
fortified posts, the influence they have upon the circumjacent 
country, and the pannick that generally succeeds their loss. 

" The Delaware being a long and narrow river, the chan- 
nel crooked and vei-y confin'd, it must be somewhat difiicult 
and not a little dangerous for a large fleet to get up and 
moor securely in the channel ; the fear of the fire ships and 
fire rafts in such a narrow channel, and quick current, M'ill 
be consider'd as so many discouraging circumstances to 
attempt opening a passage to the City. 

" There are very dilFerent opinions respecting Fort Mifilin ; 
the situation of this fort, as it cannot be injured by regular 
approaches renders it an object of greater importance and 
consideration, than a fortification of twice its strength that 
could be annoy'd by regular approaches; its distance from 
the Red Bank upon the Jersey shore is such as secures it 
from any great injury from that quarter; the land upon 
Pennsylvania side can be so easily laid under water that it 
secures the fortress from any approaches from that side ; the 
front is secur'd by throe rows of Cheveau de Frize, and it is 
impossible to approach it in the rear unless the enemy are 
masters of the river above and the City also. It appears the 
fortification is very secure. The natural make of this Island 
is not so good as I could wish, neither is the Plan of the 
Fortification so good as it may be, the plan may be im- 
prov'd by an additional battery upon the left of ten or twelve 
guns, this may be so constructed as to prevent the front 
Battery being enfiladed and will serve to annoy the enemy 
if they should attempt to post a ship or floating battery on 
the left of the Cheveau de Frize to annoy the fort on that 
quarter. I should think there ought to be a good enclos'd 
work to contain from three to five hundred men, and about 
one hundred and eighty cannoniers. This is necessary to 
prevent the fort from being surpriz'd by an attempt with 



\ 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 7 

the boats. This fort aided by the Ships, floating batteries, 
row gallies and fire rafts, I conceive will be full sufficient to 
secure the passage of the river. Those who profess the 
greatest knowledge on the strength of the Cheveau de Frize, 
assert with confidence and I believe with truth, that they 
cannot be run down by any force; neither can they be 
rais'd or remov'd from their places, unless two vessels are 
fastned to each Cheveau de Frize, one on each side, at 
young flood, and are rais'd by the purchase of the swelling 
of the water; the fire from the fort, the Ships, Batteries & 
gallies, must inevitably sink the vessells before they could 
raise the Cheveau de Frize. But suppose them to be able 
to resist all this fire; there would be no difficulty in burning 
the vessels with fire rafts in such a fixt position. 

" The xebeques, floating batteries and frigates should be 
posted behind the upper Cheveau de Frize, because the 
passage through the Cheveau de Frize must be stop'd to 
prevent the Enemy from passing. The row gallies as their 
draft of water is small — may be at liberty to move up and 
down the river to annoy the enemy as occatiou may offer. 

" The fire ships should be posted in the inner channel 
from Derby Creek, to Mifflin Fort, they will be secure in 
this position protected by the row gallies from the Enerays 
boats from any annoyance of consequence. No ship will dare 
to approach them in that narrow channel neither will they 
dare to lay a ship to obstruct the passage out of Derby 
Creek, for fear of being burnt. These ships must be con- 
sidered as extra defence ; their execution being very uncer- 
tain, no dependence should be had upon them for the main 
defence. The greatest injury I think these ships will be 
able to do the Enemy is whilst their Ships are below or 
coming up the river. The only chance of setting the 
enemys fleet on fire, will be to run the fire ships among 
them in the night with a good gale and quick tide under 
foot ; favor'd with these circumstances, there is a probability 
of doing the enemy great injur}', provided the person that 
has the command of the ships behaves with spirit and exe- 
cutes his desiifn with resolution. 



8 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

" The Commodore and many other Gentlemen, who have 
made it their business to examine the River, say the channel 
is so narrow that not more than two ships can lye abreast 
in it. If this be a fact, as I have no reason to doubt, from 
the concurrent testimony of so many Gentlemen, it will be 
impossible for the enemy to bring a greater force up the 
river than there is to oppose them. How they will be able 
under these circumstances to remove the obstruction in the 
river, when they are constantly annoy'd and threaten'd with 
the fire rafts, is difBcult for me to conceive. However it is 
proposed in aid to these, to add some fortifications upon the 
land, one at Billingsport, one at Red Bank, and one at 
Derby's Creek, the situation of all which your Excellency 
had an opportunity to see. I will just examine how far they 
will add to the security of the River, and what force it would 
take to give this aid, and then see wether the security on 
this side, will not diminish the land force to such a degree 
as to render the principal object less secure than without 
them, not to say any thing about the expence and trouble 
attending their construction. 

" The plan of the fortification at Billingsport requires four 
to five hundred men ; Red Bank from two to three, Derby 
Creek two hundred and fifty. Besides these there must not 
be less than two hundred cannoiiiers for the three fortifica- 
tions ; the whole force will amount to upwards of 1200 men, 
this is a great dimunition of the land force. The works at 
Billingsport are much superior upon the present plan than 
they were upon the former, but I could wish them to be 
contracted still if it was possible. Nay, I could wish them 
totally demolished if it was not for the prejudices of the 
people, and the reproach it would bring upon administra- 
tion and the military councils of America. There have 
been prodigious sums of monej' expended at that place, and 
people have been taught to expect great security from its 
strength. To abandon it at this time might alarm their 
fears, and give the evil dispos'd a handle to censure the 
leaders of the people for subjecting the Continent to such 
fruitless and unnecessary expense. Altho these reasons 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 9 

urge strongly for holding the work, yet those that offer 
themselves for abandoning it, operate much more forcibly 
with me. The situation of Billingsport fortress renders the 
approaches easy, the enemy can make good their landing a 
little below the work, the ground is very favorable but a 
small distance from the fort to open Batteries, the work is not 
difficult to invest, and once invested it will be difficult if 
not impossible to keep open such a communication as to 
take of[f] the Garrison, and it cannot be expected that a 
garrison without casements, and onh* constructed to guard 
against a storm, can stand a regular siege many days, I 
should suppose not more than three or four at most, when 
the Cannon and stores, if not the Garrison, will all fall into 
the enemy's hands. The effect of such an event upon the 
army and the country, can easily be conceiv'd from the 
pannick such instances has produc'd. The warmest advo- 
cate for this work will readily grant that it cannot resist 
regular approaches, but must inevitably fall if the enemy 
seriously invest it. If they do not invest it, the force of the 
Garrison is lost by being Idle ; if they do invest it, the Gar- 
rison must fall. This being granted, then the only advantage 
that can result from this work is the delay it will cause to the 
enemj', which not exceeding four or five days cannot warrant 
the expence, and trouble, in constructing such an extensive 
work; neither will it be an equivalent for the deduction of 
force, that it necessarily produces from the army. 

" The fort at Red Bank may be considered much upon 
the same footing with that of Billingsport; only less useful 
and more unnecessary. There runs a creek into the coun- 
try between Red Bank and Billingsport, eight or ten miles, 
which is now partly banked out. This being open, the 
enemy can have no communication with Red Bank without 
a march of eighteen or twenty miles. If they have a mind 
to seriously invest this fort, it must fall in the same manner 
as Billingsport. If there is no work there, they cannot take 
possession of the ground, but with a very considerable part 
of their army without laying it liable to be cut off. 

" In lieu of these inclos'd works, and strong fortifications, 



10 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

I would propose having a number of half moon Batteries 
thrown up, at such places where the ships can come to annoy 
the shipping &c, appointed for the defence of the Cheveau 
de Frize ; a few eighteen pounders on travelling carriages, 
to move from place to place, will more effectually annoy the 
enemy than fixt Batteries. A very inconsiderable force will 
execute this business. If there are no inclos'd works on the 
Jersey shore, the Eneni}' can make no lodgements without 
a considerable force, which will oblige them to divide their 
army. If the shores are defended in the manner I propose 
the parties may be diminish'd or increas'd as circumstances 
may render necessary. 

" If the enemy operates seriously on the Jersey shore, the 
forts and fortifications must inevitably fall. If they do not, 
the men appointed to garrison those works will be Idle and 
useless. That take it in either point of view, those fortifi- 
cations are unnecessary, and will be a burden upon the state 
without affording any additional security to the city. 

" The fortification of Derby Creek cannot be more useful 
than the other two. Its situation is upon an Island, and 
when the land is laid under water to secure fortMifilin from 
approaches, this Garrison will have no opportunity to re- 
treat; especially if the enemy takes possession of the Bridge 
leading to the Chester road. A few troops at this place will 
prevent any aid coming to the assistance of the Garrison. 
This garrison, if invested, must fall in the same manner as 
the others. If there are only a few Half moon Batteries, 
form'd with a couple of eighteen pounders on travelling 
carriages, they will afford all the protection and security to 
the fire ships that a regular fortification will : they will pre- 
vent a ship's laying at the mouth of the creek, or in the 
back channel. This is all that can be expected from a regu- 
lar work properly garrison'd. It is most probable the enemy 
will attempt to burn the tire ships with their boats ; the Gal- 
lies must protect them, and I have no doubt will. They 
will be able to protect themselves from any other mode of 
attack. 

" All fortifications in America, except for the security of 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 1 1 

particular objects, considering the nature of the country are 
rather prejudicial than useful : the country is taught to expect 
security, and always loose their confidence upon any unfortu- 
nate event. The enemy getting possession of our works, they 
serve them for strongholds to keep in awe all the circumjacent 
country — B}' the assistance of our garrisons, the enemy is 
enabled to keep a much greater extent of country in sub- 
jection. If they had no Garrisons to protect their troops, 
they would be oblig'd to keep their foi-ces more together. 
If they were to attempt to erect those works themselves it 
must necessarily fatigue their troops and delay their opera- 
tions. The country cannot be conquer'd and held in sub- 
jection but by garrisons ; it should be our policy, therefore, 
to have as few as may be. The enemy gains little or no ad- 
vantage by marching through the country ; the inhabitants 
from their cruelties and abuses, generally grow more obsti- 
nate and confirra'd in opposition. 

" If we build strong fortifications, the continent must be 
subject to great expence to support the garrison, besides 
that of erecting and furnishing the fortress with cannon, 
military- stores, &c. These garrisons only serve to secure a 
small part of the country, which security is purchas'd by a 
prodigious drain of men and materials from the army. I 
could wish that only a few principal passes and capital citys, 
should have any fortifications about them. The security of 
the country must depend upon our superiority in the field ; 
if our force is divided and appointed to the defence of par- 
ticular places, the enemy will be masters of the field, and 
the country loose their confidence in the army : and notwith- 
standing the Garrisons at particular places may delay the 
enemys operations a little, these advantages are far over- 
ballanc'd by the pannick their loss generally strikes upon 
the country, and the advantage they give to the enemy to 
hold the circumjacent country in subjection. 

" There is one strong reason why the fortifications should 
not be multiplied upon the Delaware ; there is not a suffi- 
ciency of cannon to put in the works, without taking from 
the fortifications, or the naval department ; and they cannot 



12 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

be spair'd from these without weakening what I esteem the 
principal security. 

" Upon the whole I would trust the security of the River 
to the Cheveau de Frizes, protected and defended by fort 
MiflBin, the shiping, and fire rafts. The channel is so nar- 
row, and the difliculty of removing the Cheveau de Frize so 
great, that there is very little danger of the enemys opening 
themselves a passage. 

" In drawing up my opinion, its bulk is swell'd much be- 
yond the size I intended, and the fear of enlarging the plan 
has induc'd me to omit many observations that were neces- 
sary as explitives to several propositions. 

" Nath. Greene. 

" His Excellency General "Washington." 

a definitive project upon the defence of philadelphia 



" In the account which I have given the Honorable Con- 
gress of the state in which fort MifHin, Redbank, and 
billing's port, were, the first of August, I think I have 
Demonstrated, that in the actual situation of things, Litle 
Dependance should be had on this fort, to Defend both the 
places, where the River is crossed by the chevaux de frize ; 
and that the gallies, fire-ships, and floating batteries, were 
the only means in which any Confidence could be placed. 

" At present, here is question to Determine the best 
scene of position, and the best use of the Defensive expe- 
diens, pursuent to the Litle Defense that the forts furnish 
them. 

" The two floating Batteries are at present, behind the 
Hand which is opposite to Billing's port. I aprove of their 
position in this place, because these Hand being very low 
and narrow, these batteries will be able to produce above 
it, a formidable fire against the fregatcs, which may present 
themselves, to attack the Line of the chevaux de frize, op- 
posite to Billing's port, these batteries consisting, the one 
of nine, and the other, of ten pieces of 18, which appeared 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 13 

to me very good, and in a very good Condition in every Re- 
spect, can Certainly Defend this passage Long enough, if, as 
the commodore asserts, three fregates, at most, can present 
themselves, at the same time. Being well managed they 
may Defend themselves, even almost infaillibly untill the 
enemy repells them from this position ; this the enemy can- 
not Do, neither by sending fregates in the chanel where they 
are, this chanel being not deep enough ; nor Raising batter- 
ies upon the bank on the Right Side, which may be easily 
covered with water, as the Commodore asserts; But by 
making themselves masters of the eminence at billing's 
port, from whence they may burn or Remove them : it is 
the necessity of hindering, or at least, of Retarding the po- 
sition of the enemy upon this eminence, to accomplish the 
forementioned Designe, which Renders absolutely necessary 
to Continue constructing this fort. 

" If, I had been informed sooner of the strengt of the 
Buport, which it is to Receive from the two floating batter- 
ies, to Defend the ehevaux de frize, and of the small num- 
ber of fregates, which can appear together in the chanel 
where the ehevaux de frize are ; I should have Contracted 
the extend of this fort, at least on the River side; But the 
map which I Require for that purpose in my first visit, could 
not then be found ; and I ask'd for it several times since, to 
no purpose. I shal profit, at least, by these new informa- 
tions, of which the Commodore alone can warant the Cer- 
tainty, to Diminish the number of Embrasures, and to 
Leave, at the forts of Mifiin and Redbank, a part of the 
Cannon, which beling's port alone should have necessarily 
exhausted. 

" The gallies and fire ships are at present at the mouth of 
Derby-creek, below, and in the same chanel, with the float- 
ing batteries; a chanel in which the Commodore affirms, as 
I have already said, that the fregates can not ascend. I 
aprove also of their position. As those gallies carry, some 
of them, cannon of 24; others, cannon of 18; and as, by 
their Construction, they present very Litle appearance' to the 
fregates, who offer them a very Large one ; and the greatest 



14 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

size of the cauiiou of the fregates being generaly only of 
12, the gallies will be necessarily superior to them ; since 
according to the Commodore, they can not be attack, but 
by two or three frigates at most, even in Coming out of this 
chanel to Conduct the fire ships. 

" But to protect their Retreat, and especially to hinder the 
enemy from taking possession of the ground which Com- 
mands this position, and which, (as it is impossible to have 
it covered with water, as well as the upper and Lower parts) 
suplys them with the proper place to fix a battery, which 
may Repell the gallies and fire ships : it would be necessary 
to erect a battery there of 8 or 10 Large pieces, at least, de- 
fended by the gorge, so as to protect it, against the attack 
by Land, which the enemy if they have any foresight, can- 
not avoid making to free themselves from the inquietude, in 
which they must be Lest the gallies and fire ships may take 
unawares the fregates, which may be embarrast in the chan- 
nel of navigation, and which, being stoped by the chevaux 
de frize, would scape with difliculty the eftect of the fire 
ships. 

" Instead of a well supplied and protected batter^', as I have 
mentioned, his Excellency has seen that this which exist at 
present in this place, has only one serviceable Cannon ; that 
the parapet of this battery, and particularly the defence of 
its gorge, are in the worst situation ; so that, if it be attacked 
by Landing boats, it must unavoidably be overcome : unless 
there be a Considerable body to Defend it. 

" The time is perhaps too urgent, and the means too weak 
to Repare, at present, the Capital fault that had been Com- 
mited in neglecting a place so favourable, to the attack of 
the fire ships, upon the enemy, which Renders it almost as 
important as billing's port, thus, as soon as the enemy shall 
take possession of the place occupied hy these bad battery, 
which must be keep only as a shew, the gallies and fire ships 
will be obliged to Retreat, at least, to the place of the same 
channel where the floating batteries are, and where, as the 
Commodore says the fregates cannot follow them, the}- will 
not be useless there ; they will help the batteries in support- 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 15 

ing the chevaux de frize, at billing's port ; which will be 
accomplish then, with an assured superiority, until! the 
enemy establishes batteries, upon this eminence. 

" For the want of a well made draught, which we allways 
have need off, and which I have not been able to suply, on 
account of the late arrival of the engeneers, who attend me; 
as well as the perpetual undetermination in which, both they 
and I, have Lived and continue to Live in every Kespect ; 
such are the sentimens, that the instructions received from 
commodore, permit me to propose relatively to the defence 
of the first Line of the chevaux de frize, with the gallies, fire 
ships, and floating batteries. 

" I conclude then, that if the precautions be taken k) sink 
only 8 or 9 new chevaux de frize, between and behind the in- 
tervallsof the first Line; which as the Commodore asserts, are 
preposterously thirty feet from one another, and Leaves cer- 
tainly an opening by which the small fregates may profit ; 
this first Line will be easily defended, at least some days ; 
even, in the bad state, in which the Land fortifications are ; 
either through the neglect of administration; or the con- 
tracted understanding of the persons, who have been charged 
to fortify the batteries of belling's port, and Derby's Creek, 
which after the new Details I have just made are indispensa- 
bly necessary in both places. 

" From the fast Line I pass now to the second, Reliyng 
allways, instead of a sure draught, upon the informations 
formerly and Lately furnished by the commodore. 

" This second Line is formed according to him, by the 
Rows of chevaux de frize ; the first of which is 920 yards Be- 
fore the point of fort mifflin, and supported, in one side, by 
hog iland, and in the other, by the bank which begins in that 
place, and take his Direction towards Red bank, where he 
joignes the Land, without allowing the passage to the 
fregates ; tho' it allowes them to advance, enough to cross 
the batteries of mifflin fort. 

" If this be the only passage ; if only three fregates can 
attack it in front, by Directing their Coui'se towards Red 
bank, to cross the batteries, as I have forementioned ; the 



16 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

gallies and floating batteries, will be certainly sufficient to 
protect them. 

" The most advantageous position, which they can be 
placed for that purpose, will be to continue keeping them 
in the channel where the enemy cannot come at them on 
account of the shallow water, and make them flank the 
chevaux de frize. 

" Thirteen gallies, which present the prow only, will have 
with their Large Cannon of 24 or 18, as I have foremen- 
tioned,' sure superiority over three, and even six fregates if 
this Cannon be well managed. 

" But hog's iland behind which the gallies should be placed 
to enj^y these Desirable position, is unhappily wider, and 
more elevated than that which is opposite to billing's port ; 
behind which the batteries are at present, and where I 
said they should be left, and the gallies should be carried, 
when the enemy, by making themselves master of Derby 
creek, might have obliged the gallies to abandon these 
position. 

" If this elevation and breadth of hog's iland are too ex- 
tensive to hinder the effect of the fire, they must be carried 
between fort mifflin and the buoj's, so as not to hinder the 
playing of the battery of this fort, which, however ill-situ- 
ated and constructed, as his excellency has seen, may not- 
withstanding be of some utility, even at the great Distance 
where it is ; specialy if there be time enough, to make the 
changes and suitables Reparations, in order to place there 
seven or eight Large pieces in capacity of playing and being 
defended. 

" The fort where this battery lies is very bad, being in- 
closed, only on two fronts, by one palisade with bad loop 
holes, and very ill flancked ; but as the enemy can Laud there, 
only with chaloupes, it may Resist Long time, even in this 
weak situation, with six or seven hundred men to gard it; 
specialy if the army was not far off", but this must not be 
Depended upon ; as the enemy may make a march towards 
the north, and be more active in their movemens than they 
have been hitherto. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 17 

" The fort of billing's port, when it is finished, can alone 
assure by a defense of fifteen days the time necessary for 
the army to arrive to protect this second Line. 

" The possession which the enemy might take of Red 
bank, and which they will probably do, will not be of great 
adv^antage to them ; Considering his great Distance to Repell 
the gallies and floating batteries, from this two forementioned 
positions ; specialy if the first may be occupied. Besides 
as the fort constructed upon this eminence, can be put in a 
State of Defence in that short time, and with a few men, by 
contracting it, as I have proposed to his Excellency, it will 
be an additional obstacle to stop the enemy. 

" It Results from the premisses, 

" 1" That I persist in thinking that the most suitable place 
to be Defended is billings port ; on account of the narrow- 
ness of the River there; of the facility with which the 
floating batteries can support the chevaux de frize, by re- 
maining behind the opposite iland ; of the necessity in 
which the enemy will be to take possession of the eminence 
of Derby's creek, to defend themselves against the fire ships, 
which they will be allwais afraid to see arrive behind the 
fregates, stoped before the chevaux de frize in the channel 
of navigation ; and in short, of the necessity in which they 
will be of making themselves masters of the eminence at 
belling's port, to drive away the floating batteries from this 
position, where the gallies may come to Reinforce them; 
when by their taking possession of Derby's creek they shall 
have obliged them to abandon this post. 

" 2°°* that it is chiefly to put this post speedily in a state 
of defence, that we must employ the means, which we have, 
which are too few to be divided between fort mifflin and Red 
bank, without being exposed to the inconveniency of making 
a bad defence in both post ; instead of making a good one, 
in a single place, as I have Declared in the first memorial I 
have given on this object. 

" 3° That matters being not in this situation, thro' the fault 
of the administration alone, it is necessary to procure some 
Remedy for the present weakness of the first Line, by putting 

2 



18 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

ourselves in state of protecting the second, and of giving 
thereby time to the array to arrive. 

" I olier to continue in this Respect ray care and that of the 
coramissioned and non-coraraissioned officers, who attend 
me; but if his excellency intends that these care should not 
be useless, and that an invincible disgust should not suc- 
ceed the raost ardent zeal, it is absolutely necessary to 
cause change in the conduct, which has been observed 
hitherto, and to accellerate the slowness of the civil and 
military administration, to wich the Congress adressed us, 
to procure the means of execution. 

" It is necessary, to accoraplish the forementioned objects, 
that the honourable Congress himself order without delay. 

" 1" thousand effective workmen every day, for billing's 
port, who are to work on holy days, and sundaj's, under the 
proper direction of the engeneers whom I have there. 

" 2°'"' the necessarj' tools, as well as for these workraen, as 
for my artillery workmen, whom I shall employ to construct 
the batteries, and to repare the carriages intended either for 
this, or raifflin fort, in the actual circurastances ; those that I 
keep at billing's port and here, for this purpose, having not 
yet been able, in spite of my Repeated solicitations, to obtain, 
this month past, neither all the tools they want, nor even 
clothes. 

" 3° 200 others workmen ever}' day at fort miflin and hun- 
dred at Red bank, under the same Conditions, with the former. 

" Provided this Request be granted, I engage to put these 
three places in a state of defence in the course of this 
month: viz. to be Defended, Billing's port, with 400 men 
and 80 canoniers ; — fort miffling with 600 and 500 canoniers ; 
Red bank with 200 raen and 20 canoniers. 

" During the sarae tirae I shall employ the Rest of ray en- 
geneers to execute, suitably to the examination of the five 
places of incampement to be taken between markus' hook 
and Philadelphia, the project declared in the memorial 
adressed to the honourable congress, and communicate the 
day before yesterday, to his excellency, who honoured it with 
his approbation. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777 . 19 

" I ask for these engeneers no other assistance, besides the 
horses, and a man to serve them and carry their instruments. 

"As to the batteries so necessaries for the support of the 
gallies and fire ships which are necessary to hold at Derby 
creek, for reasons which have been given above, it is to be 
wished that means could be furnished at the same time with 
that of billing's port ; particularly from the informations 
given by the Commodore, that there may be furnished from 
the province frigate fifteen nine pounders, and six of twelf 
from Captain Reed's ' schooner ; which vessels are not in a 
state of defense, for want of men. 

" Upon this subject I make the most pressing sollicitations, 
and more so, if conjectures permitted his excellency to be- 
lieve that the enemy will leave us time to finish billing's 
port, I should beg to employ for the Construction of this 
battery the labourers, that I have demanded to put fort 
mifflin and Red bank in a state to supply the present weak- 
ness of the first line of chevaux de frize, by supporting the 
second. 

" Du COUDRAY. 

" Philadelphia the 6 august, 1777." 

MAJOR-GENERAL ANTHONY WAYNE. 

" Gen' Wayne's Opinion of the Defences necessary for the 
River and Land in case the Enemy should attempt the Re- 
duction of Phil'. 

" The Works as Contracted by Gen'. De Coudre to be com- 
pleated and supplied with six or eight pieces of artillery, and 
men suflicient to fight them with about 500 Troops. One 
Redoubt on the High Ground at Darby Creek, suflicient to 
contain 200 men. The fleet, fire ships & Rafts to lay abreast 
and across the western channel, to act in Conjunction with 
the Batteries so long as it is practicable or prudent to main- 
tain them, boats to be kept in Readiness to carry off the 
Troops in case of a misfortune. 

' Captaiu Thomas Read, who was the first to enjoy the title of com- 
modore in the provincial navy of Pennsylvania. He resigned to enter 
the Continental service. 



20 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

" If its fouud uecessaiy to avacuate these posts, the Fleet 
and fire [ships] to Retire Immediately to Fort Island — or 
act in the Rear of the Enemy Occationally. 

" It will be absolutely necessary to throw a Good Garrison 
into the old Fort under the Command of proper officers 
with a proportionable number of men from the Corps of 
Artillery to the Guns therein mounted. Red Bank being a 
post of Consequence, as it over looks and enfilades the old 
Fort and vessels, it will he proper to Enclose the two Bas- 
tions, and place therein 4 or 500 men, which with the assist- 
ance of the militia of New Jersey in the vicinity thereof 
(after cutting away the Banks, Dams and Bridges over the 
Creeks) will greatly retard, if not totally prevent the Enemy 
from penetrating that way. 

" Whilst this is doing, the Banks, dams. Bridges and 
Roads on the west side of the Delaware ought to be broke 
up from Marcus Hook to Phil', for which purpose a judicious 
and Determined officer with a sufficient number of men and 
tools ought to be on the spot ready to execute this business 
at a signal being given. 

" The army should be stationed near Marcus Hook in 
order to oppose the Enemy should they attempt to move 
from under Cover of their shiping, — or in case they should 
proceed further up to the land, to be ready to move with 
them, taking advantage of such Strong Grounds and Marshes 
as present themselves in the waj'. 

" As much will depend on the Mode and Manner of the 
Enemies Movements, the subject admits of nothing further 
than General heads, and as such they are presented by 

" Ant'^ Wayne. 
" Phila. 7th August, 1777." 

from joseph reed. 
"Dear Sir 

" I shall make no apology for troubling you with the fol- 
lowing Hints, because I well know that the Goodness, and 
I may truly add the greatness of your mind would induce 
you to listen with Patience and even cheerfulness to the 
suggestions of the meanest soldier if properly presented. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 21 

" Whether Philadelphia is the present object of attack is 
yet a Question, and every one reasons upon it as his Fears, 
Hopes and Interest dictate. That the acquisition would give 
eclat to their arms as subduing another of the capital cities, 
the seat of the Congress, and in no small Degree the prin- 
cipal Magazine of all supplies — that it has been held forth 
in Europe as the next Object of their Pursuit, are as certain 
Truths as that one half of the summer has been lost in a 
fruitless Attempt by Land. Add to this that no military 
History can shew an Instance of a Feint or Diversion made 
with the Partys whole Force and especially subject to the 
Chances of Wind and Weather, and the Certainty of sick- 
ness and mortality arising from crowding Troops on board 
vessels in a hot season. When these Things are considered 
one would be led to decide without Hesitation that this is 
their Object. On the other Hand the obvious Advantages 
arising from a Junction with their Northern Army, the ap- 
parent if not real separation of the Northern and Southern 
States by the Possession of Hudson's River, and the great 
Accession of strength from the disaffected Counties of New 
York, seem to be equivalent to their Prospects of Philadel- 
phia. However, as your army is now here and the exces- 
sive Heat of the Weather requires their having as much 
Rest as possible. Prudence and Judgment seem to require 
that the same Disposition should be made at present and 
the system of Defence formed as if their Designs upon the 
City were out of all Doubt. — The successful Defence of 
Philadel' will comprehend not only the Preservation of the 
City, but a Disappointment of the Campaign, and in this 
view our Exertions cannot be too great or our Preparations 
too early. And as much may depend upon the arrangement, 
I have ventured to submit to your Excell^ a few sentiments 
.which I have formed upon a view of our several Defences, 
Conversation with others both of the Land and River De- 
partments. 

" However the different Defences of the River as depend- 
ing both on the Forts, Gallies and floating Batteries may be 
blended as forming one grand Plan with the Defence made 



& 



22 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, 

by the Army, it may be necessary to distinguish them in 
Council least the Variety of Objects should confuse and dis- 
tract. Tho nothing seems to be more certain than that Fail- 
ure in the Land Defence will be followed by that of the River 
and so vice versa. — I will begin with that of the Army. 

"From the conduct of the Enemy last Campaign and the 
certain Consequences that would follow if it should succeed, 
I think it very probable that if the River Defence should be 
as formidable as I trust it will, Mr. Howe will depend more 
upon his operations by Land than Water and if his Land- 
ing is safely effected will endeavor by a circuitous March to 
get into our Rear. It seems necessary therefore to take 
such a Position as to prevent this, and yet at the same Time 
so far advanced as to make his march as tedious as possible, 
and thereb}' ensure as many Opportunities to check his Ad- 
vances as the Distance of Ground and Frequency of advan- 
tageous Passes will admit — Some are of Opinion that at all 
Events opposition should be made at their Landing and 
there is no Doubt but the Landing of Troops in the Face of 
an Enemy is one of the most dangerous Manoeuvres in War 
— but in our Case the Smoothness of the Water, the Flat- 
ness of the Ground and the heavy Fire which the Enemy 
can bring to cover their operations seem almost to exclude 
any Prospect of success. To throw up Lines for this Pur- 
pose seems also out of the Question from the Extent of 
Ground on which they may land to advantage. I have 
never heard two Opinions with Respect to the Place of 
Landing every one without the least Hesitation has fixed it 
at Marcus Hook, or its Vicinity, tho they will have fast (?) 
Land between that and Wilmington in spots. I can hardly 
suppose tliey will go lower, as they will have Christine 
River (near as wide as the Delaware at Trenton) to encoun- 
ter, and the high Grounds of Wilmington possessed by our 
Troops would give us a very advantageous Position. If the 
advancing our Troops below Marcus Hook or to it, would 
throw the Landing below Wilmington, it would be a verj' 
happy Circumstance, but the Risque of their passing them 
and landing seems too great, and the Consequences of it 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 23 

would be fatal if the Enemy should by that means get be- 
tween Philadelphia and our array: I have sometimes thought 
of a middle course viz. To take a strong Position such as 
that between Ridly and Crum Creeks to make a shew of 
Troops as far down as that they could make an Appearance 
to the Enemy, to deter their Landing but not farther than 
to be able to retire without Confusion to the East side of 
Chester Creek and so up to the Main Post if it should be 
necessary. 

" Some have thought of the Enemy's landing on the Jersey 
shore and in the survey now making for your Excellency 
agreeable to what I mentioned at Head Quarters, that shore 
will be included, but no Person acquainted with that 
Ground will countenance an Idea of their Landing there 
with a view of marching up. The number of Creeks, 
Marshes and Causeways must deter them, besides that if all 
these Obstacles arc surmounted the Delaware is still be- 
tween them and their Object — The Landing between Ches- 
ter and Philadelphia, or at Chester, seems to be very im- 
probable. As to the lirst it is all Marsh or bank'd Meadow 
except in one or two Places from which thej' must come 
thro such Ground. It is extremely unhealthy and may be 
laid under "Water for several Miles. At Chester there are 
but 3 or 4 wharves and they are accessible for landing 
Troops only at High Water and near it, so that a Landing 
there must be tedious and difficult. All these Circumstances 
seem to decide clearly that no Landing will be made nearer 
the City than Marcus Hook. — If the Militia should be called 
out, and have no Tents, which seems but too likely, they 
will probably be placed in Chester. In this case it will, I 
imagine, be necessary that some Troops should be advanced 
beyond them as they will hardly have Confidence enough to 
oppose the first advances of the Enemy — and a precipitate 
hasty Retreat or Flight would have a very bad EtFect on the 
other Part of the Army. 

" The Position between Crum and liidly Creek will be 
very advantageous on one account — there will be but one 
Flank to guard, the River and Marsh effectually securing 



24 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

the other — and tho it will not be so couvenieut to Fort 
Island as the High Grounds near Darby, yet if the Post is 
maintained at the mouth of Darby Creek, the Communica- 
tion with the whole of the River Defence will I believe be 
found full as easy from the one as the other. I would also 
beg Leave to suggest another Reason for pi-eparing the Post 
between the two Creeks to Darby — that if any Accident 
should happen at the latter to make it necessary to retire 
over Schuylkill, the Distance is so small that the Troops 
would probably croud upon one another in Confusion at 
the Passage of the River — whereas if they should be obliged 
to retire from the other, the high Ground at Darby would 
be very advantageous to check the advances of the Enemy, 
while the Van of our Army were crossing, and if necessary 
in this Case a Part must be sacrificed for the Safety of the 
whole — rather than the Enemy should avail himself of our 
Bridges. Here I would remark to your Excell^ that I think 
if another Bridge of Boats could be thrown over Schuylkill 
at the lower Ferry, it would greatly Facilitate the Commu- 
nication of the Army with the City — and in Ca.se of Retreat 
I fear our Bridge would be found very insufficient for the 
Troops, Artillery and Baggage. 

" I have heard some Persons mention that in Case our 
Army should be obliged to retire either on Account of a 
superiority of numbers or any Disaster, they might do it on 
the west side of Schuylkill and so cross the River above 
the Falls — but the Country is exceedingly hilly, the Banks 
of the River on both sides very steep, and if there should 
be any heavy Rains, the Fords would not be passable — so 
that I am perswaded if our Army should be obliged to give 
Ground, there is no Rout so easy and advantageous as that 
across the Schuylkill near the City, provided the Means of 
crossing the River are seasonably attended to. 

" With respect to the river defense it may be properly 
divided into three parts. 

" First. The Fire Vessels ; secondly, the Gallies and float- 
ing Batteries ; thirdly, the Posts & Forts at Darby Creek 
Mouth, at Billings Port, at Fort Island & Red Bank. 



Defencea of Philadelphia in 1777. 25 

" As to the First. The effect is very great when success- 
ful, but it is very uncertain; in almost every siege of mari- 
time Places they have been attempted and generally failed. 
Such desperate Courage is required, so many Circumstances 
of Wind & Tide must concur as to make every thinking 
Person cautious how he depends too much upon them. 
But as great preparation is made in this Way, & the Per- 
sons concerned are very sanguine, perhaps it will be best to 
run a Risque of some of the Vessels to cover them while 
the attempt is made. But to ensure as far as possible the 
success, I humbly apprehend it would be best for those who 
are to execute it to have the sole management and Direc- 
tion both as to Time & Place. It is so detached a Business 
from the other, that I think it may safely be left to them- 
selves ; it is much to be feared that if they receive Orders 
from the Land Officers they will not act with the same Con- 
fidence; as in Case of Failure they will have Shelter from 
the Claims & Censure of the publick. There are some Ves- 
sels which move well, that I understand can be spared for 
the Purpose of assisting in this Enterprize & that without 
weakuing the Capital Defence too much. The Effect will 
be so great, if the Fire takes Place, as would seem very 
well to warrant exposing them to some Danger in order to 
give the Operation a fair Tryal. 

" As to the Gallics & floating Batteries, they are so un- 
wieldy & move so slow that Prudence will not warrant their 
being placed but in that spot where the great Defence is to 
be made, viz, at the Chevaux de frize. There are, I believe, 
some Difficulties with Respect to Rank & Command. It is 
nmch to be wished they were removed before the Enemy 
approaches. 

" The utility of all the shipping of every species will de- 
pend so much upon their being protected from the Shore 
that I am persuaded this Circumstance will claim much of 
your Excell^' Attention. 

"First. As to the Fort at the Mouth of Darby Creek. 
This Work it seems was constructed for the purpose of shel- 
tring such Vessels as should have occasion to retire thro' 



26 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

the shallow channel which runs on the west side of the River 
between the main Land & an Island. It was done on the 
Importuuitv of the Captains of the A^essels, & they seem to 
place great Confidence in it. In this view, rather than from 
any Advantage they can perceive, I find many Gentlemen 
acquiesce in retaining it ; but all agree that it ought to be 
made more respectable than it is at present. I do not pre- 
tend to any knowledge in the Science of Engineering, so 
that I do not presume to trouble your Excellency with any 
Opinion as to the mode of construction, or what Alterations 
should be made so as to give it value. 

" Secondly. As to Billings Port. A Fatality has attended 
it from the Beginning, so that perhaps it would have been 
better to have been left in a State of Nature than to have it 
in the Condition it is, or probably will be, if the Enemy 
should advance. However, it is a Post. Obstructions in 
the River have been sunk — To abandon it totally would be 
losing the Benefit of what has been done, would discourage 
the Captains & Seamen who are to defend the River & have 
been taught to depend upon some Protection from it. The 
Enemy would probably take a Possession to swell the List 
of Conquests & might perhaps annoy, tho' I think not mate- 
rially the Gallies & Vessels defending the upper Cheveaux 
de frize. IJpon these Accounts, I fear the abandoning it 
would have bad Effects. But it would be equally against 
my Judgment to weaken the Army by putting a large Gar- 
rison of Continental Troops in it. For should the Enemy 
resolve not to pass it by, it seems too accessible in the Rear 
to promise much success in the Defence of it. I would 
therefore suggest the finishing it upon a smaller scale than 
has been proposed, to mount a few Guns put in such a Num- 
ber of Artillery Men as would be wanted to work them — a 
small Detachment of Continental Troops, say 2 or 300, 
under a good Officer — add to these so many Jersey Militia 
as would completely man the Work — at the same Time 
they might be provided at the Water Side with the Means 
of Retreat whenever the Enemy's approach on the Land 
Side should indicate its being no longer tenable. This 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 27 

seems to be a mean, between abandoning & risquing too 
much in its Defence. If the Enemy resolve to approach 
by Water, this Post must be taken, or it will embarrass 
them ; they must land a considerable Force under many 
unpleasant Circumstances, the Remainder in the mean Time 
laying on board the Fleet, or divided on different sides of 
the River which must be dangerous. If, on the other Hand, 
the great Push is made on the Laud, & the Water opera- 
tions are to be subservient to it, nothing is lost but the 
Service of those Artillery Men & that Detachment. The 
Militia are upon their own Guard & probably would not 
compose a Part of the Army in Pennsylvania, if they were 
not at Billingsport. The Pennsylvania Militia would serve 
with more alacrity & effect on this side the River than 
the other, tho' they are now reallv defendino- their own 
City. 

" As to Red bank. I have never heard any other Reason 
assigned for making it a Post than to keep it out of the 
Hands of the Enemy who might otherwise annoy the Gar- 
rison at Fort Island. But when it is considered that Red 
bank is 1900 yards from Fort Island, that tho' it is higher 
it is not a very commanding situation ; that it is yet un- 
finished ; that if the Enemy are resolved to have it, it is 
accessible on the land ; that it will weaken our Force still 
farther to garrison it; that some other Post must be stripp'd 
to provide Guns for it ; I say, all these Things considered, it 
should seem very questionable whether it is worth retaining 
in the mode proposed by some Gentlemen. 

" As to Fort Island. I cannot but say I feel a particular 
Pleasure in learning that the Idea of abandoning it, break- 
ing up the Platforms & removing the Guns is exploded. I do 
not know but some Improvements may be made there, some 
Gentlemen are very clear in the Necessity of them. From 
all the Conversation I have had with the ofiicers on the 
River, I am perswaded much will depend upon the Defence 
made at this Fort. It is secured fully in the Rear — it has 
Barracks for the accommodation of the Troops — Magazines 
for the safety of the ammunition — commands the obstruc- 



28 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

tions iu the River, and while defended, it will have inter- 
course with the citj for all kinds of supplies. If it should be 
necessary the surrounding Land can all be laid under "Water. 
In short, I scarcely know a Circumstance attending it which 
an officer would wish to have altered or added, unless it be 
to raise it higher above the water. I cannot but therefore 
repeat it to your Excell^ that in my poor Opinion the Pres- 
ervation of the City on that side will intirely depend upon 
the good management of this Post & a correspondent Be- 
havior in the Gallies. Nor does it appear to me that a very 
great Number of Men will be required for its Defence. It 
cannot be stormed but from Boats landing in mud up to the 
waists of the men, or from keys which are few and easily de- 
fended. I should think it might hold out till it was battered 
down by shipping, an Event not much to be feared, as this 
Post will not be exposed till Billings Port is relinquished. 
The Garrison retiring from thence will make a handsome 
Reinforcement to that of Fort Island if they do not bring 
any Pannick with them. 

" Before I conclude I would observe to your Excellency 
that I believe some Hint from you to Congress or the Ex- 
ecutive Council of the State will be necessary, in order to 
effect a timely- Removal of the great Quantity of Stock from 
the River side, and the necessary Preparations made to 
overflow the Land adjoining the Rivers Delaware and 
Schuylkill if necessar}- — or it may happen here as elsewhere 
that these essential stej)s may be deferr'd till it is too late. 

" Thus I have ventured to throw together a few indigested 
Thoughts. I shall be happy if they are of any Use to your 
Excell^ — if they are not, I am sure you will excuse it as 
they proceed from the same sincere Attachment to your 
Person and Fame which your Friendship and Favor must 
necessarily create in a Mind of any Sensibility. I am 
" Dear Sir, 

" most trulj' & affectionately 

" yours 

"J. Reed. 

"Philad. Aug' 7. 1777." 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 29 

FROM BRIGADIER-GENERAL KNOX. 

" It is the opinion of the subscriber thafthe Battery on 
Fort Island ought to have an additional work thrown up 
upon its left, and Garrison'd with 12 pieces heavy cannon, 150 
cannoniers, and half as many assistants, with 500 Infantry. 

" Red Bank is to be contracted so as to have 5 or 6 can- 
non on the land side, and as many heavj^ towards the river ; 
to prevent any ships coming up the channel leading to it, in 
order to flank the Gallies which may be station'd for the 
defence of the Cheveaux de Frize'near the Fort. 

" Billingsport to be finish'd as at present contracted, or if 
possible more so ; so as to hold 300 men exclusive of 150 
cannoniers and 75 assistants, to work 12 pieces heavy can- 
non which ought to be in this work. 

" The Gallies to lye opposite to it at the break of the low 
Island, in order to assist the fire of Billingsport : these Gal- 
lies would be for this purpose preferable to the floating 
Batteries, as they can be most easily remov'd in case of an 
accident to Billingsport. 

" If much depends on the fire ships an inclosed Battery 
ought to be constructed on some advantageous piece of 
ground near Derbys Creek, and something higher up the 
river than where the present defective Battery is ; this in 
order to prevent any of the enemy's ships mooring at the 
mouth of the western channel ; so to hinder the fire ships 
sent round into the main ship channel. The western chan- 
nel is thought to be most commodious for the free operation 
of the fire ships either in the Channel leading to Billings- 
port or further down the river ; the Gallies ought also to lye 
in the western channel if their retreat is perfectly secure ; 
as the Commodore says ; as well in order to protect the fire 
ships, as to annoy any of the enemy's Frigates which may 
be opposed to Billingsport ; but the two floating Batteries 
which from their unwieldiness, cannot be easily mov'd to- 
gether with the Frigates and Xebecques, ought to lye behind 
the second row of Chevaux de Frize, upon a line with Fort 
Island. 



30 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

" If there should be time enough, a strong enclos'cl work 
ought to be thrown up on fort Island, capable of contain- 
ing 4 or 500 men ; an advantage may be taken of part of 
the stone work already erected, and which in its present 
state would be infinitely detremental to any body of men 
who may seek shelter from it. 

" These sentiments are respectfully submitted by Sir Y' 
most obt Hble Serv' 

" Henry Knox 
" Brief Gen' Artillery. 

" Camp Sandy run, 9"- Aug'. 1777." 

WASHINGTON TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS. 

" Headquarters, Camp, near German Town, 

"Aug [9], 1777. 
" Sir : 

" The disappearance of the enemy's fleet for so many 
days rendering it rather improbable, that they will again 
return, I have thought it adviseable to remove the army back 
to Coryell's where it will be near enough to succor Philadel- 
phia, should the enemy contrary to appearances still make 
that the object of their next operations, and will be so much 
the more conveniently situated to proceed to the !N"orthward, 
should the event of the present ambiguous and perplexing 
situation of things call them that way. I was the more in- 
clined to this step, as the nearness of the army to the city, 
beside other disadvantages, afforded a temptation both to 
officers and men to indulge themselves in licenses incon- 
sistent with discipline and order, and consequently of a very 
injurious tendency.' 

" But before my departure, I esteem it my duty to com- 
municate to Congress the result of my examination into 

' " You will take everj- possible care in your power, jis well iu your 
march as during your stay at that place [Maidenhead], to restrain every 
species of licentiousness in the soldiery, and to prevent them doing the 
least injury to the inhabitants or their property, as nothing can be more 
disserviseable to our cause, or more unworthy of the ch.aracters we pro- 
fess — to say nothing of the injustice of the measure." — Washington to 
Colonel Morgan, August 9, 1777. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 31 

tlie nature of the Eiver defence proper to be adopted ac- 
cording to the means in our possession, to prevent the suc- 
cess of any attempt upon Philadelphia by water. — I there- 
fore beg leave to lay before Congress what appears to me 
most eligible, considering all circumstances, and comparing 
my own observations, with the different opinions of the 
Gentlemen, whom I consulted on the occasion. 

" It is generally a well founded maxim, that we ought to 
endeavor to reduce our defence as much as possible to a cer- 
tainty, by collecting our strength and making all our prepa- 
rations at one point, rather than to risk its being weak and 
ineffectual every where, by dividing our attention and force 
to difierent objects. In doing this, we may disable ourselves 
from acting with sufficient vigor any where, and a misfortune 
in one place may pave the waj- for a similar one in another. 
In our circumstances, we have neither men, cannon, nor any 
thing else to spare, and perhaps cannot with propriety 
hazard them on objects which being attended with the 
greatest success we can promise ourselves, can be pro- 
ductive of only partial and indieisive advantages, and which 
may possibly fail of the end proposed, may have some seri- 
ous ill-consequences, and must at all events have some dis- 
advantages. 

" It is then to be considered, where our defence can be 
most effectually made, — whether at Billingsport, or at Fort 
Island. 

" It appears to me, that the last deserves greatly the 
preference. Billingsport has but one row of Chevaux de 
frize, Fort Island has three; and in addition to them, a 
boom and another Chevaux de frize, ready to be sunk in 
the channel, on the approach of the enemy ; of course the 
obstructions in this respect are four times as great at the 
one as at the other. The Gallies and floating batteries, that 
could be brought for the defence of the chevaux de frize at 
Billingsport, would be unable to maintain their station, 
when once the enemy were in possession of the command- 
ing ground on the Jersey side, to which they would be en- 
tirely exposed, and notwithstanding the works raising there. 



32 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

even supposing them complete, tlie strongest advocates for 
making our defence in this place do not pretend, that that 
event can be protracted more than fifteen or twenty days at 
most, at the end of which time, we should be obliged with 
the loss of our cannon at least to abandon the defence, and 
leave it in the power of the enemy to remove or destroy the 
chevaux de frize at pleasure. Nor is it by any means certain 
that a single row of chevaux de frize would be an impene- 
trable barrier to the enemy's ships. Experiments have been 
made that lead to a contrary supposition, and if they should 
hazard one, which it might be well worth their while to do, 
with some of their less valuable ships, under favor of a 
leading bi-eeze and tide, and should succeed in it, — the 
consequence might be the loss of our gallies and floating 
batteries, which I apprehend might be intercepted, and with 
the assistance of their gallies and small armed vessels, taken 
and this would greatly weaken the opposition we might 
otherwise give at Fort Island, and tend powerfully to render 
it abortive. But if the}' should not attempt this, contenting 
themselves with safer though slower operations, I have 
already observed, that it is agreed, on all hands, in fifteen 
or twenty days they would be able to possess themselves of 
infallible means of frustrating our opposition there, by the 
capture of our works ; and if we add to this, that it might 
very possibly happen in less time, — if from no other cause, 
— 3'et from the garrison being intimidated, by a conscious- 
ness of its own inferiority and inability to support itself 
against a so much superior force of numbers, — which might 
occasion a conduct destructive to itself — there will remain 
no sufficient reasons to justify the making this the principal 
point of defence. 

" At Fort Island the boom and chevaux de frize are an 
ample security against any forcible impression of the enemy's 
ships which it would be imprudent in them to attempt. On 
the Jersey side the situation of the ground is such, that the 
gallies, floating batteries and forts employed in the defence 
of the obstructions would have little to fear from any bat- 
teries erected there. Red-bank seems, by its elevation to 



Defmces of Philadelphia in 1777. 33 

be the onl}' advantageous spot for annoying them ; but as it 
is computed to be above 1900 yards from Fort Island, the dis- 
tance is rather too great to allow any battery raised there to 
act with so much effect as to be able to silence our fire. On 
this side, the ground by dykes and sluices may be laid under 
water to so considerable an extent as to leave no danger of 
our River force being annoyed from thence ; for which pur- 
pose suitable precautions ought, at once, to be made, against 
it may be necessary to carry them into effect. 

" But, though a battery upon Red-bank, would not in my 
apprehension, be able to prevent the efficacy of our defence 
or give any material disturbance to Fort Island, in particu- 
lar, yet it might serve to make the situation of some of our 
gallies rather uneasy ; and this perhaps makes it worth 
while to pre-occupy it in order to keep it out of the enemy's 
hands erecting a small, but strong work there capable of 
containing about two hundred men, with six or eight pieces 
of light cannon, and a proportionable quantity of stores. As 
the approaches to it are difficult on account of the adjacent 
creeks, and a communication can be kept open between it 
and our army, by which means the garrison might receive 
succors from time to time, though we could not expect to 
make it impregnable, yet we should have a prospect of hold- 
ing it much longer than we could the work at Billingsport. 

" In the position, which from my present view of it, I 
should think it best for our army to take, the left wing of it 
would be nearly opposite to Red-bank, and therefore in a con- 
dition to relieve and support it; whereas Billingsport being 
more remote from the probable position of the army, and 
detached from any other work, could not easily derive any 
assistance from without and must rely wholly upon its own 
strength. 

"Either at Billingsport or at Fort Island, I believe there 
is not nmch to be appreliended from the fire of the enemy's 
ships unaided by laud batteries ; For as by the information 
of those who ought to be acquainted with the fact, not more 
than three ships can act abreast at a time at either place, 
and as the gallies, not requiring the same depth of water, 

3 



34 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

can extend themselves at pleasure, and besides carry a supe- 
rior weight of metal to that which frigates commonly have, 
a much superior fire, could be opposed to them than any 
they could bring and from the dift'erence of size and make 
between the frigates and gallies, to much better effect than 
theirs. The comparative extent of the River at Billings- 
port and at Fort Island has been assigned as a motive of 
preference to the former, the river being narrower there 
than at the latter, and supposed to admit of fewer ships 
operating at a time; but as it is asserted by the gentlemen 
in the River department, that the sand banks and shallow- 
ness of the River in most places near Fort Island, compen- 
sate for the width of it and make it impossible for more 
than three ships to act together at a time, this reason of 
preferring the piosition at Billingsport seems to have no 
foundation. And if we consider, that our whole force of 
gallies and floating batteries, would be collected at Fort 
Island, assisted by the fort itself and that it would not be 
safe to trust them all out for the defence of Billingsport, for 
fear of the disaster already suggested, it seems evident 
enough that this is the place where our defence may be 
most successfull}' made. 

" One of the most weighty considerations with me is, that 
our Army as before intimated, could more conveniently 
co-operate with the defence by water here than at Billings- 
port. The ground on this side is better situated here than 
at the other place, and the Army being so much nearer the 
city, it is so much the less likely, that the enemy should be 
able, by a circuitous route to fall into the rear of it and sep- 
arate it from the city, which is a circumstance that ought 
carefully to be attended to. 

" Some Gentlemen are of opinion that our principal de- 
pendence ought to be upon Fort Island and its appendages; 
but at the same time, that we should make a part of our 
defence at Billingsport proposing for that purpose that the 
works there should be continued on the new contracted 
scale to be garrisoned by four or five hundred men. The 
reasons for this are — that it would serve to delay the enemy 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 35 

and give our army time to come up, should it be at any dis- 
tance and that it would prevent those disagreeable impres- 
sions whiah never fail to accompan}' the abandoning works 
that have been once raised and plans that have been once in 
execution ; especially when the persons concerned in the 
defence of them repose a degree of confidence in them ; — 
which is said to be the case in the present instance. But 
these reasons may perhaps not be so conclusive as 'tis 
imagined ; for 'tis a question whether, if our army was so 
remote as to make such a delay necessary, the enemy would 
embarrass themselves with removing the water obstructions 
in the first place, but would not rather debark and make 
a rapid march by land ; possessing themselves of the city 
and of those positions wliich would make the surrender of 
the gallies, &c., in some sort a natural consequence; and it 
is worthy of consideration, whether the abandoning the 
works begun at this time, which will probably allow some 
leisure for any disagreeable impressions it might make to 
be effaced, will not be less injurious than the abandoning 
them hereafter when they have cost more expence, time and 
labor, and in the critical moment of an attack, when every 
misfortune, and the loss of the most inconsiderable post is 
too apt to have a much worse influence on the mind than 
the real importance of it will justify. Add to this the pos- 
sibility that the garrison dismayed at the approach of num- 
bers so superior to their own, might not answer the end 
expected from them, and might even be lost by their ti- 
midity — the certainty of losing the cannon after the time 
limited for the defence and thereby weakening that of the 
upper position — the chance of losing the gallies and floating 
batteries, requisite for covering the chevaux de frize, by a 
hazardous and successful attempt to break through them, 
and the garrison with them, which would fall of course upon 
such an event, — It is however, submitted to Congress to 
ballance the advantages and disadvantages and determine 
accordingly. I would only beg leave to give it clearly as 
my opinion, that our principal dependence ought to be upon 
Fort Island and the obstructions there, and that Billingsport 



36 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

ought not by any means to be defended, more than as a 
secondary object. 

" And to that end, I would recommend that the works on 
Fort Island, which on their present construction are by no 
means calculated for the defence of the Chevaux de frize be 
immediately altered and adapted to that purpose, taking 
care, at the same time, to make them defensible with a 
email number of men against any sudden attempt to land 
in boats and carry them by assault. — But whatever scheme 
is pursued, I could wish the greatest diligence and despatch 
may be used in bringing it to maturity; for though the 
danger which lately tlireateued seems to have subsided, 
there is no knowing how soon it may return and certainly 
it will be prudent to do every thing in our power to be pie- 
pared for it, as we can lose nothing by being so, and may 
lose a great deal by neglecting to improve the interval 
of leisure they have given us should it be their intention 
to revisit this quarter. As the means to this — it will be 
necessary to furnish Mr. Coudray to whom the Superin- 
teudency of those works is intrusted, with a competent 
number of workmen, tools, and what other things he may 
want to enable him to carry them on with propriety, ease 
and expedition. 

" On the whole I am of opinion that the obstructions in 
the River, with the help of gallies, floating batteries, and 
with tolerable industry to put the laud works in a proper 
state, will be extremely formidable to the euemy and author- 
ise a reasonable expectation of their being effectual. The 
fire ships also will contribute to this end, for though there 
are many obstacles that render their success precarious, and 
a happy concurrence of circumstances is necessary towards 
it, any of which failing may disappoint the project, and 
there is therefore no room to be sanguine, yet there is some 
probability of its succeeding and they will be at least an 
embarrassment and terror to the enemy, and will oblige 
them to use precautions inconvenient to them aud service- 
able to us. 

" As an accurate knowledge of the country is essential to 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 37 

a good defence and as the enemy's approach may he sud- 
den and we may be called to act, without having time, when 
it happens, to examine it sufficiently if it is not done before- 
hand, it would answer a valuable purpose to have it imme- 
diately carefullj' reconnoitred, and sketches taken of all 
the landing places, great roads and bye-paths, Incamping 
grounds, heights, rivers, creeks, morasses, and every thing 
that it can be of any importance to know. 

" Marcus Hook seems to be the most advanced place at 
which it is conjectured the enemy will land, the survey should 
therefore comprehend all the country between that & Phil'. 

" Mr. Du Coudray has offered his services with his Engi- 
neers to do this business, if authorized by Congress, only 
requiring that they be supplied with horses and a hand or 
two. If Congress approve of it, I shall be glad they may 
be desired to enter upon it, without loss of time. I have 
the honor, &c. 

" G? Washington." 

FROM DU COUDRAY. 

" Philadelphia, 10 August, 1777. 

" Sir, 

" I have received with the most Respectful gratitude, the 
new proofs of esteem and kindness, with which, your Ex- 
cellency has honoured me, in making Colonel Hamilton 
communicate to me the Letter, which you have addressed 
to the Congress, with regard to the defence of the aproaches 
of the enemy to Philadelphia. 

" The manner in which your Excellency has discussed 
the different opinions about the fortifications of the River, 
places in the most evident Light the sentiment which you 
preferably adopt. 

" It is beyond all Dispute, that the situation of fort iland 
is more advantageous, than that of billing's port, by the 
difficulty which the enemy shal have of aproaching it ; by 
the Resources which the ground affords of erecting there a 
better fortification ; and by the facility of conveying assist- 
ance. The chief Reason which induced me to prefer Bil- 
liugsport, was the narrowness of the river in this place, 



38 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

which is in Reality two third lees than at fort iland, and 
upon that account, seems to Reduce the enemy to a neces- 
sity of bringing to action, at the same time, a far less num- 
ber of vessels to Destroy the means of Defending the 
chevaux de frize. But the informations given your excel- 
lency, having demonstrated, as you say in your Letter, to 
the Congress, that notwithstanding the breadth of the river 
at fort iland, the enemy can present there but three fregates 
at a time ; it is certain that preferable aplication must be 
given to defend that part of the river; if there be time 
enough, to put this fort in a condition of Resisting the 
forces which the enemy, by the means of small vessels and 
chaloupes, might conduct there a number sufficient to nail 
up the cannon, and destroy the single palissade badly 
flanked, badly [?], which constitutes actually its only De- 
fence on three of its four fronts. 

" The immediate assistance which your excellency De- 
mands, of Congress for this object, and the Reasons which 
you Lay before them to show the importance of a Ready 
Complayance, cannot fail of changing immediately the 
critical situation in which matters are in this Respect, and 
in which the most unavoidably Remain a far longer time 
than at billing's port, if the means employed be similar. 

" Tho' your excellency has Declared nothing Definitive 
to me on this subject, when I left you before yesterday, the 
idea however which I had of your opinion, has induced me 
yesterday to go to fort iland with four eugeneers, where we 
passt the whole day in examining, combining and drawing 
all its particulars circumstances, as well as those of the en- 
virons, which have any Relation to it. The aproach of the 
night, and the absolute cessation from all work in this 
country during Sundays, even in the most urgent momens, 
obliged us to deffer the continuation of this work till to- 
morrow, when I hope we will finish it. I believe we shal 
be employed tuesday and wenesday in drawing these par- 
ticulars in such a manner as to put them in a Condition of 
being presented to your excellency ; which I intend to do 
thursday or friday at farthest. I shall deliver at the same 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 39 

time the Eesult of the examination of the cannons, and the 
carriages which are at present fit to be employed, or may be 
rendered so in the course of this month ; the end of which 
I think ought to be Declared of the time when all these 
works are to be finished, both at fort island and Red bank, 
which your excellency think proper to be put in a state of 
Defense. 

" I hope also that the same period will be sufllcient to 
execute tlie minute examination which I proposed to your 
excellency, to make from markus' hook to Philadelphia ; a 
project which you have honoured of your aprobation, and 
sollicitations to Congress. 

" I shal think mj-self happy if the execution of these 
difierent objects should aftbrd me, as well all the oflicers 
who accompany me, an occasion of engaging with the 
enemy, and of carrying with us proofs of that esteem, which 
we came so far to seek for ; and the certainty of which will 
at the same time constitute our consolation and glory.' 
" I am with greatest Respect 
"Sir 
" of your excellency 

" the most obedient servant 

"DU COUDRAY." 

' " That A. met Ld B. & Gen. Howe at the entrance of the Delaware, 
that he informed them of the state of the river, and the chain, the 
chevaux de frize, &c. ; that they on that inquired into the state of Chesa- 
peake, and the possihility of huiding at the head of Elk. It was urged 
to them that it would be better to land below the impediments, as they 
would by that means save the sea voyage, and be almost as near Phila- 
delphia. To this was answered, that the taking of the city was not the 
principal object, but as it afterwards appeared that all the magazines 
were then at York Town or Carlisle, and the taking of them would 
effectively crush Gen. Washington, and therefore they pursued their in- 
tention of going up the Chesapeak, as the demolition of the magazines 
was to be more easily effected by so doing. After having landed at the 
Head of Elk with this view, the Gen'l gained secret intelligence that 
Gen. W. had promised his officers to risk a battle, and preparations were 
accordingly made to tempt him to keep his promise, which ended in the 
affair of Brandywine. That led on to the taking of Philadelphia, the 
danger the army incurred at German Town, and the laying aside all in- 



40 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

washington to the president of congress. 

" Head Quarters, Camp at Cross Roads, 
" 15 August, 1777. 
"Sir, 

" Mr. Du Coudray has laid before me a plau of the river, 
by which it appears that for a considerable space between 
the two sand banks on the east side of Fort Island there is 
from four to A\ fathoms depth of water. According to this 
representation there would be room for three frigates to lie 
between those banks, in such a position as to enfilade the 
works at Fort Island, and make it difficult to maintain them. 
There are but two ways of remedying this inconvenience ; 
one by having a sufficient number of chevaux de frize sunk 
at the entrance between the two banks, and the other by 
having the left flank of Fort Island fortification supported 
by a good battery, capable of resisting the cannon of the 
ship, & obliging them to quit their station. The first is 
evidently preferable because the efficacy of it will be more 
certain. A few chevaux de frize properly placed might 
efl:ectually bar all access to the ships ; but there is a possi- 
bility that any battery we can construct might be overpow- 
ered by the fire of the shipping. And as we have few 
cannon and Fort Island is itself a marshj- spot incapable of 
affording earth for the batteries necessary to be raised upon 
it, which must be brought from the opposite shore, it would 
not be prudent to multiply works there more than cannot 
be avoided. It would also be a great advantage gained, to 
secure the island from annoyance, except in one point and 
that in front from only three ships at a time, which would 
be effected by stopping up the passage between the two 
banks with chevaux de frize. I should therefore think it of 
importance to have this measure immediately adopted and 

carried into execution. 

" With great respect &c. 
" G° Washington." 

tentions upon the magazines, which has never been renewed during the 
whole winter, or before the opening of the campaign in the Spring, tho' 
those magazines subsisted the whole army of the enemy." — Earl of Car- 
lisle ; note of a conversation. Stevens's " Fac-similes," Vol. I. folio 82. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 41 

COUNCIL or WAK. 

" At a Council of General Officers, held at ^Neshamini 
Camp, in Bucks County the 21" day of August 1777. 

" Present 

"His Excellency, the Commander in Chief, 

" Major Generals Greene Brigad" Muhlenburgh 

"Lord Stirling Weedon 

" Stephen Woodford 

" Marquis Fayette Scot 

" Brigadiers Gen' Maxwell Conway 

"Knox 
" Wayne 

"The Commander in Chief informed the Council that 
the British Fleet left the capes of Delaware on the 31" of 
July and have not been seen, from any information he has 
obtained, since the 7"' Instant, when they were oft" Sina- 
pixon and steering to the Southward, and propounded the 
following Questions for the opinion of the Council. 

" Firsl Question. What is the most probable place of their 
destination, whether Eastward or Southward & to what 
part? 

^^ Ansiver. The Southward, & that Charles Town, from 
a view of all circumstances, is the most probable object of 
their attention. 

" Second. If it should be thought, from a consideration of 
all circumstances, that the Fleet is gone far to the South- 
ward, will it be adviseable for this Army, taking into view, 
the length of distance & unhealthiness of that climate at 
this season, to March that way ? — or will there be a proba- 
bility of their arriving there in Time, should it be attempted, 
to give any effectual opposition to the Enemy, or to pre- 
vent them accomplishing their purposes ? 

" Ansiver. It will not be adviseable for the Army to march 
to the Southwards, as they could not possibly arrive at 
Charles Town in time to afibrd any succour. 

" Third. If It should not be thought adviseable in such 
case for the Army to march to the Southward, How shall it 

i 



42 ' Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

be employed? Shall it remain where it now is, or move 
towards Hudsons River to act as the situation of aflairs 
shall seem to require ? 

" Ansioer. The Army should move immediately towards 
the North River. 
" Peter Muhlenberg B. G. G° Washington 
" G. "Weedon B. Genl. Nath^ Greene M. G. 

" W" "Woodford Brigd Gen"- Stirling M. G. 

" Adam Stephen, M, G. 
" Ch^ Scott B. G. The Mrquis de Lafayette M. G. 

" W« Maxwell B. G. 
" T. Conway B. G. H. Knox B. G. Artillery 

" Anty. Wayne B. G" ' 

memoir upon the defence of the two passages of the 
river, — viz., billingsport and fort island. 

" The soundings made yesterday by the navy board having 
confirmed those which I made last week with Mr. Donald- 
son, who have sunk the chcvaux de frize, it is demonstrated 
in the most incontestible manner that Fort MifHin, instead 
of having to act against three frigates only, as his Excel- 
lency General "Washington had been assured, and as this 
General has informed the Congress in the letter in which he 
discusses the preference that ought to be given to one of 
these forts ; it is incontestible, I say, that as Fort Mitfiiu, 
being exposed to the fire of about 15 frigates, is thereby in 
a situation of being demolished in a few hours, if it be 
attacked in the condition in which it is at present; viz., 
surrounded by a single palissade, or with a wall without a 
terrass, which can only defend it against a coup-de-main, 
and cannot by any means resist the cannon. 

" It is not less evident that the ground being almost upon 
a level with the water, it is only with vast expences and a 
considerable time that by a rampart, and other convenient 
alterations, this fort can be put in a situation of resisting so 
many vessels, the eft'ect of which would be so much the 

' See my " Writings of Washington," Vol. VI. p. 47. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 43 

more dangerous to it, as being upon a level with the river, 
and on its banks, the balls which could not arrive on 
account of the distance of some frigates, would get there 
by rebounding. 

" I join, however, to this memorial two projects suggested 
upon this head by Augustus le Brun, one of the Engineers 
who have accompanied me from France. These projects 
suppose that for reasons which particularly regard the State 
of Pennsylvania, or the plan of his excellency General 
Washington for the defense of the Delaware, it would be 
absolutely necessarj- to put this fort in a condition of sus- 
taining some time the attacks of the enemy. 

" That of these projects, which is the plainer and affords 
onlj' a very imperfect defense, could not be executed with- 
out employing the earth brought from the dikes which 
surrounds the Isle and putting it under water; this would 
render it a very unwholesome place of abode. 

" The second project, which affords a very complete and 
well conceived defense, requires that beside this earth more 
perhaps should be fetched from the other side of the 
river. 

" But the execution of even the plainest of these projects, 
could only be accomplished for the next campaign ; unless 
means which would be very expensive to this country were 
employed. 

" This, however, would not dispense (as it is certainly 
necessary in the present State of the fort) from hindering 
the enemy by chevaux de frize to place themselves in the 
two chenals where the soundings lately performed, shew 
that they can place so many frigates. 

" But to support these chevaux de frize it would be neces- 
sary to have on the opposite bank a battery of 12 or 1.5 
pieces at least, of eighteen or twenty four pounders on 
account of the great distance, to which they would fire ; 
and that their battery might not be taken, it should be 
fortified on the land side, or in other words, a new fort 
should be constructed, which would also be intended with a 
great expence in Artillery, ammunition and construction, 



44 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

although the ground I have examined with the Deputies is 
very favourable. 

" If we count the expence of this fort which should [be] 
built quite new ; that of red bank being by far too much 
above the position of the chevaux de frize ; and that of 
Bush Island being only a child's plaything ; if to this ex- 
pence be added that of the chevaux de frize, which are to 
be sunk either in the channel where there are yet none or 
in that channel where there are some already, but which are 
separated 40 feet the one from another ; if in short we add 
to all those expences these of the most necessary alterations 
to be made in fort Mifflin, it will appear evident, as I have 
declared in the first memorial which I laid before the Con- 
gress in the beginning of June, when they consulted me on 
this head, that there can be no thoughts of defending this 
passage of the river, unless, as I have foremeutioned some 
reasons regarding particularly the State of Pennsylvania, or 
the future operations of the army should absolutely require 
to enable this fort to resist for some time the attacks of the 
ennemy. 

" If these reasons do not exist, it is evident that we must 
confine ourselves to the defense of that passage alone of 
Billingsport, where the river is more than two thirds nar- 
rower than at fort Mifflin ; where the ennemy can present 
no more than three frigates at a time; where the frigates 
can do very little harm to the battery which protects the ' 
chevaux de frize, because this battery, being very high, is 
safe from the rebounding of the balls and commands the 
frigates; where the galleys and fire ships are more capable 
of acting with more profit and facility than at fort Mifflin ; 
and where in short the work is far advanced, and propor- 
tioned to the small quantity of artillery which is at present 
in a state of serving. 

" If the Government intend to unite all their eiibrts in 
finishing this fort, I would propose to hire instead of militia 
men, workmen by the day, which after an exact calculation 
of all expences, will cost incomparably less, I believe, will 
work a great deal more, give far less trouble to those who 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 45 

conduct the works, and not consume such an immense quan- 
tit}' of tools of all kinds. 

" Du COUDRAT. 

" Philadelphia, 29 August, 1777." 

du coudray to washington. 
"Sir, 

" According to the desire of the board of War I have the 
honour to send to your excellency a memorial which I have 
written yesterday upon the request of the Navy board, on 
the two passages of the river, after the verification that this 
board caused to be made of the soundings performed by me 
in the last week before fort Mifflin, and the result where of 
I had the honour to give an account verbally to your Excel- 
lency, conformable to the letter which I had directed before 
to Colonel Hamilton, one of your aid de camps, who ought 
to have received that letter since his departure from hence. 
" I am waiting for an answer to the letter which I had 
the honour to direct to your Excellency three days ago by 
Colonel Pinckney with regard to the nine militia men whom 
General Armstrong took away from the Engineers em- 
ployed about the map from Walmington to Philadelphia, 
which remain interrupted since the taking away of these 
militia men who are not yet replaced. I am with great respect. 
" Sir, 
" of your Excellency 
" the most obedient and 
" respectful servant 

"Du CoUDRAY. 
"Philad. 30 Aug. 1777." 

du coudray to congress. 

" Philadelphia 7 7"" 1777 
" Sir, 

"When the enemy's Fleet threatened the Delaware, Gen- 
eral Gates, and General Mifflin did me the honour to invite 
me to reconnoitre the country with them, to determine the 
place where it was probable the landing of their Troops 



46 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

would be made, and the principal situations which might be 
taken successively to stop their March to Philadelphia. 

" The Result of this recconnoitring having been addressed 
to Congress, and afterwards communicated to General 
Washington, was thought by his Excellency worthj- of his 
Attention, and recommendation to Congress, to emplo}- my 
service, and that of my Engenieurs, to survey these difterent 
positions in the most minute detail, and determine on the 
best manner of fortifying them ; whilst, in the mean time, 
we determined by an accurate examination of the river, 
round fort Mifflin, if it was possible to defend this post as 
his Excellency desired, and as he had reason to think could 
be effected, from the assurances given him that the Enemy 
could only bring three frigates to act against it. 

" I have addressed to the Board of War and to the Supreme 
Council of Pennsylvania, the result of the soundings of the 
river near Fort Mifflin, which I have made and which have 
been confirmed by those taken by the N"avy Board ; both 
which shew the necessity of defending only the passage of 
Billiugsport, as I proposed in .June, upon the first view of 
this spot, and upon considering the small number of Artillery 
that could be furnished. 

" I have been waiting these twelve days to know the 
measures that the Board of War, and Supreme Council 
would take upon this subject, but whatever it may be, it is 
evident that from the part which the ennemy have taken of 
making a descent in Cesepeak bay, the object the least 
pressing is the defense of the Delaware. 

" This being supposed, it is clear that the greatest atten- 
tion ought to be directed to defend as well as possible, the 
Route which the Enemy have determined upon, by their 
landing in Chesapeak. 

" It is certain that fixing on this spot to land, instead of 
Mark's hook (which General Gates, Mifflin, and myself 
thought they would chuse) will encrease considerably the 
Posts, which in proportion as they advance in the Country, 
they will be oblig'd to establish to keep up a Communica- 
tion with their fleet. But the greatest disadvantage attend- 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 47 

ing this, gives not however an entire certainty against the 
success of their march to Philadelphia, which I always 
judged and declared, since my arrival here, to be the true 
object of their Campaign. 

" To ensure, as much as possible, the success of this Cam- 
paign, it is necessary not to be merely contented with 
securing the Position of Wilmington, where his Excel- 
lency has very wisely thought proper to collect his first 
Efforts. 

" However strong this position may be supposed by na- 
ture, or may be rendered by Art; it appears to me, after 
what I have heard, that it will be possible for the enemy to 
pass it on the flank, or perhaps force it ; considering es- 
pecially the small number of Artillery belonging to his 
Excellency's army. 

" It appears to me then prudent for Congress to think of 
providing beforehand for their army, another fortyfied Posi- 
tion, which may secure the army in case they are obliged to 
abandon the first, and where they may collect new force 
against an enemy, whom the first success may render more 
audacious ; more especially as Schuylkill is the only con- 
siderable river that impedes their March to Philadelphia; 
and that this River offers at Grays-ferry a Passage which no 
officer can (I should think) propose to defend. 

" For this purpose, I offer again my service and that of 
7uy ofiicers ; in hopes that there will result from it an oppor- 
tunity of our being in action, which the delay of Congress 
in pronouncing definitively upon our existence in the service 
of the United States, always removes at a distance, and 
which probably we might wait for in vain at the forts on 
the Delaware ; at least before our return in France, should 
this take place. If the Congress consent to the proposition 
which I make, to prepare a fortified Camp between Wil- 
mington and Philadelphia, I beg them 1° to communicate 
this proposition to his Excellency General Washington. 

" 2° To give me, as a principal cooperator. General Mif- 
fiin, who knows perfectly well this country; who has a 
very great ascendant over the Inhabitants, by whom the 



48 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

works would be executed and whose great activit}- and 
penetration I have had occasion to observe. 

" 3'' To bring forward, as soon as possible, the remainder 
of the fifty two pieces brought in the Amphitrite, of which 
twelve alone are in the northern army, ten, within these 
few weeks, at the army of his Excellency General Washing- 
ton ; the rest in Springfield, and, at other Places on the 
east side of Hudson's River. 

" These thirty remaining pieces of the said fifty two, will 
be so much the more necessary, as artillery is the founda- 
tion of all defensive war; and that of these thirty' pieces, 
there are twenty one which being of a greater length than 
the others, and even any pieces in the army, are for that 
reason better for defending the intrenehments. 

" Besides this there will be an occasion to try, if these 
pieces, which weigh only one thousand one hundred weight, 
that is to saj', much less than the lightest loaded baggage- 
wagon, are so difficult to be transported, as some have 
endeavoured to persuade his Excellency ; and if their ser- 
vice is so useless that they ought to be cast over again, in 
the middle of a campaign in order to make from each of 
them three six pounders, which at most could only weigh 
three hundred weight each, and would be of a service as 
little durable as safe; supposing even that the founders at 
Boston, or Philadelphia, were capable of executing this 
casting without hazarding not only the loss of the fashion 
of these pieces, but also the loss of the metal, so difiicult to 
replace in this country; this a disinterested, and intelligent 
person will not believe, who has seen the pieces cast by 
these difterent founders, and particularly the cannon and 
Howitzers, which were sent to camp the other day. 

" The Proposition which I have the honour to present to 
the Congress as a mark of my zeal for the service of the 
United States of America, appears to me worthy of all their 
attention ; considering the important consequence which 
would follow, if the army failing of support in its retreat 
(a case which may possibly happen) should be obliged to 
abandon Philadelphia. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 49 

" I cannot avoid embracing this Opportunity of recalling 
the attention of Congress to another proposal, which ap- 
pears to me of equal importance, and what I had about a 
fortnight since, the honour of making to the Board of War, 
who, I suppose have communicated it to Congress, it is to 
cast in some of the forges most contiguous to the City of 
New York twelve Iron Mortars with the necessary number 
of shells in order to drive the enemy from that Place, or, 
at least, to prevent its being a safe harbour, for their ves- 
sels. The success of such a measure appears to me almost 
infallible, if the Geographical accounts which I have re- 
ceived of the situation of that place may be depended 
upon. 

"lam 
"Sir 

" with great respect 

" Your humble servant 

" Du COUDRAY. 

" Hon John Hancock, Esq 

" Presd' of Congress." 

COUNCIL OF WAR. 

" At a Council of War held at the Camp near Potts 
Grove the 23* day of Septera^ 1777. 
" Present 
" His E.xcellency the Commander 

" Major Generals Brigadiers General 

" Sullivan Knox 

" Green Weedon 

" Lord Stirling Nash 

" Stephen Scott 

" Armstrong Conway 

" Potter 
" Besides the above Major Gen' St. Clair and John Cad- 
walader Esquire were also present. 

" His Excellency informed the General Officers that the 
Reason of his calling them together was to acquaint them 
that the Enemy had, the preceding Night crossed the 



50 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

Schuylkill by several Fords about twelve Miles below and 
by the best accounts were proceeding towards Philadelphia. 
He also informed them that the Troops under Generals 
Sraallwood & Waj-ne had not yet rejoined the Army and 
that a Brigade of Continental Troops under the command 
of General McDougall might be expected in a few days 
from Peekskill and about one thousand Militia from Jersey 
under Gen' Dickinson in the same time. He therefore de- 
sired the opinion of the Council whether it would be most 
advisable to advance upon the Enemy with our present 
Force or wait till the Reinforcements and detachments 
above mentioned should come in ? 

" Previous to taking the Voices upon the foregoing 
Question His Excellency begged leave to inform the Coun- 
cil of the present State of the Army and the Reasons 
which had induced him to make the late movements which 
(tho' well known to most of them) were not so fully to 
Major Gen' Armstrong and Brig. Gen' Potter, who had 
been detached from the main Body of the Army. This 
being agreed to, His Excellency proceeded to inform the 
Council 

" That when the Army left Germantown upon the IS"" 
instant it was with a determination to meet the Enemy and 
give them Battle whenever a convenient opportunity' should 
be found — that they advanced the same day to the Sign of 
the Buck and the day following to the Warren Tavern upon 
the Lancaster Road. On the 17* in the morning intelli- 
gence was brought that the Enemy were advancing upon 
which the Arm}' were paraded and a disposition made to 
receive them, the pickets had exchanged a few shott when 
a violent Storm of Rain which continued all the day and 
the following night prevented all further operations. Upon 
an examination of the Arms and Ammunition on the 18"" 
it was found that the former were much impaired and all 
the latter that was in Cartouch Boxes was intirely ruined, 
wherefore it was judged expedient to withdraw the Army 
to some place of security untill the Arms could be repaired 
and the Ammunition recruited. Before this could be fully 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 51 

effected advice was received that the Enemy had quitted 
their former position near the White Horse Tavern and 
were marching down the Road leading to the Swedes Ford, 
but the Army not being in a condition to attack them 
owing to the want of Ammunition, it was judged most pru- 
dent to cross the River at Parkers Ford and take post in 
the Rear of the Fat Land Ford opposite to the Enemy. 
In this position the Armies continued for two days 
when on the 20"' instant that of the Enemy appeared to 
he in motion, and from our own observation and the 
accounts of our reconnoitring parties were marching rap- 
idly up the Reading Road this induced us to move up 
likewise to hinder them from crossing above us and by get- 
ting between us and Reading take an opportunity of 
destroying a large collection of Military Stores deposited 
there. On the night of the 20"" the Army decamped and 
marched up to the Trap and on the 21" to within four miles 
of Potts Grove, the Enemy's Van then being at French 
Creek upon the West Side of Schuylkill. In the night of 
the 22* advice was received that the Enemy had crossed 
Schuylkill at Gordons Ford below us, but the account was 
again contradicted, but in the morning of the 23'' certain 
accounts came to hand that they really had crossed in large 
numbers and were Moving towards Philad'. His Excellency 
further informed the Council that the Troops were in no 
condition to make a forced march as many of them were 
barefooted and all excessively harrassed with their great 
Fatigue. The Question being then put — The Council were 
unanimously of opinion 

" That, from the present state of the Army it would not be 
adviseable to advance upon the Enemy, but remain upon this 
Ground or in the neighbourhood till the detachments and 
expected Reinforcements come up."' 

COUNCIL OF WAR. 

" At a Council of War held at Head Q" at Pennibeckers 
Mill the 28'" day of Sept' 1777. 



62 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

" Present 

" His Excellency, the Commander in Chief. 

" Majors Gen' Brigad' Gen" 

" Sullivan McDougal 

" Greene Maxwell 

" L* Stirling Smallwood 

" Stephens Knox 

" Armstrong Wayne 

" Muhlenberg 
" Nash 
" "Weedon 
" Scott 
" Conway 
" Potter 
" Irvine 

" Besides these, John Cadwalader & Joseph Read [Reed], 
Esq' were present. 

"His Excellency informed the Board, that the main body 
of the Enemy, by the last accounts he had obtained, lay 
near German Town and that part had marched into the 
city of Philadelphia whether to remain there or not he could 
not learn. That their whole force from the best accounts he 
could get, and from a comparative view & estimate, amounts 
to about 8000 men. 

" That a detachment of Continental Troops from Peeks- 
kill, under the command of Brigad'' Gen' McDougal, con- 
sisting of about 900 men had joined the Army. That Gen' 
Smallwood, with the Militia of Maryland, amounting to 
about 1100 — had also arrived, and that Brigad" Foreman 
with about 600 — Jersey Militia, would be near the Army to- 
day on the Skippack Road. That of Continental Troops, 
at this time in Camp, exclusive of the Detachment under 
Gen' McDougal and that under Gen' Wayne at the Trap, 
there were returned present fit for duty 5472, to which is 
to be added the light Corps, lately under Gen' Maxwell 
supposed to amount to 450 — Men, and the Militia of the 
State of Pennsylvania under the command of Major Gen' 
Armstrong. That upon the whole, the Army would con- 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 53 

sist of about 8000 Continental Troops rank & file and 3000 
Militia. 

" His Excellency further informed the Board that a Body 
of Militia was coming from Virginia & that part had 
arrived at Lancaster. — That he understood from Report, 
that the number of 'em amounted to near 2000 men, but, 
that from good authority, he was advised they were badly 
armed and many of them without any at all. 

" His Excellency also informed the Board that on the 24'" 
Inst he dispatched an Express to Gen' Putnam with a letter 
dated the day before ordering a Detachment to be sent imme- 
diately from Peekskill to reinforce the Army under his Com- 
mand, which Detachment in addition to the Corps then on the 
march under Gen' McDougal, should make the whole force 
directed from that post amount to 2500 Effective Rank & 
file. 

" Under these circumstances he had called a Council of 
War to consult & resolve on the most adviseable measures to 
be pursued but more especially to learn from them, whether 
with this Force it was prudent to make a general & vigorous 
attack upon the Enemy or to wait further Reinforcements 
upon which he prayed their opinions. 

" The Board having taken into consideration the whole 
circumstances and the Question propounded, are of opinion 
that an immediate attack should not be made; But they ad- 
vise, that the Army should move to some grounds proper 
for an Encampment within about 12 miles of the Enemy, 
and there wait for a further Reinforcement, or be in readi- 
ness to take advantage of any favourable opportunity that 
may offer for making an attack. 

"Alexander McDougal 

"J"" Sullivan 

" H. Knox B. G. Artillery NATH^ Greene 

" F. Nash B. G. 

" P. Muhlenberg B. G. Stirling 

"T. Conway B. G. Adam Stephen B. G. 

" John Armstrong 



54 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

" The subscribers being of opinion our Force was suffi- 
cient to attack with, but being overruled concur with the 
above 

" W. Smallwood Jas. Potter 

" An'' Wayne James Irvine 

" Ch^ Scott " 



BRIGADIER-GENERAL FORMAN TO GENERAL WASHINGTON. 

"Red Bank Fort, 26 October, 1777. 
" Sir : 

" Your Exce" fav' of the 22" Directed to me at the Salt 
Works unfortunately went to the Salt Works by the lower 
road at the same Time I came to Freehold by the upper, by 
which means your Excel^' orders ware not handed me until 
Friday afternoon — previous to which I had rec'' an Express 
giveing an Acct. of The Defeat of y" troops your Excels men- 
tioned to have Crossed to attack the Forts and their retreat. 
— Nevertheless being fully Impressed with the Importance 
This Fort is to us and Equally so to the British Army, I made 
no Doubt but a second Attempt woold shortly be made. — 
I therefore gave Directions for the Troops y' Could be 
possably spared from y' station, viz* one hundred, to Hold 
themselves in readiness to march Next Day, viz'. Saturday — 
& Early in the morning Come forward my self to, if possable, 
give a spurr to the Burlington Militia k put them in motion — 
But am sorry to Inform your Excel^ y' Neither our Late suck- 
sesses or the Danger of haveing their Country ravaged gives 
y' spring to Their sprits y' is Necessary to bring them out — 
I have however in the Most Express manner ordered The 
Colo" to Exert Themselves and am in hopes y' a few Days 
will produce Two or Three hundred men. — 

" The Lower Militia under Gen' Newcomb have not as yet 
produced a single Man — As being Elder in command Then 
Newcomb I have taken the Liberty this T)&y to Issue orders 
for Their Immediate Assembling, and will from Time to 
Time do every thing in my power to assemble Them. 

" I got to this post before Noon This day and rec" Informa- 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 55 

tiou from the Commodore that his Boats on Guard last Night 
near the mouth of Schoolkill Heard a Constant rumbling 
of Wagons coming from Philad' AVard and Crossing over to 
Province Island from Ten o'clock uutill Near Day Break. — 
Col" Green informs me y' he saw a Large Body of men 
passing the Ferry; at one Time they could Discover y' Those 
who had Crossed wore Diferent Uniformes, some red, some 
Blue — & y' a very Considerable body ware Waiting on the 
Crossway and in the Woods on Philad* side to Cross. The 
Day was too Dark to make any Nice Discoveries. — When I 
Got Down There ware plainly to be discovered a Large Num- 
ber of Wagons on the Crossway — but it was become too Hazy 
to Discover whither they Crossed to the Island or returned — 
at four o'clock I was informed y' a Body of British Troops 
had landed at Billingsport last Evening in thirty five Boats 
— I think from the Ace" its tolerably well Ascertained y' 
There are some Troops There, but the Time of their Landing 
and Number of boats appear rather a loose Ace' not to be 
depended on. The Garrison at Red Bank has been lately 
so Exceedingly Fatigued and in its size small y' They have 
not been able to keep any party on the Shoor. — The Move- 
ments of Last Night & to Day amongst the Enemy has occa- 
sioned the Officir Commanding at Fort Mitlin to Imagine 
They mean to Attack y' fort & has This day Drawn a rein- 
forcement of seventy men from Col° Green and wished to 
have Drawn 100 more. 

" I make no Doubt but the Gen" request to Col" Green 
was judicious at it respects fort Mifflin. But at The same 
Time am fully Convinced y' Col° Green woold in Case of an 
Attack Absolutely stand in need not only of Them men but 
a greater Number to Defend it. As soon as any of my 
Troops arrive, I will send as many of Them into the Forts as 
will Compleatly mann it. 

" By these means the fort will be in as good state of De- 
fence as before The late Attack should they make a second 
Attempt to carry it by Assault, but should they Attempt to 
take the Fort by regular Approaches they will be so many 
men Lost. 



56 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

" The Gen' who have been on this Station for some Time 
may be better able to Judge of the Enemies movements 
of last Night and This day than I can. — it may be y' the[y] 
Immediately mean to attack Fort MitHin or Red Bank or 
Boath. But I should rather be of opinion (from the Ace', of 
their Wagons moving at night), that the}' ware moveing 
There stores and Baggage from Philad' a Cross Province 
Island & to Chester. Tomorow morning will perhaps De- 
termine. I have the honor &c 

" David Forman." 



LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SMITH TO WASHINGTON. 

" Fort Mifflin, 26 Oct' 1777 
" Sir : 

" I rec* your Excell'^' Order to remain in the Garrison & 
shall obey it. When I wrote I expected there would not 
have been that Occasion for my being here which I now see 
there will. Baron d'Arendt's ill State of Health will oblige 
him to retire to Red Bank for three or four days perhaps 
more. Whether Coll. Green or I are to Command I know 
not. I presume I am to have the Command untill an express 
Order from your Excell^ to the Contrary, even should he be 
an Elder Officer, for if an Elder Officer (for Instance Coll. 
Green of Red Bank) was to throw in his Reg', to our As- 
sistance, would not d'Arendt Command. I believe so if he 
would, then I certainly after him have the Command by 
your ExcelF' Order. Coll. Green says his Commission will 
be dated y' 23'' Dec' last, mine ought & I expect will be 
dated the 10"" as all the Officers from Maryland have their 
Commissions from that Date, 'tis true the Commissioners 
first appointed me Major, the Lieu' Coll" who they had 
appointed, did not Serve, the Assembly disapproved of 
many of their Appointments, alterd Some among the Rest 
made me a Lieu' Coll. these are my Reasons for thinking 
that my Commission will bear that date, if your Excell^ 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 57 

thinks them good Coll. Green will be Satisfied to Serve 
under me. 

" A Reinforcement of 100 or 200 Men would not be too 
much to resist a Spirited Attack of 2000 Men. with 100 In- 
fantry & 20 or 30 good Artillery, we might do. Our Artillery 
are & will be very ill-scrv'd. the few Artillery of Militia are 
Constantly taring [?] to be discharg'd. their Times will be 
out in Ten or 15 days. I am Clearly of Opinion if we had a 
Commodore who would do his Duty, it would be impossible 
for the Enemy ever to get Possession of this fort, without 
we are properly guarded the Enemy may be with us before 
we can form, the Channell which they are to cross is so 
narrow, in the Night they may bring their Boats & Embark 
opposite to us without our seeing them, the Baron has just 
rec'' an Answer to a Request he made for the Galleys, to be 
sent early & begging that 6 might be sent, three to guard 
above Reed's House who would rake all that part of the 
Island, and three below Hog Island & the Battery, with 
this Guard (if they would do their duty) all Sir Williams 
Army could not take the fort, his answer the Baron in- 
closd to you. The enemy are very busy making some work 
near the ferry Wharf opposite to our Wharf, for what I 
cannot Conceive, unless 'tis to cover their landing, or to 
fortify the Island against our attack & by that Means to keep 
open their Communication by Tinnicum. they have all 
this Day been Carrying fascines & waggons, & in the Even- 
ing Earth to fill up the Breaches in the Causeway. 

" Fifty Blankets as many p"' of Shoes, 4 Coats 1 Vest 4 p' 
Breeches & two Great Coats (all farmers) were all I rec'' this 
day for my poor ragged fellows, now chiefly without Breeches, 
who are oblig'd to turn out before day, & perhaps may 
Soon be oblig'd to be so all Night, the last reinforcement 
are equally unfurnish'd. This Garrison ought to be well- 
cloth'd or we destroy their Constitutions. I Hope your Ex- 
cell^ will give Order. My Ofllcers & Men think thej- ought 
to be reliev'd but could they be cloth'd I could make them 
Content. I have the Honor &c. 

" Sam Smith." 

5 



/ 



58 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 



CONTINENTAL NAVY BOARD TO WASHINGTON. 
"COXTIXENTAL NAVY BOARD 

" Borden Towx, 26 October, 1777 

"Sir: 

" As soon as we liad the Honour of receiving your Letter 
of yesterday, we ordered exact Returns to be immediately 
made of everv Man on Board the Fris^ates Washine'ton & 
Effingham ; these Returns we have enclosed for your In- 
spection. 

" We have the fullest Conviction of the Necessity there is 
to exert every Power for the Defence of the Pass near Fort 
Mifflin, & happy should we be, could we furnish Men in the 
least likely to be of service there. But as these Frigates 
have been only officer'd & no attempt ever made to man 
them, we have few or no Seamen, on board. The men we 
have are, for the most piart, militia left sick at Burlington 
& Bristol, & being found on the Recover}' were taken on 
Board merely to assist in getting the ships up to this Place. 
"With these Hands such as they are, & the Assistance of a 
few on Board private Vessels that have taken shelter here, 
we have put the Frigates in as good a Posture of Defence 
as we could, against small armed Boats ; not apprehending 
Danger from any larger Force by Water, on account of the 
Difficulties of the Channel. 

" Your Excellency's Desires shall alwaj-s be a Law to us, 
& if you think the Men in the enclosed Returns will be of 
more service in our Fleet, they shall be immediately or- 
dered down. Every thing may be got ready for scuttling 
the Frigates in Case of impending Danger, but we appre- 
hend that Business may be safely deferred 'till the Enemy 
have got up to the City with their Shipping. 

" We have removed the chief of our Stores to Easton, 
particularh' our Canvass, of which we have a considerable 
Quantity ; agreeable to Orders we saw from your Excel- 
lency some Time ago. 

" There are a number of Shallop men, & a few Sailors on 
Board the Vessels here which, if you think piroper to un- 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 59 

man our Frigates, we will endeavor to Enlist for a temporary 
service. But as there are but few of these, & fewer still we 
fear will be induced by any means to leave their vessels 
destitute, we apprehend little can be expected from such au 
Expedient. 

" One thing your Excellency may depend upon, that 
whatever method you may point out in our Line, for the 
public service ; our Abilities shall be exerted to the utter- 
most to fulfill your Desires. We have the Honour &c 

" Fra' Hopkinson 
"John Wharton."' 



LIEUTENANT-COLONEL COMSTOCK TO WASHINGTON. 

" Red Bank, Oct". 27"" 1777 
"Sir: 

"By order of Co' Greene I again put Pen to Paper, and 
inform your Excellency ; that Yesterday he received your 
Favour of the 24"" instant by Express ; in which your Ex- 
cellency was pleased to express your warmest approbation 
of the conduct of the whole Garrison on the 22*, accom- 
pan'd with your 'particular Thanks.' 

" The whole Garrison entertain a grateful Sence of the' 
Honour done them ; and hope their future Conduct may be 
such as will render essential Service to their Country, and 
continue 'em in your Excellency's Good Opinion. 

" The Number of Arms taken from the Hessians the late 
Action were about 300. The poorest of our Arms were 
yesterday exchanged for the same N"umber of tliose taken. 
The spare Arms in the Garrison are this day ordered 
away agreeable to your Excellency's directions; and the 
Wounded Prisoners delivered to the care of M^ Clymer, 
Commissary of Prisoners; and all judg'd fit to remove will 
be immedeately sent to Allin Town. 

' A letter from Commodore Hazelwood, of this date, is printed in 
Sparks's " Correspondence of the Revolution," Vol. II. p. 18. Washing- 
ton wrote to the Navy Board on the 27th. — " Writings of Washington," 
Vol. VI. p. 145. 



60 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

" Col. Greene directs me to acquaint your Excellency that 
Yesterday a Party of the Enemy landed from their Fleet 
with Cannon at Billing's Fort; at Night Co' Greene sent a 
Patrol that way to observe their movements, who took a 
Prisoner near the Enemy's Lines, & brot him in. The 
Prisoner says he is a Marine & that a Number of High- 
land Granadiers & Marines (in all 300 Men) with 10 Days' 
Provisions and 2 Eighteen Pounders were in Billing's 
Fort strengthening the works, and at present Commanded 
by the Cap' of the Eagle. — he likewise says it is given out 
that part of the Army at Philadelphia are to take post 
there. 

"I am directed to inform your Excellency; that by a 
Person who last Night went from hence into Philadelphia 
and return'd, and by several ways of inteligence we are in- 
form'd that Yesterda}', and last Night, the Enemy im- 
ploy'd near 200 Waggons in carrying Brush and Plank 
across the Schoolkill toward Fort Mifflin, k that they have 
repaired the lower Bridge across that River. The Persons 
imploy'd in this work say it is preparitory to Attack on 
Fort Mifflin. 

" Co' Greene begs your Excellency would send him a 
Reinforcement of 200 Continental Troops, the Militia he 
cannot depend upon, as no one has yet made his appearance 
here when there has been the least appearance [of] an 
attack. 

" We have rec'd some Powder of the Fleet and imploy'd 
this rainy Day in making Cartriges; and this moment 
some Waggon lo'ded with Cartriges for us and Fort Miflin 
— now we have a fine supply. I have the Hon^ &c 

"Adam Comstock, 

«i! Co'.'" 

' A return dated October 27 showed that five hundred and thirty- 
four men fit for duty were at Red Bank, as follows: Colonel Greene's 
regiment, two hundred and forty-four ; Colonel Israel Angell's, two 
hundred and twenty-seven ; and Captain David Cook's company of 
artillery, sixty-three. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 61 

WASHINGTON TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CHRISTOPHER GREENE. 

" Head Quarters, Oct. 28'^ 1777 
" Sir : 

" Colonel Areiiflt writes me, that the state of his health 
will make it absolutely necessaiy for him, to withdraw him- 
self awhile from the Garrison. I am apprehensive, that 
during his absence, there may arise some difficulty about 
the command between you and L' Col: Smith; as it is un- 
certain which of your Commissions is oldest, and cannot 
now be easily determined. The good of the service how- 
ever requires, that disputes of such a nature should be 
waved, and as L' Col : Smith had originally the command 
of the post, has been longer in it, and may be supposed to 
have more thoroughly considered every circumstance of its 
defence, than one who has been less time there ; these are 
arguments, with me, in the present uncertainty, respecting 
rank, that it should be waved in his favour. — I have no 
doubt that they will have their full weight with you when 
duly considered, and that you will readily avoid any differ- 
ence about punctilios, when the advancement of the service, 
in the least degree, may seem to require it. Relying upon 
this, I flatter myself you will chearfully acquiesce in Colonel 
Smith's command, in the absence of the Baron, and that 
there will be the most perfect harmony subsisting between 
you. I am &c.' 

" G" Washington." 

WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL FOREMAN. 

" Head Q", 28'" Octo^ 1777 
" D" S" 

" I wrote you last evening with respect to reinforceing Red 
Bank & Fort Mifflin. My anxiety from the importance of 
these places is so great, that I cannot help urging you again 
to throw in without loss of time, what assistance the Com- 
manding officers and yourself may think necessary, and 
such as you may be able to affiard them. I inform'd you 

' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton. 



62 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

that the reinforcement order'd from hence was detain'd by 
the weather, a continnanee of which, still prevents the 
march of it, and may retard their passage, when they put 
off; for which reason, I wish your immediate consultation 
with the officers, that you may know what reinforcements 
are necessary by them, if possible without loss of time. 

" I am &c. 

" G"' "Washington. 

"P.S. — If you mention the comeing down of a reinforce- 
ment, it may reach the Enemy's Ears, and they endeavour 
to intercept it, for which reason I wish it may be kept as 
secret as may be." 



WASHINGTON S INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL VARNUM. 

" Head Quarteks, 28'" Oct' 1777. 
" Sir : 

" You are immediately, or as soon as the weather will 
permit, to proceed to Woodbcrry with the Brigade under 
your command. Your most convenient rout will be from 
this to Bristol, thence to Mt. Holly, across the Delaware, 
thence to Haddonfield and thence to the place of your des- 
tination. You will be circumspect on your march, and use 
every precaution to prevent your party being surprised or 
intercepted. The design of sending you to Woodberry is 
to aid and give greater security to the Garrisons at Red 
Bank and Eort Mifflin ; for which purpose you will co- 
operate with them in every necessary measure. You will 
probablv find General Foreman at the head of a body of 
Jersey Militia, in the neighboui-hood of Red Bank; as he is 
there for the same end that you will be, a co-operation 
between you and him will be also requisite. 

" I cainiot delineate particularly the line of conduct you 
are to observe. — I leave it to your own discretion, to be 
adapted to circumstances. — The general idea, I would throw 
out is, that you are in conjunction with the Jersey militia to 
give the Garrisons and fleet all the assistance and relief in 
your power. As the men in them must be greatly har- 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 63 

rassed by labour and watching, and in need of rest and 
refreshment, I would have you send detachments from time 
to time to relieve and replace an equal number from the 
garrisons ; who are during the interval to remain and act 
with you. — You are also occasionally to reinforce them with 
additional numbers, as they may stand in need of it. — In 
case of an attack upon or investiture of Red-bank, you are 
to act upon the rear or flanks of the enemy ; not to throw 
your troops into the Fort, except such reinforcements from 
them as may really be wanted in defence of the works. 

" Woodberry I have pitched upon as a general station, 
from its nearness to the forts, and the greater facility there 
will, on that account, be, to answer in common the ends 
proposed. — In case of the approach of the enemy towards 
you, you are to take such a situation as shall seem to you 
most eligible. 

" I hope it is unnecessary to caution you to be, in every 
circumstance upon your guard against surprises. At Wood- 
berry 3-ou will be between two creeks — if j'ou can draw any 
security from this, by breaking down bridges or otherwise, 
so as to render the march of the enemy in their approach 
more circuitous, or to lessen the number of approaches, it 
will be an advantage worth improving. I am, &c. 

"G" Washington.'" 



WASHINGTON TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SAMUEL SMITH. 

" Head Quartebs, 28 October, 1777 
" Sir : 

" I am fav* with yours of the 26"'. As there seems to be 
a doubt of the priority of the date of your or L'.-Colouel 
Green's Comm" I have, in a letter of this date, desired him 
to wave the matter in dispute for the present, and act under 
your conmiand, as you have been in the Fort from the 
Beginning and must be better acquainted with the nature of 
the defences than a stranger. 

" I have ordered a very handsome detachment for the 

' Body of instructions is in Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton's writing. 



64 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

reinforcement of Forts Mifflin and Mercer and the Gallies 
— they have been ready since yesterday, but the weather has 
been such, that they could not march. "When they arrive, 
the duty will not be so severe, and if the men that you car- 
ried down at first can possibly be spared they shall be re- 
lieved. I will send them down necessaries out of the first 
that arrive from Lancaster. You seem to have mistaken 
the Commodore's meaning. From his letter I understand 
that he will always assist j'ou whenever it is in his power. 
He tells you that in rough weather his Gallies and armed 
Boats cannot live and therefore guards you against expect- 
ing much assistance from them at such times. I beg you 
of all things, not to suffer any Jealousies between the land 
and sea service to take place. Consider that your mutual 
security depends upon acting perfectly in concert. I have 
wrote to Col" Green to afford you every possible assistance 
from Red Bank till the reinforcement gets down. I have 
the greatest hopes that this Storm of Rain and Wind at N. E. 
will overflow all the enem3''s lower works upon province 
Island, and ruin the new Roads they have been making. I 
recommend every attention to you and I hope a glorious 
success will reward your exertions. I am &c 

" G° Washington. 

" P.S. — Keep the Banks of province Island constantly cut 
and you will embarrass the Enemy excessively. Do not 
mention anything of the expectation of a reinforcement lest 
the Enemy take means to intercept them."' ' 

WASHINGTON TO COMMODORE HAZELWOOD. 

" Head Quarters, 28 October, 1777 
" Sir : 

" In consequence of your representation of the Weak- 
ness of your Fleet, I have order'd a return of Sailors in 
the Army to be made to me, & find they amount to more 
than 100, which will March with a Detachment for the 
Forts, as soon as the Weather will permit. 

' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 65 

" This Re-enforcement, I expect, will amply supply your 
wants, & enable you to give every assistance to the Forts 
that can be reasonably expected from you, & as their 
Strength will be greatly augmented, it is my most earnest 
desire, that every mode may be adopted, bj^ which your 
force may be brought to co-opperate against the designs & 
approaches of the Enemy, & that a mutual confidence & 
perfect understanding may chearfully take place. 

" The Ammunition you have & will receive is to be con- 
sidered sent for the use of the whole, & distributed accord- 
ingly. 

" As there is a greater possibility that the reduction of the 
Forts might be effected b}' surprize than any other means, 
you will see the necessity of giving them every Aid by 
your Gondolas & Guard Boats as may effectually prevent 
any mischance of this kind. I am &c. 

" G° AVashington." 

brigadier-general forman to washington.' 
" Sir : 

" Your Exc'^' fav' of the 27'" was handed to me This 
afternoon, previous to my rec' of it I had given orders to 
several of the Militia officers of This part of the Country 
to Assemble their men — and have used my endeavours with 
Gen' Newcomb to obtain a return of The men it is said he 
has assembled That They might be put on some Duty either 
in the Garrisons or on some out guards — But the Gen' abso- 
lutely refuses to render me any Ace' of himself or his men 
— y' I am not able to Inform your Excel^ whether Gen' 
[Silas] Newcomb really has or has not any men Assembled. 

" The Excessive rainy weather has prevented the Troops 
from Monmouth and Burlington Coming forward as fast as 
I could have wished — They are however some of Them This 

' In connection with these letters should be read a series from Major 
John Clark, Jr., to Washington, published by this Society in the first 
volume of its Bulletin, 1845-1847. Major Clark was under orders to 
obtain intelligence of the enemy's movements in and about the city, and 
acquitted himself in a highly satisfactory manner. 

6 



66 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

day advanced as far as haddon field, and will in The Morn- 
ing be down when I will Immediately incorporate them 
with the Two Garrisons — They will not be equal to there 
wants, yet they will be a feeling reinforcement. — had it not 
been for the Excessive rains for some Days past I should have 
had more men Collected Then woold have been Necessary 
to man Red Bank and Fort Mifflin ; and yet Think I Could 
be able to Collect a respectable body of Militia was I able 
to overcome the Obstinac}' of, or to Displace, Gen' Newcomb. 

" from the best information I can Collect he has at no 
time given any assistance either to The Garrisons or the 
fleet — particularly in The late Attack on red Bank he 
neither harrassed The Enemj' in their Advance, During 
the Assault or in Their retreat. 

" he Thinks himself only Accountable to The Gov' piiiv- 
ingston] and Major Gen' Dickinson — I should be glad of 
your ExceP' directions respecting my treatment of him.' 

" On Sunday Last a number of Marines and Highlanders 
Landed at Billings Port — and have been Imployed in Throw- 
ing up a five gun Battery on the water side below the Bank, 
as we suppose to prevent our Gaily men geting the Guns 
and provisions out of the Two Ship of war y' were blown 
up the Day of the attack on the Chevaux de frize. The 
Deserters and prisoners Difter in their Ace" of Their Num- 
bers — some of Them say Three or four hundred, others say 
not more then 150. 

" The Late rain and "Winds have Occasioned an Uncom- 
mon High Tide, all the Meadowes are under Water, and I 
am sorry to inform your Exce'^ y' we have much reason to 
fear Fort Miflin will receive Very Considerable Daramage. 

' " General New comb's conduct is such as might naturally be expected 
from a Gentleman who was made a General, because your Excellency did 
not think him fit for a Collonel. ... If he makes any more Difficulties 
of that kind, I doubt not, by his present down-hill character with the 
present house, he will run a great risque of being superceded, which I 
may venture to say would prove no Loss to his Country." — Governor Liv- 
ingston to Washington, November 5, 1777. For Washington's opinion of 
Newcomb's uselessness, see my " Writings of Washington," Vol. VI. pp. 
157, 169. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 67 

" Oue of the Enemies Bridges of Boats over the Schuyl- 
kill has broak loose in the Deluge and Drifted off — A very 
Considerable part of it is allready brought under red Bank, 
and at sun down when I left The Fort the row Gallymen 
ware going after the remainder. 

" At Two o'clock This day a Number of the British 
Troops (by Estimation 1000) ware seen Crossing the Mouth 
of Schuylkill to province Island & for a Considerable Time 
stood paradred on The hill round y' Pest House — (the only 
Dry ground in y' Nabourhood,) a small mist prevented our 
observing where They afterwards went to — The Troops y' 
I mentioned to have Crossed on Sunday, we have heard 
nothing of since — but Think it highly probable They re- 
turned. 

" from the spirits of the Garrison at red Bank, the rein- 
forcements your Exce'^ mentions sending and the Militia y' 
I flatter myself I shall raise, I hope we shall be able to give 
a good Ace' of The Enemy should They make a Second 
Attempt on this post — all though This post is of great Im- 
portance to Them — I cannot believe They will Dare to send 
a Very Considerable body of Men to invest it — Least They 
Lay Their grand Army too open to an Attac from your 
Exce'^ 

" We have the pleasure to hear y' your Excels has re""^ The 
Articles of Capitulation of Gen' Burgoin's Army. I beg 
most Heartily to Congratulate your Excel'' on pleasing 
appearance of our aflairs. I have &c 

"David Forman. 

" M" Ladds Near Bed Bank 
" 29 October, 1777." 

LORD STIRLING TO WASHINGTON. 

" Reading, October 29 1777 
"Dear Sir 

" After leaveing Potsgrove I could not meet with any 

place where I could Conveniently put up 'till I came to this 

place, and I find myself so much better for the Rest I had 

here that I intend to set out for Camp again as soon as I 

find the Eoads are passable with a Carriage. On Saturday 



68 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

last I sent off to Camp an Officer with 64 men fit for Duty, 
there remain in this place 244 wounded, 63 sick, & 57 Con- 
valessents — in a very few days near 100 more of them may 
be sent to Camp I am &o 

" Stirling. 

"Poor Smith, D. A. G. is dead of his wound. Lieut. 
Baylor recovering fast. Major Clow very 111. Lieut. Ran- 
dolph better. 

" P.S. — I take the Liberty of enclosing a Memorandum 
of a few thoughts which have occurred to me, for j'our Ex- 
cellency's peruseal. 

\Enclosiire^ 

" The Enemy probably will detach another Body of Men 
to Attack Red Bank with heavier Cannon, & by a Cannon- 
ade in breach endeavour to render an Assault more practi- 
cable & more successfull. I say it is probable, because I 
believe they are now Convinced that it is their only Chance 
of Opening the Communication between their fleet and 
Army at Philadelphia; and that without it, they cannot 
long exist there. We should therefore do everything in 
our power to retard & render difficult their Operations on 
that side; by Collecting the Militia & setting them at 
work in destroying all the Bridges, Causeways, & Roads 
between Cooper's ferry & that fort, & in harrassing them 
whenever they do approach, & whenever it is discovered 
that they are about to make an Attempt that way, I would 
send a respectable Body of Continental Troops to Counter- 
act their operations. 

" If this should not soon appear to be their Intentions, 
they must mean to retire from Philadelphia to the other 
side of Schuylkill, or to give this Army Battle — the first 
should be prevented, and the latter in our present scituation 
avoided, if possible ; I would therefore be for passing the 
whole Army (except 1000 men) over the Schuylkill and 
takeing post somewhere near Radnor Meeting House, where 
we should be equally distant from all the fords on Schuyl- 
kill below the Valley forge, & by Vigilantly watching them 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 69 

oil such timely Notice of their Motions as would put it in 
our power to attack them on their March with the greatest 
Advantages. Our Station on that side the Schuylkill would 
put it in our power EtFectually to Cutt ofl" their Communi- 
cation by land between their fleet & Army, and would 
reduce Gen' Howe to force a march under every disadvan- 
tage. The 1000 men left on this side the River would 
under a Vigilant Otficer be Sufficient to prevent their small 
parties from Ravaging the Country & gaining intelligence; 
our whole Army in their present Scituation can do no more." 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL JAMES POTTER TO WASHINGTON. 

" Darbey, Oct' 30'" 1777, 3 oClock. 
" Sir : 

" I have been Round all the ferreys, and taking a vew of 
Carpenters Island the enemy sent over to the Island a large 
Reinforcement yesterday, all the Meddows are under watter 
and the breeches we maid are all opned there Bridge is 
carreyed off by the flud, a part of it is on this side of the 
River which I have Just Hard of at this place, and I will 
go Imraedatly and destroy it. I will do every thing in my 
power to prevent there Gating a Bridge across again, and 
live in hopes that your excelancey will send over some Can- 
non and men to command the ferreys. I am of opinion 
that if the communication between the enemy and there 
shiping was cut off the wold be son oblidged to move there 
Quarters, this night I will cut places in the Banks that has 
not been opened yet, and 1 am In hops it will be Imposable 
for them to get aney provision by Rodalphs ferrey. in Hast 
I am &c 

" Ja^ Potter." 

captain lee to washington. 
"Sir 

" I wrote your Excellency yesterday, since which I have 
been active in acquainting myself with the disposition & 
connexion of the enemy on this side the Schuylkill. 

" They have a body of men (not five hundred in number) 
on Carpenters island ; the possession of this post secures a 



70 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

constant & ready supply of provision. It is brougLt up by 
water, from the fleet oif Chester, deposited under cover of 
the ships against the chiveaux de frise, & then conducted 
thro' Carpenters island to the new lower ferry, & so on to 
Philad". If this communication is not interrupted, supplies 
of provisions will be as abundant, as if the fleet lay ofi' the 
wharf of the city. 

" There is a beef trade carried on between the inhabit- 
ants, & the enem}- at a place called Grubs Landing, about 
six miles below Chester. This illicit correspondence came 
to my knowledge but yesterday-. I have detached a party 
of dragoons to disturb them ; & make no doubt my en- 
deavours to interrupt this connexion, will be effectual. I 
have &c. 

"Hen^ Lee. 

"Oct. 31,1777. 

" N.B. — At present, the communication between the fleet 
k Carpenters island is totally cut off" by the inundation of 
the Schujikill. The fleet are engaged daily in bringing up 
provision to the mouth of Darby Creek, which will be con- 
veyed to Carpenters Island as soon as the roads will admit." 

WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM. 

" Head Quarters, 31 October, 1777 
" Sir : 

" The loss of our heavy Cannon on the Jforth River, and 

the possibility however remote of our losing those which are 

in the Forts on the Delaware, in which case we should be 

totally divested of these necessary opponents to the Enemys 

Fleet, make it adviseable to remove from Red Bank and Fort 

Mifliin all the large Calibers that can possibly be spared from 

the necessary defence of those posts — to some Place of safety 

where they may be kept in Reserve. Fort Mifliin has had 

an acquisition of Cannon, taken from tlie Wreck of the 

Augusta,' by which this will probablj' have a superfluous 

number. The Approaching Frosts will effectually stop the 

' See Lee to Washington, November 3, post. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 71 

Blasts of our Furnaces, which is a further cogent Reason for 
making a store of heavy Cannon in case of accidents to our 
Forts. I mentioned in my Letter to General Forman that 
the Crews on board the Galleys should not expose them- 
selves to the fire of the Battery which he thinks the Enemy 
have raised for the purpose of interrupting them — but if a 
Plan which I have suggested to him can be carried into exe- 
cution, the difficulty will be removed and a farther acqui- 
sition made of the valuable Article in question.^ I am &c 

" G° Washington." 

WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL POTTER. 

" Head Quarters, 31 October, 1777 
"Sir 

" As soon as the Schuylkill is fordable, I shall send over 
a large body of Militia to you, for the purpose of executing 
some particular matters. The principal are, to endeavour to 
break up the Road by which the enemy have a communi- 
cation with their shipping over the Islands, if it is practi- 
cable, and to remove the running Stones from the Mills in 
the neighbourhood of Chester and "Wilmington. This last, I 
would have you undertake immediately with your present 
force, as I have information that the Enemy are about making 
a detachment to Wilmington, probably with an intent to take 
post there, and secure the use of the Mills. To execute this 
matter at once, you should impress a sufficient number of 
Waggons for the purpose, without letting any person know 
what they are for, and send them under good Officers with 
sufficient parties to the following Mills — Lloyd's about two 
Miles on this side of Chester. Shaw's, about one Mile 
back of Chester. Robinson's, on Naaman's Creek, and the 
Brandywine Mills. If there are any others that I have not 
mentioned, contiguous to the River, they are also to be dis- 
mounted. Many of the Mills have spare runners, they must 
also be removed. The stones should be marked with Tar 
and Grease, or in some other manner, that it may [be] 
known to what Mills they belong, that they may be returned 

' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens. 



72 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

and made use of in future. And they sliould be moved to 
such distance that the Enemy cannot recover them. If there 
is any Flour in the Mills, it should be removed, if possible, 
after the stones are secured. I am inform'd that there is a 
considerable quantity in Shaw's, particularl}-, which there is 
reason to believe is intended for the Enemy. It is very 
convenient to the Navigation of Chester Creek and should 
therefore be first taken care of. I beg you may instantly 
set about this "Work for the reason before mentioned. That 
no previous alarm maybe given, let a certain daj^and a cer- 
tain hour be fixed upon for the execution of the whole at one 
time, and even the oflicers who are to do the Business should 
not know their destination till just before they set out, lest 
it should take wind. 

"I have yours of yesterday afternoon, and am glad to hear 
that the flood has done so much damage to the meadows — 
endeavour by all means to keep the breaches open. When 
the party that I mentioned in the former part of my letter 
gets down, I hope you will be able to break up the dykes 
effectualh'. I am &c. 

" G" "Washington. 

"P.S. — I have desired Cap'. [Henry] Lee of the light 
Horse to give you any assistance that you may want." ' 

WASHINGTON TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SMITH. 

" Head Quarters, 1 November, 1777 
"Sir: 

" I have this moment received your favor of yesterday, & 
hope General Varnum with the Detachment from this Army, 
have by this time arriv'd to your support, & that your little 
Garrison will, with the greatest confidence & Vigor, exert 
itself to bafiie every attempt of the Enemy to reduce it. 
"When I last saw Gen' Foreman I authorized him to collect 
all the Cloathing, such as Shoes, Stockings, Shirts, Breeches, 
&c', which he possibly could ; & by this Opportunity I have 
requested him to let you have as many of them as he can 

' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 73 

spare for your men, who, I make no doubt must be greatly 
in want of them. You will therefore apply to him. 

" From the Idea I at present bear of the Island on which 
your fort stands, I am of opinion, that, if the upper End of 
it was laid under water it would very much retard any 
operations of the Enemy against you — but whether this is 
practible, or whether opening the Banks to effect it would 
not be productive of Inconvenience to the Fort, I leave to 
you and the Officers with you to determine, & only mean 
to propose it for your consideration. I am &c 

" G° Washington." ' 

WASHINGTON TO COMMODOKE HAZELWOOD. 

" Whitpin, Morris's, 2 November, 1777 
" Sir : 

" Upon maturely considering the nature of the Fortress on 
Mud Island incomplete in such works as would secure it 
against Storm, and investigation what mode of defence is 
best adapted to its deficiency in this respect — it appears abso- 
lutely necessary to keep the Enemj- at bay as much as pos- 
sible and confine them to distant Combat — this can only be 
effected by the co-operation of the Fleet under your com- 
mand, or such part of it as may appear to you proper to be 
detached for the purpose. Nothing but the Fire of your 
Vessels and Galleys can prevent the Enemys making a 
descent upon the Island, if they are determined to effect it 
by such a Sacrifice as the importance of the object to them 
certainly deserves. I would advise therefore in case of the 
Enemy's attempting to throw a number of men over in boats, 
not to suffer the attention of the Fleet to be intirely call'd 
off by any concerted attempt which may be made on the 
Chevaux-de-frise at the same time — but to order a sufficient 
number of Galleys to meet their boats and keep up a well 
directed fire, or board them, as circumstances may require 
— in a word every measure should be taken which your 

• A letter of this date to the President of Congress is printed in my 
" Writings of Washington," Vol. VI. p. 156. Also letters to Brigadier- 
Gi«neral Varnum and Governor Livingston, pp. 168 and 169. 



74 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

skill in naval manoeuvres can dictate to prevent them from 
getting footing on the island. A fire of Red-hot balls thrown 
with judgement from a few Vessels, and the Solidity of the 
work itself will be a sufficient security in the meantime to 
the Chevaux-de-frise. It the Eneni}' can be foiled in this 
stratagem of causing a diversion to your fleet, by cannon- 
ading from their ships, and making preparations to clear the 
Chevaux-de-frise, there will be but one way left them, which 
is to attempt a Landing by night. How necessary the 
Guardianship of the Galleys will be in such Case, must 
be obvious. If a sudden Assault from superior numbers, 
taking the advantage of weak parts, would be dreadful by 
day, when someth^ of the Enemys designs is to be discovered, 
how fatal might it be in the confusion of darkness when the 
Guns of the Fort could not be brought to bear. 

" Galleys stationed between the Fort and province Island 
at night are the only Security which the Garrison could have 
in such case against a sudden Descent from the Enemy, 
cover'd perhaps by false Attacks and Demonstration from 
the Shipping. 

" Tou are the best Judge of the most proper Situation 
for the Galleys. However, if there is no cogent Reason for 
keeping the whole of them on the Jersey Side, it appears to 
me that station* them or part of them where they will be 
within distance for giving immediate Support to the Garrison 
on Mud Island would be turning their Service to the best 
account.* 

" I am &c 

"G° Washington." 

MAJOR FLEURY'S JOURNAL,^ AND LETTER TO COLONEL HAMILTON. 

"iVoi'em. 2^. About 2 O'Clock in the morning we hear a 
great noise of oars near the Shore of Province Island, and 
the Mouth of Schuylkil — a great number of Troops as far 
as we could judge by their voices, and the noise fil'd off 

' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens. 
» At Fort Mifflin. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 75 

upon the Bank towards the Pest-house — at 5 oCIock every- 
thing was quiet again. 

" 3. For two days past -we had suspected that the Enemys 
Vessels made difierent turns in the course of the night to 
the Augusta's wreck — either to carry off the Cannon which 
the Galleys had neglected throwing into the water, or taking 
possession of, or to tow oft" the Hulk — but the}- had a more 
important object which they have been permitted to execute 
without interruption — and this morning's daylight dis- 
cover'd to us their two nights' labour — they are raising a 
battery of heavy Cannon upon the hulk which is aground 
on the sand bank, the Galleys do not disturb them in their 
work, which, if they finish it, will do great injur}' to our 
Fort — where you know there is no Shelter for the Troops — 
it is important to drive them from that particular spot of 
the River, and thirteen Galleys with two floating Batteries 
may do it if they please. 

" As we are in want here of Joist, Pickets, Palisades, and 
even Earth, and as it is impossible to fortify a place with 
water unless one has means to stop it — I went yesterday 
with 20 men to endeavour to get wood on the Jersey Shore, 
but I could get only a few Pickets, of which I shall make 
palisades, if I am permitted to use them according to my 
Ideas. 

" When His Excellency approved my Zeal and my re- 
maining at Fort Mifflin in quality of Engineer, he did not 
give me an order to act in that capacity, and I can only 
advise without being heard. "While Baron Arendt was 
present he understands the Military Art, and my Opinions 
in point of fortification were his — but he is absent, and j'ou 
know there are persons who know a great deal without 
having ever learnt — and whose obstinacy is equal to their 
Insufficiency. However I do not complain of any one, I 
confine myself only to observing that my Zeal for your 
Cause cannot be useful unless I am permitted to display it, 
in a branch which I have studied, on a spot with which I 
am well acquainted, by my own Remarks, and those of 
many other Engineers skilful and accurate men. 



76 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

" Honour commands me to do everything in my power. I 
hope to do my Duty in whatever way I am made use of — and 
to die in the breach if necessary — but I will observe only 
that I thought myself employ'd in a different capacity from 
that of a Grenadier."^ 



LORD STIRLING TO WASHINGTON. 

" Keading Nov' 3'' 1777 
"Dear Sir: 

" Your Excellency's letter of the first Instant, I received 
yesterday, and am happy to find that any part of my thoughts 
on the measures necessary to be taken Coincided so nearly 
with those you had already pursued : and I am in hopes 
they will be amply Sufficient to render abortive an}- meas- 
ures the Enemy may attempt oil the side of Red Bank. 
The objection to the other measure is indeed a very Capital 
one, and the Communication is Certainly better kept up 
from the present position : But it is my duty to inform your 
Excellency no freshet whatever does totally Cut off the 
Communication between the two Sides of Schuylkill, for at 
this place there are two rope ferry's with excellent large 
Scows which can carry near an hundred men at a time, and 
move so quick that a Column of Troops would pass at each 
of them as soon as at the best ford at any time ; there is 
also a good ferry at Potts Grove; I mention this least they 
should be wanted on some future Occasion. I believe Gen- 
eral Howe is in a very awkward Scituation, he cannot 
attempt another attack on Eed Bank without detaching a 
larger body than he can spare from his Army, nor will he 
this season be able to advance a Battery on province nearer 
to fort Miflin, in short he cannot cooperate with the Navy 
in attacking the forts or raizeing the Cheva. de frize ; unless 
it be by some desperate attempt to storm fort Miflin in Boats 
— but desperation he is almost drove to. . . . 

" Stirling." 

' Translated by Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 77 



brigadier-general potter to tvashington. 

" Sir : 

"The enemy brings provision in Boats in the night along 
the side of the Shore, and up the Schulkill about a mile 
above the lowest ferrey, on Saterday evining last there went 
down 30 Boats I think the came up Last night in the Time 
of the flud they maid a voige. 

" You may be asured that the Enemy are Bulding three 
floting Battereys one at Ougdons [?] ferrey and two about 
a mile above, the lowest ferrey the two letter ones we can 
see Clearly one seems allmost finished the other the Began 
to Nale the plank on last Saterday, if these Battereys are 
once finished, and they have persession of Carpenters Island, 
our fourts and Galleys must unavetable fall into there Hands. 
I can see no way of saving our fourts and Galleys but by 
Immedatly Taking there fourt, and Battreys on carpenters 
Island, which I think can be dun with good Troops with no 
crait Loss if that was dun we coud use there Battrey at the 
pest Hous against themselves and by that Means Defiat 
there intencions — I hope a great part of the mill Stones 
were Removed yesterday as I had sent out for that purpose 
150 men — the enemy are in hopes of gating uj) there ship- 
ing and has brought up there Bagage as far as Chester. I 
wold Refare your Excelancey to Mess' Lytle Hunter and 
Mountgomrey for a more full Account of these Metters — 
they have Been with me in meaking Discovereys. I am &c 

" Ja^ Potter. 

"M» "WlLLINGS 
" Nov' 3, 1777 

" P.S. — I mount a gaurd of 100 men at the middle ferrey 
and at Grayes, 30, near Boons dam 50 with a proper num- 
ber of Ofiicers. 

" My men have severe duty to do. 

" I have Been Reinforged my Strenth is about 950 men 
with Arms and wanting arms 300 Exclusive of Officers." 



78 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM TO WASHINGTON. 

" WOODBEREY, 3'' Nov' 1777 

"Sir: 

" "We arrived at this Place yesterday. I have taken a 
View of the Forts, and think them in a good State of Defence. 
The Want of Confidence between the Commodore and Col° 
Smith is very great. I shall do every Thing in my Power 
to cause that mutual Support between the Land and Water 
Forces, which appears very essential for the Security of Fort 
Mifflin. I am not yet fully acquainted with the C4round, so 
as to give your Excellency that satisfaction w""" I coud wish. 
Have ordered Four Cap*", Eight Subs, Twelve Serjeants, 
Twelve Corporils and Two Hundred Privates into Fort 
Mifflin. I shall give that Post a still greater Support, by 
relieving the Invalids. The Enemy are in Possession of 
Billing's Port : Some of their Shipping lay above that Place, 
about Two Miles below Fort Mifflin. In this Situation it is 
impossible for the Commodore to drag for the Cannon &c. 
as mentioned in your Orders of the 31" ult°. There are no 
more Cannon in the Forts than are really necessary. There 
are no Militia of Consequence in Force here. General New- 
comb has perhaps between one and two Hundred, General 
Foreman is not upon the Ground. I am &c.* 

" J. M. Varnum." 



LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SMITH TO WASHINGTON. 

" FoKT MiFFLix, Novemb' 3"* 1777 
" Sir : 

" I have this Ins' the honor to receve your Excellency's 
Letter of the 1". Gen' Vernum has arriv'd and will send 
me 200 men this morning. Gen' Foreman has some 
Cloathing of small consequence, which I am to have this 
day. We by order of Gen' Vernum begin this day to take 
the Inhabitants Cloaths. I fear it will be a very poor Ke- 
source — this Garrison must be well cloathed or they will 

' A postscript omitted, as of no consequence. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 79 

perish. I always keep the part of the Island you mention 
under water, and hope now to be able to maintain the Fort, 
" The Industrious enemy turn their Misfortunes to advan- 
tage, these two nights they have been employed in raising 
the wreck of the 64 Gun Ship, and have this morning shewn 
a floating Battery almost compleat. I presume to morrow 
they will open it, unless Gen' Vernon [Varnum] takes Bil- 
lingsport from them. I think that one of the most effectual 
strokes that can be struck in our favor, and have recom- 
mended it to him, if he takes it, they then will have no 
alternative but storming this Island which they appear to 
be much afraid of. I have the honor &c 

"Sam Smith." 



CAPTAIN LEE TO WASHINGTON. 



■ jj. 3d77 



"Sir: 

" I mentioned to your Excellency in my last let', an inter- 
course subsisting between the inhabitants & fleet near Grub's 
landing. Having received a confirmation of this intelligence 
I pushed down with twelve dragoons & reached the place 
early yesterday morning. At Robinsons mill on Namur 
Creek I fell in with a foraging party ; on the appearance of 
my dragoons the enemy ran without giving one fire. A 
Captain of the Queen's Rangers, a factor from Baltimore 
County & seven mariners & soldiers were made prisoners. 
The Captain I indulged with his parole, till the 10 ins', on 
or before which day, he will wait on your Excellency to be 
farther disposed oft'. The transports have all moved up 
from New-castle to Chester. They are generally loaded 
with the wounded & baggage ; so that their being ordered 
up, predicts another attempt on the fort, which they suppose 
will be eflectual. Major Cuyler, Sir W" Howe's first Aid de 
Camp sailed in a packet the day before yesterday for Lon- 
don — his business is to press Administration for strong & 
early reinforcements. 

" Among the mariners taken yesterday is a mate belonging 
to the Union transport, he informs, that Lord Howe had sent 



80 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

orders to the Captains of the transports to send up each, four 
or more of their seamen. What he can want with them is 
not certainly known. I conjecture they are designed to 
mann the floating batteries now building in the Schuylkill. 
It is a certainty from the intelligence received from various 
characters, that the enemy design shortly to make a push 
on fort Mifllin. Their only possible mode, by which they 
can promise themselves success, is their iloating batteries. 
In this they may be totally blasted ; if we take possession 
of Carpenters island. From this post throwing up strong 
works, we most assuredly can put a stop to their favourite 
scheme, & what is of great consequence, co-operate with the 
gallies in preventing those supplies of provision which go 
up by water every night to Philad". Your ExcelP may rely 
on it, that thirty or more boats, with muffled oars, pass our 
fort & gallies every night to the cit}'. The ships blown up 
the other day were the Augusta, & Merlin sloop of 18 
guns. The Augusta took fire from her own cannonading, 
one L', chaplain & forty privates perished in the explosion. 
The Merlin being fast on ground was set fire to, by order. 

" There is brisk trade carried on at N'ew-castle. I have 
detached a party of dragoons to that place, with directions 
to visit the several landings on the river, to disperse the late 
resolutions of Congress^ among the inhabitants, & to assure 
the people, that they will be strictly carried into execution. 
I set out myself this moment with a desire to burn some of 
the enemy's small craft which lay at Grubs landing, under 
cover of an eight gun schooner. Your Excellency's &c 

" Hen"' Lee," 

MAJOR FLEURY'S JOURNAL. 

" S* night — a considerable number of the Enemys boats 
pass'd and repass'd in the course of the uight, near the Shore 
of Province Island — it appears that this Communication 
between their Fleet and Philadelphia is established, and 
what will surprise you perhaps, is that it is a sure one, there 
being no Interruption on our part — we cannot cannonade 

' Journals of Congress, October 8, 1777. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 81 

them from the Fort, the shade of Trees prevents our being 
informed of their passage otherwise than by the noise of 
cars, and firing at sounds would be wasting pretious Ammu- 
nition. 

" 4. The work of the Enemy upon the Augusta's Hulk is 
interrupted by the difficulties which they must have met 
with in raising a Battery on it — I believe however that they 
will make a further Trial, if they know their own Interest. 

" The Enemy's Land-batteries are likewise silent." ' 

WASHINGTON TO COLONEL CHRISTOPHER GREENE.^ 

" White Marsh, 4 November, 1777 
"Sir: 

" I am led to believe from the conversation I have had 
with L' Col" Green, that you have made Fort Mercer im- 
pregnable against an assault; and that nothing is to be 
feared but from regular approaches and shells — to guard 
against the first, it would be found necessary to have some 
out works, which time may, possibly, allow you to raise — to 
secure the garrison against the second, some Bomb proofs 
should be constructed. — The first yo\x can easily do, but 
how far the other is practicable I know not, for want of 
competent knowledge of the place — its extent — &c* — I would 
suggest to 3'ou however, by way of quasre, whether caverns 
could not be cut out of the Bank below the work, and sup- 
ported (the Earth) by Pillars, would not be the quickest, 
and most eflTectual method. — If this should be found to 
answer, all your Men, in case of a Bombardment, might be 
concealed in them, except such as should be found necessary 
for Guards. 

" It is unnecessary, I am persuaded, to suggest to you the 
pro^jriety of keeping a sufficn' quantity of salt provision and 
Bread or Flour in the Fort in case of an Investiture — as 
also "Wood for Fires and Cooking. I am &c' 

" G° Washington." 

^ Translated by Lieutenant-Colonel John L.aurens. 

' At Red Bank. ^ In manuscript of Washington. 



82 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM. 

" White Marsh, 4 November, 1777 
"Dear Sir 

" The Inclosed I had written to Col° Greene before your 
favour of yesterday reached my hands. — I am happy in re- 
ceiving so favourable a report, as your Letter contains, 
of the situation of the Ports — I most devoutly wish that 
the exertions of yourself & Officers may be crownd with 
the success that so good a cause, and such labours de- 
serve. 

"My Letters to Coraodore Hazlewood, & Col° Green, go 
xmopened under this cover, that you may read — seal, & 
deliver them. — If the measure proposed in the Letter to 
Col" Green can be carried into execution no time should be 
lost. — I thank you for j'our endeavours to restore confidence 
between the Com' & Smith. I find something of the same 
kind existing between Smith & Mons'' Fleury, who I con- 
sider as a very valuable officer. How strange it is that Men 
engaged in the same Important Service, should be eternally 
bickering, instead of giving mutual aid ! Offic" cannot act 
upon proper principles who suffer trifies to interpose to 
create distrust & jealousy. — All our actions should be regu- 
lated by one uniform Plan — & that Plan should have one 
object only in view, to wit, the good of the Service. Where 
this is the case, although there may be a deversity of opin- 
ion, there can be no real obstruction. — I hope all these little 
rubs will be done away by your prudent Managera'. I 
am &c 

" G° "Washington. 

" P.S. — What force have the Enemy at Billingsport? Is 
there a moral certainty (with your force) of driving them 
from thence ? If there is, I have no objection to the at- 
tempt ; but wish circumstances to be well consider'd before 
any resolution is come to."^ 

' All but the postscript is in the manuscript of Washington. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 83 

WASHINGTON TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SAMUEL SMITH. 

" Head Quarters, November 4, 1777 
"Sir: 

" I have received your Letter dated yesterday, giving an 
account of the reinforcement which you expect from Geu' 
Varuum and the supplies of clothing from Gen' Forman. 
It gives me pain to learn that the latter are likely to be so 
inadequate to your wants, but hope that by taking proper 
measures, the Contributions of the Inhabitants will not 
prove so poor a Resource as you seem to fear. 

" Inclosed is a Letter to Maj'' Fleury, whom I order'd 
to fort Mifflin to serve in quality of Engineer, as he is a 
Young Man of Talents and has made this branch of Mili- 
tary Science his particular Study, I place a confidence in 
him. You will therefore make the best Arrangement for 
enabling him to carry such Plans into Execution as come 
within his Department. His Authority at the same time 
that it is subordinate to yours must be sufficient for putting 
into practice what his knowledge of Fortification points out 
as necessary for defending the post. — and his Department, 
tho' inferior being of a distinct and separate nature, requires 
that his orders should be in a great degree discretionary — 
and that he sh* be suffered to exercise his Judgement. Per- 
suaded that you will concur witii him in ever}- measure 
which the good of the service may require, I remain &c.^ 

"6° Washington." 



WASHINGTON TO COMMODORE HAZELWOOD. 

" Head Quarters, Whitemarsh, 4 November, 1777 
« Sir : 

" Gen' Potter and Cap' Lee, who are posted upon the 
West side of Schuylkill to interrupt the Enemy's communi- 
cation across the Islands, both assure me that they un- 
doubtedly pass by Night with Boats between province and 

' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens. 



84 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

Mud Island and into Schiijlkill. If this passage is not 
stopped in some measure, it is in vain to thinli of hindering 
them from getting supplies from their shipping as long as 
the River remains free of Ice. I will not undertake to 
point out to you the mode of doing this, but in my opinion 
the most probable is, to keep small Boats rowing guard be- 
tween the south end of Mud Island and the Pennsylvania 
shore, and a Galley or two under the north end of Mud 
Island, when the weather will permit. If the guard Boats 
make a signal, the Gallies may get ready to intercept the 
Convoy. The Enemy will not chuse to fire in the dark, 
because there will be a greater chance of damaging their 
own craft, than hurting our armed Vessels, as being greater 
in number. I beg you will immediately fall upon this or any 
other Scheme, which to you may seem more etiectual to put 
a stop to this intercourse. I am &c.^ 

" G° Washington." 

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SMITH TO WASHINGTON. 

" Fort Mifflin, 4"' November, 1777 
" Sir : 

"I wrote your Excellency yesterday — am happy to find 
I was mistaken. The enemy have not constructed a Bat- 
tery on their work as I then expected. I was deceiv'd by 
the water being much lower than usual, which left a greater 
part of the wreck naked. General Varnum's reinforcement 
arriv'd yesterdaj'. Last night about 8 o'clock we were 
alarm'd with the rowing of Boats between this and Province 
Island. We at first conceived they intended an attack, but 
found they passed us with the Ebb, they came out of Schuyl- 
kill and passed along the Shore of Province Island to their 
Shiping, with the flood they return'd up again to Schuylkill. 
We informed the Gallies that lay near us. Unless some 
method is taken to prevent that communication, they will 
without much risk supply tliemselves with everything want- 
ing from their ships. I have the honor &c 

"Sam. Smith." 

' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 85 

brigadier-general potter to washington. 
" Sir 

" I'm a sorey to Inform j-our excelaneey that the Officer I 
send to the Brandwine Mills has not obay'd my orders In- 
stead of Taking the stons away he has taken the Spinnels 
Rines and Ironnale heads. I was preparing to send a party 
to move the Runners But as it is Hard to get waggans and 
as I am Informed that the Taking these Artecals answers 
the same end as Removeing the stons, I wait to know your 
Plesure in this matter. I gave writen orders to the officer. 
I will Trey him for disobedance I am oppresed with Bad 
Officers. I wold Rather be a shew boy [?] then what I am, 
if it wold sarve my Countrey as well. I am &c. 

"Ja^ Potter. 

" Camp, Nov' 5'" 1777. 

" P.S. — Col : Crafords men are uneasey and wanting to go 
home. I will not detain them. I think I have men suf- 
ficient for all I can do in this place, as the enemy has got 
that new way of carreying their provision." 

WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL POTTER. 

" Head Quarters, 5 November, 1777 
" Sir : 

" I have received your Letter of this morning : and am 
sorry to find that your orders respecting the Mills have not 
been carried into execution. — it is my desire that the Officer 
employed in this business should be put under Arrest and 
tried for disobedience of orders — the parts of the machinery 
which he has removed may be very easily replaced, whereas 
had he followed the directions given him, the end in view 
would have been effectually answer'd. 

" Colonel Crawford's party was order'd to join you only 
for the particular purpose of distressing the Enemy by cutting 
their Banks ; if this service can be done without them or is 
found impracticable altogether, I have no motive for detain- 
ing them. I am &c 

" 6° Washington. 



86 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

"As the Corps under your Command will probably be an 
object for the Enemy, you cannot be too vigilant nor guard 
yourself by too many precautions against surprize. I men- 
tion this in consequence of hints given me of their Inten- 
tions — and hope therefore it will have its proper effect.'" 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM TO WASHINGTON. 

" WOODBERRY, 6'" Nov', 1777 

"Sir: 

" Great Manto Creek is situated two Miles and an half 
from Redbank, where it empties into the Delaware. On the 
west side of this Creek is the Promontory Billingsport, for- 
tified, and garrisoned by three hundred Men, made up of the 
sevent}' first Regiment, and of Marines, according to the 
best Information I have been able to obtain. On the east 
side of the Creek upwards of a Mile from Billingsport, is a 
small Eminence on w"*" the Evening before last, we erected 
a small Fascine Battery, intending to i:)lay upon the Ship- 
ping, the morning following, with one Eighteen, and one 
Twelve Pounder. The Eighteen was overset on the way, 
and could not be got to the Battery 'till two o'CIock in the 
afternoon. The Twelve in the intermediate Time, was 
ply'd with great Advantage upon the Sommersett, a ship of 
sixty four Guns. The Roebuck and a Frigate were soon 
driven from their Stations, and the Sommersett fell down to 
the Distance of a Mile and a Quarter from the Battery, where 
she touched upon the Beach, and was obliged patiently to 
take our Fire. In this situation, the Commodore sent down 
four Gallies, which began their Fire at the Distance of more 
than two Miles. They advanced however 'till the Sommer- 
sett & Roebuck, with a Galley began to discharge their Bow 
Guns upon them, when tiiey immediately retreated. The 
Flood Tide making, floated the Sommersett ; but, as there 
was no Wind, she could not get far from us, by w""" 
means she suffered extremely from our Eighteen & twelve 
Pounders. She hoisted Signals of Distress ; the Coramo- 

' la manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 87 

dore came down with a great naval Force, and began a tre- 
mendous Fire, out of Gun Shot, he advanced firing 'till 
some of his Shot reached the Ships. He expended an im- 
mense Quantity of ammunition, &, I am pretty certain, hit 
the large ship once, in her stern ; soon after he retired. 
The Battery discharged, from both Guns, more than one 
hundred and twenty Pounds ; two Thirds of w"*" at least took 
place : And as almost every Shot was directed at the sixty 
four, she must be greatly shattered. Capt" Lee who com- 
manded the Guns, behaved perfectly well. Had the Gallies 
behaved tolerably well, the Sommersett must beyond a 
Doubt have fallen into our Hands' — Could we be fur- 
nished with sufficient Ammunition for a Twenty four and 
an Eighteen Pounder, without drawing from the Forts, I 
am confident we should oblige the Shipping to keep down 
the River as low as Billingsport. By w"""" means they cou'd 
not attempt raising the Chievaux de Frise. "We should be 
provided with proper Harness & Horses for these Pieces, 
to move them to any part of the Shore at Pleasure. I am 
apprehensive we might do much by throwing up a Battery 
about one Third of a Mile below Billings Port, from which, 
& the Battery before mentioned, we could easily cross fire 
upon every Intch of Channel Way opposite the Mouth of 
Manto Creek, and oblige the Shipping to move farther 
down, liable to be disen[?]ed from our lower Battery ; or 
farther up, when they would probably stick upon the 
Chievaux de Frize, and be in danger from Fort Mifflin and 
the Fire Craft. The great Injury their Shipping would 
receive might probably draw them out from Billings Port 
to attack us — their present numbers we could beat, & by 
that means possess ourselves of their works, should they 
considerably reinforce, w"*" I immagine they might occa- 
sionally do from their Shipping, we might loose our Cannon, 
by being obliged to retreat. Billingsport is the key of the 

' During this engagement Washington was at the Chew house, in Ger- 
mantown, and, looking from the top, " could discover nothing more than 
thick clouds of smoak, and the masts of two vessels, the weather being 
very hazy." 



88 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

Delaware, as the Ship Channel is within Musket shot of it. 
I can perceive but one Objection to a Manouvre of this kind ; 
and indeed that is an important one; Should the Enemy 
attack Red Bank in the mean Time, by landing below 
Timber Creek, which they might do, we could not afford 
that Garrison timely aid. The Remainder of General 
M'^Dougall's Division, could they be spared, would form a 
Counter ballance to that Difficulty. — Col° Smith is con- 
tinually complaining of the Remissness of the Fleet. I 
have conversed freely with tlie Commodore upon the Subject 
of Defence, w°h he ought to afford. He has pointed out to 
me the Plans where he has ordered his Guard Boats and 
some of his Gallies stationed by night. His Plan, if 
spiritedly executed, would sufficiently aid Fort Mifflin, 
and Prevent the Enemy from making a Lodgment in its 
rear. The Commodore says he cannot prevent the Enemies 
Boats from passing up and down the River, as they are 
covered by their Batteries upon Province Island and at the 
Mouth of Schuylkill. In short, the Commodore appears to 
be a very good kind of a Man ; but his extreme good N^ature 
gives too great a Licence to those under his Command, who' 
would obey only from severity, if any such he has, to' their 
Duty. From the Conduct of the Fleet yesterday, your 
Excellency will be able to know my sentiments respecting 
their Prowess. I shall religiously avoid any personal Dis- 
putes myself, where I cannot be of service by them, to the pub- 
lic ; I shall continue however, to create, if possible, greater 
Harmony between the Fleet and Garrisons. — As the Garri- 
sons have necessarily many sick, we are in great Want of 
some Gentlemen from the Hospital Department, to establish 
a Plan for their Reception, with Medicine and other Arti- 
cles to make them comfortable. Indeed they suffer on that 
account. 

" I should have mentioned, when speaking of Fort Mifflin, 
that the Enemy were busy, yesterday, in erecting a Fortifi- 
cation upon Province Island, in such a Position as to play 

'A word that is illegible. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 89 

obliquely upon the Palisadoes. This Circumstance con- 
vinces me that they do not intend a very sudden Attack 
upon the Fort. Should they destro}' the Palisadoes, the 
Defence of the Island will then greatly depend upon the 
Gallies; altho' it will be difficult to approach to the Rear of 
the Work, as the Enemy must pass upon a Meadow w°h is 
very miry. They cannot surmount that Difficulty by laying 
Fascines, unless the Gallies quit the Passage between Red 
Bank and Mud Island intirely. In fine, I must beg Liberty 
to repeat that Billingsport is of far more Importance than all 
the Forts and Gallies put together. This seems also to be 
the concurring sentiment of the Gentlemen here univer- 
sally. 

" I have not seen Gen' Foreman, nor can I learn where 
he is.' There are about sixty of his Militia at Red bank. 
Gen' N'ewcomb is still here, & his Troops may amount to 
two Hundred. I cannot tell their number exactly, and 
believe he cannot. They are badly provided, and can be of 
little Service in any serious Operation. 

" I hope your Excellency will excuse the Prolixity of this, 
& believe me sincerely yours 

"J. M. Varnum. 

" P.S.— 12 oClock. This Moment your Excellency's of the 
4"" Instant comes to Hand. In your letter to Col° Smith 
you mention Clothing. Since my arrival, have vested three 
Officers from Fort Mifflin with full Powers of gathering 
Clothing. Have sent them to Salem among the Tory 
Quakers, directing them to procure the Articles necessary 
for the Garrison, giving their Receipts, specifying the Quan- 
tities and Qualities. I should not have presumed upon such 
a measure, but from the urgent Necessity ; & being persuaded 
it was agreeable to what your Excellency had ordered in 
Pennsylvania." 

' " General Foreman has to my great concern, & contrary to my warmest 
sollicitations, resigned his Commission, upon some misunderstanding 
with the Assembly." — Governor Livingston to Washington, November 9, 
1777. 



90 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM. 

" Head Quarters, 7 November, 1777 
" Sir : 

"From various accounts I am couviuced that the Enemy 

are upon the point of making a grand effort upon Fort 

Mitflin. A person in confidence of one of their principal 

artificers thinks it will be today or tomorrow. No time is 

therefore to be lost in making that Garrison as respectable 

as 3'our numbers will admit, for should the attack commence 

before they are reinforced, it may probably be out of your 

power to throw them in. I think you had for the present 

better draw all the continental Troops into or near Forts 

Mercer and MifHin, and let what Militia are collected lay 

without, for I am of opinion that they will rather dismay 

than assist the continental Troops if shut up in the Forts. 

Acquaint the Commodore that m}' informant says there are 

three floating Batteries and some fire rafts prepared which are 

to fall down upon his Fleet at the same time that the Island 

is attacked, and desire him to keep a look-out and make the 

necessary preparations to receive them. As Fort Mercer 

cannot be attacked without considerable previous notice, I 

would have you spare as many men to Fort Mifflin as you 

possibly can ; for if accounts are to be depended upon that 

is undoubtedly the post the Enemy have their designs upon. 

I am very anxious to hear what was the occasion of the 

heavy firing of Musketry on the Evening of the 5"". It 

seemed to us to be at Fort Mifflin. I am &c' 

" G° Washington." 



BRIGADIER-GENERAL FORMAN TO WASHINGTON. 

" Prince Town, 7'" Nov' 1777 
"Sir 

" Your Exce'^= fav' of the 31' I rec" the 1=' Nov% and the 
same Morning I rec'' an answer from the Council of Safety 
to a Letter I had wrote to Gov' Livingston Respecting the 
Conduct of Brig' Gen' Newcomb. — The Council of Safety 

' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 91 

ill their Letter to me enclosed one for Gen'Newcomb which 
they assured me contain'd their orders to him to make me 
returns of his Brigade and receive my orders — I Imme- 
diately sent a Horseman to Gen' Newcomb with the Letter, 
but rec* no kind of answer from him. — I then wrote a Note 
requesting him to furnish a Number of men to mount Cer- 
tain Guards as were Necessary to insure early inteligence 
of the Enemies movements should they make a second De- 
cent on this Shoar as to prevent a Communication with the 
Enemy, and sent Lieu' Colo' Laurence with it to Gen' New- 
comb. 

" At the Colo" return I reC* a Verbal Answer y' the 
Counsil of safety had no right to give him any Directions. 
Neither woold he furnish nie with one Man or receive any 
orders from me — That He had called the Militia together 
without any order and woold if he pleased Dismiss them 
the Next Day and requested he might not be troubled with 
any further Applications from Gen' Forman. 

" The Militia from y' Quarter was then Comeing in, in 
Considerable Numbers — it struck me very fully y' by pur- 
sueing any rough measures towards Gen' Newcomb, the 
Militia might make a pretence of our Dispute to refuse to 
Assemble & y' it was not Improbable to Conclude Gen' 
Newcomb woold even Dismiss those y' ware allready As- 
sembled — I thought it very Imprudent to risque either of 
these events at y' critical time — on Considering y' part of j'' 
Excel^' Letter of the 31' wherein your Excel^ recommends 
my making a Pointed representation of Gen' Newcomb's 
Conduct, I come to the Following resolution. Viz'. 

" The Troops y' marched from Monmouth with me ware 
previously incorporated with the Garrison in red Bank fort. 
Those from Burlington I ordered to mud Island as soon as 
They should arrive — Conceiving I could at no Time be 
better spared to make the Necessary representation in per- 
son to the Gov"' Counsil & Assembly of Gen' Newcomb's 
Conduct & at the same time give the Militia Time to Assem- 
ble — Gen' Varnum's being in the Nibourhood allso Con- 
spired to make my Presence less Necessary — On Coming 



92 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

to Trentown I found the Assembly had adjourned to prince 
Town — To which place I followed them on Monday — The 
Gov' was not then come. 

" On Teusday Evening he arrived, but too Late to do any 
Business — Wednesday morning I waited on him Early and 
full}' Explaind Gen' Newcomb's Conduct — a Counsil of 
Safety was called and a Letter wrote by the Gov' with the 
Advice of the Counsil to Gen' N'ewcomb to give me the 
Command as being the Eldest officer — and No farther 
Notice Taken of him. 

" While I was here Two Petitions ware handed into the 
Assembly most unjustly charging me and sundry other Gen' 
with undue practices on the Day of Election & praying 
the Election to be set aside — The Petition was read in the 
House and a Hearing ordered on Teusday next and a Notice 
served on me to attend. 

" I immediately went to the Assembly, Informed them of 
my then situation and requested the hearing might be De- 
ferred for a few Days until the militia ware assembled and 
put in some order — my request was Denyed. 

" I informed them y' it was impossable for me to do Jus- 
tice to my Command at red Bank, and attend the House on 
Teusday — y' I found myself hurt as a Gen' by the Illiberal 
Charges in the petition — y' my reputation as such might 
suffer should I Neglect to attend — 

" On the other hand my reputation as an Officer might 
be injured by my absence from my post for so long a Time 
as I Conceived ray Attendance on their House would be 
Necessary. 

" Y' I knew of no way to save my reputation as a Gen' 
and at the same time to risque nothing as an officer but re- 
signing my Commission — Which I then Delivered to M' 
Speaker and Left the House — a few Minutes after I rec* a 
Message From the House Informing y' as I had not rec'' my 
Commission from Them, they could not receive it and re- 
turned it to me. I went Immediately to the Gov' from him 
I rec^ it and returned it to him. 

"Although I have long been Disgusted with the Indo- 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 93 

lence and want of Attention to military Matters in the 
Legislature of this State, I was Determined to spin out this 
campaign in my Slavery, untill I found a set of Men Ploting 
by the most unftiir Means to stain my Reputation. 

" for I am well perswaded they ment to take advantage of 
my Absence & at a Time when they conceived I woold not 
have been able to attend. — Gen' Varnums being at red Bank 
will I doubt not abundantly supply my absence. 

" I have at pres' no anxiety but y' the steps I have taken 
may not so fully meet your Excel^" approbation as I could 
wish, & y' I flatter myself I shall have it when I have an 
opportunity fully to Explain to your Exce'^ my Treatment. 
I have the Ilon^ &c 

" David Forman. 

" N.B.— I This minute rec* good Information y' 36 sail of 
ships sailed from New York and Sandy Hook on the fifth 
of This Inst Supposed to be Gen' Clinton." 



WASHINGTON TO MAJOR-GENERAL DICKINSON. 

" Head Quarters, 8'" November, 1777 
" Dear Sir : 

" I have received your Letter of the 6'" Inst., and thank 
you for the intelligence contained in it. You will farther 
oblige me by communicating immediately whatever new 
matter of public consequence may occur. 

" The importance of the Post at Red-bank makes it neces- 
sary for us to employ all possible resources in rendering it 
so respectable by the strength of the Garrison, and the 
number of Troops stationed within distance to co-operate 
with it, as not to fear even a more formal Attack than was 
exhibited in the first successless effort of the Hessians. All 
the men in your State that can be spared should therefore 
be collected and march'd to join Gen' Varnum. 

"Your present of salt-water delicacies will be the more 
acceptable to us, as they are so great a Rarity, and as I an- 



94 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

ticipate the pleasure they will give, I return you my thanks 
for them before their arrival. I am &c.' 

" G. Washington." 

WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM. 

" Head Quarters, Whitemarsh, 8 Nov. 1777. 
" Sir : 

"Your fav' of the B* relieved me from much anxiety as 
it was confidently reported that the firing upon the 5th was 
upon Fort Mifiiin. I am pleased to hear of the Success of 
your cannonade against the Shipping, and I am very certain 
if we had more heavy Cannon mounted upon travelling car- 
riages to move up and down the Beach occasionally, that 
we should annoy and distress them exceedingly. To pos- 
sess Billingsport as well as Red Bank is certainly a most 
desirable object, but circumstanced as we are at present in 
respect to numbers it is impossible. In a letter from Gen' 
Dickinson of the 6* he informs me that he had ordered two 
detachments of Militia to march from Elizabeth Town to 
Red Bank, one consisting of 160 men ; he does not mention 
the number of the other. I have just seen a very intelli- 
gent person from Philadelphia. He has been conversant 
with many people who stand high in the confidence of the 
British ofiicers of the first rank. He finds from all their 
discourse that a formidable attack is to be made upon Fort 
Miflilin very soon; if that fails they will be obliged to change 
their quarters, as they find they cannot subsist in the city 
without they have a free communication with their shipping. 
I therefore repeat what I wrote yesterday that you should 
immediately reinforce Fort Mifiiin as strongly as possible, 
and give the Commodore notice of the intended attack. I 
approve of the Measures you have taken to procure Cloathing 

for the Troops, and am, Sir, &c. 

" G" Washington. 

' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens. " I am pre- 
paring a Waggon Load of the Woodbridge Oisters, they are too fresh, 
but are Oisters, as such, hope they will be acceptable, shall send them on 
in a few Days to Head-Quarters, when I shall beg your Excellency's 
acceptance of them." — Dickinson to WaMngton, November 6, 1777. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 96 

" The inclosed for Commodore Hazelwood, Col" Green 
and Lt. Col° Smith are from Congress, and as they bear 
honorable testimony of their behaviour hitherto, I beg they 
may be put into their hands immediately. Perhaps it may 
prove a further incentive to their gallant exertions," ^ 

BRISADIER-GENERAL VARNUM TO WASHINGTON. 

" WooDBERRY, 8"" Nov', J past 5pm 1777 
" Sir : 

" I have to acknowledge the Rec' of your Orders of 7'" 
Instant. The Intelligence you are pleased to communicate, 
I received last Evening, by two Persons who came out of 
Philadelphia yesterday, & by a Spy whom I had in Billings- 
port yesterday, two Hours. — My Ace" give these additional 
Circumstances, That the Garrison at Billingsport consist of 
two Hundred of the seventy first Battalion,^ & two Hundred 
Marines. That they were, this Day, to be reinforced by two 
Hessian Regiments. That there were four Row Gallies & 
two floating Batteries in Schuylkil ; That an attack was to be 
made upon Fort Mifflin by the way of Schuylkill ; That they 
were to attack Red bank at the same Time, landing just 
below Timber Creek (a fine beach, and no Obstruction be- 
tween that and Fort Mercer) ; that the Troops from Billings- 
port were to move across Manto Creek, at a Signal given 
from Philadelphia, & act in Conjunction with Those from 
Philadelphia, against Fort Mercer; — That they were to 
attack this Day Morning at four, if possible ; If not, the 
first Time they should be Ready — Last Evening, at Ten, 
Sky Rockets were seen on Province Island, w°h determined 
me the Action was about to commence. I took every Pre- 
caution in my Power ; just before Sunsett this Evening, There 
appeared to be a large Number of Men, Horses, & I tho't 
Fascines, passing Schuylkill to Province Island. The Ships 
below fired Guns, w°h were supposed to be Signals. The 

' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman. The in- 
closures were the resolutions printed in Journals of Congress, November 
4, 1777. 

^ The Scotch regiment, commanded by Simon Fraser. 



96 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

Acct' respecting the Enemy's Intended Movements were 
given in the same Manner, by two Prisoners of the second 
Battalion of the seventy first Regiment, whom ray Scouts 
captured yesterda}', near Billiugsport. — I shall send a De- 
tachment this Night into Fort Mifflin, tho' upon my Honor, 
I think that Garrison sufficiently manned. — I have tho Pleas- 
ure to Inform you, tliat we had Guard Boats last night be- 
tween Hog and Province Islands, the Rout of the Enemy's 
Boats, w'^h met with, fired upon, & caused them to retreat. 
The Commodore will fix a chain this Night that is already 
prepared with dry logs to buoy it up, & anchors to fasten it 
down, between those Islands. Fourteen Gun Boats will lay 
in the Passage ; the Commodore with all his Gallies will 
lay close to the North End of Mud Island, the Floating 
Batteries, & Xebecks to guard the chievaux de Frize, & 
oppose the shipping, should they attempt to advance. And 
the Continental Vessells under Cap'. Robinson's Command 
will lay at the Mouth of Schuylkill, and at the Mouth of 
Timber Creek. I have placed the Continental and Militia 
Guards, upon Timber & Manto Creeks. In a word, I am 
perfectly satisfied with the different arrangements, & the 
universal spirit, Wh apparently pervades the whole ; & un- 
less I am too ignorant of military Dispositions, the Great 
Governor of the Universe will give to your Arms Success in 
this Quarter, should the mercenaries attack, as we sincerely 
expect and wish they will ; and to your Excellency, addi- 
tional Laurels ! Pardon me — I write upon the Run, and am 
thinking of many things at once. — The musketrj- you men- 
tion was the Ecco of Cannon in the Groves. I am &c 

"J. M. Vaknum." 



CAPTAIN LEE TO WASHINGTON. 

" No. 8'" 77 

"Sir 

"Mr. Lindsay^ is just returned from New-castle k has 
brought with him two Prisoners, the one Cap' Nicholas of 
the Eagle-packet, the other Cap' Fenwick of a sloop in 

' Lieutenant William Lindsay, of Bland's regiment. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 97 

the service of Government. These two gentlemen being 
fatigued with their ride, will not arrive at Head-quarters 
'till tomorrow. 

" The transports have received orders to furnish themselves 
with six weeks provision, & make ready for sailing with all 
despatch. A french ship laden with arms & ammunition 
lately taken by some of the enemy's cruisers, was the other 
day brought into New-castle harbour. There prevails a 
report in the fleet, that a channel has been discovered which 
avoids the chiveaux-de-frise, & that, the Somersett man of war 

ordered up to try her success on the fort, by that route. 

" One of the enemy's batteries on the Schuylkill has been 
launched two days past, & another is near finished. The 
mode now pursued by the enemy in transporting supplies, 
to the city, is as follows. They land their provision above 
Jones wharf, near a branch of Eagle-creek, they are carried 
from hence by water to Guieu' dam, where they again put 
them in boats & readily convey them down another creek to 
the Schuylkill. There is no way of interrupting them in 
this business, but by taking possession of Carpenters Island. 

" Mr. Lindsay acquaints me, that the enemy obtain large 
supplies of fresh provision, &c., from the inhabitants in the 
lower Counties; his report of this & several other matters 
eno-age me to wish for an excursion for a few davs in that 
country. 

" There is not the smallest intercourse now subsisting 
between the country & Navy from Wilmington to the Schuyl- 
kill. Your Excellency will please favor me by return of 
the dragoon with your instructions respecting this route. 
Enclosed is a let"' found; supposed to be wrote by Gen. 
Grant. I am &c 

" Hen^ Lee." 

extract of a letter from major fleury. 

"I have received His Excellency's order authorizing me 
to exercise the functions of Engineer at Fort Mifflin. Since 

' I am unable to determine what name this is intended for, as the 
writing is illegible. General Potter speaks of " Giers WarfiT." 

8 



98 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

ray being placed here I think I have neglected nothing to 
gain the Esteem of my superiors, by my constant attention 
I have endeavour'd to second the Zeal, Intelligence and 
Activity of Colo. Smith. 

" I never have undertaken any work without previously 
consulting the Commandant and Principal OiEcers, and 
rectifying my Ideas by theirs. 

" Colonel D'Arendt entrusted rae with the Command of 
the Reserve and Colo. Smith has continued me in it." 



Journal. 

" ISTovem. S"" G"*. The Enemy's boats continue to go up 
the River with the Tide every night — they seem to direct 
their course towards the mouth of the Schuylkill. I believe 
it would be possible to intercept this communication, but 
our Cannon would be of no service in it — & to fire by guess 
is throwing away Ammunition. 

" The Enemy seem determined to Winter in Province 
Island if they can't take Fort Miilliu. They are raising a 
4"" work between the two bank batteries, and half way to 
Gayers house, where their great work is situated on an 
eminence. I believe it would be possible to interrupt or 
even to ruin their works. If His Excellency would form 
some Enterprise on their Rear, I believe we might make a 
useful diversion — as I know the Island I offer to serve as 
Guide to any party that shall be order'd there, in concert 
with Col. Smith I intend this night to reconnoitre in an 
arm'd boat the position of their Sentinels, and the safest 
Landing places, of which I shall make a Report. 

" 7"". The Enemy appear desirous of fortifying themselves 
in province Island to maintain the Communication with 
their Fleet at Billingsport — they are raising Redouts from 
5 to 600 yds from the Bank, and the Fort on the rising 
ground advances rapidly towards Perfection. 

" S"". The Enemy have enlarged the upper Battery opposite 
the Fort, we this morning discover 5 Embrasures, masked 
as yet with Fascines — it is probable they will all open at 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 99 

once — their project seems to be, to knock down our pali- 
sades, and storm our west front between the two block 
houses. To cover our palisades on this side we have 
apply'd to Gen' Varnum to furnish us with fascines, which 
we shall place on the Summit of the bank to serve instead 
of Earth, which is not to be had — I don't know whether we 
shall be able to procure the Fascines." ' 

CAPTAIN CRAIG TO WASHINGTON. 

" Fkanzfgkd, 8'" Nov' 1777 
"Sir 

" By every Ace* from the City the enemy intend to Attackt 

the Fort tomorrow. The Hessians are to stand Guard, the 

Highlanders, Graniiattier and Light Infantry to make the 

Attackt. One of their Floating Batteries that was lanced 

[launched] Yesterday is sunk to the bottom. My Guard was 

rainforced Last Night. I hope I shall have it in my power 

to prevent the Enemy a Comming into the Country as much 

as the[y] have done. I am with much Truth &c. 

"C. Craig." 

BRIGADIER- GENERAL POTTER TO WASHINGTON. 

" I Receved your excelancys favour of yesterday leat last 
evining, ocasioned by my being leat on the enemys lins, 
there is nothing perticquler that I see in my power to do 
heare, could I Belive that my Troops were tit to storm 
Brestworks I wold have actacted the Island before this time. 
But Common prudance considring who I command has 
forbid it — altho I flater myself I have not the worst of men. 
I have sent all my Bagage six miles Back of where I am 
encamped and there unloaded all my waggins and ordered 
carridges to be maid for the waggons to move the stones 
from the Brandewine Mills and sent off one Hundred men 
for that purpose, at present the men under ray command 
are mutch scattred on difrent Commands as the lines I have 

' Translated by Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens. 



100 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

ocqupeyed are from Vanderings on the Schuylkill to Grubs 
on the Dalawer. I Keep a Piquit at Brooms Dam of one 
Cap*" 2 sub' 3 sajants, 50 men one at the Brest "Works of 
12 men one at Grays ferrey of 30 men one at the middle 
ferrey of 100 men one at the uper ferrey 25 men up by Van- 
derings a Reconoitring party under Major Miller, all these 
parties has a shutable number of oiEcers I have all ways 
a number of other partys on difrent Command I mount a 
guard in and about Camp of 100 men and Officers to com- 
mand them as soon as it is in my power to collect in these 
men I will order as maney as is over six Hundred privats 
to join the Camp at Head Quarters agreeable to your orders. 
There is one Batt" times out yesterday and two more to- 
morrow and when there times is out they will go the Mi- 
litia under Col. Crawford Came to me at Night and went 
off in the morning. I Requested that the[y] might assist in 
Moving the mill stons, Col. Crawford thought the[y] wold 
not and we did not ask them, as for Breaking the Banks 
there is Enuf of that sort of works dun alredey the[y] have 
found out an easer way of Bringing there provision the[y] 
unload at Joneses warff' about 100 yarrds from Eagle Creek 
and eareys it up the Creek to Giers warff, thence to Mingas 
Creek and into the Schulkill at Everleys the floting Batt^ 
the[y] Bult at Everleys sunk in the lancing the enemy has 
Carried down a Great number of fagats to the point whether 
for the purpose of Defence or for to make Bridges I cant 
say, when I send the Troops away I must draw back, and 
work on a smaller scale. I am &c. 

" Ja^ Potter. 

" P.S. — James Gray, son of M"^ George Gray came out 
of Town yesterday who says it is Reported in town that a 
Bot load of Ilesseus was latly sunk amounting to 60 men 
ocasioned by a Cannon Ball going throo the Boat, there 
was a number more drounded on Provance Island in the 
flud."i 

' The endorsement shows the date of the letter to have been Novem- 
ber 8. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 101 

COUNCIL OF WAR. 

"At a Council of War &c. 8'" Novem. 1777 

^ " Present 

" Major Generals Sullivan Brigadiers Maxwell 

" Greene Knox 

" Marquis La Fayette Wayne 

" McDougall Weedon 

" Woodford 
" Scott 
" Conway 
" Huntington 
" Irvin 
" His Excellency having informed the Council of the Rein- 
forcements that were expected from Peekskill and that 
among them was 1600 Militia from Massachusetts under 
Gen' Warren, whose times would expire the last of Novem- 
ber. 

" His Excellency informed the Council, that from a variety 
of circumstances he was of opinion that the Enemy mean a 
formidable attack upon Fort Mifflin very soon, and desired 
their opinion whether under our present circumstances as 
to Numbers, &c., we could afford further assistance to the 
Forts than has been hitherto given without endangering the 
Safety of this army. 

"The following Question was put: Whether, in case the 
Enemy should make an attack upon the Forts upon Dela- 
ware, it would be proper with our present Force to fall 
down and attack the Enemy in their Lines near Philad^ ? 
" Ans'* in the Negative unanimously." 

WASHINGTON TO FRANCIS HOPKINSON AND JOHN WHARTON. 

" Head Quarters, Whitemarsh, 9 November, 1777 
" Gentlemen : 

" I yesterday rec* a letter from Congress informing me 
that they had received a Report from your Board with your 
opinion upon the most probable means of securing the 
Frigates. Whereupon they came to the following Resolu- 
tion on the 4* ins' : 



102 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

" ' Ordered, that a Copy of the said report be sent to Gen' 
Washington for his approbation and if he approve the same 
that a detachment of troops be sent to assist in the Con- 
struction and Management of the Batteries aforesaid." 

" Upon the Eec' of this I took the opinion of the General 
Officers who unanimously agreed that, as we had not any 
men to spare to construct and defend the works recom- 
mended by you, there were no other possible means of 
effectually securing the Frigates but by scuttling them. 
Tou will therefore be pleased to have it done in such man- 
ner as will render the weighing of them most easy in future, 
and in such depth of Water as will secure them from being 
damaged by the floating Ice in the Winter. All the other 
Vessels capable of being converted into armed ships should 
be scutled also. This should be done as speedily as possi- 
ble, and as secretly, for should the Enemy get notice of 
your intentions, I should not at all wonder at their sending 
up a force purposely to destroy them or bring them down. 
You will dispose of the men that were on Board of them as 
directed in my former. I am &c ^ 

" G° Washington." 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM TO WASHINGTON. 

"WOODBEREY 9th Nov. i past 6 Ev., 1777 
" Sir : 

" Previous to the Rec' of j'our Commands of yesterday, 
I had sent an additional Reinforcement of a Cap' two Subs, 
three Serjeants and fifty Rank & File into Fort Mifflin. I 
have been at Fort Mifflin to daj- ; The Enemy are prepared 
to open a Batery of five Guns, I take them to be Eighteens 
or Twenty fours, this ISTight or to morrow Morning ; In Con- 
junction with their two Howitzers, besides two small Bat- 
teries, w'h they have heretofore fired from. They have been 

' See Journals of Congress, November 4, 1777. 

' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghraan. It will be 
remembered that it was on this day that Washington received from Lord 
Stirling the sentence from Brigadier-General Conway's letter to Gates 
which gave him the first definite intimation of the cabal against him. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 103 

very busy this Day in Crossing the Mouth of the Schuj-lkill 
with Waggons, Fascines &c. — Two double Deckers more 
have pass'd thro' the lower Frize. There are Eight in the 
whole upon this upper Station, but all of them are below 
my two Gun Battery. Thirsday last one Floating Battery 
was launched in Schylkil. it sunk with its Guns w°h were 
bro't from the Eagle ; Two more upon the stocks, one to 
have been launch'd this day. They are very busy in build- 
ing two Bridges across Schuylkill, all their Force seems to 
be in that Quarter, w"'h is destined to the Attack of Fort 
Mifflin. Their Boats are moved from Delaware; This is 
Intelligence gained from a Ferryman opposite Cooper's 
Ferry, who came from Philadelphia this Day — Our Guard 
Boats keep the Enemy from transporting Provisions &c.,the 
usual Way, but they pass unmolested over Tinnicum Island, 
by the Way of Derby Creek, a Rout that lays out of our 
Power — They enemy will make Fort Mifflin very warm. I 
shall relieve them from Time to Time to my utmost. I 
think thej' will Open their Batteries with great Activity : 
Soon after w°h, it is probable they will bring down their 
Water Craft from Schylkill, which will make a Line of 
Fire intersecting that from their Principal Battery on Prov- 
ince Island, at an Angle of about thirty Degrees. — The 
Commodore seems determined to meet them with Spirit, 
adhering to the same Dispositions, w°h I had the Honor of 
mentioning in my Letter of Yesterday — The two Mischiefs 
the Enemy will Effect by their cannonade, will be making 
of Breeches in the mud walls, and knocking down the Palli- 
sades. To remedy w°h, as much as possible, I am sending 
numbers of Pallisades, into the Fort, & great Quantities of 
Fascines. — I hope to God, our mutual Efforts here may be 
pleasing to your Excellency ; I am certain they arise from 
Good Intentions. — I ardently wish to see Gen' Foreman ! 
I cannot yet hear from him. Gen' Newcomb has, he tells 
me, about five hundred Militia here. — They are principally 
without Ammunition. — They arc good Men, & have many 
good Offlcers with them. It is a Pity they cannot be properly 
furnished. The Old Gentleman, like Imlach of old, is anx- 



104 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

ious to do all the good he can, But, unfortunately the Mo- 
tions of the Stars are not committed to Superintendence. 
I am like a body without a soul, for the want of light Horse. 
I have not beeu able to procure any. 

" I am out of patience with the commissaries. No Pro- 
visions of any consequence in the Garrisons — I have strip'd 
this Post today, & sent to Fort Mifflin — I will continue 
sending in Supplies as fast as I can. — If these Gentlemen 
do not act with a little more Sincerity, I will lessen their 
Number. 

" The Baron is really unfit to be in this Neighbourhood. 
He will not be fit for Duty for a long Time, if ever. — I hope 
he may obtain Permission to retire. — His letter is inclos'd. 

" Be pleas'd to accept of my sincerest Thanks for your 
Excellency's repeated Informations, and the paternal Care 
you exercise towards this little part of your Family. 
" I am, in due Submission, &c. 

"J. M. Varnum. 

" N.B. — In Justice to Col° Frink I must mention, he de- 
livered your letter of yesterday, at Nine, last Evening. 

" P.S. — I past Seven. W"" Ward is bro't in by my Scouts, 
a Prisoner from Camilla, who was this afternoon taken. 
' He come ashore with the Captain to dine at Billingsport ; 
— He says the Ships are in Readiness to move up upon a 
Si2:nal, w°h is to be given from Province Island, w°h will 
be an English Jack hoisted. They are to attack Red Bank, 
saying that if they should take fort Mifflin, red Bank would 
cover the Garrison. Says the Shipping have orders to move, 
some to New York, some to one Place, & some to another, 
in a Fortnight, should they not take the Forts. — Says the 
Ships have not more than a Third of their Complement, & 
are verj' sickly.' 

" Whether their Preparations against Mifflin are real or 
a Feint, T cannot say; but believe the former; however 
shall attend to both Circumstances."' 

' Endorsed : " This goes by Quartermaster Wheatly, wbo is permitted 
to pass all Guards, and others, unmolested." 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 105 

COLONEL SMITH TO WASHINGTON. 

" FoET Mifflin, 9'" November, 1777 
" Sir : 

" About the 20"" Instant if we are not attacked sooner, I 
am of Opinion we shall have put this Fort in a good posture 
of defence, at which time the Officers of the Virginia Regi- 
ments and my party hope your Excellency will relieve them 
and their men. Your Excellency will see the propriety of 
this request when I assure you that out of 200 Men com- 
pleatly Officer'd which my Party consisted of, there are not 
now in Garrison more than 4 Officers and 65 Privates, the 
6"" Virginia Reg' brought 120 rank and file, and this morn- 
ing returned only 46 fit for duty, the first nearly in propor- 
tion, and the party from Gen' Varnum have already sent off 
4 oflicers and 16 privates besides Convalescents, for some 
time past there has not been one night without one two or 
three Alarms — one half of the Garrison are constantl}' on 
fatigue and guard, these reasons I hope will induce your 
Excellency to send the Relief they request. 

"As the Business and Duty Incumbent on the Command- 
ing Officer of this Garrison has been of a very difficult nature 
and attended with much fatigue, I shall be oblig'd if your 
Excellency will also relieve me. I shall expect to stay 
several days after the Relief arrives to shew the officers the 
Advantages and weak parts of this place. This Garrison 
will require 500 Rank and file during the winter besides 80 
Artillery Men, they will perhaps not be so sickly as we have 
been, as the fatigue will be chiefly finished, and the sickly 
season over. A Large stock of Salted Provision ought 
immediately to be laid in, for in the Winter thej' will not 
always be able to cross for Provisions &c. a want of Rum 
has occasiou'd our late very extraordinarj^ sickness. A 
quantity sufficient for a Gill each man p' Day ought to be 
provided for Winter. I have the Honor &c 

"Sam. Smith." 



106 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

COLONEL SMITH TO WASHINGTON. 

" Fort Mifflin 9'" November, 1777. 
" Sir : 

" I receiv'd your Excellency's favour of the 4"'. I pre- 
Bume you must have mistook Major Fleury's meaning, he 
has since he arrived acted fully in his department of En- 
gineer, when I proposed anj'thing he has generally been so 
polite to approve it. he writes and I presume will acknowl- 
edge that his Ideas have been adopted as far as the strength 
of the garrison would permit. 

" The enemy since I wrote you last have been fortifying 
their Island for an advanced post and for a pass to the City, 
they have strengthened the first work which they made on 
the height with Pickquets and Abbatees, and yesterday threw 
up a breast work or Redoubt, a quarter of a mile below that, 
I Immagine to defend some narrow part of the Creek where 
you might pass to repossess the Island. Within these two 
nights they have thrown up a long Breast work to the left 
of their first Bomb Battery, it is not yet opened, but we 
can distinguish 5 Embrasures and Ship Carriages for their 
Cannon. I am of opinion their Intentions now must be to 
knock down our pallisades on that side, destroy our Block 
houses & storm us. We had your Excellency's notice last 
night and prepared accordingly, but I conceive they will not 
attempt any thing until they make a breach. 

" The Honble the Congress have done me too much 
Honor ; perhaps the enemy may give us an Opp'^ to merit 
the high approbation they are pleased to express of my con- 
duct and the Officers under me. I have the Honor &c 

"Sam Smith." 

continuation of major 

" 9"" at night. The Enemy appearing ready to open their 
batteries, we raised the bank which covers our Palisades on 
the west Front, against which the whole Fire of the Enemy 
is directed, and which will be the point of attack in case of 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 107 

their storming the Fort. I have some fascines making at 
Eed-bank, but shall want a great number. 

" 10— The 24 and 18 pound shot from the Batteries No. 16 
and 17 broke some of our Palisades this morning, but this 
does not make us uneasy — t\iQj save us the trouble of cut- 
ting them to the height of a man — which we should do, as 
the tire of loop-holes [is] in itself not very dangerous, and 
our loop-holes in particular are so badly contrived as to 
leave two-thirds of the Glacis unrak'd. 

"It is probable that the Enemy will undertake to carry 
this place by storm, and I should not fear them if we could 
fix the floating Chain described in the Figure ; it would cover 
the Front which is likely to be attacked, and by delivering 
us from our uneasiness for this side, would enable us to post 
the men destined for its defence, at the Wall of Masonry 
which is ten feet high and is not out of the reach of an Esca- 
lade, notwithstanding the Ditches, Pits and Stakes Ac" with 
which we have endeavour'd to surround it. 

" The Commodore, Master of the incoyyijmrable Chain in 
question, proposes to stretch it by means of Buoys, between 
our Island and Province Island. I believe this obstacle to 
the communication between the Enemy's Fleet and Army 
will be of little consequence, and if he would spare us the 
Chain, the Enemy would pay dear for their Hardiness if they 
dared attack us. Colonel Smith wrote this morning to ask 
this favour, but I am afraid that public Interest will suffer 
by private misunderstandings. I am interrupted by the 
Bombs and Balls which fall thick. 

" 10 at noon. The Firing increases but not the eftect — our 
barracks alone suffer. 

" At 2 o'clock. The Direction of the fire is changed — our 
Palisades suiFer — a dozen of them are broke down — one of 
our Cannon is damaged near the Muzzle — I am afraid it will 
not fire streight. 

" 11 at night. The Enemy keep up a firing of Cannon 
every half hour — Gen' Varnum promised us Fascines and 
Palisades, but they are not arrived — and they are absolutely 
necessary. 



1 08 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

" The Commodore has promised the Chain — Our Garrison 
diminishes, our soldiers are overwhehued with Fatigue — 
they spend nights in watching and Labour without doing 
much on account of their weakness." ' 

•WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENEKAL VARNUM. 

"Head Qtjaeters, 10"" November, 1777 
" D« Sir : 

" I am pleased to find by yours of the S"' that proper dis- 
positions were formed for the reception of the Enemy at 
Forts Mercer & Mifflin and that the Garrisons were so full 
of confidence. We already hear a firing which we suppose 
a prelude to something more serious. I sincerely wish you 
success; but let the event be fortunate or otherwise, pray 
let me have the speediest intelligence. I am &c 

" G° Washington. 

"P.S. — Your Detachments are on their march from 
Fishkill to join you." 

continental navy board to WASHINGTON. 

"Continental Navy Board 

" Borden Town 10"' Nov'. 1777 
" Sir : 

" In Answer to your Letter of yesterday, we would in- 
form 3-our Excellency that when we first fixt the Navy 
Board at this Place & got our Frigates up, we had formed a 
Plan for defending them by a small Battery; of which 
among many other Things we gave Notice to the Marine 
Committee of Congress. We had no Answer to our Letter 
from that Committee till the Day before yesterday, when 
they sent us the Resolve of Congress referred to in your 
Letter. In the mean Time, however, we had the Honour 
of a Correspondence with your Excellency on this Subject; 
in which j'ou fully declared your Judgment of the Matter 
and explicitly told us what you would have done. We 
have the satisfaction of assuring your Excellency that your 
Orders were immediately complied with, & as punctually 

' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens. 



Defences of Philadelpkia in 1777. 109 

executed as our Situation would admit of. The Frigates 
have been long since sunk, and now lie fast aground in a 
Place where they can receive no Damage from the Ice & 
cannot possibly be got off by the Enemy unless they knew 
the particular Parts where they have been bored, & of which 
we have a secret Gage that will enable us to raise them with 
Ease when a suitable Time shall offer. "We gave you our 
"Words that your Desire should be complied with & we have 
fulfiU'd our Engagement so far as respected the Frigates ; 
the men indeed have not been discharged owing to the fol- 
lowing Accident : In sinking one of the Ships she unfortu- 
nately lay against a steep Bank, which on the Tide's falling, 
caused her to heal outwards from the Shoar. As this is an 
uneasy Situation & may injure the Ship we have been obliged 
to retain all the Hands & even hire more to get her up-right 
again. "We have not yet been able to Effect this Purpose, 
but hope to do it in a few Days with the Purchases & Powers 
we are preparing to apply. All other Vessels great & small 
(one only excepted) we have with great Labour crouded up 
Crosswick's Creek, where most of them Ij'e aground at high 
water, nor can any be got down but by means of an extra- 
ordinary Tide, or Fresh, nor then, but with the utmost Skill 
& Patience. Not trusting wholly to this, however, our De- 
termination is to sink a "V^essel at the Mouth of the Creek, 
which must effectually secure them from the Enemy. The 
Ship excepted above, is a large "Vessel belonging to M"'. 
Robert Morris, having on Board a valuable Cargoe of To- 
bacco, part Continental & part his private Property. This 
ship cannot possibly be got up the Creek with her Cargoe, 
we are therefore unloading her into Shallops & when empty 
shall get her also up the Creek, or sink her, which ever may 
be most suitable. We request your Excellency would be 
perfectly easy as to the Shipping at this Place. The Enemy 
may possibly send up & burn them, — this we cannot help — 
but you may depend upon it none of them shall fall into 
their Hands, so as to become an Annoyance to your military 
Operations. 

" It gives us great Concern to think your Excellency 



1 10 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

should for a Moment suppose us capable of neglecting your 
earnest Instructions after having so solemnly assured you 
we would strictly obey them. We confess, however, the 
Resolve of Congress in Consequence of our former Kepre- 
sentation, gave you suiEcient Reason to suppose we had 
applied to that Body, instead of following your Advice. 
But the mystery will unfold when you consider that our 
Application to Congress was prior to the Letters we received 
from you on this Subject. We did indeed write to Con- 
gress a second Time, enclosing a Copy of your Instructions 
to us, and declaring our Determination of complying with 
them. But Congress, anxious, as we suppose to save the 
Frigates, & not so apprehensive of Danger from the Enemy, 
framed their Resolve parellel to our first Scheme ; which on 
further Consideration appears to be ineffectual. 

" We shall be happj' in hearing from your Excellency 
that the above Representation is satisfactory; & that our 
Conduct in this Affair meets with your Approbation. If 
anything is amiss, or you would wish anything further to 
be done in our Department, you may depend on our earnest 
Endeavours to comply with your Desire. 

" We request your Excellency would be so good as to 
forward the enclosed Packet to York Town by the first 
Opportunity. We have therein informed Congress of what 
we have done & our Reasons for so doing. 

" With the utmost Esteem & sincere Prayers for your 
Health & Success, we have the Honor to be &c. 

" Era'; Hopkinson. 
"John Wharton." 

brigadier-seneral varnum to washington. 

"WOODBERKY, 7 o'clock Ev. 10"' Nov' 1777 
" Sir : 

" The Enemy this Morning opened against us with five 
Batteries. At two this afternoon, no Man was killed or 
wounded. The Cannonade and Bombardment have con- 
tinued feebly since that Hour. I suppose the Rain has pre- 
vented their being more brisk — They have thrown some 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. Ill 

Shot among our Shipping : Theirs remain below us. They 
have made but little Impression upon the Works or Palli- 
sades. — I have just desired Col". Smith to put his Men into 
their Barracks, thinking that it is better to have a few 
killed or wounded, than to have the whole suffer, expos'd 
to the Inclemency of the weather, upon mear Mud. 

" I have reason to expect the Attack will be more severe 
tomorrow as Cannon have been observed to pass over 
Schylkill this Day — Happy might it be for Troops to 
attack Province Island upon the rear of the Batteries — 
Should Heaven continue the Rain, so as to overflow the 
Meadows, we shall attack it upon this Side. 

" It would be serviceable either to furnish the Militia 
here, with Ammunition, or discharge them. The important 
Moments are swiftly rolling on, in w°h they can assist us. 
It is with your Excellency only to supply them. 

" Fort Mifflin will soon be in want of Cartridges for 
their Cannon. The supplies are very inadequate to the 
present Siege. I am &c. 

"J. M. Varnum." 



COLONEL SMITH TO WASHINGTON. 

"FoET Mifflin, lO"" November, 1777 
"Sir: 

" This morning the Enemy open'd their Battery in the 
Rear of our Nor' West Block House, about 500 Yards dis- 
tance from it of 6 Pieces of Cannon 18 to 32 Pounders, and 
one Eight inch howitz, one other eight inch Howitz oppo- 
site the right of our Battery, they were so fortunate to 
strike one of our 18 Pounders in the two Gun Battery on 
the Muzzle, by which she is rendered useless; their Shott 
from that Battery rakes the Pallisades fronting the Meadow, 
and cuts down 4 or 5 at a time, they have laid open a great 
part of that side, and chiefly destroyed that range of Bar- 
rocks, they also keep up an incessant fire from the Hospital, 
they have dismounted 3 of our Block house Guns, and 
much injured the Block houses and the other Range of 



112 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

Barrocks. We cover our Men under the Wall, and have 
the good fortune as yet to escape unhurt, in 5 or 6 Days 
(unless the Seige can be rais'd) the fort will be laid open, 
and every thing destroyed, if they continue to cannonade 
and Bombard us as they have done, of which I haven't the 
smallest Doubt. Our Men already half Jaded to Death 
with constant fatigue, will be unfit for service. 

" Gen^ Varnum has promis'd to prepare for us new Pal- 
lisades, if so, we will replace at night what is destroy'd in 
the day, and endeavour to keep the Fort as long as it is in 
our power. As the principal object I presume of your Ex- 
cellency is to hinder the enemy from raising the Chevaux 
de frize this winter, I am of Opinion it could be done 
nearly as well from the other Shore as from this fort, was 
our Cannon there. Gen' Varnum inforra'd you of the two 
Gun Battery he erected, with which the enemy might be 
hindered from raising the Obstructions with the Assistance 
of the fleet and 2 Guns that may be placed on Bush Island. 
My Opinion & the Opinion of the Officers in this Garrison 
is, that unless the Seige can be rais'd the enemy must in a 
short time reduce this place. We are determined to defend 
it to the last extremity, but we are of Opinion that it wou'd 
be for the common good to destroy the whole of the works 
and take the Guns to the Jersey Shore, where they'll serve 
to guard the River, and in case we could get Possession of 
Billingsport to mount on it, had we that post it would 
secure the River Effectually. The Galleys will be much 
annoyed from the enemies Batteries, and when the Shiping 
comes up, we shall have the whole of their fire. A Saylor 
taken this morning says they are prepar'd to come up and 
act in concert with their Batteries. 

" Our present Situation strikes us in the light I have 
described, shou'd circumstances alter our Sentiments I shall 
give you the earliest notice. I have the Honor &c 

"Sam Smith. 

"P.S. — The enemies Boats still pass up and down the 
river. I presume with provision." 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 113 

WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM. 

"Head Quaeters, 11 November, 1777 
'' Dear Sir : 

" Your Favors of the 9"" & lO* Instant I have duly received. 
I think we may reasonably Hope, that, from the good dispo- 
sition of the Troops in your Quarter, & the Zeal & activity 
of the officers and raen,join'd to the present very advanced 
& cold Season, which must greatly retard if not prevent the 
Operations of the Enemy; Matters may Terminate with 
j'ou agreeable to our Expectations, this must have the great- 
est Influence upon the Conduct of Gen' Howe & force him 
to adopt disadvantageous or disgraceful Measures. 

" Gen' Knox informs me that he has sent down a person 
to get an exact return of the Ammunition which you now 
have, & of what ma}- be want'd, & that he has sent down 
17 Waggons loaded with Ball, which you will receive about 
this time. — A Waggon with 20,000 Musket Cartridges will 
be immediately despatch'd to be deliver'd to the Militia (if 
you see iit) by your order only. — It is greatly to be wish'd 
that all firing could be prevented except where there is a 
real Necessity & the distance such as might promise a good 
effect. 

" I have wrote to Gen' Potter ordering him to take every 
Step by which he can assist you & disti-ess the Enemy on 
Province Island — he may alarm them & draw off their Atten- 
tion from Fort MifHin if nothing more. — You are ac- 
quainted with the reasons why a greater Force is not sent 
to annoy them in that quarter. I am &c 

" G° Washington." 

brigadier-general potter to WASHINGTON. 

"NovMl"- 1777 

"Sir 

" I have just Received Intelagance of 38 sail of the enemey 
fleet coming up the River the latters was wrote five oclock 
yesterday evining altho the[y] are dated as of this day. 
the fiering yesterday was from the enemys Battereys on 

9 



114 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

province Island near the River Banks I Believe the[y] have 
dun little damige if any I liiceved your excelanceys of the 
10"" of Nov', as for my doing any thing that can be of us[e] 
to the fourt — I can't conseve how I can do it. I am c&c. 

"Ja® Potter." 



brigadier-general potter to washington. 
"Sir 

"Yesterday I sent Col. Rankan and Capt. Livis to give 
me an account of the fiering. Rankan is Returned, and 
says that about eight o'cLock there was an Attact maid on 
Rid Bank which continued one hour and a half, about 11 
oClock the Attact Began and continued upwards of one 
hour, and about 3 oClock the[3'] attact"* again and Con- 
tinued about 3 Quarters of an hour about one quarter after 
3 oClock the[y] Began again and Continued about one hour 
and a half and after the small Arms seased, the cannaiding 
Continued about 3 minits, and all seased. Col. Rankan is 
confidant that the fourt is ours yet and says he will wiger 
his hors against a gill of Whisque. I hope your Excelancey 
will have Glorious Accounts from Rid Bank. I am &c 

" Ja"* Potter. 

" Nov' ll'" 1777 ten o'clock." 



JONATHAN RUMFORD TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL POTTER. 

" Wilmington 9"" 11'" 77 
" D? General 

" This will acquaint you with the loss of a 64 Gun Ship — 

"Wednesday last, shee was drawn up with springs to her 

cables to fire on forte Miflin, alias mud Island, but as Heven 

would have it, the Springs broke or by some means gave 

way. The Ship ran a Shore n'r [M]anto Crick. Our People 

Errected a small Batery on Billings Port & soone sunk the 

Ship — there is now three Ships more going up one of which 

a 64. I am &c. 

" JoN-^ RuMFORD." 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 115 

MAJOR EVANS TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL POTTER. 

" Wilmington, Nov' 11'" 1777 
" Dear Sir : 

" Having Just arived at this place I had account of thirty 
Eight large ships lying at or near reedy Island yesterday 
with a number of troops on board some say 3 some 4 & 5 
thousand, the ships are all now standing up the River by 
this place now five of the Clock, therefore thought it my 
indispensible duty to give you tlie earliest intelligence that 
you might provide yourself accordingly. I am &c. 

" Geo : Evans, Major M." 

JONATHAN RUMFORD TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL POTTER. 

"Wilmington Nov ll'" 1777 
" Dr. General 

" I am acquainted by Cap' Hugh Mongomery who is Just 

come from the River Shore that hee Counted thirty Eight 

Sales of Vessels Cheifly ships & that hee heard from M' 

Whitehead Jones these had Ten Solders landed & came to 

his House who acquainted him That there was a fleete now 

in the Delawar with Several Thousand Brittish Soldears on 

Borde. The Ships are Now Passing by I therefore send 

you this Inteligance & am &c. 

" J0N■^ RUMFORD." 

brigadier-general VARNUM to WASHINGTON. 

"WooDBERRY 11'" November, 1777 
"Sir 

" Cap' [Samuel] Treat of the Artillery and one Man be- 
sides was killed this Morning. The Enemy have battered 
down a great Part of the Stone Wall. The Pallisades and 
Barracks are prodigiously shattered. The Enemy fire with 
Twenty four & thirty two Pounders. Upon these, and other 
Considerations, Col° Smith is of Opinion that the Fort must 
be evacuated. A storm would not be dreaded; But it ap- 
pears impossible for the Garrison to withstand point blank 



116 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, 

shot. I am now going to consult the Baron & Col° Greene. 
I expect we shall cause an evacuation this Night. I 
am &c. 

"J. M. Varnum. 

" N.B. — The Evacuation may enable us to take Billings- 
port." 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM TO WASHINGTON. 

"WooDBERRY, ll'" Nov' 12 o'Clock P.M. 1777 
" Sir : 

" I am this Moment returned from Fort Mifflin — Every 
Defence is almost destroyed. Poor Col" Smith is on this 
Shore, slightly wounded. — I have ordered the Cannon, least 
in use, to be brought off". L' Col° [Giles] Eussell of Col" 
[John] Durkee's Battalion commands. I have ordered the 
Garrison to defend at all Events 'till your Pleasure can be 
known. Nothing shall be wanting to support them, which 
we can give — The}' cannot hold out more than two Days. — 
Col" Smith urges an Evacuation still ; at least, to continue 
a small Garrison only, w°h might be bro't oft" occasionally, I 
cannot acceed to the Measure, as long as we have lost but 
few Men. — The Enemy have pass'd seven Boats this Evining 
between the Fort and Province Island. — The Cannonade is 
renewed; If as great Injury should take Place to morrow 
as to Day, we may be obliged to relinquish the Place. — I 
M-ish to know your will — The Fort shall be held, at all 
events, "till then. 

" Your Commands of this Day, just come to Hand. I am 
much obliged. 

" At Red Bank, an Eighteen Pounder burst — one man 
killed and several wounded; at the two Gun Battery, a 
Serg' killed and one wounded. 

" The Baron ought to know whether he shall <^o farther 
than this, as he is extremely unwell. I am &c 

"J. M. Varnum." 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 117 

colonel smith to brigadier-general varnum. 
"Sir 

" I am clearly of your opinion to keep the fort to the last 
extremity, which in my opinion may as well be done with 
100 as 500 men. By tomorrow night every thing will be 
levelled — our block houses next the enemy are almost 
destroyed — the N. West Block has but one piece of cannon 
fit for service — one side of it is entirely fallen down — they 
have begun on that next Read's House & dismounted two 
pieces — the Pallisades next the meadow are levelled; the 
small battery in front of the gate torn up — the [a word that 
is illegible] battery torn up also. The wall is broke thro' in 
difierent places. In fine should they storm us I think we 
must fall. However, as it is your opinion I will keep the 
garrison tho' I lose mine and my soldiers lives. I hope the 
night may prove sufficiently favorable to get out some of our 
cannon ; and then should we fall, you may still defend the 
River. I am now without 18 cartouches — must beg you will 
send me 300 which will serve me to-morrow — it must be 
done in the night. I would advise the garrison to be with- 
drawn except about 50 men, who could just keep up the 
same fire that is done now, and might escape in case of a 
storm — This would be my advice. 'Tis true I fight for glory, 
but at the same time must study the general good. I am &c 

" Sam Smith. 

" Fort Mifflin, 11 Nov. 1777. 

" N'.B. — Refiect if they make the attack that their cannon 
will be placed against our Block house, in which case no 
man can stay in them. I expect to see the whole of the 
N. W. Block house fall every minute. If you should be of 
my opinion send boats in the first place to get over the 
cannon, and before day take oflT the men leaving as I men- 
tioned." ' 

' " General Dickenson, to whose Discretion it w.as left to take the Com- 
mand of our Militia now under General Newcomb, or to continue on his 
present station as he should conceive most for the Publick Interest, has 
preferred the latter, on account of a Plan he has formed to make a 
Descent on Staten Island, which he says is a favorite scheme of his ; and 



118 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

•WASHINGTON TO FRANCIS HOPKINSON AND JOHN WHARTON.' 

" Head Quarters, 12 November, 1777 
" Gentlemen : 

" I have 3'our fav'' of the 10"" and am only sorry that I did 
not sooner know my request of sinking the Frigates had 
been complied with. The delay of the Resolve of Congress, 
from the time you first applied for their advice, was what 
led mo into a mistake, and I am obliged to you for the gen- 
teel manner in which you excuse me. I am perfectly satis- 
fied with the measures which you have taken to secure the 
shipping and desire when you have no further occasion for 
Men that they may be disposed of as directed in my former 
letters. I am itc^ 

" G'' Washington." 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL POTTER TO WASHINGTON. 

" I received your Excelanceys favour of yesterday at 10 
o'clock last night. I was out Eeconnitring, the Shiping are 
com up. the number of soldiers I cant assurtain. 

" As to the marching of the Militia the[3-] were all at Head 
Quarters before I ReC* your Letter, as for my Harrassing 
the Enemy the sitation of the pleace is such that I can do 
Little, and m^- numbers so Trifling, that I cant prevent there 
coming over the Bridge, they are alarmed on the Island, and 
have strenthened that place with men and works and cannon 
there will be mutch more dificqualty in Redusing it than 
would have been eight days ago, 

"I am sorey that Gen' [John] Armstrongis under a mistake 

from whicli he expects to derive considerable Advantage to the Cause. 
From the frequent Complaints I have had of General Newcomb's Inac- 
tivity and utter want of all Discipline, I have sent for him to this place 
to account for his conduct to General Forman ; & hope his friends here 
will embrace that opportunity to persuade him to resign a Post, which 
most of them seem now convinced he is incapable of discharging either 
with Honour to himself, or Advantage to the State." — Governor William 
Livingstonio Washinglon, November 11, 1777. 

' Some letters of this date are printed in my " Writings of Washing- 
ton,"' Vol. VI. pp. 187, 188. 

" In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 119 

in Regard of mygivin Interruption to the enemy in Balding 
there Bridge, I drove there gaurd three times down to the 
warf, but my men were oblidged to Run back again the 
ground on the other side commands tliat on tliis side and 
they soon drive us off with there cannon — If it is agreeable 
to your Excelancey I could wish some other officer was to 
take the command here. 

" I will do all in my power to get a Communication with 
Ridbauk But cant vew it in such an easy light as some 
Gentlemen do. 

" I am your Excelanceys &c 

" Ja' Potter. 
" Nov' 12"' 1777." 

brigadier-general potter to washington. 
"Sir 

" I am sorey to Inform your excelancey that Last night in 
the night the enemy got two Briggs and one sloop up past 
the Island on the side nixt the Island, and this day they 
were unloading them at the Lowast ferrey in Schulkill, 
there has been a verey hevey fiering this day at the fourt 
from the Battereys on the Islands the fourt seldom Re- 
turned the tier the Galleys went lower down the River 
[ ] and fired on the ships. 

" I hope I will Receve Accounts tomorrow from Red bank 
this Evining I have Receved the within closed from a gen- 
tleman that was in the City several daj^s he assures me that 
I will get Intiligance from two good whigs in the City — I 
have just Receved a letter from George Reed, Esq' of the 
Dalawer State Informing me that there Militia hav Destroyed 
6 Vessels in Duck Creek with provisions going to the enemys 
shipiug and Taken a number of the Treaders he can give 
no Account of the numbers of soldiers that were in the fleet 
that came up — sum says there did not appear to be meney 
on Board. I am &c 

"Ja^ Potter. 

" Nov' 12"' 1777 9 oClock 

" P.S. — We have Taken five Prisners this day and will 
send them to your Excelancey tomorrow." 



120 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

MAJOR FLEURY TO WASHINGTON. 
" EXCELLENCEY 

" in my quality of engineer in chief at fort mifflin I think 
that my duty obliges me to informe you of the present 
situation of the fort. 

" the Fire of the enemy has been successfull enough to 
spoile our three Block liouses, and dismount the canon of 
all, except two. the great lockes [logs ?] of which we had 
covered them are not strong enough to preserve the inside 
of the block houses, and we have none others to mend them. 

"some of our Palissades at the nordside are broken, but 
we can mend them every night. 

" in all the fort is certainly yet in state to be defended, 
but the garrison is so dispirited that if the enemy will at- 
tempt to storm us, I am afraid that they will succeed, they 
are so exhausted, bj' watch, cold. Rain & fatigue, that their 
Courage is very Low, and in the Last allarme one half was 
unfit for dut}'. 

" I have informed Gen' Varnam of the situation of the 
fort, and how small was the garrison considering how large 
is our enclosure. 

" I think it necessary for my honour to put under your 
eyes the same observation, to not be thought guilt}- in case 
of bad event. I am excellency &c 

" Fleury. 

" 10 o'clock 12 9"*' 1777" 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM TO WASHINGTON. 

" WooDBEERY, 12" Nov' Sunset 1777 
" Sir. 

"The Garrison holds out; tho' the Enemy continue to 
batter with great Success upon the Works, but few Men are 
killed and wounded. The Troops are extremely fatigued. 
I shall send one Hundred fresh Troops this Night, & all that 
I have tomorrow Night, if the Fort should remain defensi- 
ble. The most fati2;ued will be taken from the Garrison. — 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 121 

Col" Smith will be unable to return to bis Command for 
some Time; It is a misfortune, but, Col" Russell will com- 
mand with Spirit, & Col° Durkee will go in tomorrow Morn- 
ing, should Col° Russell be much fatigued. Inclosed you 
have Major Fleury's opinion.* I am anxious to hear from 
you. Have no particular Intelligence save that Forty sail 
of Vessells with Troops, on Saturday last, entered the Dele- 
ware. — Should the Enemy continue their Cannonade the 
Island will be lost: however, the Garrison will continue 'till 
your Excellency shall order otherwise. I am &c. 

" J. M. Varnum." 

COLONEL SMITH TO WASHINGTON. 

" WOODBERRY, 12 Nov' 1777 

" Sir : 

" I yesterday unfortunately rec'^ a Contusion on my Hip 
& left Arm, both which give me much pain. I imprudently 
went into my Barracks to answer a Letter from Gen. Varnum 
& a Ball came through the Chimney & struck rae on the Hip 
so forcibly that I remained senseless for some time, however 
I am happy to find myself much less hurted than I at first 
imagin'd & Hope in 5 or 6 days to be again fit for duty. 
Coll. Russell now commands in fort MiflSin. The troops 
there are worn out with fatigue, watchings & cold. All the 
Guns in the Block Houses are render'd unfit for service & 
the Houses almost destroy'd. the Pallisades were renew'd 
last Night & this Day destroy'd again, the other Guns on 
my two Gun Battery render'd unfit for service. An 18 p' 
next to the right of the Battery dismounted, the New Well 
very much injur'd, the whole of the Garrisons Heap of 
Ruins, this Night Gen. Varnum intends removing some 
of the heavy Cannon. "We shall perhaps be able to keep 
the fort three days, in which Time it will be levell'd to the 
Ground. Yesterday Cap' [Samuel] Treat was kill'd by a 
Ball which came through the Grand Battery & this Day his 

' This opinion is not different in detail from that submitted to Wash- 
ington, p. 120, ante. 



122 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

Lieut. [John] George wounded, so that there are now but 2 
Artillery Officers in Garrison, if they attempt a storm, I 
fear the Garrison must tall. Such weather as this the Gallies 
can give no Assistance. I Have advis'd the Garrison to be 
withdrawn, except the Artillery & ab' 50 Men who could 
keep up the same fire that the whole can. But to be pre- 
par'd & in Case the Enemy attempt a Storm they might set 
fire to every part & withdraw. Gen. Varnum waits your 
Order. I have the Honor &c. 

"Sam Smith." 

washington to brigadier-general varnum. 

" Head Quaeters, 13 November, 1777 
"Sir: 

" I wrote you two Letters yesterday' ; the first contained 
positive orders to maintain the Fort on Mud Island at all 
events, the second in consequence of subsequent advices from 
you gave discretionary powers to evacuate the post, and a 
copy of it was sent to guard against miscarriage ; I refer j'ou 
to its contents and repeat that I would liave a Show of de- 
fence kept up as long as possible by such a number of men as 
you shall judge necessary. The importance of delaying the 
forther progress of the Enemy and preventing their making 
a lodgement on the Island is too obvious to need my insist- 
ing upon it. In addition to the perseverance of the Garri- 
son, I think an Enterprise of a more active nature might 
be carried into execution in concert with a detachment from 
the Fleet. I mean a Descent upon Province Island for the 
purpose of spiking the Enemy's Cannon and levelling their 
Batteries — which would considerably embarrass the Enemy 
and gain us a great deal of time. This is proposed however 
only by way of consulting you upon the subject : you will 
be best able, being on the spot, to judge of the practicability 
of such a Scheme. Voluntiers and pick'd Men would be 
most likely to do this Service eflectually : and as a Stimulus 
to their Courage and Exertions I promise ample Rewards 
in case of Success. I would have Fort Mercer strengthen'd 
as much as Circumstances will allow — it may be put in such 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 1 23 

a condition as to require a greater Sacrifice than the Enemy 
can afford to make in attempting it. I am &c 

" G° "Washington. 

" P.S.— Present mj- Compliments to Col" Smith. The 
Contents of his Letter are fully answer'd by this to you." ^ 



MAJOR FLEURY'S JOURNAL. 

"Nov. 13"" at night. — The Enemy have kept up a firing 
part of the night — their shells greatly disturb our workmen, 
and as the moon rises opposite to us, her light discovers 
to the Enemy where we are. As long as n\j Workmen 
would remain with me, I employed them in covering the 
two western Blockhouses with Joist within and without and 
filling the interstices with rammed Earth. I have closed 
the breaches made in our Palisades, with Planks, Centry- 
boxes, Rafters, and strengthen'd the whole witli earth — 
General Varnum has sent me neither Ax, Fascine, Gabion \ 
nor Palisade, altho he promised me all these Articles,! sup- 
pose it has not been in his power — it is impossible however 
with watry mud alone to make works capable of resisting 
the Enemys 32 Pounders. 

" 14"' Day light discovers to us a floating battery of the 
Enemy, placed a little above their grand battery, and near 
the Shore ; it seems to be a Bomb-battery. 

" Fort Mifllin is certainly capable of defence if the means 
be furnished — if they supply us from Red-bank with Tools, 
Fascines, Palisades, &ca all which they may do in abun- 
dance — the Fire of the Enemy will never take the Fort, it 
may kill us men but this is the Fortune of War. and all 
their bullets will never render them masters of the Island, 
if we have courage enough to remain on it — but they are 
removing our Cannon from the grand battery under pre- 
text that it is necessary to raise a battery on the Jersey side 
to keep the Enemys shipping at a distance — but what signi- 
fies it, whether their Fleet be at the point of Hog Island or 
a quarter of a mile lower — will they not by taking this 

' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens. 



124 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

Fort have the Channel of province Island open, for their 
small Sloops and other light vessels — will they not drive the 
Gallies from the River — Fort Miiflin is the important 
Object, it must be maintained and furnish'd with means of 
defence. Men, Earth and Fascines to cover them — Our 
new Garrison consists of 450 Men — what can they do in a 
circumference of works so extensive as ours — being weak 
everywhere, they could make a defence nowhere and the 
Fort would be carried — The apparent Project of the Enemy 
is to debark on the Island ; either to risque a Storm, or to 
establish a battery on the old ferry wharf, or nearer if they 
can — what means have we of hindering them — with a Gar- 
rison so feeble, can I make any advantageous Sallies — can I 
dislodge the Enemy — if I raise a battery against them will 
it not serve against ourselves in case of attack — for without 
a sufficient number to defend it, it must be given up — our 
grand Battery has 19 Embrasures and 8 cannon, two of 
which are dismounted — we must have Artificers to make 
Wheels — Fascines and Palisades for breaches. Gen' Var- 
num supplies us scantily — We must have men to defend 
the Ruins of the Fort — our Ruins will serve us as breast- 
works, we will defend the Ground inch by inch, and the 
Enemy shall pay dearly for every step — but we want a com- 
manding Officer, ours is absent and forms projects for our 
defence at a distance. 

" P.S. — As the Light becomes clearer, I jierceive the En- 
emys floating battery, not to be a mortar battery but that it 
contains two 32 Pounders — we are going to raise a Counter 
battery of two eighteen Pounders taken out of our River 
battery — which will now have no more than 7 Guns, the 
Wheels of two of which have been disabled hy the Enemy's 
Cannon. We are so much neglected that we have been 7 
daj'S without wood, and at present have only cartridges of 
eighteen pounders for a Piece of 32 which does considerable 
michief to the Eneni}'. 

" 14"" at 7 oClock. The Enemy keep up a great Fire 
from their Floating Battery and the shore. 

" I repeat it, our Commanding Officer issues orders from 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 125 

Woodberrj — if he were nearer he would be a better judge 
of our Situation. 

" Our blockhouses are in a pitiful condition, but with 
fascines I hope to cover two pieces in each lower stor}' which 
will be sufficient to flank us. I say again the Euemys fire 
will not take our fort, if they attempt a storm we shall 
still have a little parapet to oppose to them, but we must 
have men to defend it. 

" Novem 14"" at noon. 

" We have silenced the Enemy's floating Battery, I know 
not whether we have dismounted her Cannon, or whether 
her present Station exposes her too much, but the firing 
from her has ceased. I suspect that she is destined to land 
men on this Island. 

"Their grand battery is in little better condition than our 
block-houses — We have open'd an embrasure at the Corner of 
the Battery, and two pieces here joined to two others on the 
left which we have reinstated, throw the Enemy into disorder. 

" I repeat it — their fire will kill us men, because we have 
no cover, but it will never take the Fort, if we have suffi- 
cient courage to keep our ground — but a stronger Garrison 
is indispensibly necessary, we are not secured against Storm, 
if the Enemy attempt it — I fear they will succeed — in pene- 
trating a Circumference of 1200 Paces defended only by 
450 men and half ruined Palisades — A boat which this day 
deserted from the Fleet, will have given the Enemy suffi- 
cient intimation of our weakness — they will probably attack 
us or attempt a Lodgment on the Island which we cannot 
prevent with our present strength. 

" Tonight an Attempt is to be made on the floating battery 
of the Enemy."' 

BRIGADIER- GENERAL VARNUM TO WASHINGTON. 

" WOODBEREY, } p" 4 Mor. 

ugll, "14 Nov. 1777 

"One Hour since, all was pretty well in Fort. Three 
killed yesterday, and seven wounded. Our greatest misfor- 

' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens. 



1 26 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

tune has been, that so high, we could get nothing across the 
River. However it is now calm, & the time improving. I 
have sent all the fresh Troops into the Fort & shall, in every 
Respect pursue your Orders signified IS"", o oClock P.M. 
The Garrison may continue for some Time. Possibly we 
shall keep the Island. To day we shall open upon their 
Shipping with three Guns from the lower Battery. I am &c. 

"J. M. Varnum." 



BRIGADIEK-GBNERAL VARNUM TO WASHINGTON. 

" WooDBERRY, i past 3 P.M. 14"' Nov' 1777 
"Sir: 

" Your Favor of yesterday is received. Major [Simeon] 
Thayer has the Command at Fort Mifflin at Present. In- 
clos'd you have his Sentiments. I have continued nearly 
four hundred Rank & File in the Garrison. All Col° Smith's 
Troops are brought to the Main to get a little Rest. I have 
no more Troops fit for Duty. I am very happy that a toler- 
able Prospect of holding the Post appears — Last Evening 
my whole Company of Artillery went into the Fort. Capt. 
[James] Lee commands. He is brave and good. — It is very 
unhapp}^ that the Wind has been so great ; However, we shall 
be now [better] able to send supplies, than for several Days. 
— An Attempt upon Province Island is desirable, but impos- 
sible for us, who have no Troops, but fatigued ones, & those 
in less Force than the Enemy's upon that Place. As your 
Orders appear discretionary, in some measure, we shall 
risque many things in attempting to keep the River. — I 
think we may hold the Island till such Time as you can send 
us five Hundred Troops to make a second Relief — If that 
cannot be done, we will endeavour to hold it. 

" The large Howitz we want very much. I am &c. 

"J. M. Varnum. 

" N.B.— I am now going with Col" Smith to Fort Mifflin, 
& shall be able, in the Morning, to give you a particular 
ace'." 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 127 

MAJOR THAYER TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM. 

" Fort Mifflin, Nov. 14, 1777 
"Sir 

" By this I would give you to understand that the can- 
onade we have here we value not, nor can conceive how 
any one would dream of delivering up so important a post 
as this at present ; from Cannon we have nothing to fear, if 
there should be no sudden storm. If, Sir, you will send us 
a reinforcement tonight of 100 or more men, it will certainly 
be a great means of the salvation of this garrison. A float- 
ing battery of the enemy appeared this morning. We have 
silenced her for the present. I am &c 

" Simeon Thayer Cora''. 

" P.S. — A Boat with a number of men deserted from our 
fleet but this minute — they may give some unfavorable 
account of our state, and insinuate some notion of our 
evacuating the fort. All well — none hurt since my arrival 
here — The garrison in good spirits." 

CAPTAIN lee to WASHINGTON. 

" N" 14"- 77 
" Sir : 

" I have just returned from the lower counties on Dela- 
ware. In our excursion thro' that country, the several 
landings on the river were visited, but to our satisfaction, we 
learned that the intercourse between the inhabitants & fleet 
was totally broke up. Lord Howe has positively forbid the 
least connexion under severe penalties. 

" I should have proceeded down as far as Dover, in order 
to destroy some small craft, that were employed in furnishing 
the enemy with fresh provision fuel &c, from Duck creek, 
but this business being completed by Gen Patterson, I con- 
cluded the route unnecessary, & returned to my former 
station. Thirty eight sail of Transports arrived in the 
delaware while I was down & joined the fleet ofl" Chester. 
It was expected they had troops on board from N. York, but 



128 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

none could be discovered as they passed up the river. I 
am &c. 

"Hen'' Lee." 



MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE TO WASHINGTON. 

" At Mk Morris, Nov. U'" 8 oClock P.M. 1777 
" Dr. Sir. 

" We have just returned from reconnoitering the grounds 
about Darby, the Islands below and up to the middle ferry — 
we purpose to go out again in the morning — from the present 
view Darby appears the only eligible position for the army 
for the purpose of their crossing the river. It is the opinion 
of several of the gentlemen that the enemy may be kept 
dislodged from the Islands by detachment, others are of 
opinion that it would be dangerous unless the party was 
covered, by the Army, but all are of opinion, it is practicable 
either the one way or the other and considering the good con- 
sequences that will result from it, it ought to be attempted. 
Darby is not the most eligible post I ever saw, but it is not 
so dangerous as to discourage the attempt to relieve fort 
Mifflin. 

" The iiag was flying at Fort Mifflin at sunset this evening, 
there has been a very severe cannonade today. — inclosed is 
a letter from Col° Greene respecting the condition of the 
fort. The enemy have got up two or three vessels into the 
Schuylkill, they were attempting to get up a two and thirty 
gun frigate, between hog Island and Province Island — by 
the best observation we could make her guns were taken 
out and follow'd her in a sloop. — She did not get up, but 
what was the reason, I know not. — The Commodore should 
be directed to sink a vessel or two in the new channel as 
soon as possible, and the fort encouraged to hold out to the 
last. — There is but one bridge over the Schuylkill and that 
is at the middle ferry. I examined the river myself from 
the falls to the mouth. 

" The enemy have got a chain of redoubts with Abatis 
between them from one river to the other, part of this is 
from information and part from my own observation — The 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 129 

Schuylkill is very deep and rapid, too deep for foot to ford 
it — the bridge at Matteson's ford is not in so great forward- 
ness as I could wish, the commanding officer sais it will be 
done in three days — but a bridge of waggons can be thrown 
over for the foot to pass if that should not be done. 

" The enemy are greatly discouraged by the forts holding 
out so long, and it is tlie general opinion of the best of the 
citizens that the enemy will evacuate the city if the fort 
holds out until the middle of next week. 

" There is plenty of forage in this country, especially about 
Darby — we purpose to examine the ground a little more 
about Darby tomorrow, and if possible return tomorrow 
evening — From the best accounts we can get there is but 
five ships with troops on board in the river. I am &c 

"Nath. Greene." 

commodore hazelwood to washington. 

" Red Bank, Nov' 15"' 1777 
" Sir. 

" Agreeable to your Excellencys request by letter to me 
of 13 Nov', I have inclosed you the opinion of myself & 
Officers in Council of War held of[f] Red Bank the 14'" 
Ins', a copy of which you have inclosed, where your Excel- 
lency will see we are all unanimously of opinion in regard 
to our holding this Station with the Fleet. While we were 
on this business their Fleet came up & attacked this Fort. 
I immediately carried all our force against them, & after a 
long & heavy Cannonading, with the assistance of a two 
Gun Battery, we drove or caused their Ships to drop down, 
but they getting their Ship Battery & a Sloop Battery up in 
the inner Channel close under our Fort Mifflin & under 
cover of all their Cannon & Bomb Batterys, & keeping up 
such a warm & hot fire, it was impossible for the Fort & 
that brave & good Officer to hold it longer, M'ithout that 
Ship could be destroyed. I ordered one half of our Galleys 
with as brave an officer as I had, to destroy the Ship & Sloop, 
but he returned & said it was impossible while they was so 
well supported by all their Batterys, so at last that brave & 

10 



130 Defmces of Philadelphia in 1777. 

good Officer Major Thayer was obliged to set fire to their 
works & quit the Fort. Our Fleet has received much 
damage, & numbers kill'd & wounded, which cannot now be 
exactly ascertained, but as soon as I can get a return made 
out, shall send it. We shall hold our Post as long as pos- 
sible, & shall anxiously wait to have your answer to this, 
Whether your Excellency approves of our determination. 
Our Men & Officers behaved with spirit & bravery. Having 
not to add for the present, ara &c. 

"John Hazelwood." 

" In Council of War held on board the Chatham Galley, 
Nov' 14"", 1777, summoned by Commodore Hazlewood to 
deliberate on a letter wrote him by his Excellency Gen' 
Washington dated Whitemarsh, 13"" Nov' 1777. 

" After maturely considering the contents of his Excel- 
lence's Letter, this Council are unanimously of opinion. 
That should Fort Mifflin be evacuated & so fall into the 
euemys hands, it will be altogether impracticable for our 
Fleet or any of them to keep their present station, or to 
prevent in such case the enemys raising works at the afore- 
mentioned Fort Mifflin, as in their present situation they 
are within reach of Shot & Shells from the enemys Bat- 
terys on Province Island. But should such evacuation on 
our side, & possession on that of the enemy take place, 
this Council are of opinion, that by the Batterys raised & to 
be raised on this the Jersey Shore on the upper side of 
Mantua Creek, & above that opposite the Chevaux de Friez, 
the passage of the enemys Shipping especially those of any 
considerable force, will be altogether obstructed, as without 
raising, or removing the Chevaux de Friez, it is impossible 
such Ships can have a passage. 

" Much, indeed all depends on our keeping possession of 
the Jerseys, for should the enemy prevail there, it is our 
opinion, that our Fleet will be altogether annihilated, as in 
that case our retreat & resources will be entirely cut oft". 

" Should we be by the enemys getting possession of Fort 
Mifflin, be obliged to retire further up, we have a sure retreat 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 131 

into Timber Creek where all our Fleet may shelter in safety, 
from whence the Galleys might in a very short time salley 
out & we trust defeat any light Vessels of the enemy, for 
which the pass thro' in the intervals between the Chevaux 
de Frieze might be practicable, but those Vessels in such 
case must meet with many obstacles not only the risque of 
venturing thro' almost impracticable passes, but be also 
exposed to the lire of those large Batterys of ours on this 
the Jersey Shore. 

" We of the Council are therefore unanimously of opinion. 
That on our Forces keeping possession of the Jerseys, de- 
pends altogetlier the preservation of our Fleet, & conse- 
quently every expectation to be formed from its MancEuvres 
in future. 

" John Hazelwood Isaac Roach 

" John Eice John Mitchell 

" Richard Eyres James Josiah 

" Thomas Moore Edward York 

" Nathan Boyce John Harrison 

" Hugh Montgomery Robert Hardie 

" Benjamin Dunn "William Watkin 

" Thomas Houston Isaiah Robertson 

" William Brown "Warner 

" Jeremiah Simmons Peter Bruster." 
" George Garland 

captain CRAIG TO WASHINGTON. 

" Frankfoed, IS"- Nov' 1777 
" Sir : 

" I believe your Excellency may Depend upon the enemy's 

force being drawn to Attact the Fort to day, a very severe 

and heavy firing began this morning about 10 oClock and 

has continued ever since, the Enemy Dread the Northern 

Armj-s joining your Excellency and have been making every 

preparation to attact before the IST army joyn'd, and have 

not been prepared before today. I have the honor &c 

"C. Craig." 



1 32 Defences of PhUadelphia in 1777. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM TO WASHINGTON. 

" Fort Mercer IS" Nov' 1777 6 oClk P.M. 
"Sir 

" The Firing is universal from the Shipping Batteries &c. 
— We liave lost a great many Men today — a great many of 
the officers are killed and wounded — My fine Company of 
Artillery is almost destroy'd — We shall be obliged to 
evacuate the Fort this Night. I am &c 

" J. M. Varnum. 

" Major [Silas] Talbut is badly wounded, Major Fleury is 
wounded also. It is impossible for an Officer to possess 
more merit than Major Thayer, who commands the brave 
little Garrison." ' 

BENJAMIN RANDOLPH TO WASHINGTON. 

" Burlington, 15*^ Nov' 1777 
"Sir 

" Being apointed by General Warnan to take charge of 
the Flag with Docter Glentuth, yesterday we aterated it. 
the Capton of the Friggat Eec'd it & detained us til he sent 
it to General How who Return'd for ansur we could not be 
Receved must return back to the warf at Coopers &c. 

" at 9 oClock in the morning just as we got to the ferry 
I heard a univrsal Ratle of their drums in town and all 
moveing downwards below town. I likewise heard from a 
Quaker that Just Left it & the ferryman that brought them 
over, that on the 7"" Inst, the Enemy Brought Stoors from 
their Shipiug to last them for two weeks, that they sayd no 
more could come for two weeks after that on acc't the moon- 
light uits, they said they were hail'd by our men on the fort 
three times as they were Passing up. Likewise heard them 
cry out All' well as they Passd, likewise told me the enemy 
ware moveing some Boats down towards the mouth Schul- 
kill. The officer of the Friggot told me they had just been 
sending two flotiug Batteries down the Schulkill with four 
32 Pounders on board to assist against our fort that they 

'"Major Ballard carries this." — Endorsement by Brigadier- General 
Vaniuin. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 133 

ware in want of Provisions but expected their Shiping up 
in two or three days — he wanted to no wheather General 
Putnam was Likely to Join your Excellency soon or not, I 
could not tell anything about the matters of that sort, they 
seamed much concerned it apeared to me. I am &c 

"Benj* Randolph." 

brigadier-general varnum to washington. 

" WOODBEBRY, 15'" Nov' 1777 11 oCk A.M. 
"Sir 

" I was a great part of last night in Fort Mifflin ; It is 
greatly shattered, but very defensible, had we the Men men- 
tioned in my letter of yesterday. — I shall send two Hundred 
Militia in this night. They will be able to work & fight 
upon Occasion. — What put it into the Enemy's Head, I 
cant say. But they kept up a constant cannonade and 
Bombardment all night, so as to prevent in a great Measure, 
the necessary Repairs in the Breaches. — I am under the 
Necessity of beseeching your Excellency to send a General 
Officer, whose concurring Sentiments, or Orders, should he 
be of superior standing, will be very advantageous. The 
Objects here are so various that I cannot fully do what I 
know is essential to the Service. — The Militia are without a 
Commander. — It is very difficult getting Matters done in a 
speedy Manner. I am obliged to attend every department 
myself — I do not make this Request because I am not fond 
of commanding, — But from a Consciousness that the service 
demands it. We want another commanding Officer of 
Artillery, & more Artillery Men. Indeed, I think a Field 
Officer of Artillery should be here. Capt. [James] Lee will 
do all that a brave, good Officer can, but a Shot may claim ; 
then we should be badly off indeed. I am just informed 
the Shipping are in Motion — Our Battery below has just 
opened. I am &c 

" J. M. Varnum. 

" jfT.B. — Should the Shipping play upon the Island, we 
must evacuate it, But I am in hopes we shall keep them 
down." 



134 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, 

WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNCM. 

" Head Quarters, 15 November, 1777 

'■" Sir : 

" I have received your Letter of yesterday inclosing the 
opinion of Maj. Thayer, the present Commandant at Fort 
Mifflin respecting the defence of that Post — and am happy 
to find that he and Maj'' Fleury coincide in their Sentiments 
as to the practicability of maintaining it iti spite of the 
Enemy's Land and Floating Batteries. Their perseverance, 
however, may expose them to falling a sacrifice in case of 
an Attack by Storm, unless the necessary materials be fur- 
nish 'd them from your side of the River, for repairing the 
daily destruction caused by the Enemy's Cannon. There 
should be a never failing supply of Fascines & Palisades — 
large Gabions will be useful — and a quantity of earth loaded 
in bulk on board of Flats, will be very serviceable in cor- 
recting the 007.^ nature of the soil on which they are obliged 
to work. They are likewise in want of Ammunition for 
their 32 pounder, for which they have been obliged to use 
the Cartridges of their eighteen Pounders. — A stock of Fire 
wood, an indispensible Article at this season of the year 
should be laid in at every convenient opportunity, so that 
they may not be deficient in it, in case of the Commuuica^ 
tion between them and the main being interrupted by high 
wind or bad weather. One or two of their gun carriages 
are dismounted, which will require the presence of such 
Artificers as you can spare. M' Fleury seems desirous of 
retaining the Cannon on the Island. I cannot at this dis- 
tance decide as to the propriety of suffering them to remain, 
which must depend upon the State of the Works, and the 
prospect of reestablishing some essential parts of them. 
Your visit to the Island will enable you to speak decisively 
upon this and other matters of importance. 

" Gen' Greene in a Letter received from him this morn- 
ing informs me that the Enemy are attempting to get a 
Frigate thro the Channel between Ilog Island and Province 
Island. This passage may be render'd impassable for Ves- 
sels of a respectable size by sinking a hulk there, or throw- 



Defences of Philndelphia in 1777. 135 

ing some other obstruction in the ways. It will be proper 
therefore that you should have a conference with the Com- 
modore upon this subject immediately, and consult with 
him upon the best means for frustrating the Enemy's 
Designs. 

" With respect to the Enterprise upon Province Island 
which I recommended in ray last — I must observe that tho 
my expressions gave it a great Latitude and that I proposed 
the ruin of the Enemy's works as part of the End in view 
— yet I should be content if nothing more could be effected 
to have the Cannon of those works, or any part of them, 
spik'd. A resolute body of Voluntiers and chosen men I 
still think might be employed with success in this Under- 
taking — and tho the time gain'd by us and the Embarrass- 
ment occasioned the Enemy would not be so considerable 
as in the other case, yet it appears to me worth the attempt, 
especially as by the means of surprise, the service might be 
done before the party could be opposed in force — and at all 
events the Retreat is easy.' 

Gen' Greene in his Letter calls the Channel in question 
the New Channel. I am not certain which he means, but 
you will be able to determine. I am &c.^ 

" G° WASHINaTON." 

COLONEL SMITH TO WASHINGTON. 

" WOODBERRY, 15 Not' 1777 

" Sir : 

" My Arm will this Night or tomorrow Night permit me 
to take the Command at fort Mifflin. I was there last Night, 

' This attempt, suggested in Washington's letter to Varnum, dated No- 
vember 13, 1777, ante, probably led to the proposed expedition outlined 
in Wayne's letter to Richard Peters, of November 18, printed in Stille, 
" Major-General Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line," p. 105. I can find 
no evidence that the suggestion came from Wayne; and I think it more 
likely that when Varnum raised difficulties, Washington undertook the 
matter, and selected Wayne as a fit mau to lead. He determined to 
await the re-enforcements from the north, and the opportunity was lost. 
This reconciles the statements of the two men as given by Dr. Still6. 

'' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens. 



136 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

it is now one Heap of Ruin & must be defended with mus- 
quetry in Case of Storm. I presume the Enemy will con- 
tinue to cannonade for four or five days & then they will be 
obliged to storm. When they do, I am of Opinion they 
will succeed. With 600 Men I think we could defend it as 
an Island. Our great dependance must be their being to 
much afraid to storm. I hope it will hinder them from 
the Attempt untill your Excell^ can send such Number as 
will give the Men a Relief every 3 Days — in that Case I 
think we might defend it as an Island, & I Hope your Ex- 
cell^ will soon be able to attempt Something that will hasten 
their Departure to their Shipping — such parties of Men 
would rebuild in the Night what they destroy in the Day. 
I have the Honor &c 

" Sam Smith. 

" Gen. Varnum has been oblig'd to send Cap' Lee to take 
the Command of the Artillery at fort Mifflin. Mr. Comstoc' 
who took the Command after Cap' Treat was very unfit, we 
want a good Ofiicer & more Artiller}' Men very much — We 
are oblig'd to fire much Powder away & shall want Cartridges 
for 12", 18' & 32 pounders immediately." 

BARON ARENDT ON FORT MIFFLIN. 

" As long as we have a design to prevent a Junction be- 
tween the Euemys Fleet and their Army, the maintaining 
Fort Mifllin is indispensibly necessary — not that this place 
in itself hinders the Juuctiou, tho it certainly contributes to 
that valuable purpose, but it gives Security to our Fleet, 
which could not keep its present Station if the Enemy 
should make themselves masters of the Fort & raise bat- 
teries against it — this is the opinion of the Commodore 
whom I consulted upon this subject. 

" Although therefore this post ought to be maintained to 
the last extremity, yet I grant that there are many difficulties 
in the way — the fatigue and inclement weather to which 
the Garrison is exposed, are not the least considerable. 

' Probably William Comstxjck, of Rhode Island, 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 137 

" The Design of the Enemy seems to be to make them- 
selves masters of the Island, by constant bombarding and 
cannonading so as to ruin the works and either drive out 
the Garrison, or exhaust them by keeping up a fire at night 
— if however they find themselves disappointed it is probable 
they will venture another attack with Troops. 

" Whatever be their designs, we have only two points in 
view — the Preservation of the Garrison— and repairing as 
much as possible the ruined works. I propose this expedi- 
ent which is not impracticable, because frequently used in 
besieged Fortresses. 

" 1. To preserve the Garrison let it be disposed in the most 
secure places — this has been done hitherto by placing the 
men behind the Stone Wall, but as it is considerably dam- 
aged and begins to fall, it can't afford shelter much longer. 
My opinion is that the men ought to go out every morning 
at day break, and lie down in order to be better conceal'd 
upon Planks behind the Bank which is opposite to Province 
Island — they should make no fire, but keep themselves warm 
with their blankets, and have their victuals either cook'd 
over night, or on the eastern side of the Island — to keep 
them in spirits there should be an additional allowance of 
Rum or strong-beer — especially as the Soil and Water are 
exceedingly unwholesome— it is morally certain that the 
Enemy will not fire upon the spot proposed, but direct their 
shot against the Fort— where there should be only a few 
Gentries left, and a few necessary hands to serve the 
Artillery. 

" 2. The Garrison should be relieved as often as possible — 
Gen' Varnum says he has not men enough to relieve everv 
night, but that it might be done every 48 hours— which is 
sufficient — thus the Health of the Soldiers will be preserved, 
they will not be worn out with Fatigue, and their Courage 
will be renew'd — The Garrison ought always to be 400 strong 
— the Commanding Officer and Engineer ought likewise to 
be relieved. 

" 3. For repairing the works, and in order to spare the 
Garrison, it would be well to send every night for fatigue a 



138 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

Detachment of 100 Militia with their Arms, they would be 
so many fighting men — they should carry with them Pali- 
sades, Fascines and Gabions — the work to be done, will 
depend upon the Damage sustain'd in the course of the day 
— I am of opinion that a Parapet of Fascines and Gabions 
should be substituted to the Palisades, it might be made 
under cover of them, and would be infinitely more service- 
able — they might afterwards be taken away. 

" It has been proposed to construct a battery upon the 
same bank, which I have pointed out above as Shelter for 
the Garrison, — and it is thought that this would change the 
direction of the Enemy's Fire so as to divert it from the 
Fort — but my plan would be inconsistent with this, and be- 
sides many of the Balls intended to take the battery pro- 
posed obliquely and in flank, would go beyond it and batter 
the Fort. 

" 4. I think that the heavy Cannon, which are not pointed 
against the Enemy's batteries, should be removed and placed 
in the battery lately open'd on the other side of the River 
— there they would be out of the reach of the Enemy's 
balls, and would be more dangerous to their Shipping — as 
they would give a plunging Fire — the Commodore is of the 
same Opinion. 

" 5. As to Ammunition and Provision I think a sufficient 
quantity for a few days only should be left at the Fort and 
the rest deposited in some vessel or vessels. 

" 6. For the Security of the Garrison in case of extremity, 
the Commodore should be required to send upon a conven- 
tional signal being given at the Fort, all the Vessels and 
boats to take them off. 

" Lastly to hinder the Communication which still subsists 
between the Army and Navy of the Enemy, and is kept up 
by means of little boats upon which Fort Mifllin has fired 
without success — there is no other method that I know of 
than having armed boats and Gallies stationed in a proper 
place for driving away the Enem3's boats. 

" Bar. Arendt. 



Defences oj Philadelphia in 1777. 139 

" I have communicated most of these Ideas to Gen* Var- 
num and Col. Smith." ' 

SUBSTANCE OP BARON ARENDT's LETTERS. 

" General Varnum informed me this morning, that Col" 
Smith had sent him word by an officer, that he thought it 
impossible for the Fort to hold out longer than till tonight 
— and asked my opinion upon the subject. It was that the 
Fort should be maintained to the last extremity, but that 
the Cannon of the Battery should be brought off" with all 
the superfluous Provision and Military Stores — that the 
Cannon brought off might be placed with advantage else- 
where — and that provision and Ammunition for two days 
only should be left in the Fort. 

" I went to Fort Mercer, with a design to cross to the 
Island and resume my Command, but my strength was not 
equal to my Good Will."^ 

COLONEL aREENE TO GENERAL POTTER. 

"Red Bank, 15 Nov. 1777 
"Sir 

" Since my last the Cannonade has been very severe upon 
Fort Mifflin — this Day the Ships have come as near as the 
Chevaux de Frize would allow them. A floating Battery 
with 18-24 p" came up between Fort Mifflin & Province 
Island, and the Fire from Them togather with that of their 
Batteries has dismounted all the Guns but two. Almost 
destroyed the works — and have killed and wounded a very 
considerable Number — Among the latter is Major Talbut 
and two Cap" of Co' Durkee's Regra't. Our Shipping have 
kept up a warm Fire, and a two Gun Battery about 2| miles 
from this has annoyed the Enemy very much — We have sent 
Boats to the Brave Major Thayer, who has discretionary 
Orders to maintain the Post as long as he thinks practicable 

' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens. The endorse- 
ment shows it to have been written on November 15. 

'' An undated sheet in manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Joliii 
Laurens. 



140 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

— that the brave Garrison may have a secure retreat when 

the Post is no longer tenable 'tis too true that the 

boat deserted, another run away the next morning — We 
apprehend Nothing here. I am &c. 

"C. Greene." 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL POTTER TO WASHINGTON. 

[" 16 November, 1777.] 
'<D» Sir 

" I am sorey to be the raesenger of Bad news last night 
at Ten oClock our Breve Garrison at fort Mifflin set fier to 
the Barrucks and set off to Ridbank this Intiligance I have 
by my express that Brought me the in Closed — I see myself 
that our Barricks are Burnt and the enemys ships Viglint 
and a sloop are leying a long side of the Island this moment 
I Receved your favour of this day and will observe the Con- 
tents. I am &c 

" Ja° Potter'" 

brigadier-general varnum to washington. 

" WoODBERRY } after 11, A.M. 16 Nov' 1777 

"Sir 

" Agreeable to what I wrote you last Evening, we were 
obliged to evacuate Fort Mifflin. Major Thayer returned 
from thence a little after two this morning. Every Thing 
was got oft", that possibly could be. The Cannon could not 
be removed without making too great a Sacrifice of men, as 
the Empress of Russia, alias Vigilant, lay within one Hun- 
dred Yards of the Southwest part of the "Works, & with 
her incessant Fire, Hand Grenades & Musketry from the 
Round Top, killed every Man that appeared upon the Plat- 
forms. — The Commodore gave positive Orders to six Gallies 
to attack, and take that Ship. They warp'd over to the 
Island, & there held a Council, lost a few of their men, & 
then returned without attempting any Thing, I left the Com- 

' On November 28 Congress directed an inquiry to be made by Gen- 
eral Washington into the loss of Fort Mifflin, on the river Delaware, 
in the State of Pennsylvania, and into the conduct of the principal 
officer conimauding. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 141 

modore since one this Morning. He had positively ordered 
six Gallies, well manned, to attack the same Vessel — how 
they succeeded, I am not inform'd, but, according to Major 
Thayer's Sentiments, we could have held the Island, had the 
Ship been destroy'd. — I dont think the Shipping can pass 
the Chevaux de Frize while we keep this Shore. — The two 
Guu Battery, near Manto Creek, annoy'd them very 
much Yesterday. It is still firing slowly; but the Shipping 
having remov'd out of direct Distance, too much firing 
would be Profusion. — We are erecting a Battery, directly 
opposite the Frizes, w°h I believe will be finished to-day — 
I am not of Opinion that the Enemy can possess themselves 
of the Island without too great a Loss. Whether we shall 
keep a Guard upon it or not, I cannot determine 'till, from 
a critical Observation, I shall be furnished with new Circum- 
stances. While we keep the Shipping down, our Navy will 
be safe ; but should our Defences prove ineffectual, we shall 
take out a Part of their Guns, & let the others attempt 
passing the City. — Our Troops are so extremel}- fatigued 
that no time will be lost in knowing your Excellency's 
Orders, whether the Troops commanded by Col° Smith shall 
remain here, or return to Camp. The Oflicers seem anxious 
to join the Army, as their Men are much harrass'd — How- 
ever, they have had two Nights Rest, & are necessary here, 
should we attack Billings Port — As a great part of my own 
Brigade have been lost at Fort Mifflin I shall not be able to 
make any hostile Attempt this Night; but am of Opinion 
that the Enemy should at all Hazards, be dispossess'd of 
this Shore. — We shall want the large Howitz, w°h I men- 
tioned before. 

"Your Excellency's Letter of yesterday came to me this 
Morning early — I am just told the Gallies last order'd to 
attack the Vigilant, did nothing : That misfortune will pre- 
vent us from keeping Men upon the Island. I am &c 

" J. M. Varnum. 

"P.S. — Col" Greene offered to Ofiicer and Man three 
Gallies, that would destroy the Empress of Russia, or perish 

11 



142 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

to a Man. Cap' Robinson, of the continental Fleet, offered 
to go himself & the Commodore proposes a fine Disposition, 
but cannot command his Fleet." 

COLONEL SMITH TO WASHINGTON. 

" WOODBERRY, 16"" Nov' 1777 

"Sir 

" Gen. Varuum will have inform'd your Excell^ of the 
Evacuation of fort Mifiiin. I am extremely sorry for the 
Circumstance. Major Thayer defended it too bravely. 

" My party taken (as your ExcelP knows) from the pic- 
quet, think they have done their Tour of Duty, & hope for 
your Excell^ permission to join their respective Regimeuts, 
who (they say) want their immediate Attention — the Officers 
have no Cloths with them. My Arm is yet very painful. 
Major Fleury is hurt but not very much, he is a Treasure 
that ought not to be lost. Cap' [Edmund B.] Dickinson of 
the first Virg" Reg' deserves much Attention — he stayed with 
& assisted Fleury — he is a brave, industrious good Officer. 
Cap' [George] Walls of the 4"" Virg* has distinguish'd him- 
self on every Occasion, for a brave, industrious & prudent 
Officer. Cap' [William Dent] Bell of the 6'" Maryland has 
much Merit. I have the Honor &c. 

"Sam Smith." 

joseph reed to washington. 

" Capt. Lee's Quarters — near Springfield 
" Meeting House, 6 Miles from Darby 

"Nov. 16, 1777 
" Dear Sir : 

" General Green will give you so perfect an Idea of what 
he has seen here as to make any Remark unnecessary from 
any one else. I hope & believe it is not yet too late to give 
the Forts some effectual Relief, but every Moment is precious, 
in the present advance Season & after the Injury so heavy 
a Cannonade must have done them. 

" As I know you are pleased with having the Sentiments 
of every Person who gives himself the Trouble of reflecting, 
I have no Difficulty in giving you mine as to the Mode of 
Annoyance. I am much inclined to think that unless the 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 143 

Attack upon the Works in the Islands is either a total 
or partial surprize it will fail — should they take Alarm at 
any Movement of ours, & throw over a Body of Troops 
on the Islands, the Approaches are so difficult that I think 
the Attack will fail or at least will be attended with great 
Loss. — The late heavy Rains have broke one of the Dams 
& the Meadows are much softer than they were when this 
Matter was under Consideration formerly. — But I should 
hope these Difficulties may be obviated by Gen' Potter's 
moving down to some convenient Distance — a Detachment 
of at least 3000 Men moving over to him with Artillery, the 
latter if concealed by a Kight march I think the better. 
The Time of Attack previously fixed & the main Body of 
the Army to cross agreeably so as to destroy the Bridge, & 
cut off all Communication of support at the same Time. 
Should the Surprize fail I still think the whole Force of the 
Army may be drawn to a Point so as to make the Islands 
too warm but I think it will be effisctual & more likely to 
bring on a general Action which it seemed to be a general 
Sentiment should be avoided, & which I also in our present 
Circumstances am of Opinion we ought not to seek. 

" I shall trouble your Excell^ no farther at present. Cap' 
Lee will give you an Account of the Observation of the 
Day, which affi)rds a happy Prospect. I am &c 

"J. Reed. 

"P.S. — General Cadwallader desires me to mention that 
a Party will go from Gen. Potter tomorrow to meet the 12 
pounder & Howitz which are expected for the purposes Gen. 
Cadwallader suggested." ' 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM TO WASHINGTON. 

" Fort Mercer, 17'" Nov' 1 oClk P.M., 1777 
" Sir : 

" In Consequence of the Enemy's armed Vessells, laying 

at Fort Mifflin, their Provision Vessells pass unmolested up 

' See a letter from Colonel Christopher Greene to Washington, dated 
Red Bank, November 17, 1777, in Sparks's " Correspondence of the Rev- 
olution," Vol. II. p. 43. 



144 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, 

to the Mouth of Schylkill, between Mud Island and Prov- 
ince Island. A considerable Number of Shipping have 
moved up this Day & anchored off" Billingsport. It is prob- 
able they may intend landing the Troops from New York, 
w°h in Addition to those already there, (I mean Billings- 
port) their Force may be such as to put it out of ray Power 
to prevent a Siege. — It is my Opinion, if your Excellency 
intends taking Possession of Province Island, this Post 
should be held. If you give up all Ideas of preventing the 
large Shipping's going up the River, this Post is of no essen- 
tial Consequence ; Batteries along the Shore, between this 
& Manto Creek, might annoy greatly, or totally prevent the 
Shipping from raising the Cheveau de Frize, if the Troops 
besieging should be dislodged. — If your Excellency should 
think of establishing a strong post at Cooper's Ferry, I 
imagine all the large Cannon should be removed to Mount 
HoUey. In that Case the Troops here would be of great 
Service. — It will require a large Force to keep the Shore so 
as to play directly upon the Shipping — Was our Fleet to 
continue under the Cover of this Place, the Enemy's Ship- 
ping would be in a worse Situation ; but, as they seem to be 
upon the Wing, the Enemy will soon be able to open Bomb 
Batteries from Fort Mifflin. This would not be terrible in 
itself, but connected with an Investiture, would deprive the 
Garrison of that Cover, w^h might otherwise be derived from 
the Bank of the River. — Col° Greene will write you the Sen- 
timents of the principal Officers of the Garrison, upon their 
present Situation. Provided the Enemy should attempt 
crossing Timber and Manto Creeks at the same Time, 
Woodberry will be a more ineligible Situation than Haddon- 
field, as it will throw my Troops between the Enemy's 
Front and Fort Mercer; and prevent that Communication 
w°h would be necessary. Ilowever, in that Case, I shall act 
according to immediate Circumstances. — I hope your Excel- 
lency's Earliest Orders may be given upon these Matters. — 
It is a great Misfortune, that we have lost Fort Mifflin; 
Nothing but the undaunted Bravery, & persevering Pru- 
dence of Major Thayer, prevented a much greater Effusion 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 145 

of Blood, than has taken Place. — The Ground was held 
until the principal Canii[ona]de was over, when the greater 
part of the Garrison were put off. The Major with a rear 
Guard of about forty Men, remained, 'till with amazing 
Address, he had sent off the most part of the Stores, he 
then came away. Had the Garrison been bro't away in the 
Day time, the Loss must have been very great, as the ship- 
ping would have sunk many of the Boats. I mention these 
Circumstances, in repetition of what was said in my last, as 
it may be said by some, that the Major continued too long 
upon the Island. — If that was the Case, the Fault was mine, 
not his. I can say from my Conscience, I think never did 
Man behave better. 

" I have called for an exact return of the killed & wounded, 
w°h will soon be transmitted ; It is not so great as was 
imagined or expected. 

" I am &c. 

"J. M. Yarnum." 

CAPTAIN CRAIG TO WASHINGTON. 

" Frankfort, IS'" November, 1777 
" Sir : 

" I have not been able to gain any intelligence of Conse- 
quence since I had the Honour of Addressing your Excel- 
lency. 

"The enemy intend some Grand Menouver in Jersey 
very shortly which I hope to be informed of — the[y] have 
been making small enquiries respecting the Northern Army, 
and what number of Men your Excellency has in Jersey. 

" Enclosed is a rough Draught of the enemy's lines. I 
have been so unfortunate as to meet with an Accident 
which prevents my being so active on the lines as I wou'd 
wish to be — shoud anything new Transpire I shall embrace 
the earliest Opportunity of communicating it. I have &c. 

" Charles Craig. 

" I have this Moment received information of Lord Corn- 
Wallace' crossing in Jersey last night with four thousand 



146 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

Men. I shall write more particularly this evening. I 
have &c. 

"C. Craig. 
" J past 11 o'clock. 

" Since ray last I have had I believe a True Acct. of Lord 

Coruwals"' rout. Last night about 12 o'Clock his Lordship 

Marchd from the City with Two thousand Granadiers, & 

light Infantry, he intends his march for Willmington where 

he is to Cross the river and march up the other side and 

make an Attackt on Red Bank Fort. I have the Honor &c. 

"C. Craig. 
" Near Frankfort, * past 3 oClock." 

LIEUTENANT HEARD TO WASHINGTON. 

" Frankfokd, 18'" Novemb' Half past 2 P.M. 

"Sir 

"I am just now creditably inform'd by M' Petre, direct 
from the City, that last Night at 11 oclock, a large Body of 
the Enemy under the command of Cornwallis, march'd to 
the Neck, their intentions are to cross over the River 
below the Fort. Mr. Cooper further adds, that this detach- 
ment has so much weaken'd them, that they have not now, 
in the City, Men sufficient to Man their Lines. I have 
receiv'd various Ace'' of this, which, tho' in themselves they 
do not all agree, yet all in this, that a large Number has 
actually gone off. 

" M'' Cooper received this piece of Intelligence from a 
Sergeant, who supposing him & two or three who were with 
him to be well affected to the Royal Army, liad communi- 
cated this to him. As Cap' Craig is now absent & I now 
command, I have thought proper to send this. I have the 
honor &c 

" John Heard." 

brigadier-general potter to washington. 

" Squair, Nov' 18'" Eight oClock P.M., 1777 
" Sir : 

" You have been informed of the enemys move to Ches- 
ter last night and of Generals Reed and Cadwalder & me 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 147 

Reconnitring them — by Reeds letter of this day from Darbey 
I am now to inform you that the[y] are all Imbarked on 
Bord there ships and gon over to the Jarsey — Redbank 
must now fall. I am &c 

" Jas. Potter. 

"P.S. — I send you enclosed the Deposition of Mr. Sel- 
lers.'" 

JOSEPH REED TO WASHINGTON. 

" Lewis Davis's 5 miles feom Darby & near 

" Springfield Meeting House, Nov. 18, 1777 

" J past 9 oClock. 
" Dear Sir : 

" Since I wrote you this Afternoon we have got Intelli- 
gence, out of Chester, which may be depended on that the 
Troops at Chester began to embark at 11 oClock this Morn- 
ing & past over to Billingsport with their Cannon, Wag- 
gons, &c. — they made no Secret of their Intentions to attack 
Red Bank — They gave out their Number was 5000 & the 
Inform' says there was certainly a great Number chiefly 
British. 

" They said they would storm it to night if practicable 
but they were so late that the Informant thinks they could 
not effect it to night. He farther adds that Troops went 
from on Board the Ships on the same Errand. U Corn- 
wallia commands this Detachment. "We have thought it 
best to despatch this Intelligence this Evening that you may 
be fully apprized of every Circumstance necessary for your 
Exccll^ to form a Judgment of what may be proper to be 
done in our present Circumstances. 

" Gen' Cadwallader supposing from the Position of the 
British Troops that his Scheme was wholly frustrated, had 
directed Proctor to return & proposed crossing the River to 
Head Quarters tomorrow morning, but upon this Intelli- 
gence he has determined to stay. You may depend upon it 
that every Precaution will be taken for the Safety of the 

' Nicholas Sellers, of the borough of Wilmington, a shallopman, and 
lately a prisoner with the English. The deposition refers to the cruel 
treatment meted out to prisoners, and the efforts of the British to starve 
them into enlisting on their side. 



148 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

Pieces, & I make no Doubt they will be safely returned. I 
am &c ^ 

"Jos: Reed." 



WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM. 

"Head Quarters, 18 November, 1777 
" 10 o'clock P.M. 
" Dear Sir : 

" A Body of the Eneni}" marched last Night from Phila- 
delphia, across the Bridge at the Middle Ferry and pro- 
ceeded to Chester. Their number is variously reported, 
being from 1500 to 3000, but I imagine the former is most 
likely, although some people, from the city, think their 
numbers are much lessened upon their lines. They this 
day embark'd their Horses from Chester on Board Ships 
and Brigs. This would seem as if they were going away, 
but in my opinion it is only a feint, and that they intend to 
cross over to Jersey and pay you a visit. Therefore keep a 
good look-out below; if you do this, they cannot surprise 
you because they must make a tedious debarkation of their 
Horses. To all matters contained in yours of yesterday I 
refer you to the Generals St. Clair, Knox and Kalb, who 
went down to consult with you and the Commodore. I 
expect a report from them to govern me in my operations, 
towards assisting you. If j'ou could get some countrymen 
to go into Billingsport with a small supply of provisions, he 
might learn somethina' of their intentions and numbers. I 
am &c^ 

" G° Washington." 

' From Major Clark's letters I obtaia tbe numbers of the regiments, 
exclusive of the Hessians and light infantry, which enable me to give 
the names of the colonels : 

Fifth Regiment, Hugh, Earl Percy. 
Fifteenth Eegiment, Kichard, Earl of Cavan. 
Seventeenth Regiment, Hon. Robert Monkton. 
Thirty-third Regiment, Charles, Earl Cornwallis. 
Fifty-sixth Regiment, John Irwin. 
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 149 

WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL GLOVER. 

" Head Quarters, 19 November, 1777 
" 11 o'clock P.M. 
" Sir : 

" The Enemy having thrown a considerable part of their 
force over Delaware, with an Intention as I suppose of 
makino; an attack upon our Fort at Red Bank, occasions 
me to Reinforce the Garrison & troops already their with 
a large Detachment from this Army — in addition to which 
it is my desire & you are hereby order'd to March by the 
most convenient Route after receipt of this to Join the 
Continental Array which may be in the Neighbourhood of 
Red Bank under command of Major Gen' Greene, or any 
other Officer there commanding, & take his directions with 
respect to your conduct at that Post. You will take the 
Necessary precaution for the Subsistance of your Troops 
on their march to this place by Detaching Commissaries 
(fee", to provide for them. Your first Route should be 
Directed to Haddonfield & from thence as Circumstances 

will require. I am &c 

" G° Washington." 

WASHINGTON TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF EITHER POOR'S 
OR PATERSON'S BRIGADE. 

" Head Quarters, 19'" November, 1777 
" Sir : 

" Instead of proceeding to Coryels Ferry which I imagine 
is your intended Rout, I desire you will march down as far 
as Trenton, and there wait my orders before you cross the 
River. The moment you receive this, dispatch an Officer 
to me, to inform me where you are, when you will be at 
Trenton, & by what Road you will march, that I may send 

orders to meet you. I am &c. 

" G° Washington. 

" If this should reach you between Flemington and Cor- 
yels Ferry, you are not to march towards Trenton, but 
cross at Coryels, as first intended.' 

' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens. 



150 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM. 

" Head Quarters, 19 November, 1777 
" Dear Sir : 

" In Consequence of advices rec* since I wrote you last 
Night, I have ordered Gen' Huntington to march to your 
Assistance. You will please to direct the detachment that 
went first down to Fort Mifflin under the command of Col" 
Smith to return to camp, they are in so much want of 
Necessaries that it is impossible for them to remain longer. 
Let the Militia that are with you be put in the best order, 
that they can be. I wish they had a good officer at their 
Head to arrange them properly. I am &c 

" G° Washington. 

" P.S. — It would not be amiss to collect all the Militia 
you can in the Country adjacent." ' 

WASHINGTON TO COMMODORE HAZELWOOD. 

" Head Quarters, 19 November, 1777. 
"Sir 

" I am favor'd with j'ours of 15"' Instant covering the 
Resolution of a Council of "War held the preceding day 
upon the Subject of my Letter of the 13"". 

" The General officers who have been sent from here 
to Examine into & determine upon the Measures to be 
adopted in that quarter have, I expect, by this time put 
things in such a Ti"iin as will be most conducive to the 
public Interest, & agreeable to the Officers concerned. 
Should any matter be left undetermined by them, I shall 
be able from their Report to form my Opinion thereon & 
shall immediately communicate it to you. In the mean 
time I have no doubt but you will afford every Assistance 
in your Power to repell any attempt which may be made to 
clear the channell or reduce the Fort. 

" Inclosed you have a Letter from Presid' "Wharton 
which he requested might he forwarded to you. I am &c 

" G" Washington." 

' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 1 51 

WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM. 

" 19 November, 1777 
" Sir : 

" The Generals St. Clair, Knox and Kalb returned to 
Camp this Evening — they are all clear in their opinions 
that keeping possession of the Jersey shore at or near Red 
Bank is of the last importance.' I have therefore deter- 
mined to make such an addition to the Reinforcement that 
marched this morning under Genl. Huntington that I am 
in hopes you will be able to give an effectual Check to the 
force which the Enemy at present have in Jersey. Geu' 
Greene will take the command of the Reinforcement — Very 
much will depend upon keeping possession of Fort Mercer, 
as to reduce it the Enemy will be obliged to put themselves 
in a very disagreeable situation to them and advantageous 
to us, upon a narrow neck of land between two Creeks, 
with our whole force pressing upon their Rear — Therefore 
desire Colonel Green to hold it if possible till the relief 
arrives. All superfluous Stores may be removed if it can 
be done after this reaches you ; that in Case of Accident 
as little may fall into the hands of the Enemy as possible. 
While we hold the fort it will be necessary for some of the 
Gallies to lay close under the Bank to keep the Enemy 
from making any lodgment under it, and it will also secure 
your Communication with the Water, which perhaps may 
be essential, for I do not remember whether there is a Well 
in the Works. There can be no danger to the Galleys while 
we keep the Bank above them, and if we evacuate, if they 
cannot get oft", they may destroy them and put the Men on 
Shore. I have recommended this upon a supposition that 
they will be very serviceable to you ; if you do not think 
they will, you need not keep them. 

" Altho I am anxious to have the fort kept, I do not mean 
that it should be done at all events so as to endanger the 

' Joseph Keed gave to President Wharton another account of the 
conclusion of these generals, saying they " were of opinion that the 
fort would not be tenable against regular approaches, and that the gal- 
leys would be of no use." 



152 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

safety of the Men without any probability of success. I 
am &c' 

" G° Washington." 

captain craig to washington. 
" Sir : 

"I received various Accounts yesterday respecting the 
Enemy's Measures for making an Attack on Red Bank in 
my last Letter to your Excellency I mentioned the Enemy's 
intending to march by Willmington, having receiv'd that 
information from the City, But I think it very improbable — 
That Cornwallace is march'd with a party of Troops is a 
Certainty, said to be two Thousand Granadiers and Light 
Infantry. But where he intends Crossing I am not able to 
learn. The Enemy were last "Night alarmed, and Drew in 
their Piquets. Nothing New has Transpired since my last. 
In that Sketch of the Enemy's lines I sent yesterday is 
mentioned a Comp'' from each Reg' being Draughted — 
Those men were Draughted before the reduction of Fort 
Mifflin. I have the Honor &c. 

" C. Craig. 

"Frankfort, lO"" Nov' 1777 

" Since my last Letter I have received a Certain Account 
of a Number of Highlanders crossing to Jerse}' last Night 
about nine oClock. The[y'] cross'd at Coopers ferry — their 
Piquets were Drawn in last night, their lines very weak by 
ever}^ information. I am &c. 

" Wednesday one o'Clock" 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL WAYNE TO WASHINGTON. 

" Two Mile Stone, 2 oClock P.M. 19" Nov. 77 
" Dear Gen'' 

" The light Infantry who were Encamped on the Right 

between third & fourth Street have struck their tents this 

morning — their Picquets are drawn in — we took possession 

of the advanced Redoubt made of Rails, where they vacated 

this day. I am just proceeding along the line to the left. 

' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 153 

They have turned out the Guards from a house near the 
City with a few of their Horse, but dou't seem Inclined to 
Advance — there is no Abeilu to the Right. I am &c 

"Ant'^ Wayne." 

brigadier-general varnum to washington. 

" Haddonfield, Nov. IQ"- 5 P.M., 1777 
" This Morning my flying Camp was removed from Wood- 
berry to this Place, as a more fit Situation for benefiting Red 
Bank. One principal Inducement was a Concurrence of 
Reports that the Enemy from Philadelphia were to form a 
Junction with those from Billingsport. In w°h Case we 
have a proper Position for attacking the Party first men- 
tioned, & thereby facilitate the Retreat of the Garrison over 
Timber Creek, w°h otherwise would be impracticable. — My 
Videts have just informed me from Manto Creek Bridge, 
Sunton, that the Enemy moved, three Hours since with 
about one Thousand towards that Bridge, but as it was 
taken up, which they could not fail knowing, I imagine 
their Principal Manoeuvre was filing oft' from their Rear to 
their Right, in Order to cross five Miles above, where the 
Creek is easily fordible. Should this be the Case, I fear 
the Garrison must retreat in the Morning. However, I am 
this Moment going to Red Bank, & its Vicinity to satisfy 
myself more fully, & consult with Col" Greene. I am so 
fully of Opinion that they will bend their whole Force to 
get full Possession of the Jersey shore, rather than ^ I shall 
recommend holding the Post longer than otherwise, think- 
ing that you will contend with them here, in great force, 
rather than suffer their Points to be carried. Nevertheless, 
not knowing what your Result may be, I shall not suffer the 
Garrison to be sacrificed upon Conjecture; but continue 
them as long as I can cover them — That most of the Troops 
have left Philadelphia, appears in Corroboration of your 
Excellency's ' Intelligence,' by daily Deserters who come 
to me. I have no Doubt of it, and am fully of your 
Opinion respecting their Intentions. — I have Accounts 

' In turning the leaf the general seems to have omitted some words. 



154 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

from Billingsport, bj^ Deserters, two of whom came to 
me last Night, of the sixty-third Regiment, that their 
Force consists of three British Regiments from New 
York, fift}' five Rank & File in a Company. I am induced 
to believe the Calculation true in part, as all the recruits 
from England have joined in New York — Some Companies 
of Guards, three and an half Hessian Battalions, two Green 
Coats & Preston's Regiment of Horse. These in Addition 
to those before there. I have nothing more to add, but that 
I am &c. 

"J. M. Varnum. 

"By Major Ward, I now have your favor of this Day; 
am much obliged for the Reinforcement proposed ; but can 
not think much of the Militia of this part of Jersey. A 
Reg' from the Eastern part has left us to Day, but another, 
larger, came to us." 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL POTTER TO WASHINGTON. 

"Nov 20"" 1777 
" I am under the disagreeble necessity of Informing 
your Excilancey that on the eighteenth Instant one of my 
picquats that Consisted of 1 Cap' 2 sub' 50 privits had 28 
privits, Lieut. & 2 Sarg' taken prisners, and 3 wounded, as 
to the perticulars I Refare you to General Cadwalder. I 
am &c. 

"Ja^ Potter." 

washington to brigadier-general poor. 

" Head Quarters, 20 November, 1777 
"Sir 

" Upon receipt of this you are to direct your march to- 
wards this Army, and to be as expeditious as possible in 
forming a Junction. I am &c 

" G° Washington. 

" If in consequence of yesterday's orders you should have 
filed off towards Trenton, continue that Rout and give me 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 155 

notice of it by a Messenger. He will probably find me at 
the Crooked Billet." ' 

WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL PATERSON. 

" Head Quarters, 20"" November, 1777 

"Sir 

" I yesterday wrote you a Letter with conditional direc- 
tions relative to your march ; upon receipt of this, you will 
proceed by the way of Coryel's Ferry and join this army 
as expeditiously as possible. I am &c 

" G° Washington." 

captain McLANE to WASHINGTON. 

" DiCKESON HOUSE, Nov' 20"" 1777 

"Sir 

" Intelligences this day agree that the Enemy have but few 
Troops in the City its currently reported that our people 
have avaccuated Red Bank last night this Evening I fell in 
with one Thornton as he was going to his family near the 
lines he is a [ ] to the Gallys & left them this morn- 

ing in Bristol he left the River opposite Red Bank this 
morning at 3 oClock he thinks that the fort was then in 
our Posission and that our people had received Intilligence 
that their was a reinforcement Comeing to their assistance 
he saw last Tuesday a Great Body of the Enemy Cross over 
province Island to Billingport this day the Enemy's advance 
Sentrys consist of horse and they are on aline from delaway 
to Schuylkill distance about one & half miles from the City — 
no Picquits of foot his discovered this day outside their lines 
this Evening I heard a smart fire of small Arms for about 
one Minute it appeared to be across the Delaway towards 
Cooper's ferry. Inclosd you have a few lines from the 
same person that sent the last — tiiis morning one Thomas 
Smith of my party deserted to the Enemy he was one of 
the Sixth Maryland regiment has many of my party are 
Bare of Cloaths & desire to be Actife [?] if his Excellency 

' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens. The letter to 
General Paterson contained the same P.S. as that to General Poor. 



156 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

thinks propper I will be prepared to receive the relief in 
German Town tomorrow Evening. I remain &c. 

"Allan M^Lanb. 
\^Enclosure.'\ 

" The Meadows Before the Eedouts under water fortifica- 
tion acrost the roads of 2'' & 3'' Streets Intrenching along the 
Brow of the hills all the rest of works as before mentiond 
The longer you Delay the more Difficult it will be." 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM TO WASHINGTON. 

" Haddonfield, 20'" Nov' 11 A.M., 1777 
"Sir 

" Upon my Arrival at Red Bank last Evening, I found 
that Col° Greene had rec'* the same Ace" w'h I mentioned 
to your Excellency in my Letter of yesterday; he was 
farther informed that the Enemy were actually crossing 
the Ford, In Consequence, he had given Orders for an 
Evacuation. The Powder by Cap' Duplissis, was strewed 
over the Fort. However, upon an Apprehension that your 
Excellency might make a great Effort to save it, the Gar- 
rison agreed to remain ; Hoping to take up the scattered 
Powder by Day Light. Immediately they were alarmed by 
the rowing of many Boats near the Shore. This changed 
the Scene and induced us to bring off the Men, leaving a 
strong rear Guard to fire upon the Boats. Upon the 
Approach of this Party the Boats retired. This caused a 
diversity of Opinion at first; But, it was finally the prevail- 
ing Sentiment, that the Boats retiring was a feint to draw 
the attention of the Garrison, & lull them into Security, 
'till a Party from the Ford should throw themselves be- 
tween Tim[b]er Creek and the Fort. From these Con- 
siderations, added to a dismal Circumstance that the firing 
a single Musket in the Garrison would blow it up, or the 
bursting of a single shell, — it was concluded to take away 
the Men, leaving a small Number to set Fire in Case of 
Necessity, & trust to their Fate. — We have bro't oft" many 
Stores; a large Number of Waggons have gone this Morn- 
ing for the same Purpose. I believe the Possission will be 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 157 

our8 'till we can get away everj' thing valuable, except tlie 
heavy Cannon, or till a strong Force might again be sent 
in. I am now ascertained the Enemy's Reason for not 
attacking us here before. By a j'oung Gentleman, who 
left Philadelphia last Evening, It appears that General 
Howe imagined there was a very large Force in New Jersey, 
commanded by Gen' Greene. He has therefore ordered all 
the Grenadiers down, with some other Troops to join Gen' 
Willson : Lord Cornwallis commands the whole. It is 
given out that they will take Red Bank or sacrifice their 
whole Army — This Young Gentleman farther adds, that he 
verily believes there are not to exceed one Thousand Men 
in Philadelphia. \ past 12. Your Excellency's Favor of 
yesterday is delivered to me. — We shall send some Men 
into the Fort. The Gallies have gone past Philadelphia. — 
I cannot think the Enemy will attempt the Force, [fort ?] 
after being once convinced that we are equal, or superior 
to them in the Field. Should General Greene arrive before 
they attack, & have suflicient Force to move over Manto 
Creek, they must fight us, before they make any other 
Attempt. If we beat them, Billingsport as well as red 
Bank will be ours. Should they possess themselves of 
Red Bank previous to General Greene's Arrival, that will 
not prevent an Action, as the Fort will contain but few 
Men, and, in the Result, will be his who conquers in the 
Field. I am &c 

"J. M. Varnum." 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM TO WASHINGTON. 

"Mount Holley, 21" Nov' 1777 
"Sir 

" Last Evening Fort Mercer was evacuated. Some of the 
Shipping burnt this Morning. Most of the Stores bro't 
safely off. The Enemy, part at Billingsport, part between 
Manto & Timber Creeks, and some at Fort Mercer. "We 
have moved to this Place as the first safe Position on 
Account of the Creeks. From hence we can move by the 
Head of the Creeks, go down upon the Enemy, secure both 

12 



] 58 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

our Flanks by the Creeks, and by the same means, secure a 
Retreat in Case of Disaster. It is a tit Situation for making 
a Junction of the respective Cors. Gen' Huntington has 
already joined me. Gen' Greene is at Burlington. The 
Militia amount to Twelve Hundred. Three Hundred here, 
seven Hundred at Haddonfield. I have ordered them here, 
but am just told ' they dont like the Manoeuvre.' Two 
Hundred at Coopers Ferry & Gloucester: They are to join. 
With the Great Force you have ordered, we shall be 
superior, I believe, to the Enemy in the Field. We have 
the Advantage by being at the Head of the Creeks; & it is 
my firm Sentiment we ouglit & shall attack them to Advan- 
tage. The Success of that Manoeuvre, as I mentioned before, 
will determine the Possession of the Forts. I am &c.' 

" J. M. Varnum." 

MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE TO WASHINGTON. 

" Burlington, 5 oClock P.M. Nov. 21. 1777 
"D« Sir. 

" General Varnum this moment acquaints me that fort 
Mercer was evacuated last evening — Commodore Hassel- 
wood informs me also that the greater part, if not all the 
fleet except the thirteen Gailies were burnt this morning; 
one or two of the smallest vessels attempted to pass the 
city and could not effect it, one was set on fire and one 
other fell into the enemies hands owing to the matches 
going out — the People made their escape. My division 
arrivd on the other side of the river about ten this morn- 
ing, but the want of scows to get over the waggons will 
prevent our marching until this morning the greater part 
of the night if not the whole will be employd in geting 
over the baggage & Artillery. 

" General Varnum has retreated to mount Holly. I pur- 
pose to see him and General Huntington earl}' in the 
morning if it is practicable to make an attack upon the 

' See a letter of this date from Joseph Reed to President Wharton, in 
Reed's " Life of Reed," Vol. I. p. 338, where it is wrongly dated the 
25th. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 159 

enemy it shall be done ; but I am afraid the enemy will put 
it out of my power as they can so easily make us take such 
a circuitous march by taking up the bridges over timber 
creek — I cannot promise any thing until I learn more of 
the designs of the enemy, their strength and the position 
they are in. If it is possible to make an attack upon em 
with a prospect of success it shall be done. 

" Col. Slirieve [Israel Shreve] was with me this afternoon 
about turning out the Militia. I wish he may succeed, but 
from the temper of the People, there appears no great 
prospect — I have heard nothing from General Glover's 
brigade. I hope Col. Morgan's Corps of light troops will 
be on in the morning and Cap' Lee's troop of light Horse. 

" The fleet are greatly disgusted at the reflections thrown 

out against the oflicers ; the Commodore thinks the Officers 

are greatly injured, he asserts they did their duty faithfully. 

I am &c. 

"JST. Greene. 

"N.B. — The Commodore this mom' informs me there is 
three Sloops & a Brigg past safe by the City." ' 



" The lines at the North End of the City are nearly com- 
pleat, they are ditch'd & facin'd from Delaware to Schuylkill, 
between each Redoubt — They have dam'd the Run at the 
upper end of second street, in order to keep the back water 
in, the more to obstruct your coming up to their works — 
On Monday night Lord Cornwallis & Sir W" Erskine, with 
a lai'ge detachm' some say four, some 5 thous* men marchd 
thro' Derby downwards, cross'd the Delaware & took Red 
bank which was evacuated before they came to it, in Con- 

' " Resolved, That an enquiry be made into the causes of the evacuation 
of Fort Mercer, on the river Delaware, and into the conduct of the 
principal officers commanding that garrison; and that a committee be 
appointed to report the mode of conducting the enquiry." — -Journals of 
Congress, November 28, 1777. The members of the committee were 
William Duer, Francis Dana, and Francis Lightfoot Lee. 

^ From a new correspondent. 



160 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

sequence of which, our brave little fleet were put to the 
rout. I believe all the Gondelows & two topsails made a 
safe retreat up the River, the others are all burnt — this 
morning 21" Nov' 1777. 

" One o'clock P.M. Just now a boat came from W"" 
Cooper's ferry with a flag of truce. Bringing a Hessian 
Doctor & four Ladies over, soon after she left the wharfi", 
the Delaware Frigate fired a Shot at her, she proceeded, till 
the frigates Boat met her took them all out & made the 
ofiicer & his Crew prisoners, the passengers were sett at 
liberty & the others took to jail. The reason of this 
Violation I cannot guess, perhaps the flag was not properly 
authenticated by a General Ofiicer, or they were Exasper- 
ated at the Burning our Fleet. 

" They continue getting up Provisions by way of Schuyl- 
kill, they sell Rum at a Guiney p'' Gall : pork they [have in] 
plenty. Beef & Butter they have none, their flower all very 
Musty — they begin at the Chevaux de frees tomorrow — they 
say Cornwallis is to scower the Jerseys, whilst How is to 
maintain this City with about 3000 men, they appear to be 
in the greatest security, notwithstanding I have the greatest 
reason to believe from every Ace' that they do not exceed 
that Number. 

" Their different preparations plainly denote their deter- 
mination of wintering here. 

"They have pulled down peal hall & all the rest of the 
houses facing their Redoubts. The}' have ordered all the 
wood within their lines to be cutt for the use of the Arnn', 
they are takeing up houses & when the empty ones are full 
they quarter the rest on the Inhabitants — Beef in Market 
is sold for 5/ p' lb. paper, & 3/9 hard nione}' — thank God, the 
Quakers Idol is fallen \ already, & I hope soon will to 
nothing; 'tis reported & I believe it to be fact the Quakers 
have lent them 90,000 pounds the better to carry on the war 
& some of them at this time refuse to take it for goods. 

" The army are very healthy k very saucy, say they have 
men enough to defend their Lines whilst Cornwallis clears 
the Country. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 161 

" I hope His Excellency General Washington will soon 
convince them to the contrary." 



major-general greene to washington. 

" Mount Holly, Nov' 22, 1777 
"D^ Sir 

" I came to this Place yesterday morning — the Difficulty 
of crossing the Baggage over the River prevented its coming 
up last night. The Boats & Scows at Burlington are under 
very bad Regulations. — Gen. Varnum had retreated as I 
wrote your Excellency before to this place. He left a 
Party of Militia at Haddonfield : I am afraid there has a 
very considerable Quantity of Stores fallen into the Enemies 
Hands, but principally belonging to the Fleet. The Enemy 
and the Militia had a small Skirmish at little Timbercreek 
Bridge, the Enemy crossed there in the afternoon & en- 
camped. They say they are going to take Post at Haddon- 
field to cover the lower Counties & open a Market from 
thence; Those Counties are some of the most fertile in the 
State, from whence great Quantities of Provisions can be 
drawn — A large JTumber of Boats went up to Philadelphia 
from the Shipiiig yesterday morning — there were some 
Soldiers on board of them. 

'• Col° Morgan's Corps of Light Infantry advanced this 
morning for Haddonfield. If the Troops can be got in 
Readiness I intend to put the whole in motion this after- 
noon. We are greatly distrest for want of a Party of Light 
Horse. I must beg your Excellency to forward some as 
soon as possible. 

" I have heard nothing from Glover's Brigade. I sent an 
Express to the commanding Officer yesterday, but from the 
present Situation of things, I believe it will be best not to 
wait their coming up. 

" Every Piece of Intelligence necessary for my Informa- 
tion with Regard to the Movements of the Enemy in the 
City, I must intreat your Excellency to forward to me by 
Express. 



162 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

" Col° Shreeve will attempt to turn out the Militia, but the 
Commissary's Department is in such a bad Situation & the 
People so unwilling to furnish Supplies, that it will be diffi- 
cult to subsist a large Bodj-. 

" A considerable Body of light Horse would be very use- 
ful here. 

" Your Excellency's Letter of the 22* Ins' is just come to 
Hand. You have in this, all the Intelligence which I have 
received. I am &c. 

"Nath. Greene." 



WASHINGTON TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE. 

"Head Quarters, Whitemarsh, 22 November, 1777 
" Dear Sir : 

" I am fav* with yours oi yesterday afternoon from Bur- 
lington. As you have crossed the River, an attack upon the 
Enemy's detachment, if it can be made with success, would 
be a most desirable object. But I must leave the propriety 
of it entirely to your own judgment. I have heard nothing 
more ot Glover's Brigade than that they are advancing down 
the Road from Morris Town. I sent an Express to meet 
them, and to turn them down towards you, but I think you 
had better despatch one of your family or an Officer to guide 
them to you. There are not more than one hundred and 
seventy of Morgan's Corps fit to march as the}- in general 
want Shoes — they went yesterday and will join you I sup- 
pose this day. Capt. Lee's Troop are not yet come from 
the other Side of Schuylkill, but they are expected every 
instant, and will be sent immediately over to you. If you 
can procure any account that you think can be depended 
upon of the Number that the Enemy detached from Philad", 
I beg you will send it to me. Or if they send any part of 
their force back, let me know it instantly'. I shall be anxious 
to hear of every movement of yo\x or the Enemy, and I 
therefore wish to have the most constant advices. I am &c. 

" G. W. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 163 

" P.S. — I shall order an express to be stationed at Bristol 
to bring on jour despatches." * 

WASHINGTON TO CAPTAIN ALLAN M^^LANE. 

"Head Quarters, 22 November, 1777 
"Sir: 

" I have this moment received your Letter containing the 
Proposals of some of the Inhabitants near the Enemy's 
Lines. I will undoubtedly accept their offers of service 
on condition that they give in a list of their names, and 
engage to be under the absolute command for the time 
specified of such Officer as I shall appoint. This precau- 
tion is necessary, for otherwise they may only receive the 
Public Money without performing the Duty expected of 
them. I am &c.^ 

" G° Washington." 

WASHINGTON TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM. 

"22 November, 1777. 
"Sir 

" I have rec* your favors of 20 & 21" Inst, by this Express 
I shall write to Maj. Gen^ Green from whom you will re- 
ceive your Instructions respecting your Operations on that 
Shore. 

" I am at a loss to determine upon what Principle the 
Powder was strewed over the fort at Red bank as I expected 
that if an Evacuation was found necessary it might be 
brought off, & if that was impracticable I considered the best 
mode of destroying it was to throw it into the River unless 
it was determined to blow up the Works with it, which 
could never be effected by the mode which was adopted. 

" As the Destruction of the Fort would naturally accom- 
pany the Idea of being obliged to Abandon it, I shall be 
much disappointed if I hear it has not been executed. I 
am &c 

" G" Washington." 

' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman. 
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens. 



164 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

WASHINGTON TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE. 

" Head Quarters, 22 November, 1777 
" Dear Sir. 

" I have received your Letter of this Day's date — it does 
not appear from any account worthy of credit, that any 
part of the Detachment which cross'd the Delaware under 
Lord Cornwallis has return'd to Philadelphia. I am in- 
clined therefore to wish that you would advance to meet it 
as much in force as possible — and that for this purpose you 
would use every means to hasten the junction of Glover's 
Brigade. I am at a loss to account by what mistake Capt. 
Lee's Troop is not with you; that was originally intended 
for the Service you mention, as it was esteemed the best 
calculated for it. As a party of horse appears so essential, 
that or some other will be ordered to join you immediately. 

I am &c 

" G" Washington. 

"By an officer from Glover's Brigade I was informed 
that it reached Morris Town the evening of the 20*. I 
sent a message to him to urge them forward and have 
reason to think they are by this time in your Neighbor- 
hood." > 

the navy board to washington. 

" Continental Navy Board 

" Borden Town, 23'" Nov' 1777 

" Sir : 

" It is with the greatest Concern we inform you of the 
total Destruction of the Continental Fleet at Red Bank; 
having been burned by our own Officers in Consequence of 
a Determination of a Council of War. We have not yet 
had an Opportunity of making a regular Enquiry into the 
Reasons of so desperate a Measure. As far as we can 
collect from the Officers and Crews here, it was occasioned 
by the Assurances of the Commander of the Land Forces, 
that they must expect no further Protection from his Army ; 
not even to secure a Retreat in Case of Emergency. But 
' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 165 

this must be the Subject of future Enquiry. Be the Cause 
what it may, the Loss seems at present, to be irreparable. 

" We request the favour of your Excellency to let the 
enclosed Packet go with your next Despatches to Congress, 
& are &c. 

" Fra^ Hopkinson. 

"John Wharton." 



COLONEL JOSEPH ELLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE. 

" [Haddonfield], Nov' 23* 1777 
"By a Woman who came thro' the Enemy encampments 
this day, says, that their main Body lay at Woodbury & 
Lord Cornwallis quarter'd at M' Coopers — That they have 
a large encampment at Great Timber Creek Bridge and 
their advanced picquet consisting of about thirty are posted 
at Little Timber Creek Bridge. — They give out that they 
have 10,000 Men, but she thought they had not half the 
number; most of the Troops she saw were cloathed in 
Greene — she thought they had between 80 & 100 Light 
Horse." 

[Unsigned.] 

MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE TO WASHINGTON. 

" Mount Holly, Nov' 24, 1777 
" D^ Sir 

" I have nothing new to communicate to your Excellency 
with Respect to the Motions of the Enemy — they remain or 
did remain last night at Woodbury, with a Guard at Timber 
Creek, consisting of about six hundred men. The Boats 
that went up, mentioned in ray former Letter, I conjecture 
had on Board the Baggage of the Army ; the Soldiers seen 
on board, were the regimental Guards to the Baggage. 

" The Militia of this State is dwindling to nothing. Gen. 
Varnum says, there was upwards of 1400 a few days since 
— they are reduced now to between seven & eight. Col" 
Shreeve is gone out to see what Impression he can make upon 
the People, and to endeavour to draw together as large a 

13 



166 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

Number as possible ; but I cannot flatter myself with any 
considerable reinforcement. — I will endeavour to inclose 
your Excellency a Return of our Strength in Continental & 
Militia this Afternoon if possible. 

" "We are all ready to advance ; but the General Oflicers 
think it advisable to wait the Return of the first Express 
sent to Glover's Brigade; to learn the strength & time the 
Junction may be formed with that Brigade. — I have heard 
nothing where it is, notwithstanding I have sent three Ex- 
presses. — Capt. Lee is not arrived, neither have I heard any 
thing of him — I could wish if possible, some Horse might 
be sent, as every Army is an unwieldy Body without them; 
& in this Country, they are more immediately necessary, 
to prevent the Enemy from sending out theirs to collect 
Stock. 

" Col° Cox who is with me at this Place, says, if the 
Enemy can open a Communication with the three lower 
Counties, they will be able, independant of all the sur- 
rounding Country, to draw Supplies of every kind, neces- 
sary for the Subsistance of the Army & Inhabitants of the 
City of Philadelphia. 

"Your Excellency observes in your last, you must leave 
the Propriety of attacking the Enemy to me. Would you 
advise me to fight them with very unequal numbers. Most 
People, indeed all, agree they are near or quite 5000 strong 
— Our Force is upwards of three, exclusive of the Militia, 
which may be from seven to eight hundred at most. The 
Situation the Enemy are in, the Ease with which they 
can receive Reinforcements, & the Difliculty of our knowing 
it, will render it absolutely necessary, whenever we advance 
from this Place, to make the Attack as soon as possible. — 
I had much rather engage with three thousand against five, 
than attack the Enemy's Lines, & there is a much greater 
prospect of succeeding, but still I cannot promise myself 
victory, nor even a Prospect of it, with Inferior !N'umbers. 
I have seen of late, the difficulty your Excellency seemed 
to labour under, to justify the Expectations of an ignorant 
Populace, with great Concern. It is our misfortune to have 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 167 

an Extent of Country to cover, that demands four times our 
Numbers — the Enemy so situated as to be very difficult to 
approach, and from pretty good Authority superior to us in 
numbers. Under these Disadvantages, your Excellency has 
the choice of but two things, to fight the Enemy without 
the least Prospect of Success, upon the common Principles 
of War, or remain inactive, & be subject to the Censure of 
an ignorant & impatient populace. In doing one you may 
make a bad matter worse, and take a measure, that, if it 
proves unfortunate, you may stand condemned for by all 
military Gentlemen of Experience ; pursuing the other you 
have the Approbation of your own mind, you give your 
Country an opportunity to exert itself to supply the present 
Deficiency, & also act upon such military Principles as 
will justify you to the best Judges in the present day, & to 
all future Generations. For my own Part, I feel Censure 
with as great a Degree of Sensibility, as is possible, and I 
feel ambitious of doing every thing that common Sense can 
justify; but I am fully persuaded, in attempting more you 
may make a temporary a lasting Evil. — The Cause is too 
important to be trifled with to shew our Courage, & your 
Character too deeply interested to sport away upon un- 
military Principles. — 

" For your Sake, for my own Sake, & for my Country's 
Sake I wish to attempt every thing which will meet with 
your Excellency's Approbation — I will run any Risque or 
engage under any Disadvantages if I can only have your 
Countenance if unfortunate. With the Publick I know 
Success sanctifies every thing and that only. I cannot help 
thinking from the most Dispassionate Survey of the Opera- 
tions of the Campaign that you stand approved by Reason 
& justified by every military Principle. — With Respect to 
my own Conduct, I have ever given my Opinion with 
Candour & to my utmost executed with Fidelity whatever 
was committed to my Charge. 

"In some Instances we have been unfortunate. — In one 
I thought I felt the Lour of your Excellency's Countenance, 
when I am sure I had no Reason to expect it — It is out of 



168 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

my Power to command success, but I trust I have ever 
endeavoured to deserve it. 

"It is mortifying euough to be a common Sharer in 
Misfortunes, but to be punished as the Author, without 
deserving it, is truly afflicting. 

" Your Excellency's Letter of the 22", but I suppose it 
was of yesterday, this moment came to hand. As I have 
wrote so fully upon the Subject I have nothing to add, only, 
that to advance from this place before Glover's Brigade 
joins us, unless we attack the Enemy without them, will 
rather injure than facilitate our Designs. But if your 
Excellency wishes the Attack to be made immediately — 
give me only your Countenance & notwithstanding it is 
contrary to the Opinion of the General Officers here, I will 
take the Consequences upon myself. 

" Inclosed is a copy of a letter from Colo. [Joseph] Ellis 
at Haddoufield. 

" The Hospitals in the Jerseys are greatly complained of 
— they prove a grave for many of the poor Soldiery — prin- 
cipally oweing to the Negligence of the Surgeons who have 
the Care of the Hospitals. How far these Complaints are 
well grounded I cannot pretend to say — but I would beg 
leave to recommend the sending of good trusty Officers to 
inspect the Management of the Hospitals & to remain there 
until regularly relieved. I am &c. 

"Nath Greene. 

"Major Burnet has just returned from Glover's Brigade 
— they will be at the black Horse to Night — Eight miles 
from this place. 

" half past three oClock." 

colonel ellis to major-general greene. 

" Haddonfield, Nov' 24"' 1777 
" Dear Sir 

" In complyauce with your Letter of yesterday, I send 
you a state of the Militia under my Command, which is 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777 , 169 

about 400 Effective at this place, and about 100 in the 
neighbourhood below Manto Creek; the time of service for 
which they came out will for the greater part expire in a few 
days ; Orders are out for Assembling the other Classes, so 
that I hope to keep up the number. — As to the Enemy, from 
the best discoveries we have been able to make, their main 
strength is at Woodbury, and their lines extend from Manto 
Creek, to Little Timber Creek, an extent of six or seven 
miles : their whole force about 5000, consisting of Brittish, 
Hessians, and Marines; The Marines are employ'd in de- 
stroying the Works at Red Bank, when that is effected they 
give out, they intend moveing their Army upwards, to Bur- 
lington and Mount Holly ; Their Post at Woodbury is ad- 
vantageous & difficult to attack. — Thus you have an Account 
of matters in this quarter. If any thing interesting comes 
to my knowledge, I shall transmit it with all possible speed. 

I am &c. 

" Jos : Ellis. 

" KB. — The Enemy have 8 or 9 Field pieces on the dif- 
ferent Roads near Woodbury. 

" Just now receiv'd Intelligence by a Person who came 
thro' part of the Enemy's lines on the upper-side of Great 
Timber Creek, who says there is about 300 at and between 
the two Timber Creeks." 



BRIGADIER-GENERAL WEEDON TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE. 

" Haddonfield, Nov' 24, 7 oClock 
" D" General. 

" We only arrived here a few minutes ago. Some of our 
parties have taken 9 prisoners, which will get to you early 
to morrow. From them we have had I believe pretty exact 
accounts of their numbers, which the Marquis will enclose 
you a particular account of. They amount to 4250, 60 
pieces of Artillery and 100 Light Horse. The Infantry 
and artillery may be nearly right, but I doubt the informa- 
tion respecting the horse. They have this day advanced on 



] 70 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

this side Great Timber Creek with their Main Bodj', and 
have pitched on this side of Little Timber Creek also — 
Some of the prisoners were taken within two miles of the 
town — They have no troops at Red Bank, and but few at 
Billingsport. The prisoners say they intend crossing the 
Delaware at Cooper's ferry. "We shall look about us in the 
morning, and shall communicate any thing of importance. 
From yours very sincerely 

" G. Weedon." 



\0n back-l — "I have this moment rec'' your Orders to 
return ; — myself & Horse is so much fatigued, that can't 
get further than Moors Town tonight. Shall join you early 
in y° Morning." 



BRIGADIER-GENERAL POTTER TO 'WASHINGTON. 

" Camp at the Squair, Nov' 24'" 1777 

" Sir : 

" I was at Chester yesterday the most of the shiping is 
gon up the River as far as the Bend below Billingsport — the 
enclosed lines I Received from a good honest whig that 
would not assart a falce hood knowing it to be such he lives 
in the City." 

[Unsigned.] 

l_Enclosure.'] 

"Sir 

" I Received y° Beef & Return thanks till better paid. 

" The troops in thee Jerseys under Comand of Lo* 
Cornwalis are not come back Neither is any others ar- 
rived here, but Shipping with Stores for army. No ace' 
at all from y' Jerseys their Numbers here I cant find out 
but I Beleave it takes one third part Daily for Guards in 
& about town. 

" The meaning of that fire you see was the Americans 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 171 

set fire to their fire ships & the reports of their guns 
when the fire had got to them & tlie great Esplosons 
of Magazines on board the Galleys all got up safe to 
Burlington."' 



■WASHINGTON TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE. 

" Head Qrs 24 November, 1777 
"D« Sir: 

"If you have not moved from Mount Holley when this 
comes to hand, I wish you to wait there till you see Col" 
Meade, who will set oft' immediately charged with some 
important matters which I thought it improper to commit 
to paper. This, however, you are to understand under this 
restriction — That I do not mean to prevent you a moment 
from prosecuting any Objects you have immediately in view 
that promises success. I am &c ^ 

"G° Washington." 



'This was from the same correspondent as gave the lines printed on 
page 156. 

^ In manuscript of Robert Hanson Harrison. A council of war sat on 
November 24 to consider the possibility of attacking successfully the 
enemy in Philadelphia. No decision appears to have been reached, and 
Washington requested each officer to submit his opinion in writing. 



172 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 



[Note. — To properly understand the importance of the following 
documents, it is necessary to recall the political position occupied by 
Washington. The success of Gates at the northward had directed 
public attention to his supposed capacity as a commander. The plot 
which has passed into history as the Conway Cabal originated some 
time before Conway had anything to do with it, and was in its nature 
political rather than military. The idea entertained by some members 
of Congress, notably those from the Eastern States, of the necessity 
of having two commanders instead of one, offered a basis for scheming 
in the military line. Did anything happen to Washington, it was felt 
there was no man to take his place ; and Gates, at the head of the 
northern army, reaping the benefits of the preparation and leader- 
ship of others against Burgoyne, gave promise of a brilliant military 
future, and thus presented himself as a legitimate successor to Washing- 
ton. This was early the feeling among certain members of Congress, 
and their prepossessions were used in an illegitimate way to further the 
ambitions of men wishing to advance themselves by means of Gates. 
There is not enough evidence to prove that Gates was a party to any 
scheme having a definite purpose to supplant Washington ; bi\t there is 
abundant evidence of a wish on the part of certain officers in close con- 
nection with Gates to push him for the chief command of the American 
army. In seeking this they sought even more their own advancement 
and advantage, and it is to Conway and Mifflin, out of Congress, and to 
Samuel Adams, James Lovell, and, as is generally supposed, Richard 
Henry Lee, in Congress, that the alleged Cabal owed a support and 
encouragement that eventually led to an actual plot to advance Gates 
even at the expense of removing Washington. 

The surrender of Burgoyne directed attention to Gates. To accomplish 
that object Washington had so far depleted his own army as to be in no 
position to offer effective resistance to the advance of Howe upon Phil- 
adelphia. The battle of Brandywine and the reduction of Fort Mifflin 
practically determined which army should hold the city, and the general 
public, seeing only defeat in onequarter and a brilliant success in another, 
jumped to the conclusion that the one was due to inefficiency, while the 
other was caused by splendid military ability. It was, therefore, easy 
to foment an opinion that Washington had been derelict in his share of 
the campaign ; and as day after day passed with the two armies almost 
within gunshot of one another, yet no engagement taking place, the popu- 
lace clamored for action. They could not understand why, with forces 
supposed to be nearly equal in strength, an assault upon the British in 
Philadelphia should not be attempted. They could not know how much 
Washington had sacrificed of his strength to assist Gates, and they did 
not know that the force returning from the northern army after its suc- 
cess did not rejoin Washingtun until after Fort Mifflin had fallen. It 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 173 

was only when Glover's brigade and Morgan's corps had joined the 
main army that Washington felt himself strong enough to entertain an 
assault upon the city. Not only did he wish to make this assault, but 
he was urged to it by the popular clamor, as it was thought that good 
political results would follow a striking military success. He knew that 
he had enemies in the army, and felt that he had them in Congress. The 
sentence from Conway's letter gave him knowledge of the one, while his 
friends in Congress kept him advised of the other. It was to determine 
whether his idea of an attack on the British was practicable that he 
called a council of war and requested the opinion in writing of each 
general officer. These opinions are now published for the first time, and 
must be considered in the light of something besides military policy, 
although they are naturally concerned more with the military than the 
political features. 

One bit of evidence which I believe has not been heretofore known is 
to be found in a report submitted to Congress by the Board of War on 
November 21, or three days before this council was held. The military 
questions in Congress had been under the control of a " Board of War 
and Ordnance" until October, 1777, when a " Board of War" was estab- 
lished, to consist of three persons not members of Congress. As a begin- 
ning of a separation of executive from legislative functions, this was a 
decided step in advance. It was on October 17 that the report consti- 
tuting the Board of War was adopted, or about two weeks after the 
knowledge of Gates's victory had been obtained. On November 7 the 
members of the Board were elected : Major-General Thomas Mifflin, Colo- 
nel Timothy Pickering, and Colonel Robert Hanson Harrison. Mifflin 
and Pickering accepted their appointments. On November 17 Congress 
determined to add two members to the old Board of War, and selected 
Mr. Dana and Mr. J. D. Smith. This old Board, composed of members of 
Congress, met on the morning of the 21st of November ; and, by a strange 
oversight, the report they laid before Congress contained the name of 
Major-General Mifflin as present and apparently taking a full part in the 
proceedings as one of the members. This error was afterwards corrected 
and his name stricken out. In this report is to be found the first sugges- 
tion formally made that Gates should be the President of the new Board. 
It also contained other matter of such interest as to warrant its publica- 
tion in full. It will be seen that the paragraph applying to Gates was 
postponed, as well as that which provided for the retention of Richard 
Peters as Secretary to the Board. Six days later Congress proceeded to 
the election of three Commissioners for the Board, and elected Major- 
General Gates, Joseph Trumbull, and Richard Peters as the Commis- 
sioners, and specially appointed Gates as the President of the Board. It 
is thus established that it was due to Mifflin that Gates received this high 
appointment to a place in which he could more easily work upon the 
sympathies and influence of the members of Congress, led rather by the 



174 Defetioes of Philadelphia in 1777. 

ambitious of others than by his own wishes. The general impression to 
be gained of Gates, from his correspondence, is that of a rather dull, 
well-meaning, and easily influenced man, such a man as would readily 
become the tool of others possessed of greater capacity and more 
unscrupulous. 

Nothing could be more cutting to Washington than the terms of this ' 
report urging the claims of Major-General Gates to the position of Presi- 
dent of the Board. The principal matter urged by Washington upon 
Congress as essential to future operations— a measure on which the future 
of America would depend — was the formation of a new army of compe- 
tent number and engaged for the war, or for a longer service than twelve 
months. As the end of the year was approaching, he found himself once 
more face to face with the formation of a new establishment. He had 
been providing for this contingency for months, and after an experience 
of short enlistments through two campaigns, had become so convinced 
of the attending evils as to see no safety in any other course than in a 
reasonably permanent force of .sufficiently long service to become dis- 
ciplined and accustomed to their officers, — a prime necessity in an effi- 
cient army. Nothing could have hurt him more than to have one 
intoxicated by an unusual success cut in under him with the remark 
that his policy was a " theory" and that there were other things more 
important. The committee urged Gates's military skill as competent 
to suggest " reformations" in the different departments of the army, 
while his "char.acter and popularity in the army" would facilitate the 
execution of such reformations, — " a Task in the opinion of this Com- 
mittee more arduous and important than the formation of any new 
Establishment, however wise it may be in Theory." 

Fortunately, no such language was used in a formal resolution ; for it 
is hardly possible to believe that Washington would have remained at 
the head of the army under such a studied rebuke of his policy. Con- 
gress rejected the words of the report, and on the 27th passed the 
following : 

Resulved, That Mr. President inform Mujor-Gener.al Gates of his being 
appointed president of the new constituted Board of War, ex|ire5sing the 
high .sense Congress entertain of the general's abilities and peculiar fitness 
to discharge the duties of that important office, upon the right execution of 
which the success of the American cause does eminently depend ; that he 
inform general Gates, that it is the intention of Congress to continue his 
rank as major-general in the army, and that he officiate at the Board, or in 
the field, as occasion may require; and that the general be requested to 
repair to Congress with all convenient despatcli, to enter on the duties of his 
new appointment. 

WOUTHINQTON C. FORD.] 



Defences of Philadelphia in 177 



175 



REPORT OF THE BOARD OF WAR. 



f 



Ag^ 



"At a Board of War, y° 21" Nov' A.M. 1777. 

"Present, Major General Mifflin, M' Lee, M' Duer, M' 
Jones, M' Harvey, M' "Williams & M' Dana. 

" The Board beg leave to report to Congress 

" That they have had a Conference with Gen- 
eral MifHin on the late Establishment made by 
Congress for conducting the War Department, 
and are unanimously of opinion, that a sulBcieut 
number of Commissioners have not been ap- 
pointed for giving due weight to the execution 
of the Regulations which may be recommended 
by the Board, and adopted by Congress, and 
particularly for enabling one of the Board of 
Commissioners to visit from Time to time the 
diilereut Armies, Posts, or Garrisons in order 
to see that the Regulations adopted by Congress 
are carried into Execution, and to examine what 
are the wants of the Army, and what Defects or 
Abuses prevail from time to time in the difier- 
ent departments.' 

" That it wou'd further greatly tend to facili- 
tate the Business of the Department, especially 
at the Commencement of the new Establish- 
ment, to secure the Continuation of the Services 
of the Secretary of the late Board of War, who 
in their Opinion has discharged the Duties of an 
arduous and complicated Department in its In- 
fant stage, with Honour to himself, and much 
Disinterestedness, and with Fidelity and advan- 
tage to the Public. 



> 



Prio Q,' 



■ Printed in the Journals of Congress, November 24, 1777. 



176 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 



Postp'' 



" The Board further beg leave to represent 
that General MitHin has express'd a warm Sol- 
licitude that Major General Gates shou'd be 
appointed President of this Board, from a Con- 
viction that his Military Skill would suggest 
Reformations in the different Departments of 
the Army essential to good Discipline, Order & 
(Economy, and that his Character and Popu- 
larity in the Army would facilitate the execu- 
tion of such Reformations when adopted by 
Congress ; a Task in the opinion of this Com- 
mittee more arduous and important than the 
formation of any new Establishment, however 
wise it may be in Theory. 

" On these Principles your Committee are of 
opinion 

" That two additional Commissioners should 
be appointed to execute the Department of the 
"War Office in P^Suance of the Resolution of 
Congress of the [I7th of October' ], and that 
any three of the said Commissioners should be 
a Quorum to transact Business; anything in 
the former Resolutions respecting the Board to 
the contrary notwithstanding.^ 

" Extract from the Minutes. 

" Jos. NOURSE 

" i». 8. B* War." 



Endorsed by Thomson as "passed." In the hand- 
writing of Richard Peters is added : 

"The Board are further of Opinion that the Resolution 
pass'd on the Inst, relative to the Execution of the 

War Department should be annuU'd; and that the Mem- 
bers former Committee of Congress Board of War should be 
authoris'd to proceed on the Business of that Department, 



' In manuscript of Charles Thomson. 

' Printed in the Journals of Congress, November 24, 1777. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 177 

till such Time as a Quorum of the Commissioners of the 
"War Office shall attend." 



OPINION OF MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE. 

" Mount Holly, 9 o'clock Nov. 24, 1777 
"D»SlR 

" I received your favor by Col. Mead who has communi- 
cated to me the design of an attack upon Philadelphia, the 
consequences if successful are so desireable that I wish it 
appeard to me more practicable. — In war there must be 
always something left to chance and I would always recom- 
mend to trust some consequences to the spirit and bravery 
of the troops. An excess of caution which councils of war 
are generally productive of, often deprives a country of the 
advantages of a due exertion of the spirit & bravery of the 
troops — but I have viewed this subject in and out of council, 
I have weighed the good and bad consequences — I have 
surveyd it in a Historical point of light, I have examind 
it from my own observations in the course of the war, and 
I cannot think there is that degree of probability of the 
attempts succeeding that will warrant the undertaking. I 
have not time without detaining Col. Mead too long to give 
my reasons against the attack in full detail, but I think it a 
hazardous attempt and will terminate to the injury of the 
Continent and disgrace of the army. — I am sensible that 
many things pronounced impracticable before they were 
attempted have been crowned with success in the undertak- 
ing — But prudence forbids that being made a principle 
which necessity alone can justify — I wish that it was in our 
power to give that Army some capital wound — the reputa- 
tion of the Army and the happiness of the country loudly 
call for it — but in consulting our wishes rather than our 
reason, we may be hurried by an impatience to attempt 
something splendid into inextricable difficulties. 

" The depreciation of money, the corruption of the people 
and the dislike to service that prevails throughout the army 
will justify measures at this day that might wear the com- 
plexion of rashness under different circumstances. How 



178 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

far these considerations may authorise the attempt I cannot 
pretend to say. One thing I would beg leave to recom- 
mend, that is if your Excellency thinks of attacking the City 
this winter improve the present moment for sure I am what- 
ever reinforcements of militia may be drawn in to aid the 
army they cannot render it so formidable and equal to the 
attempt as it is at this hour. I am very willing to lay aside 
my own private Judgment and second the attempt — you 
may depend upon it Sir that I will as freely embark in the 
attempt if your Excellency thinks it warrantable as if I was 
of the same sentiment, and whatever may be the event my 
opinion never shall be known. 

" The troops here are under marching orders — Glover's 
Brigade will join us in the morning — I intended to advance 
in the morning at nine, but Col. Mead's coming and recom- 
mending the postponing the march until I hear further from 
your Excellency, and as the troops coming in will want one 
day's rest I thought it best to countermand the orders for 
marching until I hear from your Excell^ and I am further 
induced to the measure because I dont apprehend the diffi- 
culties of attacking Lord Cornwallis will be increasd from 
one or two days delay. The Enemy give out they are 
10,000 strong and that they intend to march to Burlington. 

" I wish your Excellency to weigh the subject coolly and 
take your measures accordingly — I shall be perfectly satis- 
fied be the result what it may. 

" I am &c. 

"N. Greene." 

OPINION OF LORD STIRLING. 

" Camp, Nov' 25'" 1777 
" Sir : 

" In Compliance with your Excellency's request that each 
of the General Officers met in Council yesterday Evening, 
should give you their Sentiments in writing on what Meas- 
ures had best be pursued in the present Exigency of our 
affairs; I must now beg leave to give it as my opinion that 
as all the reinforcements we had any reason to expect, have 
now Joined the main Army, and as a Considerable body of 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 179 

the Enemy's army is detached into New Jersey under the 
Command of Lord Cornwaliis, a favorable opertunity is 
presented for an immediate Attack of the Enemy. That 
other Circumstances render this measure absolutely neces- 
sary. That from all I have heard said, or that has occurred 
to me on the Subject, I think the following plan of Attack 
most feaseable, 1" That the Enemy's Lines on this side 
Philadelphia be attacked at Daylight by three Columns 
properly flanked and supported. 2'' That two thousand 
men be drawn from General Green and embarked in Boats 
at Dunker's ferry, to proceed to Philadelphia, land at or 
near Spruce Street, push thro' to the Common, endeavour 
with part to secure the Bridge over Schuylkill, and with 
the remainder to Attack the Enemy in the Rear of their 
Lines. 3* That five hundred Continental Troops with the 
Millitia under General Potter possess snch of the hills on the 
other side of Schuylkill as command an Intilade of the 
Enemy's Lines, and while part of them carry on a Brisk 
Canonade in that place, the rest of them proceed to the 
Bridge over Schuylkill and wait an oppertunity of attacking 
the Works there in front, when the party from Spruce Street 
make an Attack in the Rear. The Landing of the party at 
Spruce Street should he eftected if possible just before day 
light, as it would greatly facilitate their passage thro' the 
Town and bring the Alarm to the Rear of the Enemy's lines 
in time to Cooperate with the main Attack in front. These 
are outlines of the plan I would propose, and submit it to 
your Excellency & am with great Regard and Respect 
"Your Excellency's most Humble Servant 

" Stirling." 

opinion of major-general sullivan. 

" Camp, Whitemarsh, Novem' 25'" 1777. 
" Dear General : 

" Agreeable to y' Ord" of Last Even« I have cons'* the prac- 
ticability of making an Attack upon the Enemy in Ph 

& weighed its probable Consequences in every view That 
occurred to me. 



180 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

" In order to Determine whether such an Attempt is Likely 
to succeed it is necessary to consider the Euem3-s situation — 
The Manner of our making the Attack on the Lines — the 
Mode of Attack we must adopt for carrying the city after 
we have made ourselves masters of their Lines & the prob- 
able method the Enemy may adopt to Render our Designs 
abortive. The Right of the Enemy is secured by the Dela- 
ware, their Left by Schuylkill & their Rear by the Junction 
of those Rivers. Their front is parti}' secured by an Inac- 
cessable Pond & the Residue by a Chain of Redoubts 
strengthened by Abbatties in part & partly by circular 
Works — These Redoubts being 14 in number. The Attack 
upon them must be total or partial if the whole are to be 
attacked, as works cannot be carried but by Columns. The 
attacking part of your force in Front must be Disposed in 
fourteen Columns to carry 14 Redoubts manned with 100 
men each. After carrying those they are to assume a Dif- 
ferent Form to attack the city which will then be on their 
Left Defended by 4600 men, even if we suppose the Enemys 
whole Force in Philadelphia to amount to no more than 
6000. If a partial attack is made upon these Redoubts, it 
must be on these Left, for if these Right be attacked & 
carried those Redoubts which remain on their Left will with 
their field pieces play obliquely on the Rear of y' Troops 
while Forming & making the attack on the city. Should 
then their Left be attacked & carried & your Troops pass 
them & form agreeable to your most Sanguine Expecta- 
tions & advance towards the city they will have the chains 
of Redoubts on their Left, the Schuylkill in their Rear, the 
city & the Delaware in front & the Delaware & Schuylkill 
on their Right. When your Troops advance to the city in 
Line they will find the wall of Brick Houses opposed to y' 
right of their Line, The upper stories of those Houses well 
filled by rausqueteers & the main streets by which alone 
they can penetrate filled with men. Drawn across of sufficient 
Depth to oppose any part of your Line that may come 
against them, & the whole Defended by a Train of artillery 
surely (?) superior to any you can possibly bring against 



Defences of Pkiludelphia in 1777. 181 

them, & this artillery being placed in front of the Houses 
makes no Interval in their Line & is conipleatly covered by 
The Musqueteers occupying the upper Lofts of The Houses. 
This Disposition will oblidge you once more to form Columns 
to penetrate the Streets, in Doing which your Troops must the 
moment they enter the city expect a Fire in front from the 
Troops opposed to them & on both Flanks from the Houses : 
These circumstances must occur to the party attacking in 
Front. How far they may be assisted by a party thrown 
into the city by water I will not Determine. If the party in 
front is successful they may be saved — if not they are inevi- 
tably lost — before we promise ourselves Success from this 
Stratagem it will be proper to consider how far this plan 
will be Likely to be Discovered by the Enemy in Season to 
prevent its Eftects. Every person who has attended to the 
Noise made by a Fleet of Boats Rowing in the Night must 
be sensible that they will be heard at Lest two miles & the 
Noise will Direct the Enemy where to make their opposi- 
tion — It cannot be supposed that the Enemy will be stupid 
enough to Let their whole army run to oppose them — they 
have alarm posts which they will repair to & send a sufficient 
Number of the Reserve with field pieces to oppose or entrap 
them. It will be far from having the Effect Designed by a 
Feint which answers no other purpose but to Induce the 
Enemy to suppose your whole force being thrown to a point 
with an Intention to make your most vigorous effort there 
& by this means Draw them from the posts you wish to 
carry. They will easily know that you have not boats to 
Transport any considerable part of your army to the City 
by water, nor would it be prudent in you so to do. They 
will therefore consider this as a Feint & Treat it accord- 
ingly while they prepare to Receive your Real Attack in 
Front which this Feint will sufficiently announce to them — 
with Respect to the probability of carrying the Lines & 
afterward the City Defended by an army almost equal in 
Number to that part of yours which you can expect any- 
thing from is what both reason & experience speaks Loudly 
against. I have sometimes Read of Lines & partial Retrench- 

14 



182 Defmces of Philadelphia in 1777. 

ments being carried but in the course of my Reading (which 
has not been Inconsiderable) I have never Read of a Chain 
of Redoubts Covering the whole Front of an Army being 
carried (even where they had not as in the present Case 
rivers covering every other side of tliem). I cannot help 
observing that some Gentlemen Avho think we can easily 
carry those Redoubts say that if we are Defeated we have a 
Strong and secure Camp to Retreat to. how it can be sup- 
posed that a Camp without Lines or Redoubts can be 
better Defended by a Defeated army against a victorious 
one than Lines & Redoubts can with Troops, against others 
upon equal footing only is beyond my Conception. I know 
it is Said that these Redoubts are weak, but it would b|e ab- 
surd to suppose that the Redoubts they liave been Labour- 
ing at six weeks are not as perfect as those Thrown up by 
Peter the Great in one night which Defeated the best army 
in the world or equal to that single Redoubt which Ruined 
the British Army at Bunkers Hill. Mr. Howe has never 
attempted a Redoubt since but at Red Bank & was Defeated 
— he was several Days with Double your numbers within 
musket shot of y"' Lines on Long Island & White Plains & 
feared to attack you — he has no Conception that Lines are 
so easily carried but if in this he is mistaken all military 
writers agree that the attack of a village is the most Hazard- 
ous Enterprise in war, & has seldom been attended with 
Success. Experience has so far convinced the King of Prus- 
sia that he is determined never to attack another, if it be 
said we must Reduce it by Cannonnade ray answer is that 
must be a work of time, especially as they have more cannon 
& heavier mettle than we. 

" I know the world expect something from this Army & 
our affairs call for it, but no Caprice of the Greedy Multitude 
should induce us to Sacrifice the Army — a Defeat will be so 
far from helping that in my opinion it will ruin our affairs. 
The common people will Discover Howes superiority to 
both our armies without Considering the advantage he had 
against them — those who have sense enough to Discover the 
advantages he had against them will condemn the attempt 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 183 

as xinwarrantod by Reason or Experience — so that from 
Different views the Country will become universally Dis- 
couraged, which I fear will end in the liuin of our Cause — 
Upon the whole I think the most certain method to retrieve 
our affairs, to strengthen our friends & Discourage our Ene- 
mies as well as to establish the Currency of our money will 
be to put the army in such a Situation as will render it neces- 
sary for Mr. Howe to fight us or Loose his honor & the con- 
fidence the people have in his arms. Once it is known that 
by avoiding you he acknowledges your Superiority in the 
field his very friends will Despise him for his weakness & 
Deceit. Yours will be encouraged & value your money at 
a high rate when supported by those Arms which (this 
hitherto) arrogant Invader dare not Attack. — There is still 
another mode of attack upon the Enemys Lines which is to 
pass your Columns between the Redoubts, if this should 
be attempted & the Enemy should retire & Draw up in Rear 
of their Works Leaving in them a suflicient Number to 
man them your Troops must advance under a Front & Two 
Flank Fires till they have passed the Redoubts when they 
will have an additional one in their Rear from the Redoubts 
they have passed & after Enduring all this they will have to 
attack the City under all the Disadvantages before men- 
tioned, in which if they are successfuil they will do what no 
other Troops have ever accomplished. 

" I know it is said by some that your Excellency's charac- 
ter & that of the whole Array will suffer if something is not 
attempted as the Northern Army is called to our Assistance, 
&c. I am far from thinking so. But Let us consider what 
foundation there can be for censure. It is beyond a Ques- 
tion that General Howe has been much Superior to you in 
Numbers thr" the whole Campaign. Yet you have fought 
him & th° the field remained his the victory was yours — he 
to add to his Force & to get a Decisive Superiority over you 
in the field called for a Reinforcement & you to counteract 
him did the same. You by this means became 13000 strong 
& he remains at Least twelve, if your additional militia 
will make up for the want of Discipline in your young 



184 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

Troops I think it is all we can expect. Where then is this 
Superiority in numbers on your side which will warrant your 
making an attack so Likely to Compleat the Ruin of your 
Currency : an attack condemned by every military writer 
& unwarranted by Reason or Experience? Actions always 
take their Character from the Success that attend them, & 
those Gentlemen who urge this matter to save tlie Credit of 
the Army Deceive themselves & you ; for if you are unsuc- 
cessful the Credit of the Army will be Destroyed & the 
Confidence of the people Lost beyond recovery & your own 
Character must suft'er. It has been urged that these works 
may be carried by Surprize : I have ever understood that 
works were constructed to prevent a Surprize & never 
once conceived it possible to surprize & carry 14 redoubts 
especially when the Enemy's first line is encamped in Front 
of them — it would be needless to give your Excellency in- 
stances of such attempts upon Redoubts alone and unforti- 
fied Villages being rendered abortive. Military Books are 
full of them those writers tell us that a single Stone House, 
mill or Church if well defended cannot be reduced by [but ?] 
by cannon, if this be true with respect to one a Regular 
Line of them opposed to your whole Front must be much 
more Difficult. What success a Cannonnade from Troops in 
the open field is Likely to have upon others covered by a 
village & redoubts & possessed of a Superior Train of artil- 
lery requires no great share of military knowledge to Deter- 
mine. I have mentioned some unfortunate attacks upon 
Redoubts that have fallen within our own knowledge. I 
will at present mention but two that have proved so upon 
villages not Defended by Lines or Redoubts. One was in 
Corsica the first campaign made by the French ag' it, where 
the whole French army were cut to pieces in storming a 
small village defended by Paschal Paoli's Brother with a 
Handful of Corsicans & at German Town one Stone House 
snatched from us a victory which was about compleated. I 
am therefore clearly of opinion that the attempt would 
be Hazardous & must End in Ruin to the Army & to the 
American Cause, but should y' Exce^ think the attempt 



Defences of Philadelphia m 1777. 185 

practicable I shall cheerfully give up my opinion & use every 
effort in my power to carry it into Execution with Success. 
I have the honor to be your Excey' most obed' Serv' 

"Jn° Sullivan." 

opinion of major-general armstrong. 

" Camp at Whitemarsh, 25'" Nov', 1777 
" Sir : 

" Without such an acquaintance of the Enemies lines as 
wou'd discover to you where they are more or less accessi- 
ble, I cannot well approve of an attack upon them, nor can 
I conceive the opposite numbers at Philad" under six thou- 
sand or upward. — And question whether an attack can be 
successful if the lines are not penetrated in so short a space 
of time (perhaps some seven or at most ten minutes) as will 
render it impossible for the party thrown into the City 
shou'd the first attempt on the lines fail, to contribute any 
effectual influence. The principle upon which that part of 
the disposition is formed is perfectly just, but the numbers 
too few, and the contingencies various. 

" In the present view of things I rather approve carrying 
the Army over Scuilkill & making tryal of any advantages 
that yet maj' be derived from a possession of the Islands 
&c. &o., by which means either the Enemy may be drawn out 
or the Scuilkill pass'd to advantage on the Ice. At the same 
time I am totally submissive to y' Excellency's commands, 
beging leave only to add that whether the attack is made or 
not, but especially if it is, the far greater part of y' force in 
the Jersey may suddenly be recalled and join the Army. 
And that I am with the greatest respect &c 

"John Armstrons." 

OPINION op the CHEVALIER DU PORTAIL. 

" 25 9"" 1777. 

" To attack the Enemy in their Lines appears to me a 
difficult and dangerous Project. It has especially this very 
considerable Inconvenience — the exposing our Army in case 
it does not succeed to a total Defeat. This is easily demon- 



186 Defences of PhUadelplda in 1777. 

strated. One of the priiici[»al meaus proposed is to throw 
two thousand men in the rear of the Enemy — if we do not 
succeed these are so many men absolutely lost. As to the 
main body of the Army which is to attack in front, it must 
pass through the Intervals left between the Abattis and 
Redoubts, which they say form very narrow Passages — if 
after penetrating we should be repulsed can Troops in dis- 
order return easily by the Passages through which they 
were introduced — will it not bo very easy for the English to 
cut off their Retreat. Our whole Army tlien may be de- 
stroy'd or made prisoners. Now does it become this Army 
which is the principal one, to run such Risques — does it be- 
i C07ne it to stake the Fate of America on a sint/le Action ? I think 
^ not. For mj' part I never would place this Army in a Situ- 
ation where its Rear was not perfectly free, much less where 
it will be inclosed on all sides without means of Retreat. 
To justify such an Enterprise the success must be almost 
certain. To judge of this we have only to take a view of 
the Dispositions which must be made for this attack. This 
View will render the Difficulties evident. First — two thou- 
sand men are to be introduced by a River of which the 
Enemy are wholly Masters. If ^ve embark them near the 
Enemy the noise may alarm them — if at a distance, the 
cold which they will undergo, will render the use of their 
Arms exceedingly difficult in the morning — besides can we 
flatter ourselves that the River side is unguarded. Let us 
reflect that a single man is sufficient to make this project 
miscarry and cause us the loss of two thousand men. 

"As to the Attack in front — these are nearly the Dispo- 
sitions which would be followed — We should march upon 
as many Columns as there are Roads leading to the Enemy 
— upon our arrival in their presence, each Commanding 
Officer of a Colunni, according to the size of the works be- 
fore liim, and the number of men which he judges are con- 
tained in them, divides his Troops into two parts, one of 
which surrounds the works and attacks them vigorously, 
while the other marches boldly througli the Intervals and 
falls upon the troops in the Rear. But every one sees how 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 187 

much harmony is required in all these dispositions. How 
much presence of mind in the Superior Officers — how much 
firmness in the troops who have to execute all their ma- 
noeuvres under the fire of an Enemy who are in a great 
measure cover'd. 

" If the Enemy's works are not inclosed, the Enterprise 
would be much less dangerous — if they are, the Enterprise 
is too hardy. 

" His Excellency I think desired us to say a word respect- 
ing the operations in Jersey. In general it seems to me 
that we can do nothing better than to endeavour to attack 
the Enemy's Force there with superior numbers — but there 
is a very important Observation to be made, which is that 
we should not weaken ourselves too much here ; for we are 
to consider that the Enemy may recross their Troops in one 
night and attack us by day break with their whole force. 

"If however an attack be determined upon, the Enemy's 
Works should be more particularly reconnoitred. 

" The Chevalier Du Portail." ' 

opinion of baron de kalb. 

" According to His Excellency General Washington's or- 
ders, and desire of having every Gentleman's opinion on 
the Subjects laid before the Council last evening. 

" Mine is to attempt an attack on the lines & City, as soon 
as the Plans thereof can be properly laid, all necessary dis- 
positions and calculations made, as to the mode & time. In 
respect to the Plan much must depend on intelligences of 
the Enemy's Position & collected or separated forces, and 
the whole Enterprise on secrecy and Expedition. 

"Two essential points would be necessary to be known. 

"1° Whether a passage for a Column will be practicable 
on the Bridge or middle ferry on Schuylkill river, to make 
there a strong attack, or whether the Ennemies take down 
the Bridge in night time. In this case a small body of 

' This opinion was given in Frencli. I have used a translation made 
by Lieutenant-Colouel John Laurens. 



188 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

troops and some artillery would be sufficient on the right 
bank of that river to disquiet & annoy them in their Lines, 
and the whole army to be Employed to attack in front with 
different Columns. 

" 2° Whether the Key & City Shore of Delawar be not 
strongly defended, either by Pickets, intrenchments, row 
Gallies, floating and other Batteries, and whether the Noise 
of the Boats to be employed there, will not prevent or de- 
feat the Execution of a landing, for if th' attempt should 
fail by such obstructions, the boats could hardly be brought 
off and these troops would be in great danger of being either 
sunk or taken. If on the contrary no such obstacles were 
to be feared, a surprise on that side and a well timed attack 
in the rear of the lines woud undoubtedly insure a com- 
pleat Victory. 

" Many more things could be said on this subject. 

" As for myself and Division we will do our best in what 
ever part of the Enterprise and attack, His Excellency will 
find proper to Employ me. 

"Baron be Kalb. 

" At Camp, 25 9"" 1777" 

OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL IRVINE. 

" Whitemarsh, Not' 25"" 1777 
" Sib : 

" I have seriously revolved in my mind the subject that was 
debated in Council last night, and notwithstanding the pres- 
ent disagreeable situation of our affairs, cannot think that we 
are yet reduced to the necessity of hazarding the total destruc- 
tion of the army bj' a general attack, on the very ground 
that general Howe would wish to fight us on ; to attack re- 
doubts ifec" with any prospect of success, we should be much 
superior in numbers to the enemy and at least equal to them 
in discipline, were we possessed of these advantages, & had 
boats sufficient to throw about 3000 men into their rear I 
should chearfully vote for the proposed attack, as in my 
opinion the defeat of gen' Howe would then be as certain, 
as, I am afraid ours would be were we to attack him with 
our present strength. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 189 

" I could therefore wish that the array was placed in such 
a position (either on this or the other side of Schuylkill) as to 
invite or oblidge general Howe to leave his strongholds & 
seek us in the field, as the probability of success in a general 
action then, would be more in our favour with equal numbers, 
than in an attempt upon his lines with our present triffliug 
superiority. 

" I have had but little experience in war, & therefore give 
my opinion on this important question with diffidence, should 
your excellency or the major part of the council determine 
on the attack, I shall chearfully sustain the part assigned to 
me, & exert my utmost abilities to procure success. I 
have &c. 

"James Irvine." 



opinion of brigadier-general maxwell. 

" Sir : 

" Agreeable to your Excellency's request of last night that 
I should give my opinion this morning in writing concern- 
ing the making an attact on Philadelphia immediately — I 
am not for attacting it at present, and will proceed to give 
some reasons why I would not, viz : It is but a few days ago ; 
before General Green & Huntington crossed the Dellaware 
that we determined in a full council that an Attact on the 
Enemy in their Fortifycations &c. was by no means eligible, 
and I think we was as strong then as we are now on this 
side. It is urged that if we do not make an attact on the 
Town we must be put to the greatest difiieultys to raise 
another Armey, keep up our credit, &c^ I am of opinion 
if we throw the Armey away we have, without some good 
appearance of success we are much more likely not to get 
another one nor support the Credit of our money. I am 
for attacting and Harrassing them by every means in our 
power ; by any other method than that of attacting them in 
their works. I am &c. 

"W Maxwell. 
" White Marsh, 25'" Novbr. 1777. 



1 90 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

" KB. — I have heard that the Enemy has got up 2 or 3 
small armed Vessels to Philadelphia by people that came 
out yesterday." 

OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL PATERSON. 

" Nov. 25, 1777 

"Sir: 

" The proposed attack on Philidelphia iu my Opinion will 
be so hazardous that we cannot be justified in prosecuting 
of it, as a Failure will most certainly be attended with the 
loss of great Numbers of our Troops, which I am fearfuU 
would be attended with Fatal Consequences M3' perfect 
Ignorance of the Country renders me intirely incapable of 
recommending any other Plan, but shall with Chearfulness 
do my utmost to put in Execution this or any other your 
Excellency shall think adviseable. I am &c. 

" .Tn° Paterson." 

OPINION OF brigadier-general POOR. 

" November 25'" 1777 
" Sir : 

"I am sencable tliat the Situation of our Country loudly 

Calls for the Exertions of this Army. 

" But fear an atact upon the Lines Round the City of 

Philidelphia will be unsucesful therefore dont advize to it. 

"as I have jest arived to Camp & not acquainted in the 

Countrey beg to be Excused from proposing a new Dis- 

posistion of the Army. I am &c 

" Enoch Poor. 

"^. G'." 

OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL SCOTT. 

" White Marsh, 25"" Nov' 1777 
" Sir : 

" I am for making an attack, so soon as things Can be put 
in readiness. As to the plan I can Think of none better 
than that propos'd by Gen' Cadwalader, with this Altera- 
tion, that the partie proposed to land in the City be detached 
from Gen' Green and not taken from this arm}-. I Have 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 191 

two reasons for this, the one is that those men with him are 
the Flower of the army, and that it will requier the hest 
men we can pick to efi'ect the landing if opposd. My other 
Is that we cant well spare them from this army. I have &c 

" Ch' Scott." 



OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL SMALLWOOD. 

" Camp, Novemb' 25"" 1777 
" Sir : 

" I have revolved in mj' Mind the Subject of your Requisi- 
tion last Night, and placed it in every Point of View, and must 
confess I am much embarrassed. I see the Propriety and 
Necessity of an Attact, I view with Pain the pressing Ex- 
pectations of the Public, the Reputation of the Army at 
Stake, the depression of our Money, the difficulty & hazard 
of the proposed Attact, and the Misfortunes, and I may add 
the almost inevitable destruction which must ensue upon a 
Defeat, — and upon due Reflection let it suffice to say I am 
against an Attact on the Enemy's Lines, from an Impres- 
sion that our Troops are not equal to it, unless there was a 
moral certainty of throwing in the Parties proposed, down 
the Delaware & across the Schuylkill, to alarm & make a 
Diversion on the Flanks & in their Rear, but I think this 
Event wou'd be doubtful & uncertain, as well as extremely 
hazardous for the Delaware Party & might in general sub- 
ject the Army to too great a Sacrifice upon such a Contin- 
gency. 

" I shou'd therefore think it more eligible to manoeuvre, 
and endeavor to draw Gen' Howe out of his Lines to an 
Engagement, w""" I shou'd judge is both Practicable, and 
probable. I have the Honor &c. 

" W. Smallwood." 

opinion of brigadier-general WAYNE. 

" Camp at White Marsh, 25'' Novem. 1777 
" Sir : 

" After the most Dispationate & Deliberate Consideration 

of the Question your Excellency was pleased to propose to 



192 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

the Council of General Officers last Evening ; I am Solemnly 
and Clearly of Opinion — that the Credit of the Army under 
your Command, the Safety of the Countrj' — the Honor of 
the American Arms — the Approach of Winter which in a 
few days will force you from the field, and above all the 
Depreciation of the Currency of these States, — Points out 
the Immediate jSTecessity of giving the Enemy Battle. 
Could they possibly be drawn from their Lines, it's a Meas- 
ure Devoutly to be wished. 

" But if that canuot be Effected, It is my Opinion that 
your Excellency should March tomorrow morning and take 
post with this Arm}- at the Upper or North End of German- 
town — and from thence Immediately Detach a Working 
party to throw up, or effect to throw up some Redoubts 
under the direction of your Engineers. — this Intelligence 
will reach the Enemy — they will Conclude that you Intend 
to make good j'our Quarters there, and however desirous 
they may be to dislodge you — yet it will take up some time 
to withdraw their force from the Jersey. 

" by this Manoeuvre you will be witliin Striking Distance, 
the Enemy will be deceived by j'our Works, your Troops 
will be fresh and ready to move the same Night so as to 
arrive at the Enemies Lines before day light on thirsday 
Morning Agreeable to the proposed plan of Attack — with 
great part of which I am in fellowship — the outlines are good 
— they may be Improved to Advantage and Crowned with 
Success. 

" It has been Observed by some Gentlemen that the At- 
tack is Hazardous — that if we prevail it will be attended 
with great loss. 

" I agree with the Gentlemen in their Position — but how- 
ever hazardous the Attempt — and altho some Loss is certain, 
yet it is m}' Opinion — that yon will not be in a worse Situa- 
tion — nor your Arms in less Credit, if you should even meet 
with a Misfortune — than if you were to Remain Inactive. 

" The eyes of all America are fixed on you, the Junction 
of the Northern Army — which Obliged Gen' Burgoyne to 
lay down his Arms, gives the Country & Congress some ex- 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 193 

pectation, that a vigorous Effort will be made to Dislodge 
the Enemy. 

" Its not in our Power to Command success — but it is in 
our Power to produce a Conviction to the World that we 
Deserve it. Interim I am &c. 

"Ant^ Wayne, B. G." 

opinion of brigadier-general woodford. 

"Dear Gen-- 

" I cannot help viewing the purposed attack upon the 
Enemy's Lines as attended with many Hazards & Dificulties. 
But these are over Ballanced by the following considera- 
tions viz' first the necessity that something should be at- 
tempted by this Army before it retires into Winter Quarters, 
both for its own C' & the support of our paper currency. 

" Secondly that from my knowledge of the State of the 
soldiery we are not likely to be in a better condition, if so 
good a one, at any Future time. 

" Thirdly, that all the Force we expected is arrived — and 
lastly, that the present Detach'd situation of the two Arrays 
promises a fairer prospect of success than is likely to pre- 
sent itself whilst we are able to continue in the Field. 

" I am therefore for making the Attack so soon as your 
Excellency & some of the Gen' Officers have had sufficient 
time to Digest a proper plan. I have &c. 

"W" Woodford. 

" Nov' 25'\ 1777" 

OPINION OF brigadier-general KNOX. 

" Pabk of Artillery, Camp, Whitemarsh 26"" Nov' 1777 
" Sir : 

" I exceedingly lament my want of experience and ability 
to fill properly the important station in which I am, and I 
am more particularly distress'd when such important Ques- 
tions are referr'd to my decision as those which your Excel- 
lency gave us in Charge the last evening. The happiness 
or misery of the people of America may be the consequence 
of a right or erroneous judgment. 



194 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

" Much lately has be[en] urg'd concerning the reputation 
of our arms, as if we had long been a warlike nation whose 
existence like the antient Romans depended on their mili- 
tary Fame. I confess I view the matter differently and 
cannot bring myself to believe (how much soever I may 
wish it) that we are upon a par in military knowledge and 
skill with our enemies. Indeed it is not possible and the 
sensible part of mankind well know it. 

" We set out in the contest with notions and sentiments 
very different from these. We then considerd we were con- 
testing for our all, for everything dear to humanity : But it 
now seems otherwise with many persons, whose anxiety for 
military Fame seems to absorb every other consideration. 

" I have also heard it urg'd that your Excellency's repu- 
tation would suffer. I freely confess an Idea of this kind 
pains me exceedingly and were I fully to believe it, I should 
be impelled to give my opinion for measures as desperate as 
I conceive the attempt to storm the enemies works and 
Philadelphia. I am not of opinion that your Excellency's 
character suffers in the least with the well affected part of 
the people of America. I know to the contrary, tlie people 
of America look up to you as their Father, and into your 
hands they intrust their all fully, confident of every exertion 
on your part for their security and happiness — and I do not 
believe there is any man on Earth for whose welfare there 
are more sollicitations at the Court of heaven than for j-ours. 

" I believe perfectly that there are some people who speak 
disrespectfully of your Excellency, but I as perfectly believe 
that these are people who have never given any unequivocal 
evidence of their attachment to our rights ; or whose bound- 
less ambition has been check'd b}- your well try'd patriotism. 

" The state of the depreciation of our Currency has also 
been urg'd as a principal inducement to some desperate 
attack — That its value diminishes every day. It is but too 
true that the large emissions and some other causes have 
effected a diminution of the value of our paper currency. 
Had the same enormous emissions taken place in a time of 
profound peace and flourishing Commerce as have taken 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 195 

place during the war, without sinking any part of them by 
taxes, I do assert that the Currency would be equally de- 
preciated as at present. 

" The circumstances of the respective states would not 
permit them 'till lately to endeavor to sink their proportions 
of the paper currency — butt now almost everj- state on the 
Continent are making large strides towards it. The Cur- 
rency in the eastern States from their large taxes will in- 
crease in its value every day. I cannot therefore perceive 
the force of the argument urg'd, deriv'd from the consider- 
ation of the failure of the currency. 

" The Gentlemen who urge the desperate measure of at- 
tacking the enemies Line, Redoubts and city of Philadelphia 
seem to forget the many principles laid down by people ex- 
perienc'd in the art of war against our engaging in General 
actions upon equal terms — against our risquing our all on 
the event of single Battles — In the beginning of the Contest 
our friends in England urg'd the impropriety of such con- 
duct, giving instances of numbers of States who lost their 
liberties by means of them. It is an invariable principle in 
War, That it cannot be the interest at the same time of 
both parties to engage. It is also another fix'd principle 
that the invaders of a Country ought to bring the defenders 
of it to action as soon as possible. But I believe there is 
not a single maxim in War that will justify a number of un- 
disciplin'd troops attacking an equal number of diseiplind 
troops strongly posted in redoubts and having a strong city 
in their rear such as Philadelphia. 

" It is proposed to attack the enemies redoubts without 
being perfectly acquainted with their number, strength, or 
situation, with troops of whom we have had the experience 
in two capital actions, that it was impossible to rally after 
they were broken. By the mode of attack propos'd we are to 
stake the Liberties of America on a single attempt in which 
the probability of success is against us, and if defeated of 
sacrificing the happiness of posterity to what is caii'd the 
reputation of our arms. 

"It has been agreed that the enemies Force consists of 



196 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

10,000 rank and file fit for duty — it is said Lord Cornwallis 
has taken with him from 1,500 to 3000. Suppose the num- 
ber 2500, which is 500 more than I believe he has — there 
remains 7,500 rank and file fit for duty. Our returns are 
8000. (I say 8000 because I hold the militia in case of an 
attack of this kind useless entirely, for we know they will 
not stand within the range of a Cannon ball.) We are to 
attack 7500 strongly posted in redoubts, having batteries 
and a strong City in their rear. In this instance the Idea 
that is necessary among disciplined troops of having three 
to one to storm works is laid aside, not because our troops 
are better disciplined than the enemies, but because from a 
concurrence of circumstances our affairs are in a desperate 
situation, and we must retrieve them or perish. 

" Marshall Saxe says redoubts are the strongest and most 
excellent kind of field Fortification, and infinitely preferable 
to extended lines — because each redoubt requires a separate 
attack, one of which succeeding does not facilitate the reduc- 
tion of the others. Charles the IS"" with the best troops in 
the World was totally ruin'd in the attack of some redoubts 
at Pultowa, altho he succeeded in taking three of them. 

" The Character of the British troops in Europe is far above 
mediocrity — and the experience we have had of their dis- 
cipline and valor by no means proves them contemptible. 
In the commencement of the War they storm'd an unfinish'd 
work on Bunker Hill, but the experience gain'd there has 
entirely prevented them from making any similar attempts. 
Indeed the Germans lately made an attempt on red Bank, 
the event of which will hardly give them a favorable opinion 
of the attack of redoubts by storm. 

" The situation of the American army on long Island after 
the Battle of the 27"" Aug' was exceedingly ineligible, and 
the enemy must have known it ; but they did not attempt 
to carry our redoubts by storm, altho' had they succeeded 
in one instance and made a sufficient opening for the intro- 
duction of a large Column of troops, the greater part of our 
army then on the Island must have fallen a sacrifice or have 
been taken prisoners. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 197 

" From the experience deriv'd from reading and some little 
service and the knowledge of the strength of the enemies 
works, my opinion is clearly, pointedly, and positively against 
an attack on the enemies redoubts, because I am fully con- 
vinc'd a defeat certain and inevitable. 

" My opinion is to draw our whole strength together, take 
post at and Fortify Germantown, considering it as our 
Winter Quarters. — When the Works there are in a toler- 
able state of defence, I should propose taking our whole 
force (except one brigade to guard the redoubts) and pro- 
ceed near the enemies Lines, offering them Battle, which if 
they declin'd would in the opinion of every rational man 
fully evince our superiority in point of strength — if they 
should come out, fight and defeat us, we have a secure re- 
treat and Winter Quarters. 

" I have thus ofFer'd my sentiments to your Excellency with 
freedom, but if a contrary disposition should take place and 
an attack be resolv'd upon, I shall endeavor to execute the 
part that may be assign'd me to the utmost of my ability. 
I am &c. H. Knox, 

"5. <?en' Ariilkryr 

WASHINGTON TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE. 

" Head Quarters, 25 November, 1777 
8 o'clock P.M. 
"D-'SiR: 

" Col° Mead delivered me yours this morning, as I was 
upon my way to reconnoitre the Enemy's Lines from the 
West side of the Schuylkill. I had a full view of their left 
and found their works much stronger than I had reason to 
expect from the Accounts I had received. The Enemy have 
evacuated Carpenters Island and seem to be about doing the 
same by Province Island. Accounts from the city say Lord 
Cornwallis was expected back today or tomorrow, which 
corresponds with the information sent you by Gen. Weedon. 
All their movements make me suspicious that they mean to 
collect their whole force while our's is divided, and make an 
Attack on the Army on this side. I therefore desire (except 

15 



198 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

you have a plan or prospect of doing something to advantage) 
that 3'ou will rejoin me with your whole force as quick as 
possible. I have ordered all the Boats down to Burlington 
to give you despatch and when you have crossed, all those 
not necessary for the common use at the Ferries, should be 
immediately sent up to Coriels again. Yours of yesterday 
that appears to have been written before that sent by Col° 
Meade has reached me since I got Home. The Hospital at 
Burlington deserves your consideration. If you leave it 
uncovered and Lord Cornwallis should detach a party, the 
patients will certainly be made prisoners. I therefore beg 
you will endeavour to have them removed, or think of some 
way of giving them protection by posting some Militia or 
leaving some Other Troops while the Enemy remain in that 
Quarter. The Hospital at Princeton also will be left naked 
if the Enem}' should move farther up. You will therefore 
leave them some cover, if you think there will be occasion. 
I am &c.' G° Washington. 

" P.S. — As leaving a Guard at Princeton will still divide 
our force, if the patients could be removed further from 
thence, I think it would be for the better. I told D" Ship- 
pen when he fixed it there, it would be dangerous." - 

MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE TO WASHINGTON. 

" Mount Holly, Nov' 25" 4 oClock 
" D" Sir 

" This moment received intelligence the enemy are em- 
barking from Glocester and crossing over to Philadelphia. 
Col. Comstock sends this intelligence and says it may be 
depended upon. — I have order'd General Varnum's & Gen- 
eral Huntington's brigade to advance immediately to fall 
upon the enemies rear and prevent their getiug off their 
stock. I wait your Excellencies orders to march where yon 
may think advisable. Colo. Sheppard ^ got into camp about 
noon — the whole body of the troops will be ready to move 

' In manuscript of Robert Hanson Harrison. 

' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman. 

' Colonel William Shepard, in command of Glover's brigade 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 199 

at a raoments vvarniug — The Riffle Corps & about 600 
militia are upon the enemies flanks. 

" A detachment from Cap' Lee's Horse took nine pris- 
oners yesterday, the first account I ever had of their being 
in this quarter. I am &c. N. Greene." 

MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE TO WASHINGTON. 

" Mount Holly Nov. 25"- 12 o'clock 
" D« Sir : 

" I wrote your Excellency this afternoon that the enemy 
were crossing from the Jerseys to Philadelphia and that the 
intelligence came from Col. Comstock — he is stationd at Had- 
donfield to collect intelligence. — I have received two letters 
from the Col. today the first dated at 12 o'Clock the last at 
three both of which I have enclosd. — It appears to me the 
enemy are crossing their Cattle, but I much doubt whether 
any part of the troops have crost the river — perhaps they 
may begin in the morning — I am divided in my mind how 
to act — If your Excellency intends an attack on Philadel- 
phia our moving down to Haddonfield will prevent our co- 
opperating with you — but if the enemy are crossing, the 
attack upon the city would not be warrantable now if be- 
fore, without our whole collective force at least, and as part 
is below and part here, I wish to move forward for the 
support of the troops below and attack the enemy if prac- 
ticable. 

" I expected before this to have received your Excellen- 
cies further Orders but as I have not and from the intelli- 
gence there appears a prospect of attempting something 
here I have ventured to put the troops in motion — if I 
should receive orders to the contrary I can speedily return. 

" K the enemy cross to the city they may be attackt at 
any time hereafter as well as now — if they have not crost 
and are in a situation to be attackt we shall have an oppor- 
tunity to attempt something. I am anxious to do every 
thing in my power and more especially as the People seems 
to be dissatisfied at the evacuation of red bank fort. I 
am &c. K Greene." 



200 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

COLONEL COMSTOCK TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE. 

u gjj^ . " Haddonfield, 25 Nov. * past 12, 1777 

" This moment I arrived from a reconnoiteriug tour near 
Little Timber Creek Bridge, sent a smart young woman 
who had a sister in Gloster as a spy to Gloster; she has 
returned and I believe has rec* no other damage than 
receiving a kiss from the Hessian General (this is as she 
says). She reports that a very large number of British & 
Hessian troops are in Gloster, that they are embarking in 
boats & going to Philadelphia, and that her sister there in- 
formed her they had been embarking ever since early in the 
morning. That Lord Cornwallis quartered at Col. Ellis' 
house & the Hessian General in a house opposite — who 
asked the young woman where the Rebels were ? She 
answered, she could not tell — she had seen none of them ! 
She said she passed many sentrys before she came to little 
Timber Creek Bridge where she passed the last. 

" I doubt not this information. I fear they will be too 
quick for us. Col. Hart's Reg' is here. With great esteem, 

"Adam Comstock." 

colonel comstock to major-general greene. 

" Hadenfield, 25"' November, 1777 
a gjj^ 3 oClock P.M. 

" Seven prisoners just arrived here from the Enemy taken 
by the Militia, about 3 mile from this place on the Road to 
Glos'ter. — the prisoners I have examined. Two of them 
are Gunners and 2 Matros, belonging to the first Reg' of 
Artilary, the other 3 belong to the 33'' Reg' — they were 
about J a mile from their Picket plundering, those belong- 
ing to the Artilary had 3 of the Artilary Horses with them 
marked G. R. which are also taken. This Express rides 
one of em. The Prisoners on Examination say the Main 
Body Lye about 4 Mile from this on the Gloster Road 
encamp'd that their Line form a Tryangle, that they are to 
wait there till they have embark'd all the Stock for Phila- 
delphia, which will take em all Day, & that the Army ex- 
pects to embark tomorrow and go into winter Quarters, that 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 201 

they have 2 6 pounders in front, 2 ditto in the Rear & some 
smaller in the Center, that they were not in the least appre- 
hensive of any of the American Army being within 10 
miles of them, otherwise they should not have been taken 
in the manner they were. This moment 7 Hessian Pris- 
oners arrived here taken in the same manner. I have not 
examined them. I could wish your Army was here now, for 
I think they may be supprised very easy. They give various 
Ace" of their Numbers, from 5 to 8 thousand. They mostly 
agree that Billings Fort & Fort Mercer are leveled. — how 
I want to give em a Floging before they Leave the Gersey. 
With every sentiment of Esteem & Respect &c 

"Adam Comstock." 

major-general greene to washington. 

" Haddonfield, Nov' 26"" 4 o'clock P.M. 1777 
"D^SlR 

" Your Excellency's letter of the 25"" reached me at this 
place — I halted the troops on the receipt of it, those that 
had not got into the town — Gen' Varnum's & Huntington's 
Brigades got to this place before the letter came to hand. 
I am sorry our march will prove a fruitless one — the enemy 
have drawn themselves down upon the Peninsula of Glou- 
cester — the Ships are drawn up to cover the troops — there 
is but one road that leads down to the point, on each side 
the ground is swampy, & full of thick underbrush, that it 
makes the approaches impracticable almost — these diffi- 
culties might have been surmounted, but we could reap no 
advantage from it — the Shipping being so posted as to cover 
the troops, and this country is so intersected with creeks, 
that approaches are rendered extremely difficult, and re- 
treats very dangerous. — I should not have halted the troops, 
but all the Gen' Officers were against making an attack, the 
enemy being so securely situated — and so effectually cov- 
ered by their Shipping. 

" "We have a fine body of troops & in fine spirits, & every 
one appears to wish to come to action : — I proposed to the 
Gentlemen drawing up in front of the enemy, & to attack 
their Picquet and endeavour to draw them out, but they 



202 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

were all against it, from the iraprobabilit_y of the enemies 
coming out. The Marquis with about 400 Militia & the 
rifle Corps, attack'd the enemies Picquet last evening, 
kill'd about 20 & wounded many more, & took about 20 
prisoners — the Marquis is charmed with the spirited be- 
haviour of the Militia & Rifle corps — they drove the enemy 
above half a mile & kept the ground until dark — the 
enemy's picquet consisted of about 300 & were reinforced 
during the skirmish — The Marquis is determined to be in 
the way of danger. 

"From the best observations I am able to make & from the 
best intelligence I can obtain it is uncertain whether any 
of the enemy have crossed the river, the boats are con- 
stantly going but I believe they are transporting stock — 
there is as many men in the returning boats, as there goes 
over — by tomorrow it will be reduced to a certainty. — I be- 
lieve the enemy have removed the great Chiveaux de frize — 
there went up 60 sail of Vessels this morning. If the ob- 
structions are removed in the river it accounts for the 
enemies evacuating Carpenters & Province Islands as they 
are no longer necessary — the prisoners say the enemy are 
going into "Winter quarters as soon as they get up the river. 

" Inclosed was our order for battle, with a plate agreeing 
to the order. 

" I purpose to leave General Varnum's brigade & the 
rifle corps at this place for a few days, especially the rifle 
men who cover the country very much. — Gen' Varnum's 
brigade will return to Mount Holly tomorrow or the next 
day. — I will make further enquiry respecting the hospitals, 
& give such directions as appear necessary. 

" My division, Huntington's & Glover's Brigades will 
proceed with all despatch to join your Excellency — I could 
wish the enemy might leave the Jersies before us.' 

" I am &c. 

" Nath. Greene." 

' The body of the letter is in the manuscript of J. Burnet, V. aide-de- 
camp. Greene's other aides at this time were William Blodget and James 
Lloyd. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 203 

MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE TO WASHINGTON. 

" Mount Holly, Nov. 27, 1777 
" D« Sir 

" Your favor of yesterday' I received last night about 12 
oClock. The greater part of the troops returned to this 
place last night and marched early this morning to cross 
the Delaware — I staid at Haddenfield myself with General 
McDougal's division to give the necessary Orders to the 
Militia — I have left the rifle Corps at Haddenfield and Cap' 
Lee's troop of light Horse to encourage the Militia and awe 
the enemy; to prevent their coming out in small parties — 
Col. Olney had orders to make an attack upon their Piquet 
this morning but they drew them in so close to their main 
body, and there being but one road he could not effect it — 
their Piquet consisted of about 300 men — I am much afraid 
the withdrawing the troops will greatly alarm the Country — 
Any position below this with any considerable force would 
be very dangerous — the country is so exceedingly inter- 
sected with creeks ; and lies so contiguous to Philadelphia — 
I think any body of troops may be surprised from the city 
at Haddenfield in five hours, and at almost any place in its 
neighbourhood. 

" The Hospitals will be in some danger at Burlington, 
Burdenton & Princetown if all the troops are withdrawn 
from this state, but if the sick were ordered to be imme- 
diately removed, it would still increase the alarm in the 
country, for which reason I would risque what are there at 
present and order the Director General not to send any 
more there. 

" I shall set out immediately for Burlington — I have given 
Lt. Col. Abale orders to procure waggons and send off all 
the spare ammunition to Huntingdon, the heavy cannon to 
Bordenton — At my arrival at Burlington I will enquire of 
the Commodore respecting the matters by you directed. 

" General McDougal's division will quarter here to night 
and march at five in the morning for Burlington — I think 

'Printed in my " Writings of Washington," Vol. VI. p. 220. 



204 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

there are as many troops gone forward as will be able to 
get over to day. 

" I shall push on troops as fast as possible without in- 
juring their health. I sent forward one of my aids to Bur- 
lington early this morning to superintend the embarkation 
of the troops & baggage — I am with sincere regard & due 
respect &c. N. Greene." 

captain craig to washington. 
"Sir 

" I have this moment been Honoured with your Excel- 
lency's Letter — and embrace this opportunity of returning 
an Answer. By every Account, Lord Cornwallis is returned, 
it is a Certainty that a number of Troops are Arived at 
the City — both Horse and foot. I wrote y' Excellency this 
Morning the Enemy ware under march* orders, it is ex- 
pected the[y] will March tonight. Your Excellency may 
Depend on the earliest information of their Movements — 
by some Accounts the enemy intend to send their Boats one 
way, and the greater part of their Army another, it is 
thought the boats are intended for Delaware. I have the 
Honour &c. C. Craig. 

" Feankfoet, 28"" Nov' 1777. " 

major-general GREENE TO WASHINGTON. 

" Burlington, Nov. 28'" 9 oClock, 1777. 
" D« Sir 

" Three Brigades are now on their march for Head Quar- 
ters, my division & Glover's Brigade — General McDougall's 
division is not yet come to town — they had orders to march 
at four this morning and I was in hopes they would have been 
in town, by the time Glovers brigade got over the River — I 
am afraid the want of provision has detained them this 
morning. It is with the utmost difficulty we can get bread 
to eat — the Commissary of purchases of flour is very ill 
managed — there is no magazines of consequence, and the 
army servd from hand to mouth — The Baggage cannot be 
got over by tomorrow night. 

" Mr. Tench Francis an uncle of Col. Tilghman was 
brought to me a prisoner this morning — he was taken at 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 205 

Glocester — he sais Lord Cornwallis' detachment consisted 
of about 6,000, that none embarked until yesterday — he 
also adds that the reinforcement consisted of about 2500 
from New York. General Howe designs to make an im- 
mediate attack upon the Army unless the weather is bad — 
this is the general conversation of the Officers of ail ranks — 
Mr. Francis sais he thinks the enemy design to burn and 
destroy wherever they go — Germantown is devoted to de- 
struction — The enemy plundered every body within their 
reach, and almost of every thing they had. It is the common 
conversation among the officers of all ranks that they design 
to divide our lands as soon as the Country is conquered — 
The obstinate resistance they say made at Mud Island has 
broke the campaign. I am &c. N. Greene." ' 

THE NAVY BOARD TO WASHINGTON. 

" Continental Navy Board 
" BoEDEN Town, 28 Nov' 1777 
"Sir 

" "We are under a Necessity of drawing your Excellency's 
Attention once more to the Frigates at this Place. — Not- 
withstanding our Endeavours, we have not been able to 
raise the Effingham — she still lyes on her Beam Ends in a 
very disagreeable situation. After the Destruction of our 
Fleet at Eed Bank, the Officers & Crews of the several 
Vessels came up to this Place, to the Amount of between 
three & four Hundred. We are much at a Loss for Accom- 
modations for these Men ; but if we had our Frigates afloat, 
this Difficulty would be obviated. As we have now so many 
Hands at Command, we are of Opinion, we can with Cer- 
tainty get these Ships ready for their Reception ; & at the 
same Time have the Plugs so fixed that they might be drawn 
at a minutes Warning & the vessels sunk, should the Enemy 
make an attempt upon them. Nevertheless, however safe 
or convenient this Plan may appear to us, we do not think 
proper to put it in Execution without your Approbation, 

'For a letter from Washington to Greene, written at seven o'clock on 
the evening of this day, see my " Writings of Washington," Vol. VI. 
p. 228. 



206 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

As the winter is now approaching fast & must soon put an 
End to all our Water Schemes, we request your Excel- 
lency's Answer by the Return of the Bearer (Cap' Pomeroy). 
Whatever your Advice may be in this Matter, you may de- 
pend on our strict Compliance with it. 

" Several Captains of the Vessels lately destroyed have 
saved some of their Sails, Stores &c. We wish to know 
whether you are of Opinion they may be kept here with 
Safety or not. 

" A Report is circulated & again contradicted respecting 
a French War. We should thank your Excellency for In- 
formation, whether it is so or not. We have &c. 

" Era'* Hopkinson 
" John Wharton 

" P.S. — We are sorry to trouble you with Letters to Con- 
gress ; but hope it will be attended with no great Incon- 
venience ; apprehending that you have frequent Occasions 
to send to York Town & that our Packets may go with your 
Despatches." 

WASHINGTON TO FRANCIS HOPKINSON AND JOHN WHARTON. 

" Head Quarters, 29 November, 1777 
" Gent'' 

" I am fav'' with yours of the 20"'. I see no Reason for 
changing my former opinion in respect to sinking the Frig- 
ates to ensure their safety. K they are weighed again, 
and converted into Barracks for the Seamen, they must be 
brought near the shore and when the Frosts sets in, they 
cannot be sunk should the Enemy approach at such time. 
I however, leave the Matter to your judgment. 

" The Hulks of the Vessels will be all that are necessary 
for Barracks, if you should determine to put them to that 
use. The sails. Rigging and all other Stores of them and 
the Vessels that have been burned should be removed to 
some distance from the Water Side. I am &c.^ 

" 6° Washington." 

' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel Tench Tilghman. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 207 



COUNCIL OF WAR.' 

[The following papers were overlooked and therefore are not in the 
place they would have occupied had a strictly chronological order been 
followed.] 

" At a Council of War held at Head Quarters at Whit- 
paiu 29* October 1777. 
" Present 

" His Excellency The Commander in Chief 
" Major Generals — Sullivan Brigadier Generals — Maxwel 
" Greene Smallwood 

" Stephen Knox 

" Marquis Fayette Varnum 

" McDougall Wayne 

" Mughlenberg 
" Weedon 
" Huntington 
" Conway 
" Pulaski 
" His Excellency informed the Board, That the enemys 
whole force according to the best estimate he could form, 
founded on general returns of their Army which had acci- 
dently fallen into his hands bearing every mark of au- 
thenticity, and from probable calculations of such changes 
as may have happened since the date of them, amounted to 
abt. 10,000 rank and file, present fit for duty. That their 
main body by the last accounts were in and near Philadel- 
phia. That they had established several batteries on Prov- 
ince Island, opposite to Fort Mifiiin, from which, they 
continually annoyed the garrison there ; but hitherto with- 
out any material effect, — That they had on the 22* instant 
attempted to carry Red Bank by storm, but were repulsed 
with considerable loss. That the day following several of 

' The call for this council is printed in my " Writings of Washington," 
Vol. VI. p. 143, and did not contain the question of an exchange of 
prisoners, suggested by the letter of Lieutenant-Colonel Persifor Frazer. 
An opinion by Brigadier- General Wayne is in Still^'s " Wayne," p. 109. 



208 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

their ships of war drew up against Fort Mifflin ; which, in 
conjunction with their batteries before mentioned began a 
severe attack upon the fort; but were compelled to quit the 
enterprise and retire with loss — That however, notwith- 
standing the obstacles they encounter in the River obstruc- 
tions, they have found means to open a communication with 
their ships by way of Tinicum Island. 

" He further informed them, That our whole force at this 
time amounted by the last returns to 8313 Continental 
troops and 2717 Militia rank and file present fit for duty. 
That besides these, were the garrisons at Fort Island and 
Red bank, the former consisting of about 300 Continental 
troops, the latter 350 ; in addition to which a detachment of 
three hundred Militia marched the 26'" to reinforce the two 
posts — also the troops on the other side the Schulkill in 
number about 500 — Militia, under Brigadier General Potter. 

" That this force was likel}' soon to suffer a diminution of 
1986 Militia, by the expiration of the term of service for 
which those from Virginia and Maryland engaged. 

" That on the other hand, He had called upon the State 
of Pennsylvania in the strongest terms, to aflibrd all the 
assistance and reinforcement in its power to this army; and 
that he had also written to Generals Dickinson, Foreman, 
and Newcomb, pressing them in the most earnest manner, 
to endeavour to collect all the militia of the State of New 
Jersey, that can possibl}' be spared from other objects, in 
the neighbourhood of Red bank, as an additional aid and 
security to that post; but was uncertain what degree of 
success these different applications might have. 

" He finally informed them that by advices from the 
Northward, it appeared that General Burgoyne and his 
whole Army had capitulated to General Gates, on condition 
of being permitted to return to Great Britain, and not bear- 
ing arms again in North America during the present contest. 

" That by a letter of the 25"' instant from General Dick- 
inson, there was reason to believe Sir Harry Clinton and 
the forces with him had returned down the North River ; 
and that the troops heretofore stationed at Rhode Island 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 



209 



were arrived at New York — That he was not able to afford 
any precise information of the dispositions made by General 
Gates and Putnam, in consequence of the forementioned 
events ; but had heard that General Gates had detached two 
brigades to join Governor Clinton at Esopus. 

" Observing, that under these circumstances, he had 
called a Council to consult and resolve upon the measures, 
best to be persued; He accordingly requested the senti- 
ment of the Gentlemen present on the following subjects — 



Questions. 

" 1" "Whether it will be pru- 
dent in our present circum- 
stances and with our present 
strength to attempt by a gen- 
eral attack to dislodge the 
enemy from Philadelphia ? 

"2'* If prudent — and in 
case we are unsuccessful — 
Where shall we retreat to ? 



" 3'' If not thought eligible 
— What general disposition 
of the army had best take 
place, till the season forces 
us from the field ? 



Answers. 



to 



It will not. 



Precluded by the above 
answer. 

The army should take post 
on the ground a little to our 
left, which has been recon- 
noitred and reported by the 
Engineers; and sufficient re- 
inforcements should be sent 
to the garrisons of Red- 
bank and Fort Mifflin, to 
complete the number of 
men requisite for their de- 
fence. 



" 4. Supposing the enemy ^ 
keep possession of the 



City — Where, and in what 
manner, shall the Conti- 
nental troops be cantonned, 
when they can no longer 
keep the field ? 



V 



Deferred. 



210 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 



" 5. "What measures can be ^ 
adopted to cover the Country | 
near the enemy and prevent \ 
their drawing supplies from 
it during the Winter ? 



Deferred. 



1 



"6. Can any — and what 
succours may with propriety 
be drawn from the Northern 
armies at this time ? 



Succours should be drawn 
from the Northern armies 
to Consist of twenty Regi- 
ments — fifteen of Massachu- 
setts — three of New Hamp- 
shire and Lee's and Jack- 
son's regiments. 



" The deliberations on the foregoing subjects finished, — 
The Commander in Chief proceeded to the following 
questions — 

" As the whole time of the 
Adjutant General seems to 
be engrossed with other du- 
ties — Will the oiSce of In- 
spector General to our army 
for the purpose principally 
of establishing and seeing 
practiced one uniform sys- 
tem of manuel and ma- 
noeuvres, be adviseable ? 



" Should Regimental pro- 
motions extend only to the 
rank of a Captaincy or to 
that of a Majority ? 

" Will it be consistent with "^ 
propriety or policy to allow j 
soldiers the reward offered \ 
to others for apprehending 
deserters ? J 



Such an office is advisea- 
ble. The Manuel Manoeu- 
vres or any regulations to 
be established, previously to 
be settled or agreed to by 
the Commander in chief, or 
a board of oflicers, appointed 
by him for that purpose. 

Promotions should be resri- 
mental as high as Captains 
inclusively. All from that 
rank in the line of the State. 



The reward should be al- 
lowed to soldiers. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, 



211 



" The Commissaries com- 
plaiu of the number and dis- 
proportion of the rations 
issued to the troops, and at 
the same time of the exor- 
bitant price of all kinds of > 
spirits, owing to the imposi- ' 
tions of the suttlers on the 
soldiery — What regulations 
or remedies can be applied 
to rectify these abuses ? 

" Col. Frazer, in a letter of " 
the 9"" instant having repre- 
sented that he had ' liberty 
to mention it as General 
Howes earnest desire, that 
a general exchange of pris- 
oners should take place on 
equitable terms, or that the 
officers, prisoners of War 
on both sides should be re- 
leased and have liberty to 
go to any place in possession 
of their friends on their 
paroles' — What measures 
might it be proper for us to 
take in consequence of that 
information ? 

"Jno. Sullivan 
"Nath*- Greene 
" Adam Stephen 
" Le Mquis de Lafayette 
"Alex'' McDougall 
"W. Smallwood 
"H. Knox 
" J. Varnum." 



Deferred. 



Deferred. 



An" Wayne 

P. Muhlenberg 

G. Weedon, B. G. 

Jed Huntington, B. Gen' 

T. Conway, B. G. 



2 1 2 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

[Note. — With the failure of any plan for attacking the British in 
Philadelphia the question of future operations became of importance. 
The popular view was still in favor of some active measure which 
should give the enemy an idea of the fighting ability of the Continental 
army, and this view found support in Congress, where it was urged as 
much on political as on military grounds. No one denied the expe- 
diency, even the necessity, of a partial victory to inspire the States with 
a little energy, infuse a little vitality into the sinking currency, and 
wipe out the depressing atmosphere of a retreating and somewhat dis- 
organized army. But this was only one side of the question. It appeared 
to Washington that a present and temporary advantage might be obtained 
at too great a cost. A defeat or failure might complete the ruin of the 
army, give strength to the jealousies and rising plots among the officers, 
and, by dispersing the army, scatter throughout the continent the seeds of 
complaint, of fancied wrongs, and suffering under inaction and defective 
commissary and hospital service, which would obstruct the enrolling of 
a new army. However brilliant a successful dash might be, it was too 
late in the season to retrieve the fortunes of war, and the husbanding of 
the existing force, seasoned and disciplined as it was, seemed of greater 
moment than devising an attack on the issue of which all might depend. 
To consider the question of winter-quarters a council of war was called, 
and the following are the opinions. 

WORTHINGTON C. FOED.] 



OPINION OF MAJOR-GENERAL SULLIVAN. 

"Camp at Whitemarsh, Decem' 1, 1777 
" Dear General 

" Agreeable to your Excelleuceys Commands I have Cou- 
sidered upon the most suitable place to Cautou the Army 
During the winter. The several places proposed in Councill 
have their Advantages and Disadvantages but that which has 
the Least objections ought to be fixed upon. The Inten- 
tions of the Board is to take that Station which will answer 
best to cover the Country, Kefresh the Troops & Discipline 
the Army & by adding to the Numbers by Recruits & other- 
ways prepare it to take the field with vigour Early in the 
Spring — in order to Determine what place will be most 
Likely to answer this purpose it will be proper to consider 
the several places proposed with the objections that may 
justly be made to each : The first is The Great Valley on 
the other side of Schulkill. There it is proposed to Hutt 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 213 

the Army for the winter. The second is to canton the 
Troops in "Wilmington & its Neighbourhood. The Third is 
to canton them from Lancaster to Reading. — 

" The first place proposed will cover the Country west of 
Schulkill, provided Large Detachments are kept near the 
Schulkill & on the Delaware to prevent the Enemy from 
making Inroads and Collecting Forage &c. in the Neigh- 
bourhood of Darby, Chester & Wilmington but in case 
the Enemy should take post with a large party at Wilming- 
ton, you must send a Force superior to theirs to attack 
them, or move a large part if not the whole of your Army 
near that place to prevent them from Foraging & Drawing 
provisions, in which Case your Huts must be forsaken & of 
Course become useless. One great objection to Hutts is 
that they are exceeding unhealthy and are at Best but a 
miserable Shelter from the Inclemencj' of the weather. — 
The mortality among the Hessians at Brunswick Last 
Spring as well as common observation will justify this as- 
sertion. Should you be able to cover the west side of the 
Schulkill by adopting this plan it must be by making a 
Winters Campaign ; but it is to be Rememberd at the 
same time that you Leave Exposed the State of New Jersey 
and all that part of Peusylvania which Lies on the East 
of Schulkill, and put it in the power of the Enemy to ren- 
der your Communications with the Eastern States across 
the Delaware very Difficult, if not impracticable. The 
second post proposed namely Wilmington & its Environs 
will not only Leave New Jersey & the Eastern part of Peu- 
sylvania, with most of your Hospitals & Stores Exposed but 
even the Western part of Pensylvauia will be in great 
Measure Exposed unless you keep a Force near the Schul- 
kill to prevent the Incursions of the Enemy. This will also 
occasion a Winter's Campaign, without answering any other 
purpose but that of covering part of Maryland & the Dela- 
ware States & your Situation will put it in the power of the 
Enemy compleatly to cut off' your Communications with all 
the States east of Schulkill. In addition to those Diffi- 
culties There is another of great weight in my mind, which 

16 



214 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

is that Though it is not Easy to Surprize the post, it is by 
no means Impracticable. This will necessarily Increase our 
out Guards & Pickets, & make the Dutj- of the Soldiers 
something severe — & to add to it M' How by a move of his 
array up the Schulkill towards y' Stores may corapel 3'ou to 
move your Army as often as he chuses to repeat the ma- 
ncBuvre. If, therefore either of the before mentioned posts 
are taken a Winter's Campaign must be the Consequence. 
This in my opinion ought if possible to be avoided. The 
most warlike nations in the World both in Ancient and 
Modern times have endeavoured to avoid them, even when 
they had a sufficiency of Cloathing for their Troops, & were 
in Climates much more temperate than ours, Experience 
convinced them that the gain was by no means equal to the 
Loss and though in most Instances whole Provinces have 
been given up, this Consideration has not been thought of 
sufficient weight to keep Armies in the Field through the 
winter Season. 

" The Situation of your Army will be scarcely Tolerable if 
placed in the warmest Houses During the winter the whole 
of them without Watch Coats one half without Blankets & 
more than a Third without Shoes Stockings or Breeches & 
many of Them without Jackets. Indeed there are some 
without Coats & not a few without Shirts Even the Officers 
in sundry Instances are Destitute of proper Cloathing, some 
of them being almost naked. These Considerations should 
Induce us to avoid a winter's Campaign if it may be Done 
without the Greatest Inconveniencys. — The Third place will 
leave exposed the East & West Side of Schulkill near the 
Enemy & at the same time expose New Jersey. It will, 
however cover the Back parts of the Country give oppor- 
tunity of Recruiting & Disciplining your Army & at the 
same Time furnish Houses that will supply the want of 
Comfortable Cloathing to your Troops, & give you & your 
officers a proper opportunity of turning your Thought to 
proper Measures for Regulating your Army & enabling it to 
take the field with vigor in the Spring. To secure the 
Country as much as possible one Brigade should be placed 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 215 

in New Jersey for the militia to collect to in Case of Inva- 
sion & scouting parties of the militia should be constantly 
near the enemy to intercept the small parties from making 
inroads into that State — at Potsgrove or Reading in Penn- 
sylvania should also be another Brigade or Division for the 
same purpose & the militia of this State should be constantly 
scouting near the Enemies' Lines to keep them from foraging 
with impunity. This Disposition will cover your Hospitals 
& Stores & keep open your Communications with all the 
States — Though you may in taking the above Situation be 
under a necessity of Removing some Inhabitants who have 
iied from Philadelphia farther Back into the Country, yet 
this is a much Less Evil than Exposing the Army to be 
Ruined by the Inclemency of the Seasons & the want of 
Cloathing, but this may in some Measure be Remedied, as 
the Distance between you & the Enemy will permit you to 
canton your Troops in Towns considerably back of the Line 
which marks your Front. I know that there are also Ob- 
jections against this Disposition which have great weight, 
among which is that of Leaving so much Country open to 
the enemy, but in every view of the Subject I think this the 
Least Liable to objection. I cannot help giving it as my 
opinion if we are to make a winter's Campaign, & our Force 
is Deemed sufficient to dispute the field with the enemy 
after the seven Virginia Regiments Leave us : that German- 
town will be the most proper place for the purpose — as that 
& Beggars Town will afibrd cover for most of the Troops. 
The several Roads leading to it may soon be fortified against 
a surprize & Corps selected to defend the Houses which 
will supply in great measure our want of numbers. The 
proximity of our Situation to the Enemy will keep them 
within Bounds & by keeping a strong party of Pensylvania 
Militia on the west of Schulkill and 1 of the Jersey Militia 
on the East of Delaware, their Incurtions into the Country 
will be totally prevented, if a winters Campaign is to be 
carried on this will be the most advantageous and comfort- 
able Quarters for the purpose — but if a winters Campaign 
is to be avoided, the other is to be preferred for the Reasons 



216 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

afore assigned. I know that both officers & soldiers Dread 
a winter's Campaign, the prospect of which Induces our 
officers to Resign in such JSTumbers & prevents privates from 
Engaging in the Service. With Respect to the post our 
Army takes previous to Retiring to Winter Quarters, I 
think it immaterial at present, for if M' Howe Declines a 
general Action no situation we can take either on this or 
the other side the Schulkill will eompell him to fight us as 
he has the Delaware open to furnish him with supplies, and 
if he is Determined to bring on an Engagement he will 
seek out the Army let their Station be where it will. D"' 
General, the above is submitted with all Due DetFerence & 
Respect by your Excellencey's most obed' serv' 

"Jn° Sullivan." 

opinion of the marquis de lafayette. 

" Your excellency ordered me to give my opinion about 
the three plans for winter quarters : 1° the chain from about 
the Sculckill till bethehem — 2° this from reading to laucas- 
ter — 3° building hutts about and quartering in willmington. 

" I must confess my being prevented of fixing Tay senti- 
ments in a decisive manner by my want of knowledge about 
very interesting points among them are 1° how far we 
should distort and perhaps disaffect those persons who 
echould be turned out from the diferant places they are in. 

" 2° how far we may expect to collect and keep with the 
army all the officers who perhaps will think themselv-es in- 
titled to go home, to occupate themselves with theyr busi- 
nesses or pleasures if we are not in a kind of warlike 
quarters, and then we will took the [ ] advantage of 
theyr being instructed and disciplined we schould endeavour 
to gaite [get ?] in going into peaceful places. 

" 3° What effect can it make upon the people our leaving 
the country entirely oppened to the execution, cruelties, and 
also to the seduction of the enemy, when we shall give 
them all the opportunities they can wish to draw all the 
provisions from everywhere and in the same time to inlist 
provincial soldiers. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 21 7 

" 4° if our giving a greater idea of the array in covering 
the country and laying near the ennemy will more facilitate 
our making recruits than if we were in good comfortable 
towns and not in a place and in a manner which shall seem 
to the eyes of the people a kind of winter campaigne. 

"5° till what point those different measures will please or 
distress the officers and (what is generally to the militur 
world the less attended to, and deserves the greater atten- 
tion) our private soldiers. 

" 6° till what point we may depend upon our intelligences 
and light troops to avoid equally and being surprised and 
tiring the troops by false alarms. 

" 7° if we can hope that the soldiers will now receive 
cloathes &c. in order to be fit for some winter marches and 
operations, if in case where they schould be defeated we 
may hope to meet them again. 

" Such are the points of knowledge which I am deprived 
of by my being stranger in this country, and my being- 
stranger in the army, if I can speak to, for I have no officers 
no soldiers under my particular direction whom I could 
consult and know theyr temper theyr inclinations, and all 
what it is possible to expect from them. 

" however I'l tell your excellency my very imperfect sen- 
timents about the matter. 

" 1" the first proposition seems to me the less eligible, and 
mj- reason for it is the scarcity of villages and principally 
the report of the commissaires and other gentlemen who 
know the country. 

" 2° the second seems to me the most prudent : there we 
schall be quiete, there we can discipline and instruct our 
troops, we can be able to begin a early campaign, and we 
schall not fear to be carried into a winter campaign if it 
pleases General howe. therefore in consulting only pru- 
dence, and as far as my little knowledge can go, I am at lest 
certain that I'l have nothing to reproach to me in giving my 
choice to this second proposition. 

" however (and in making excuses to your excellency for 
such an indecision and referring myself to your knowledge 



218 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

about the suppositious I will make) if it was uot diswilling 
neither for officers neither for soldiers, if going to lancaster 
will disafect and make a bad impression as far as to prevent 
our recruiting, if we can keep better our officers when we 
schall be iu a kind of encampment near the ennemy, if prin- 
cipally you think that we schould be fit for some winter 
march's we should be able to support some disadvantages 
then I am fullj' and with a great chearfulness of opinion 
that we must go to willmington my reasons would be these. 

" 1° this position enable us to do in the course of the winter 
what we schall think proper to annoy, to deprive of res- 
eources of every kind to attack if possible the ennemy. 

" 2° this position has something shining and military like 
which will make the best effect and upon the continent and 
even in Europe. 

"3° the doctors, and americaiu ones who know the man- 
ners and phisik constitution of our soldiers say that nothing 
is so comfortable as well made butts. 

" prudence orders me to choose lancaster, but if the incon- 
veniences I fear (without being able to know them) if those 
inconveniences I explain to your excellency are not as strong 
as they can be, if principally our civil situation ask from us 
something shining and perhaps bold then I give all my 
wishes and all my choice to willmington. 

" THE Mquis de Lafayette 

" M. g:' 

OPINION OF BARON DE KALB. 

" Rest, Recruiting & Cloathing being most necessary to the 
army I am of opinion that taking winter quarters at Wil- 
mington almost behind the Ennemy, will not answer the 
purpose, because every movements the Ennemies will make 
up Schuylkill river we must follow their motions or be 
cut off from our Stores, or forced to fight whether it will 
suit us or not. I am apprehensive this position will of 
necessyty bring on a Winter Campaign. 

" It appears to me, unless His Excellency has very strong 
reasons, to maintain Delawar State & part of Chester 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 219 

County, that more tranquility & safety could be expected 
between Lancaster & Reading by building partly butts for 
tbat purpose, if it is equally (as was observed by several 
Gentlemen) unavoidable to have butts near & about "Wil- 
mington. 

"Baron de K!alb. 
"AT Camp 1" X"'' 1777." 

OPINION OF MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE. 

" Agreeable to your Excellency's command I shall in a few 
words give my Sentiments with respect to the necessity of 
puting the troops into winter quarters and the properest 
place to canton them in. — Every one that views the Condition 
of the army and is acquainted with the severe duty they 
have gone through will readily agree that good warm com- 
fortable quarters are necessary to supply the defect of cloath- 
ing, and that some relaxation is essential to give a proper 
tone to both men and Officers to prepare them for the 
ensuing campaign — In doing this we must have regard not 
only to the army, but the country. 

" An army without a country is like an infant incapable of 
feeding or cloathiug itself — Every part of the country 
whether "Whigs or Tory that we suffer to be ravaged is a 
diminution of our strength, and an increase of theirs. — Men 
are essential in war, but provisions, cloathiug and accoutre- 
ments are equally so. — The first and great object in canton- 
ing the troops is to take a position secure from surprize ; the 
next is covering; the third is a situation convenient for 
drawing forage and provisions for the subsistence of the 
army and the cattle belonging to it. — These are the great 
principles to be attended to in quartering the troops and 
cannot be dispensed with without certain and inevitable 
ruin to the whole military machine. — There are other 
secondary considerations such as covering the country and 
distressing the enemy in drawing their supplies; where a 
position can be found to answer all these valuable purposes 
is the object of enquiry. 

" It is said by many that a total relaxation is necessary for 



220 Defences of PhilaAelphia in 1777. 

the good of the army — for enabling the officers to recruit 
their Reg" and to give the men time to recover their spirits. 
— I must confess if I was to speak from my own feelings and 
declare ray wishes instead of my sentiments, I should be of 
that opinion — Pleasure is ever agreeable to human nature, 
but never more so than after long and severe duty an oppor- 
tunity to unbend the mind must be the wish of every one, 
and it is not very difficult to accommodate our reason* to our 
wishes ; but whether a total or a partial relaxation will be for 
the general interest of the army is worth enquiring into. 

" If we retire so far back as to be totally out of danger, 
pleasure and dissipation will be the consequence. Officers 
of all ranks will be desirous of visiting their friends — the 
men will be left without order, without government — and 
ten to one but the men will be more unhealthy in the spring 
than they now are, and much worse disciplined. — The health 
and discipline of troops can only be preserved by constant 
attention and exercise — we must not flatter ourselves that 
going into quarters will recover the health or discipline of 
the troops without regard is paid to one and attention to the 
other. 

" It is said we must carry on war upon the great Scale, 
and that particular interest must not be brought in compe- 
tition with the general interest and that by attending to the 
minutiae, we shall sacrifice the principle object. I readily 
agree that it is perfectly consistent with the maxims of sound 
policy for the lesser to give place to the greater — but is it 
necessary for us to throw open a great extent of country to 
give a necessary relaxation to the Army ? It is the country 
that feeds, cloaths, and furnishes us with troops. If the 
subsistance of the Inhabitants is destroyed they will be in- 
capable of giving us the necessary aid — if the army in the 
winter season leaves the country unprotected — will it not be 
a disco.iraging circumstance to sending recruits to join us — 
which will be a diminution of their local security, if they 
can expect no protection from the collective force. — I am 
no advocate for taking measures from popular opinions, but 
it is necessary to preserve the confidence of the country ; 



Defmoea of Philadelphia in 1777. 221 

for by the union and spirit of the people alone can the op- 
position be continued. — 

" The Legislator is in some measure under the necessity 
of accommodating his measures to the prejudices of the 
people — mankind will only be subservient to your purposes 
in proportion as they conceive their interest and happiness 
connected with your measures — I have heard it remarked 
that the sufferings of the army spread in all directions 
throughout the continent, alarms the people and prevents 
them from entering into the service. 

" The same may be said with regard to the poor plundered 
inhabitants. — It is true the eyes of all the continent are upon 
us for protection — but it is natural for man to reason, what 
is my neighbours condition may bye and bye be mine. — 

" If the army seems disposed to exert its force to shelter 
the country from ravage ; it is natural to expect the people 
will be anxious to strengthen its hands ; but if the enemy 
are left at liberty to ravage at large, and the inhabitants of 
our State make the condition of another their own, it will 
be an alarming consideration. Therefore I think some re- 
gard should be had in taking our measures to afford as much 
cover to the country as possible without militating with the 
principal design — not for the sake of the particular spot 
that is covered, but to prevent the disagreeable influence it 
will have upon the surrounding Inhabitants. 

" I cannot conceive a total relaxation to be necessary to 
recruit the army, or recover its spirits. I am fully persuaded 
that recruiting by voluntary inlistments is in a great meas- 
ure at an end. The enormous bounties that are given so 
far exceed the american funds, and the continental bounty 
now allowed falls so far short of private bounties, that few 
if any recruits are to be expected through that channel — If 
this be granted then the recruiting service will wholly de- 
pend upon the exertion of the civil authority of the respec- 
tive States, and this exertion doubtless will be in proportion 
to the reputation and coniidence the legislative bodies place in 
the army — For it cannot be expected from the local prejudices 
of mankind that the several legislative bodies will be will- 



222 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

ing to strip themselves of their inhabitants, & lessen their 
own internal safety unless they are well persuaded the meas- 
ure is essential to their own happiness and security. 

" It is absolutely necessary the army should have an op- 
portunity to relax and recover its spirits — but there is a 
great ditference between constant duty and total relaxation 
— A proper medium between these two extremes will be 
found better adapted to restore the spirits of the army and 
preserve its discipline — We must be in a situation to take 
off" that constant watching and yet not so remote from 
danger but that some attention to duty is necessary. 

" Men are naturally apt to sink into negligence without 
there is something constantly to rouse their attention — The 
objects of pleasure are so much more inviting than those of 
Duty that without a restraint is laid on one and a necessity 
imprest to attend to the other it is ten to one that the ob- 
jects of Pleasure steal the mind wholly from the discharge 
of its duty. — I do not mean to urge these reasons for taking 
a position near the enemy to oblige us to be constantly on 
the watch but to shew that a total relaxation may be dan- 
gerous — Remember Hannibal's army at Capua. — 

" The general discontent among the officers of almost all 
ranks renders winter quarters essential to redress the pre- 
vailing grievances and new organize the army for the spring 
— but the fatigues and hardships of the campaign and the 
want of rest and relaxation are not the great sources of the 
discontent that prevails. It springs from a different foun- 
tain. It is the pay and subsistance which are found to 
be incompetent to the necessary demands of the officers 
to preserve their dignity and support their families, — 
This is the great evil and this must be remedied or else 
this army must and will dissolve. — There are some other 
things complained of — Such as, Rank, that military Jewel, 
being confered on almost all orders of men to the disgrace 
of rank, and great mortiiication of officers who find them- 
selves often reduced to a level with persons they despise, 
from the prostitution of military dignity. — 

" The manner of cloathing the troops is a subject of com- 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 223 

plaint. — There is no provision made proportionable to the 
demand of the army; and the difficulty of obtaining that 
which is provided has given great disgust to some and dis- 
content to others. — These are some of the principal subjects 
of complaint — and a partial relaxation from military duty is 
necessary to put every thing in a proper train for opening 
the next campaign. 

" It is necessary that an appearance should be kept up as 
much as possible of besieging the enemy, not onlj' to cover 
the country, but to preserve the credit of our currency which 
will always rise and fall as our army appears superiour or 
inferior to the enemy. The enemy will also draw out of the 
country many recruits without they are kept within bounds. 
— All these are objects worthy our attention. 

" There have been two plans proposed for cantoning the 
troops. One from Bethlehem to Lancaster, the other at 
Wilmington and it's environs. — There can be great objec- 
tions raised to both. — It is said (with how much truth I 
know not) that all the back towns are crouded with inhab- 
itants, refugees from Philadelphia ; if that be true, to turn 
them out to make room for the Soldiery will bring great 
distress upon the inhabitants & be productive of no small 
discontent. — I have no doubt in my own mind but that there 
can be quarters procured in the proposed Line of canton- 
ment from Bethlehem to Lancaster, but there appears to me 
to be many evils attending it. — It is a great distance back 
in the country and leaves the Enemy a great range in front 
and upon each flank. It must distress the back inhabitants. 
"We shall be consuming the substance in the bowels of the 
country which should be always held as a reserve against a 
misfortune. — In withdrawing ourselves to so great a distance 
it will be improved abroad into a kind of dispersion into the 
mountains and among ourselves it will wear the complexion 
of a retreat, and many will be suing for Protection. 

" I must confess however that, if safety and relaxation 
are the only objects under consideration, the geography of 
the country from Bethlehem to Lancaster is more favorable 
for a Cantonment than Wilmington — but I cannot help 



224 Defences oj Philadelphia in 1777. 

thinking that quarters can be got at "Wilmington with much 
less distress to the Inhabitants of the State — that the posi- 
tion will be secure enough with the force cantoned in and 
about it — That provision & forage can be got easier and 
cheaper in that position than in the other — in this Position 
we can draw it from the enemy while the other will leave it 
for them — that this gives us a better opportunity to protect 
the lower Jersey and not less the upper — that this will dis- 
tress the enemy in drawing supplies — and upon the whole 
cover a greater extent of country than any other. — For these 
Reasons I am for the Position of Wilmington, and if any 
part of our stores are insecure I would immediately have 
them removed. — I would have about a brigade of continen- 
tal Troops in the Jerseys and about one thousand militia 
between the Delaware & Schuylkill, and about a thousand 
more at or near the Gulph — and an advance post at Chester 
— of continental troops. 

"N'ath. Greene 

" 31. (?." 

OPINION OF LORD STIRLING. 

" Camp White March, Decern 1, 1777. 
" Sir : 

" In agitating the General Question which your Excel- 
lency put to the Council of General Officers yesterday, there 
arose three propositions as to the Stationing of this Army 
for the winter, all attended with very great Inconveniences. 
That of placing it at Wilmington does not answer the pur- 
pose of Quartering the Army, as the buildings in and about 
that place are not Capable of receiving above one third part 
of the Army ; besides I think it is one of the most danger- 
ous Scituations that I know of, for if the Enemy were to 
make a sudden movement and take post near Kennet 
Square or New Garden, our Army would have no Retreat, 
we should be reduced to the Necessity of fighting them, 
with the Delaware and two other Irai:)assable Waters on 
our flanks and Rear. It is true it would cover the three 
lower Country's and part of Maryland from the Incursions 
of the Enemy by land, yet they would have what Commu- 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 225 

nication they pleased with it by water, this advantage would 
therefore be trifling, & for it we should give up all pensil- 
vauia & New Jersey, for the Enemy to Ravage at large ; and 
put it in their power Eifectually to Cut of our Communica- 
tion with all the Country to the Eastward of Delaware 
River : these are reasons I think sufficient to Induce us to 
drop all thoughts of Quartering the Army at Wilmington. 
As to the plan of putting the Army into Huts in the Town- 
ship of Tryduftrin in the great Valley, I must acknowledge 
it is a Scituation well Calculated for Covering Chester & 
Lancaster Counties, and for Checking any Attempts the 
Enemy may design against Maryland & the Lower Counties 
on the one side and a Great part of the Country between 
the Schuylkill and Delaware on the other, the Communica- 
tion with Jersey and the Northern States will be preserved, 
the Encampment will be easily guarded as there is but one 
Waj- to approach it from Philadelphia ; But it is still only an 
Encampment. It is not going into Winter Quarters, It is 
not procuring for the Officers and Men that Comfort and 
Opportunity of recruiting which they richly deserve after a 
long and fatigueing Campaign ; these perhaps are not in our 
power to give them anywhere, and should that be the Case, 
this may be as good a Scituation to hut in as any ; provision 
can be handily brought in from all Quarters, but how it is 
for forage I know not. The third proposal was to Cantoon 
the Army in the Towns of Reading and Lancaster and the 
Villages between them or in their Vicinity. If this is 
practicable I should like it best of any, as the Men would 
have a Chance of getting better refreshed than by either of 
the other two proposals ; but it has been objected that it is 
impracticable, as those towns and Villages are already filled 
with persons who have fled to them for Refuge, and if it is 
so we must be Content. If the Safety and Comfort of the 
Army is principally to be Considered, they can Easily be 
Cantooned in the Towns in New Jersey which are in a 
great Measure deserted by the Inhabitants. But I think it is 
also of high Importance to Cover as much of the Country 
as we can ; and that the possition in the Valley will Cover 



226 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

as much or more of the Countr}' than any other that can be 
pointed out ; the Enemy will never Venture out as far as 
Chester on that side, as we Can Cut them off by taking 
post at Darby, to which there is a direct Road ; nor would 
they be fond of penetrating for to the Northward of Phila- 
delphia, least we might pass a body of troops over between 
them and the Town. Upon the Whole I should be for 
hutting the Army somewhere in or near Tryduflrin, espe- 
cially if it is so fine and Rich a Country as has been repre- 
sented. I am &c. 

" SlIRLINe." 



OPINION OF MAJOR-GENERAL ARMSTRONG. 

"Camp at W. March 1" Dec': 1777. 
" May it please y" Excel'^ : 

" I beg leave to recommend that as early as it may be 
safe, to make such movement, the Army may pass over the 
Scuilkill & take for some time a position on that side. 

" With respect to Winter Quarters for the Army — the 
longer I consider the measure pointed out in the back Vil- 
lages of this State, the more inadmissable that step appears 
to be, as by the large lattitude thereby given the enemy 
thro' the winter & early part of the spring, every doleful & 
pernitious consequence must be expected — The hearts of 
good-men thro' all the States depressed, and this State in 
particular, little less than sacrificed to the whole without 
real necessity ! Amongst the innumerable evils resulting 
from that situation, the impossition of the Oaths of Alle- 
giance & an end to Government & the future aids of the 
Militia tbro' great part of the State, must inevitably follow. 

" I'm therefore of Opinion that in proper time, part of 
your Army take possession of Wilmington, and the Resi- 
due form a Chain from thence to Dowingstown & perhaps 
to White Horse on the Lancaster road, at these two some 
Cover may be had, & Hutts with some use of Houses in the 
intermediate space — these are the best outlines that appears 
to me, which may be corrected and better determined when 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, 227 

the Army is on that Side. And am with perfect respect y' 
Excellency's Most Obed' humb' Serv' 

" John Armstrong. 

" P.S. — I hear that some part of the Bridge is already 
broken or carried off. G' Potter is not yet come over, I 
suppose owing to the bad weather. I expect him today. 

"J: A." 

opinion of brigadier-general maxwell. 
" Sir : 

" Agreeable to your Excellencys request of last evening, 
that we should give our opinion concerning the most eligi- 
ble place for Quartering or iucamping the Troops during 
the winter. As much has been said on the Subject of 
Quartering in different places some with a view of covering 
the Country, & others for recovering, recruiting, and gath- 
ering the Troops together, for another Campaign, and to ly 
at such a distance from the Enemy that they were not liable 
to be harrassed by them during the winter. If covering 
the Country is your Excellency's chiefest object I would 
recommend that our armey should be moved to the west 
side of Schoolkil, at the distance of about 30 miles from 
Phil" with our left tolerable near that River, leaving a party 
of observation on the East side; and there Hutt in the 
most convenient place. But if the other part viz the re- 
freshing and recruiting our Armey be your Excellency's 
chief object in that case I would recommend that our Armey 
should retire back in the Country on a line from Reading 
to Lancaster and in the Neighbourhood of that line, and try 
to collect all our scattered Troops of every sort near the 
main body, and take every Method in our power to get the 
Reg" filled up during the winter, aud those well cloathed 
we have. If the last proposition takes place I would 
recommend that a party of observation be stationed one 
on the West S., the other on the East side of Schoolkill to 
prevent the Enemys partys from penetrating far into the 
Country. 

"Likewise a party should be sent into New Jersey to 



228 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

relieve the Militia there who has been a long time on duty 
& to give them an opertunity to fill up their Quotas in 
the Continental line. Those Troops might return in the 
Spring as soon as the roads was fit for traveling on, should 
it be thought necessary. This last Scheme I prefer to the 
first — and am your Excellencys Most Obedient Humble 
Servant 

" W Maxwell. 
" White Marsh the 1" Decern' 1777." 

OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL SMALLWOOD. 

" Camp, Decern' 1" 1777 
"Sir 

" The Distresses of the Army, the Inclemency of the 
weather, & the approaching Season, combine to point out 
the Expediency of fixing on Winter Quarters ; and in doing 
this all local Attachment ought to be sacrificed to the Public 
Good, to reduce the Enemy, & free ourselves, I wou'd chear- 
fully resign myself to a Den the ensuing & many other 
Seasons if found necessary. — Three Positions have been 
pointed out — from Bethlehem to Lancaster — the Valley in 
Halts — & Wilmington — three Capital Objects are in view — 
The Health & Security, the Discipline of the Army — & 
the supp»ort and covering the Country — the first Position 
would be incompetent to any other than the first of these 
Objects. The second wou'd not amply admit of, or be ade- 
quate to any other than the second Object, for it woud im- 
pair the men's Health, & leave not only the Jerseys, but also 
the Delaware Government & Eastern Shore of Maryland 
open, which the Enemy woud avail themselves of, & get 
fully suppli'd this Season. — Tlie Third tho it does not fully 
coincide with our Views, yet in a more inlarged & general 
Degree, it answers the Object of our wishes, more than the 
preceeding or any other Position I know of under our 
present circumstances — I woud recommend sending the sick 
to the first mentioned Position, but I am strongly impressed 
that the hail & active part of the army ought to take post at 
Wilmington, to awe, & perhaps annoy the enemy, or at least 



\ 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 229 

prevent and deter them from taking possession of, or draw- 
ing their supplies from such an extensive Tract of Country 
as either of the other Positions than Wilmington wou'd 
lay open to them — Wilmington & its vicinage will cover 
more Troops, & is more compact, may annoy the Enemy, 
will obstruct them, & cover more of the Country than any 
other Position I am acquainted with under our present 
Situation, & will admit of Exercise & manoeuvring (from 
the compact station) upon as large a Scale & as often as 
may be necessary, & with respect to insecurity against sur- 
prize think no Post within a Night's March of the Dela- 
ware below Philad" cou'd be rendered more secure — a Post 
that's perfectl}' secure is eligible, but I am induced to think 
it wou'd have a bad Tendency on our Array. Officers of 
all Ranks & Denominations wou'd be going Home, their Im- 
portunities wou'd bo irresistible, the Soldiers wou'd follow 
their Example, & if Furloughs were not granted. Desertion 
wou'd ensue, & in most Instances a Neglect of, & inattention 
to Discipline. 

" Being Officer of the Day Time admits not of my en- 
larging more on this Subject; or adding further than that I 
have the Honor to be with great Respect, your Excelleucys 

most Obed' H"' Serv' 

" W. Smallwood." 

OPINION OF BRIGADIEK-SENERAL KNOX. 

"Park op Artillery, Dec' 1, 1777 
" SiK, 

" Your Excellency last evening referr'd to your General 
Officers the consideration of the position proper for Winter 
Quarters, and order'd us to give our opinions respectively 
on that subject. 

"I shall be concise in my opinion, establishing the prop- 
osition that Winter Quarters are indispensably necessary 
for the Army in order to give it that rest and refreshment 
of which it stands much in need — to repair the Carriages 
of various kinds which are damag'd ; to recruit the ex- 
hausted horses; to recruit and till up the reg"; to reform 
the army in some essential particulars, in a word to put the 

17 



230 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

army in all its branches on such a footing as to be able to 
take the field next Campaign with the greatest probability 
of Success. 

" The King of Prussia says ' the first object in Winter 
Quarters is Tranquility' — it is very evident if we take our 
Winter Quarters so near the enemy, as to be subject to fre- 
quent alarms and constant hard duty, we shall have but a 
small part of the present army to oppose to our enemies. 
Could a place be found about 30 miles distant from & North 
or N. W. of Philadelphia in wliich it was possible to quarter 
the troops, I should prefer it to a greater distance or ditFer- 
ent direction as by it we should be able to cover a greater 
extent of Counti-y than by taking post at Wilmington or 
retiring so far back as Lancaster & Reading. 

"Two Ideas present themselves in considering a place 
proper for Winter-quarters. The ease and safety- of the 
troops and the covering the Countr}', thereby preventing 
the enemies deriving supplies from it. I consider the first 
the greater objects and all inferior ones should give place to 
them, and therefore give my opinion that the troops should 
at the time appointed retire into Winter Quarters, tlie right 
of the Cantonment to be at Lancaster & tlie left at Reading, 
provided a sufficiency of houses and good cover can be pro- 
cur'd there — an officer of reputation on whose veracity your 
Excellency could rely can easily ascertain this matter. — 
parties of 500 or 600 to be kept out on command advanc'd 
30 or 40 miles, under the command of active partizan Offi- 
cers who should be directed to be constantly moving 
about to prevent the enemy making any disposition to sur- 
prize them. 

" Advantages may by these means be taken of any smaller 
detachments sent out by the enemy — indeed the militia of 
the State may be kept considerably advanc'd, they being 
light troops, will cover the Country & be but in little danger 
of being surpnz'd. 

"If the Cover in the range from Lancaster to Reading 
should be found to be insufficient, I should be for hutting 
the whole army about 30 miles distant from Philadelphia, 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 231 

in some position which should hiive the Schuylkill about 10 
or 12 miles on the right or left — the goodness of the position 
to determine this. General Muhlenberg mention'd a po- 
sition which comes within this description which perhaps 
on examination might be found to be proper. 

" I have the honor to be with the greatest respect 
" Your Excellencys most obedient Humble Ser' 

" Henry Knox, 

>' B. G. Artillery:' 

OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL POOR. 

" Monrlay, 1" December, 1777 

" Sir, 

" in answer to the questions propos'd 3'esterdaj, Rispect- 
ing the Quartering Army this winter I am clear of apoinyen 
that the grait Object is to secure our men from the Inclem- 
ency of the wather lucres our numbers Dissapline our men 
and make our Army as Formadable as possable that we 
may be able to take the field early in the Spring. 

" I am not acquainted with this Country so as to point 

out the most sutiable place — by Information do think that 

the line from Lankcster to Reading is the most Elagable of 

the three places mention'd. I am Sir your most obedient 

Humble Serv' 

"Enoch Poor, B. Gen'." 

OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL WAYNE. 

" Camp at White Maesh, 1" Dec' 1777 
" Sir : 

" The procuring good and easy Winter Quarters for the 
Troops under your Excellencies Command — and Covering 
the Country from the Depredations of the Enemy as far as 
Possible without too much fatigue to the Army — are Objects 
of the first Consequence, & to which too much Attention 
cannot be paid. 

" A Chain of Cantonments has been proposed (and sup- 
ported with very plausible Arguments) from Lancaster to 
Reading and the Intermediate villages between them, — to 
which Cantonments I can't agree for the following Reasons. 



232 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

"Because by taking Quarters at the Distance of sixty 
miles west of Philadelphia, you at once give up to the 
enemy all the Delaware State, the Eastern shore of Mary- 
laud, the Counties of Phil% Bucks and Chester. 

" Because by this access of fine Country the Euemy will 
he enabled to draw supplies, not only for the Winter — but 
to lay up Stores for the next Campaign — to rittual their 
Transports — carry Gen' Burgoyne's army to Great Brittain 
— and perhaps bring out an Equal Number to Re-enforce 
Gen' Howe early in the Spring. 

"Because the sick and feeble of the Army in the Re- 
spective Hospitals will in a great Measure be left between 
the Enemy and us — Otherwise Intermixed with the healthy 
Troops — and subject them to the same Disorders that the 
Sick may be Infected with. 

"Because you cannot in these Villages procure cover for 
more than one-third of your Eifective's without casting to 
the Mercy of "Weather and Howling Wilderness — those 
families who flew before the Enemj- to these very places for 
Shelter — giving up ease & AfHuence, for Libert\- and Pro- 
tection. 

"Because other States are Subject to Invasion — who will 
naturally conclude if these are given up to Distruction — 
that it may be their case next, and will thereby be deterred 
from giving that aid, which they otherwise would aftbrd — 
least they should first Irritate, & afterwards be left to the 
Mercy of a more than savage foe. 

" Because the Eyes of the World are upon us — and we 
have given the Country some Ground to expect, some Pro- 
tection — since the Junction of so great a part of the 
Northern Army. 

" For these Reasons I am positively against taking 
Quarters at the places before Mentioned — but would pro- 
pose making good our Quarters in a Position that will at 
once afibrd cover to the Country and enable you to draw 
supplies for your Arm}' — from the Vicinity of the Enemy 
— in doing of which you will not only Distress them — but 
save for the use of the next Campaign those Stores which 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 233 

you would be necessitated to expend if Quartered at the 
Distance of Sixty Miles from the Delaware River. 

" You will also leave such Houses as can be procured in 
that Country to be Converted into Hospitals for the use of the 
Sick and Convalescents — to which the feeble of the Army 
may be collected & Commissioned Officers sent (in Propor- 
tion to the Number of the Sick) to superintend them — who 
will not only preserve Order but Introduce Discipline 
amongst the Convalescents, by obliging them to appear 
clean on the parade and Manoeuvre them whenever the 
weather will permit, which will be more conducive to their 
health and be a means of saving men's lives than the whole 
powers of the Materia Medica — they will also afford protec- 
tion to our Stores by Detering any small party from attempt- 
ing their Destruction. 

" For these Reasons, and to sweeten the tempers of those 
Officers that at present may be a little sowered as well as 
for the ease & Conveniency of others, I am Induced to meet 
those Gentlemen in Sentiment, who are for Quartering the 
Army at Willmington & in its Vicinity — which with the aid 
of some Hutts will afford Cover sufficient. 

" The Position is such as to give the Enemy the Greatest 
Annoyance — with the least fatigue to your own Troops. 

" Your Excellencies own good Judgment will point out 
the proper Measures necessary to guard against that Surprize 
whicli some Gentlemen Effect so much to dread — I can only 
assure your Excellency that whatever Position you may 
think most proper, I shall always be ready to acquiesce with, 
& to serve you with the best Service of your most Ob' and 
very Hum' Ser' 

"Ant"^ Wayne." 



OPINION OF BRISADIER-GENERAL VARNUM. 

" Whitemarsh, 1" Dec' 1777 
"May IT PLEASE YOUR Excellency! 

"From a cursory view of the present state of your Array 
compared to the Position of the Enemy I am fully con- 



234 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

vinced that your Troops should immediately go into quiet, 
peaceable Winter Quarters. B}' the various Fatigues of the 
Campaign, your Men are dispersed thro' many parts of the 
Country, incapable of taking the Field at this advanced 
Season. The Hospitals are crouded with Sick and Invalids, 
occasioned, in a great Measure, by the want of clothing & 
Rest — Your Officers are very discontented, as their Families 
are suiFering at Home, not being able to purchase the Neces- 
saries of Life. The Credit of the Mony is so amazingly 
decreased, by the prevailing Avarice of the Times, that the 
recruiting Service rests upon a very precarious Basis. Your 
great Dependence must therefore be upon the jiresent 
Army. To make it respectible, it is necessary to collect 
the feeble together; to nurse and cloath them, and give to 
the whole such a Spirit of Discipline and Order, as will 
make them truly formidable. The Enemy is in good Quar- 
ters, not to be attack'd, without the greatest Hazard. He 
will not attack you, unless he imagines he has a manifest 
Advantage. In this Situation, you have much to loose, 
nothing certain to gain. — As therefore another Campaign 
is morally inevitable, your Troops should be put in the best 
Situation, to open it early, with vigor & Activity. To fix 
upon the Line of Cantonment, is a matter of Perplexity. 
If you attempt covering the Country from the Excursions 
of the Enemy, you make a "Winter's Campaign necessary. 
But that Position w°h will give them the greatest Check, 
consistant with the Ease of the Troops, is the most eligible. 
That part of Pennsylvania w°h lays between the Delaware 
and the Schylkill seems best calculated for this Purpose. 
While it preserves a Communication with the Southern and 
Northern States, it gives some kind of Security to New 
Jersey. A removal to Wilmington and Places adjacent, 
would give the Enemy the full command of the Delaware, 
and perhaps, Eifect a Separation of the States. It cannot be 
supposed that the large Villages in the back parts of Penn- 
sylvania are so crouded with Inhabitants as to give no Shel- 
ter to the Army. Should the Buildings be too scanty to 
receive all the Troops, the Deficiency might be made up 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 235 

by substituting Hutts, w'h would prove a sufficient cover 
for the moi'e healthy and robust. 

" I am, with great Submission, your 

" Excellency's most obed' Serv' 

" J. M. Varnum." 



OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL WOODFORD. 

"Camp, 1" Decern' 1777 
"Dear Gen^- 

" Upon considering the several places purposed for the 
winter cantoonments of the army, I think the "Villages 
from Reading to Lancaster, with the addition of some 
Hutts, the most Eligable position for the Troops in their 
present situation. 

" Were the men warmly clad, I should give it as my 
Opinion that Willraington, or some post nigher the Enemy 
should be taken in preference to the above, where we might 
annoy them in their Forrageing &e. in the course of the 
Winter. 

" But upon considering our present circumstances & 
looking forward to the opperations in the spring, I think 
the advantages we should give them of possessing a part 
of this state & the Lower Countys, would be overballanced 
by our having a vigorous army ready to take the Field 
early in the next campaign, with sufficient Magazines of 
provision & Forrage laid up in the course of this Winter. 

"If the Range of Cantoonments I purpose should meet 
the approbation of your Excellency, after hearing the senti- 
ments of the Gen' Officers, I would purpose that as much 
Forrage & provisions as possible, of every kind, be imme- 
diately drawn from the Country between our Quarters & 
the Enemy & that such as we had it not in our power to 
remove be destroy'd, saveing a bare sufficiency for the 
subsistance of the Inhabitants, & that the Country in our 
Rear be kept as a Reserve. 

"Previous to the removal of the Army, I would recom- 
mend that one or more, Gen' Officer go with the D. Q' Master 



236 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

Gen' to view the cover that can be procured for the Troops, & 
make their Report to your Excellency as speedily as possible. 
" If these Villages are found too much crouded with the 
Refugees from Philadelphia & its neighbourhood, I should 
think it no great hardship for them to be obliged to remove 
to the Farm Houses contiguous, & that the D. Q' Master 
Gen' (after having ascertain'd their numbers), be order'd to 
assign them Quarters at a distance that it would be unsafe 
to squander the Troops in, & that the publick waggons re- 
move their affects. I am with great respect your Excellencys 
most Obed' humble Serv' 

" W« Woodford." 

opinion of brigadier-general weedon. 

"Dear Sir: 

" I have agreeable to your Excellency's direction, consid- 
ered in every point of view I am able ' a proper position for 
this Army during the winter' — Three plans for facilitating 
this desirable purpose have been proposed, viz' Hutting, 
Drawing them down to Wilmington & its vicinity, or can- 
toning them in the back country from Reading to Lancas- 
ter. — In ray opinion there will be great inconveniences at- 
tending any measure we may take — The first plan is certainly 
the most desirable, but I fear the least eligible ; & both for 
reasons so obvious that the}' hardh* need mentioning. Does 
not the present situation of affairs promise another Cam- 
paign ? Tis true that by wintering your Troops within 
ten or fifteen miles of the enemj' you might in some meas- 
ure cover the country contiguous thereto, but would not 
this subject your Army to a winter campaign ? Add to 
this the unhealthy quarters they would be confined to, 
rendered still the more so by the very nature of the ma- 
terials which compose them. Our service has already driven 
us to this necessity on a former occasion, which proved 
more fatal to the troops than all the actions they fought 
during the campaign ! — Let us benefit by experience. — 
Your army, Sir, is now much reduced by hard service & 
other sufferings during this Summer & Fall ; I fear k be- 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 237 

lieve, I may say witli truth, (& consequent!}' on this occa- 
sion with propriety) that a third of them tho' now in the 
field, are more fitting for the Hospital than the Camp: 
without Blanketts, without Shoes, & in short almost desti- 
tute of every comfort required hy the strong & robust, 
much more the weak & feeble. "What then must be the 
efiects of keeping them out all winter in this dispiriting 
situation ? Can you promise yourself service from them 
in the spring? When the Enemy find your troops ex- 
hausted by fatigue, thej' will no doubt avail themselves of 
it. What must then necessarily follow is disagreeable & 
needless to anticipate — Troops undisciplined, worn-out by 
service, deprived of every comfort which is necessary to 
restore health & vigor, cannot be supposed to support an 
attack against those who thro' the Winter have been in 
comfortable quarters, constantly trained in Manoeuvring & 
other exercises. That this will be the case, I make not the 
least doubt. 

" A position at Wilmington, I should have no very great 
objection to, if the troops could be covered in a tolerable 
compact body, but this I fear cannot be done; & Cantoning 
by Detachment is a dangerous experiment. — I look Sir, on 
this Army as the Herculean hinge, on which American 
Independence turns. — The covering this, or the other spot 
for the space of three or four months is not a motive sufli- 
cient to hazard, or expose this Army for, the object is in 
nowise adequate to the disadvantages that may result from 
it : you would in my opinion subject yourself to frequent 
alarms by taking post at Wilmington, Christiana, Newport 
& Chester, particularly at the latter. The Enemy are mas- 
ters of the River, have a numerous Fleet at their command, 
and within one nights march of you — I should not indeed 
dread a surprize, but supposing the enemy not inclined to 
attack you by a sudden march, (which at the same time 
they would have in their power) but to mancEuvre up the 
Schuylkill & cross above you, should we not be in the pre- 
dicament we have all this campaign been endeavouring to 
shun, by keeping their left-flank must we not instantly 



238 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

leave our quarters, perhaps at a season of the year when 
our magazines could not be got off. — The sick must fall 
into their hands also, unless we fight them & are success- 
ful — Should any disaster attend us, by an action with them 
in this situation, what would be the consequences? a total 
Annihilation of this Army, & with it, the Liberties of 
America ! — Upon the whole sir, distressing as it is to leave 
a country uncovered, & at the mercy of an ungenerous 
Enemy, who no doubt will i-avage & plunder the inhabit- 
ants; yet Sir, we must view our affairs in a more extensive 
Scale. Subjugating a few individuals who must be left at 
their mere}', or possessing a small tract of country for a 
few months goes but a small way in the American cause, 
while you have this Army in full health. — That we must 
have another Campaign is, I believe, beyond controversy, 
prudence therefore dictates a timely provision for the same, 
the success of it will depend on the health & discipline of 
your Troops, the care & vigilance of your Officers, and 
early operations in the Field. — To provide for such im- 
portant purposes, I give it as my opinion this army be 
quartered as soon as circumstances will permit, in a country 
where not only your Officers may have it in their power to 
make themselves comfortable during the winter, but your 
troops be relieved from heavy guards, covered from the in- 
clemency of the weather, nursed in sickness, disciplined & 
restored to their former health & vigor — This Sir, & this 
alone, will give you the Superiority over your Enemy. — 
Your Hospitals are now as strong nearly as your Battal- 
ions : & while you are followed by an army of feeble in- 
valids, what reward can you expect for your unwearied 
exertions, by any atchievements such Troops can obtain ? 
The Chain of Cantonments from Reading to Lancaster has 
been mentioned, I cannot with precision eay they are the 
most eligible, but from the small knowledge I have of the 
country, should suppose them the most likely to cover the 
troops, & afford them rest thro' the winter. 

" I am Sir y' very H'bl Serv' 

"G. Weedon." 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 239 

OPINION OF BKIGADIER-GENERAL MUHLENBERG. 

" December 1" 1777 
" Sir : 

" Agreeable to your Excellency's requisition I transmit 
you my Sentiments on the Question proposed in Council 
yesterday. 

" I would beg leave to premise that agreeable to my Sen- 
timents, tiie Army should continue in a Position, where 
they can most effectually Annoy the Enemy, untill it shall 
be absolutely necessary on Account of the Severity of the 
Weather to Quit the Field— 2"^ That the Preservation of the 
Army by getting them into good Winter Quarters, will be 
of much greater Utilitj'', than any small Advantages, which 
can be gain'd over the Enemy by keeping the Army near 
their Lines. 

" With regard to the place, Propper for the Army to 
take Winter Quarters, I must confess, I am more inclined 
to join in sentiment with those Gentlemen who propose Lan- 
caster for the Right of the Cantonment & Reading for 
the left, than with those who propose Wilmington — my 
reasons are these. Wilmington &c. are so near the Enemy 
that there is the greatest probability of their frequent Alarm- 
ing us, consequently the end intended, that is, the Ease of 
the Army will not be answered. 

" 2'"^ Our Army will certainly diminish, at least for the 
Winter, by a Number of the Soldiers receiving permis- 
sion to return to the different States they came from which 
would perhaps enable the Enemy to gain material Advan- 
tages over us, especially if it should be found necessary, 
on account of Covering, to Quarter the Men some distance 
apart. 

" 3'"^ The upper Part of Pensylvania would be left entirely 
to the Mercy of the Enemy, & the Communication with the 
Eastern States cut of 

" 4*'^ The Enemy will have it in their power to draw 
more Supplies from the Jersey, than it would be possible 
for them to draw from the lower Counties, e%-en if they 



240 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

were entirely given up to them, for if the Army lay at Wil- 
mington, one armed Vessell would he sufficient to prevent 
us from affording any relief to the Jerse3-s. 

" Perhaps if your Excellency was to order some Person 
to Reconnoitre the Country from Heading to Easton it 
would be found more Eligible, to make Reading the right 
of the Cantonment, & Easton the left, than any other place 
proposed, especially if the Hint thrown out by a Gentleman 
in Council, was adopted, that is, to erect Hutts for the more 
Robust, & let the Feeble be quartered in Houses, &c. — In 
Reading the Refugees from Philadelphia are less numerous 
than in Lancaster, Lebanon, &c. Reading, Allentown Beth- 
lehem & Easton lie in a direct line, very near the same 
distance from Philadelphia — a few miles in front of this 
Line, is Maxetawny & Macungy, one, if not two Divisions 
may be Quartered with the greatest ease, & here the Troops 
would be ready, either to protect our Stores, or prevent 
any considerable Ravages in the Country. Your Excel- 
leneys 

" Most obed' & humble Serv' 

" P : Muhlenberg." 

OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL SCOTT. 

" White Maesh, 1" Dec' 1777 
"Sir: 

" After Considering maturely the matter Proposed Yes- 
terday with reguard to the Quartering the Troops for this 
Winter, I have at Length thought that Wilmington and its 
Neighbouring Villages the most Elligable. 

" I would not wish to Trouble your Excellency with my 

Reasons as it was so very Fully spoke upon Y'esterday. 

I am Your Excellencys 

" Ob' Serv' 

" Cn' Scott." 

OPINION OF COUNT PULASKI. 

" I leave the choice of Ground to those who are well 
acquainted with the Country, & confine myself to considering 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 241 

the advantages which will attend a continuance of the Cam- 
paign, and the Inconveniences which will flow from retiring 
to Winter Quarters — Our continuing in a state of activity 
will give courage to our Friends, be an antidote to the 
effeminacy of young Soldiers, and enure them to the 
fatigues which Veterans undergo — keep them in the exer- 
cise of their profession and instruct them — Whereas the in- 
activity of winter quarters will ruin the Army, discourage 
the Country, leave an extent of Territory for the Enemy to 
ravage and depopulate ; besides how do we know what Re- 
inforcements the Enemy may receive before the next Cam- 
paign. For my part therefore I only think that the invalids 
of each Regiment should be suffer'd to retire where they 
may under the direction of proper officers be refreshed and 
recruited — with all the rest collected I would make a vigor- 
ous attack upon the Enemy as soon as the Schuylkill is 
frozen. 

" C. Pulaski. 

" In case winter quarters are determined upon, I sollicit 
His Excellency to allow rae the body of Cavalry and In- 
fantry to remain near the Enemy's Lines." ' 

OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL DU PORTAIL. 

" By taking Winter Quarters from Lancaster to Reading, 
we abandon to the Enemy, Jersey, and all the Country ad- 
jacent to Derby, Chester, and Wilmington, one of the richest 
Tracts in this part of the Continent. By establishing them 
at Wilmington we cover the Country, and do not so com- 
pletely abandon that part of it which is before Philadelphia, 
nor even Jersey, because our proximity to the Enemy and 
the ease with which we could throw ourselves upon the Rear 
of their Lines in case the Schuylkill should be frozen, will 
keep them in respect, and put it out of their power to send 
considerable Detachments on the other side of Delaware 
from the fear of weakening themselves too much — and the 
small detachments which they ma}' send will be greatly 

' Translated by Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens. 
18 



242 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

restrained by the Jersey Militia — The Position then of Wil- 
mington answers the end of making subsistence very diffi- 
cult to Gen' Howe, who has not only his Army to feed but 
likewise the Inhabitants of the Town, and who must besides 
furnish Provisions for the Army of Gen' Bourgojnie if he 
means that they should embark for England. — This position 
farther deprives him of the means of recruiting in the 
Country, extending himself in it, adding to the number of 
his Partisans, in a word gaining the Country. It has besides 
the advantage of rendering his Communication with his 
fleet difficult, for I imagine the Vessels will not be able to 
approach Philadelphia when the Ice prevails — I should not 
omit mentioning a case in which this Inconvenience would 
be very considerable — if War should be declared between 
France and England, and Gen' How from a dread of finding 
himself blocked up in the Spring by a French Fleet, should 
wish to quit Philadelphia, we shall be within distance at 
Wilmington for hindering his Embarkation of which we 
should have timely notice. 

" This Position then unites great Military advantages — 
but it must be confess'd at the same time that these very 
advantages ought perhaps to prevent our taking it — because 
the Enemy probably will not sutler us there, and will march 
against us. — Thus to ask whether the Position of Wilming- 
ton is eligible, is to ask at the same time whether it is eligible 
to expose ourselves to an Action, and perhaps more than one. 

" If the season were less advanced, I don't see why we 
should avoid them — but at present — what end would be 
answer'd. if we should gain an advantage we should be 
unable to pursue it — if we Experience a Check, we run the 
risque of seeing our Army dissipated in the rude marches 
consequent on a defeat — Consistently with the plan which 
we ought to form of putting our Army in good condition 
this winter and preparing it for a good Campaign, we ought 
not to have it's Repose preceded by a Defeat. 

"As to the other points to be consider'd in this Question, 
whether Wilmington or Lancaster will be the most proper 
Situation for furnishing the Army with every necessary — I 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 243 

cannot decide, being ignorant of the Country — but it ap- 
pears to me in general that this point deserves our most 
serious attention — it is much better to lose Soldiers in Com- 
bats with the Enemy to whom we cause a Loss at the same 
time, than to lose them by Disorders, & Desertion arising 
from their Misery. Misery destroys a part of an Army and 
leaves the other without Vigour, without Courage, and with- 
out good Will — we should find ourselves then in the Spring 
with a Bod}' of an Army incapable of any thing, and con- 
sequently have no right to expect a successful Campaign.' 

" Du PORTAIL." 

opinion of brigadier-general irvine. 
" Sir : 

" Whether the army should retire into winter quarters 
in the interior part of this State or to Wilmington and its 
environs, or whether it ought not to take post nigher to the 
enemy and remain in huts during the winter, are questions 
of such importance and the arguments for and against each 
of those measures so many and cogent that I confess myself 
at a loss how to decide upon them. — To leave so large a 
proportion of the most valuable part of the State uncovered 
as we unavoidably must do should we quarter in either of 
the places mentioned may have a very unhappy effect upon 
the minds of the inhabitants, and render it extreamly 
doubtful! whether much, if any assistance could be drawn 
from this State the ensuing campaign — few men have a less 
opinion of the importance of the militia in their present 
state than myself, but I am apprehensive that should our 
friends be disgusted as it is highly probable they would be, 
the executive powers would not be able to make drafts 
therefrom to fill up the thirteen regiments raised in the state 
which form no inconsiderable part of the continental army. 

" If the observations made yesterday are founded on 
facts, that so great a part of the army are in a sickly situa- 
tion, it does not appear clear to me that we should find 
shelter for more than the invalids, the question then is 

' Translated by Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens. 



244 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

whether the remaining part of the arnw would be more 
comfortably lodged in huts at the distance of sixty miles 
from Philadelphia, than they could be at twenty or thirty. 
I am of opinion that they could not, and therefore advise, 
that the weak and infirm be immediately collected together 
and quartered between lancaster & reading, that the resi- 
due of the army take a strong position on the other side 
Schuylkill, where wood is plenty, out of surprising distance, 
and there hut themselves for the winter. I am with the 
greatest respect. Sir, your most obedient & humb : serv' 

" James Irvine. 
"Whitemaesh, Decern' 1, 1777." 



"Sir 

" I wish to recall your attention to the important matter 
recommended to your consideration some time ago — namely 
— the advisability of a winter's Campaign and, practicability 
of an attack upon Philadelphia with the aid of a consider- 
able body of militia, to be assembled at an appointed time 
& place — particular reasons urge me to request your Senti- 
ments on this matter by the morning, and I shall expect to 
receive them in writing accordingly by that time. I am, 
Sir, Y' most Obed' Ser. 

" G° Washington. 

" Dec' 3, 1777." 

OPINION OF MAJOR-GENERAL SULLIVAN. 

" Camp, Whitemaesh, Decern' 4"" 1777 
"Dear General 

" Agreable to your Excellency's Directions I have con- 
sidered upon the Advisability of making a Winter's Cam- 
paign, and the practicability of making an Attack upon 
Philadelphia with the Aid of a Body of Militia to be called 
in for that purpose. 

' For some reason the written opinions just given were inconclusive, 
and tlie General again desired an expression of sentiment. It was doubt- 
less owing to some political pressure brought to bear upon him, urging 
an attack on the British in Phil.adelphia. 



Defences oj Philadelphia in 1777. 245 

" Though the attacking & carrying Philadelphia is an 
object much to be wished yet as the Attempt carries with 
it an Idea of a Winters Campaign I must give my opinion 
against it — When this motion was first made I was in favor 
of it, but I was then taught to believe by those who pre- 
tended to have view'd the Enemy's Lines that their Re- 
doubts were not Inclosed in Rear but my own observation 
has since convinced me of the contrary, my own opinion 
as well as that of a Great majority of the General Ofiicers 
has been that an Attack upon the Enemies Redoubts in 
Front & upon the City afterward would be Hazardous & 
must End in Ruin to the Army ; & as we find their Re- 
doubts are Equally strong in Rear, the attempt will be 
Equally Dangerous — but if not altogether so, it must at 
Least be attended with great Hazard — and in order to make 
the Attempt, your naked Army must be kept in the field 
the greater part if not the whole of the winter. This in 
my opinion should never be Done but where the object is 
of great importance and where there is a moral certainty 
of obtaining the End in view, even when an Army is 
properly cloathed against the Inclemency of the Seasons : 
but of your Army one third of them at Least are now con- 
fined to their cold Tents & unwholesome Hutts for want 
of Shoes, Stockings & other Cloathing, a very Large num- 
ber of them unable Longer to endure the Severity of their 
Situation have retired (sick) to the Hospitals or to Country 
Houses. The numbers which Daily fall sick in Camp is 
surprizing — They have neither Cloaths to keep them warm 
by Da}' or Blankets by night. Most of the Ofiicers are in 
the same Situation. This is what Induces so many of them 
to Resign. Many Ofiicers who have behaved with Credit 
have petitioned me for Leave to Retire for a Season, or to 
resign their Commissions & assigned as a Reason for not 
waiting on me that they were so naked they were ashamed 
to be seen, That Cloathing was not to be had & even if it 
was their wages would not enable them to purchase; I 
have taken pains to Inquire from the most sensible officers 
& have conversed with several General Officers upon the 



246 Deferwes of Philadelphia in 1777. 

alarming Spirit of Resignation which takes place in the 
Army & find they in General say this : ' that thej^ and their 
men have been marching and countermarching all the year, 
that they have fought no General Action beside Skirmishes, 
that the Cloathes & Shoes which they wore out has amounted 
to their wages, which leave their Families to sutler at home, 
That the Baggage they sent to Bethlehem has been mostly 
plundered & they have no possible way of replacing it: 
That the price of Articles bears no proportion to their 
wages — they further say that their Rank has not been 
settled, that they have been told from time to time that this 
should be done when they Retired to winter Quarters of 
which they see not the Least prospect, & that while they 
have contentedly borne all this they Daily see Congress 
placing men over their heads without any Regard to their 
Ranks or Services.' Dear General, I feel for you when I 
tell you that this is not the Language of a few officers of 
Inferior Rank, but of high & Low. Such a Disafiection I 
never could have conceived had not my inquiries convinced 
me. I know it must give you pain as it is not in your 
power to Redress these grievances, but Duty oblidges me 
to give the information. I am fully convinced and fear the 
Event will prove that more than half your officers will 
leave you in a month, unless some Remedy is found out to 
quiet their minds & relieve their Distresses. — Under these 
circumstances a Winters Campaign will in my opinion Dis- 
solve the Army : I know it has been urged that the above 
sad state of our affairs should induce us to Risque an Action 
as soon as possible and I am myself fully of that opinion — 
but can we corapell the Enemy to it if they Decline it — if 
M' Howe does not come to attack us when we Lay so near 
him it is Evident he does not mean to fight us unless we 
attack his Lines — Whoever would advise to this measure 
puts the fate of America upon the Toss of a single Die 
without Refiecting upon the Dismal Situation our affairs 
must be in if unsuccessful in an attempt, where there are 
at least twenty chances to one against us — to remedy those 
Evils as much as possible, I most sincerely Recommend 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 247 

tliat the Army be removed immediately to Winter Quarters ; 
That Congress fall upon some methods of affording a proper 
support to officers & Soldiers and that the Rank through- 
out the Army be settled & made known, that in Instances 
of Rank which give universal Dissatisfaction, the Honor of 
a few Individuals should be sacrificed to the good of the 
whole, and every method taken to Recruit the Array collect 
the scatter'd, Recover the Feeble & Discipline the whole, in 
order to take the field with vigor early in the Spring which 
may be by March or April & in the mean while an Appa- 
ratus should be collecting to set down before Philadelphia 
in form so early in the Spring as will enable us by Regular 
approaches to carry the Town before a Reinforcement can 
arrive. A Body of Militia may (if tho't necessary) be 
seasonably notified to join us on the Day your Excellency 
may fix for opening the Campaign — I know it may be ob- 
jected to this plan that During the winter we leave a vast 
Tract of Country exposed to the Enemy, but this may be 
said in all cases of taking Winter Quarters. Every Army 
that retires to Winter Quarters must leave some Country 
exposed & I think it much better to give them all Pensyl- 
vania for the winter than to Ruin that Army which must 
save America, if saved at all. If a winter Campaign is 
carried on barely for the purpose of preventing the Enemy 
from Drawing provisions & Forage we shall in my opinion 
be the greatest sufferers — the Army cannot in a Little time 
act but in the partizan way. Some of Colo. Steward's 
Reg' will soon leave you, nine Virginia Regiments must 
soon go Home — The Drafts from Connecticut Leave you 
the first of January — this with what will be taken off" by 
fatigue &c. will render M'' Howe superior to you in the 
field through the winter, & if our attention is taken up in 
carrying on a partizan winter Campaign, you will have in 
the Spring the miserable remains of an Army worn out 
with Fatigue & totally unfit for any opperations. The King 
of Prussia speaking of winter Campaigns says that no man 
having his eyes open will carry on a winters Camjiaign 
unless he has Infinite objects in view — this he says of winter 



248 Defences oj Philadelphia in 1777. 

Campaigns generally, but I believe if bis opinion was 
taken upon an Armys carrying one on under our Disad- 
vantages he would adopt a language still more forceable; 
be says, good winter quarters are to give Tranquillity to 
tbe minds of tbe Soldiers to Recruit your Army, restore 
Constitutions reduced by Fatigue, mend Carriages, fill up 
your Regiments, manoeuvre your Troops, refresh your Horse, 
make your Arrangements & Lay your Plans for tbe Ensuing 
Campaign. All This is Essentially necessary for us at 
present to be about. I am therefore clearly of opinion 
that no time should be lost in taking the Troops to winter 
Quarters, & that we should immediately fall upon some 
method of giving Ease to our Soldiers & Satisfaction to 
our Officers : unless this is Done & unless all other Con- 
siderations give Way to it, I fear the Event of tbe next 
Campaign will prove that in striving to do too much we 
have ruined all. I am confident that if the plan I propose 
is adopted we shall be able in the Spring to take the field 
with an Army vastly superior to the Enemy even if our 
new Recruits should not be numerous, we have a vast num- 
ber of sick, many have Deserted to their own Homes, there 
are upwards of a hundred Deserters from the Delaware 
Regiment only, who are secreted by the Tories. Many 
other Regiments have almost an equal proportion, these 
might all be collected in the winter and with the sick which 
may recover & Recruits which may be added to our Army 
will be able to take the field with great advantage in the 
Spring. 

" The above is with all due Submission oiFered by. Dear 
General, your Excellence's most obed' Serv' 

"Jn° Sullivan. 

" P.S. — The best mode I could Devise for covering tbe 
Country' I pointed out in my last — Therefore forbear to 
repeat it in this." 

OPINION OF MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE. 

" The Subject under Consideration before the board is 
whether a plan to draw together a large Body of militia in 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 249 

aid of the Continental Troops in the dead of winter to 
attack General Howe in his winter quarters is eligible or 
not. However desirable the destruction of General Howe's 
army may be & however impatient the public may be for 
this desirable event, I cannot recommend the measure. 
I have taken the most serious View of the Subject iu every 
point in which I am able to examine it, & cannot help think- 
ing the probability of a disappointment is infinitely greater 
than of success. We must not be governed in our meas- 
ures by our wishes — the love of glory natural to man often 
prompts them to exceed the bounds of human nature in 
their enterprizes. I am sensible in many instances, that 
things pronounced impracticable have been crowned with 
success in the attempt. I know it is justifiable in war to 
leave something to chance, yet prudence forbids that being 
made a principle which necessity alone can justify ; I am 
by no means inclined from an excess of caution in a council 
of war to rob ray Country of the happy consequences that 
may result from a due exertion of the spirit and bravery of 
the So]dier3' — but at the same time let us not flatter our- 
selves from the heat of our zeal that men can do more than 
they can. To judge properly upon the subject we must 
first consider what human nature is capable of when aided 
by all the powers of art, and what is to be expected when 
unsupported by those necessary Assistants. In the second 
place we have to consider how reluctantly people will leave 
the pleasures of domestic life and engage in a hard and 
dangerous enterprize at such a rugged season of the year, 
especially after being out great part of the Summer. In 
the third and last place let us consider what a combination 
of circumstances are necessary to give success to the enter- 
prize ; weigh this in the Scales of probability and see how 
far we can promise ourselves a happy issue to the design. 

" In the first place supposeing our Soldiery the best of 
veterans, capable of the boldest attacks, are they cloathed, 
are they appointed with every thing necessary for such a 
severe and difficult Attempt? Let any body examine the 
Condition of the troops, one half without breeches, shoes. 



250 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

or stockings, and some thousands without Blankets, and 
judge how far men in this situation are capahle of enduring 
the severity of a winter's campaign. The continental troops 
must be out in the field during all the time the militia are 
drawing together, and in the natural order of things there 
must be a great diminution of their Force ; the troops must 
be subject to this evil or else go into winter quarters untill 
the militia are collected, in which case the officers will be 
dispersed, which will render it very difiicult if not imprac- 
ticable to draw the troops out of quarters in a condition to 
undertake the attack. I would not wish to spare either 
blood or treasure necessary to work the destruction of Gen- 
eral Howe's Army ; the object is so important that it de- 
mands every sacrifice that human nature or national policy 
can justify, but to make a great sacrifice of men and money 
without accomplishing the design will be disgraceful to the 
army and discouraging to the Country. 

" The militia perhaps may come together something 
better cloathed than the continental troops, but the difterent 
manner of their living in camp to what they have been ac- 
customed to, together with the extraordinary hardships they 
must be necessarily subject to in the undertaking, cannot 
fail of producing a great mortality, or at least some thou- 
sands may be expected to fall sick and be rendered incapable 
of duty. This will not only produce a great diminution of 
strength, but a numerous sick must be very distressing to 
those that are well. 

" In Europe where they are much older in war than we 
can pretend to be, and where there are as hardy a race of 
men as are on the Globe, where the severity of the season 
little exceeds that of ours and where necessity, ambition and 
military Glory all conspire to produce winter campaigns, 
yet they are never undertaken without the soldiers being 
well cloathed and each furnished with a good watch coat 
and Blanket. Experience is the best of schools and the 
safest guide in human aflairs — j'et I am no advocate for 
blindly following all the maxims of European policy, but 
where reason corresponds with what custom has long sane- 






Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 251 

tified, we may safely copy their Example. It must be con- 
fessed, aud the fatal effects of last winter's campaign will 
confirm it, that unless men are well cloathed they must fall 
a sacrifice to the severity of the weather when exposed to 
the hardships of a winter's campaign. — The successes of 
last winter were brilliant and attended with the most happy 
consequences, in changing the complexion of the times, 
but if the bills of mortality were to be consulted, I fancy it j 
would be found we were no great gainers by those operations. , 

" There is not only the difficulty of cloathing, but that i 
of covering also. Tents cannot be procured, houses in the 
country are too scattering to quarter the troops in either for 
attack or defence. If the troops lye out in the weather 
they must soon, very soon, be rendered unfit for duty. 
Such a numerous body of men, hastily drawn together, 
all unconnected cannot be speedily so arranged as to co- 
operate in one great and general design. To these diffi- 
culties may be added, that of subsisting such a numerous 
body of troops without having large magazines previously 
established for that purpose, when such a cold and rigid 
season, and the variableness of the weather will render 
transportation by land and water very difficult and un- 
certain. 

" Hospitals proper to receive such a number of sick as 
we may reasonably expect there will be, will increase the 
distresses of the army and add to the complaints of the 
country — especially if the event should be unfortunate. 

" The second objection I have to the measure is the dif- 
ficulty of drawing out such a body of militia from the dif- 
ferent States as will be necessary to ensure success to the 
Enterprise. Those States which are remote from danger, 
whose militia have been harassed in the Course of the 
Campaign will be unwilling to call them out without the 
most pressing necessity, and supposing the Legislators to 
feel all the military enthusiasm we could wish we cannot 
flatter ourselves that that spirit will pervade all orders of 
men which will be necessary to draw out such bodies as 
will be requisite for the Design. 



252 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

" Every one that has attended to the difficulties of calling 
out large bodies of militia, the uncertain success of the 
most spirited exertions, the impatience they discover to 
be gone, and the trouble of manageing them when here, 
may form a good judgment what success we can promise 
ourselves when we have all those difficulties to encounter 
in the diffijrent stages. 

" It is highly probable that a requisition from the Con- 
gress to the neigliboring states may produce a resolution in 
each to furnish their quota, but out of the number demanded 
perhaps not two thirds would actually march and out of the 
number that did march, ten to one, whether more than 
three fifths ever arrive at camp. 

" The time of the troops being drawn together and for- 
warded on to camp depends on the coercive power of Gov- 
ernment; some being stronger and some weaker, those 
that arrive first will get out of patience before the arrival 
of the others — Desertion and Disgust will be the conse- 
quence, and if either the one or the other should prevail 
to any considerable degree, the whole plan would be de- 
feated. I would ask any one if these observations are not 
founded in truth and human nature, & whether it is not the 
true history of the militia ? 

" If it is, what can we promise ourselves from the attempt; 
when if the whole force was to arrive safe in camp — still 
there is a great combination of circumstances necessary to 
compleat the work ; the failure of either may render abortive 
the whole scheme — 

" The best way of judging of men and measures at a 
future period is to recur to their past conduct under similar 
circumstances — How difficult have we found it to draw the 
militia of one State to the aid of that of another even 
where it was necessary to give a check to the enemy from 
entering the State to which they belong. — 

" This measure must go recommended to Congress. — 
From the Congress after a week or ten days consultation 
a resolve will take place, recommending it to the difterent 
States. — The Assemblies of each one are to be called to- 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 253 

gether, their Deliberations and judgement to be had upon 
the propriety of the measure, and then an order after ten 
or twelve Days issues, to assemble the militia, — if the officers 
are slow and tardy as usual, to collect and march them to 
camp will be the business of a month. — The continental 
troops must be out in the field near two mouths on the most 
moderate calculation before the Scheme will be ripe for 
execution — "We shall all this time be wasting the very vitals 
of the army, and risqueing a certain evil for an uncertain 
good, dependent upon too many contingencies for us to be 
very sanguine of success. 

" The diiFerent States will be put to no small difficulty to 
provide arms for a numerous militia, which must protract 
the time for collecting it — Consider likewise what delays 
great and heavy Storms will produce. How distressing they 
must prove to those that are coming to camp as well as those 
waiting their arrival there. — 

" The third and last objection 1 have to the measure is the 
great combination of circumstances necessary to crown it 
with success, and the improbability of such a multitude of 
circumstances ever harmonizing together that are inde- 
pendant of each other and originate from such difl^erent 
springs. 

" There is in the first place a sufficient force so appointed 
as to be able to execute the plan of attack, it is highly im- 
probable that such force can be put in motion and still more 
improbable that they will be properly equipt — Supposing 
the necessary force to meet properly appointed, they will be 
a very unwieldy machine, and it must take up a very con- 
siderable time to organize the whole in such a manner as to 
move in concert — Such a numerous militia cannot be drawn 
together very near the Enemy, where their force is collected, 
and always ready to take advantage of circumstances, with- 
out being very liable to surprize and defeat. Therefore, if 
they must be drawn together at a considerable distance from 
the enemy's Lines, and first organized, and then move to 
the attack the variableness of the weather may interfere — 
Heavy storms of either rain or snow will put a total Bar to 



254 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

the operations for a time, and more especially the former — 
but suppose neither of these difficulties interferes, still the 
operations will be dependant upon the temper of the weather 
which must be neither too severe or too moderate to enable 
us to prepare and execute the manceuvre — If the weather 
is very severe the men cannot live out in the Field long 
enough to prepare and execute the attack — If the weather 
is not so severe as to freeze the rivers hard enough for men 
& artillery to pass over, there can no attack be made only in 
front of the Enemy's lines — and how far such an attack can 
be expected to succeed I leave every one to judge — I am 
told the weather is ver}' variable here and that Storms are 
frequent — both of which must ruin the platform of our 
operations; our whole success depending upon the Rivers 
being sufficiently frozen to enable us to pass over on the 
ice — 

" But suppose all these circumstances should happen to 
combine to give success to the design, which by the bye is 
scarcely within the limits of possibility & far out of the 
bounds of probability can we promise ourselves a victory ? 
Does history afford us an instance as a foundation for such^ 
a hope ? It is agreed on all hands that there is a very ' \ 
formidable force in Philadelphia and every house is a forti- ' 
fication — can it be expected that young troops unaccus- 
tomed to such enterprises will have steadiness enough to 
push the Enemy from place to place untill they are totally I 
routed from the City? — to make the attack and not totally [ 
defeat them will fall far short of the importance of the \ 
design or the expectations of the public. _J 

" What aid can be expected from the militia ? "Will they 
come up to storm the houses ? Let us recur to past ex- 
perience of the militia & such a militia too as we cannot 
expect for the present attack and see how far we can hope 
for success with such troops opposed by such as we have to 
attack. — I must confess I think it right to trust everything 
to the spirit & bravery of troops that is warranted by human 
nature, History or our own observation. Has the present 
Scheme these Sanctions ? Are we not rather drawn into 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 255 

the attempt by the brilliancy of the object than by the 
probability of its Success founded in either nature or 
Reason. -— 

" The King of Prussia the greatest General of the age 
strongly protests against attacking troops by storm in vil- 
lages, much more in large regular brick cities — He observes, 
it often proves the ruin of the best part of an army — this 
was verified in several attacks he made upon towns and 
villages last war. — Philadelphia is a great object, but I wish 
our reason may not be seduced from its importance to take 
measures to repossess it that are not warranted by history 
or our own observation — An attack of this nature will not 
depend upon the multitude that attacks, but upon their 
bravery — for the greater the multitude the worse the con- 
fusion when once they are thrown into disorder; and we 
have no reason to expect anything else from our own or 
others experience — Men who are brought from home with 
all their family feelings about them, commanded by officers 
who in general have little or no ambition for military glory, 
are not fortified for such scenes of carnage as are generally 
exhibited in attacks made upon towns defended by a large 
body of veteran troops. — 

" I am not against a winter's campaign if the temper of 
the officers and the condition of the troops would admit of 
it, neither have I the least objection to making an attack 
upon Philadelphia if there was a probability of succeed- 
ing founded in human nature or the experience of man- 
kind. — 

" Let us consider the consequences that will result from a 
disappointment in a measure of this nature. — In the first 
place, it will be attended with a vast expence, and the loss 
of many lives to no valuable purpose — it will prove a great 
obstruction to the recruiting service and a defeat will give 
a general alarm and spread universal discontent throughout 
the continent — It will expose the weakness of our militia 
to the enemy and not only to them but to all Europe who 
now consider them much more formidable than they really 
are. — 



256 Dejmces of Philadelphia in 1777. 

I " A winter's campaign in the present discontented state of 

/ the officers and an attack upon the city of Philadelphia 

' appear to me like forming a crisis for American liberty 

I which if unsuccessful I fear will prove her grave. If the 

ai'my goes through a winter's Campaign and the recruiting 

service is as much injured as I expect from calling out the 

militia, it will be in a miserable plight to open the campaign 

with in the Spring; and we may reasonabl}' expect that 

great britain will rake all the kennels of Europe for troops 

to repair their affairs in America. 

" I have wrote my mind so fully upon the subject of 
winter quarters, and with respect to a winter campaign that 
it is unnecessary to add anything further here — I would beg 
leave to recommend the measure suggested in that paper for 
recruiting the army — and filling up the continental Bat- 
talions — if the measure is adopted the army can be recruited 
nearly or quite as soon as the militia can be got together — 
the attack can be made with much more hopes of success & 
if we are defeated we shall still have a force to carry on a 
regular siege as soon as the military apparatus can be pre- 
pared and the season will permit us to open batteries against 
the enemy's lines. 

" These are my sentiments Sir upon the subject which 
with all due deference are submitted to your Excellency's 
consideration, but if your Excellency thinks a winters cam- 
paign a necessary measure, or an attack upon Philadel- 
phia, an eligible plan, I will lend every possible aid in my 
power to carry it into execution; notwithstanding that this 
is the third year since I have paid the least attention to ray 
own private affairs. , ^^^^^ ^.^^^^^ ^_ ^ 

" Camp, December 3", 1777." 

OPINION OF LORD STIRLING. 

" Camp, Decern' 3'> 1777 
"Sir: 

" Your Excellency's letter of this date requesting my 

Sentiments on ' the Adviseability of a Winters Campaign,' 

' and the practicability of an Attack upon Philadelphia with 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 257 

the Aid of a Considerable Body of Militia to be Assembled 
at an Appointed Time and Place,' I have duly Considered 
and in Answer to the first Question am of Opinion That 
in order to undertake a Winters Campaign the Troops 
should be fresh, in good Order and well Cloathed with at 
least two warm Vests two pair milled Woolen Stockings & 
mittens, good Shoes Woollen Overhalls, a Good blanket 
Coat besides a blanket to Lodge in. Our Troops are not 
n. this Condition, nor are they like to be provided in this 
Manner, they are already worn out by a long fatigueing 
Campaign a Considerable part of them in the Hospitals 
above one half of those in Camp are almost naked, and are 
walking barefooted on the Ice or frozen Ground. In short 
It a Winters Campaign should be attempted with them our 
hopes wi 1 be deceived, the Army will be totally ruined • 
and we shall find ourselves without one in the Sprino- the 
Consequences of which in the Affairs of the im^Hcan 
States are too evident to need an enumeration, and there- 

UmXllbre':'"'^ '^" ' ^''''''' "^"^^'^^° f'^J -*--^^: 
'; As to the second Question, I have already declared my 
Opinion (after your Excellency's own view of the Enemy-; 
lines) tbat ,t is impracticable on the side Schuylkill with the 
IZTm'v/'"^."' T"' ^^"^'"'^"d, and were you aided by 
a 1 tbe Militia the States on this Continent can furnish by 
the first of february they would only serve to make thi 
Carnage, or the Route, the greater: the only Chance we 
have of attacking Philadelphia to advantagef is, over tie 
Schuylkill when it is sufficiently frozen to bea; a Column of 
Troops to pass it; this happens to be the Case in most 
Winters, sometimes in one Month, sometimes in another 
last W^inter It was so in the beginning of January, it b oke 
up by the Middle of that Month, and did not get^m again 
a the remainder of the Winter, this Uncertainty would 
render the Attempt very precarious. After an Immen e 
expence in Collecting a Great body of Militia we m " 
have no opportunity of passing the Schuylkill; the Men 
would be disgusted with the Service at thai severe Season 

in y 



258 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

without any thing to Cover them, they would return dis- 
pirited, the disappointment in the Expedition would bear 
the Character of a defeat & would have all the bad effects of 
one, it would increase our sick, hurt the Recruiting Service 
and prove Ruinous to the Army, but should the Schuylkill 
prove passable at a proper Season, I should have but little 
hope of our Carrying Philadelphia; to storm the Streets 
thro' the fire from Redoubts houses & Columns of Men, is 
too much to expect from any Troops. — to set down before 
it at that Season, and to drive them out of it by Battering, 
ia to us impracticable, and any Attempt of the kind highly 
unadviseable. I am your Excellency's 

" Most Obedient Humble Servant 

" Stirling." 

opinion of the marquis de lafayette. 

" The project of calling a large body of militia for such 
a day, in order to attack the ennemy in Philadelphia, seems 
to me attended with so many difficulties, inconveniences, 
and bad chances, that if it is not looked upou as a necessary 
and almost desperate enterprise, tho' it is a very shining 
and highly pleasing idea, however I cannot think it is a 
prudent and reasonable one. The reasons for my rejecting 
it are as follows — 

" 1" I do not believe that any body could advise your 
excellency to attack only the redoubts in front, whatever 
could be our force ; such an attack vould be attended with 
a greater loss but not a greater succes than if we had only 
continental troops. 

" 2° We must therefore expect the moment when the ice 
upon the SchuUckill will oppen to us all the left side of the 
enemy's line and encampments, but or the climate makes 
a great difference between this country and the european 
ones, or one single fine day may frustrate all our hopes and 
preparations in putting a way all the ice. then we schould 
expect one other moment before dismissing the troops, and 
in my actual supposition they are to be kept a very schort 
time. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 259 

" 3° ill europe ice is brocked every night when it can 
facilitate the projects of the enemy; if all is not cleared, at 
least a ditch can be formed in the river. I know that we 
schould annoy theyr workmen, I know that such an opera- 
tion would be very hard an[d] troublesome for them, but 
in the first case I'l answer that everywhere military works 
are performed with the same inconveniences, in the second 
the people of Philadelphia can be employed there, when I 
say that we could trouble theyr operation, I suppose that 
our winter quarters are not in the back country. 

" 4° "We can't expect any secrecy in our collecting those 
forces, we can't deceive the ennemy for theyr destination, 
therefore (untill we could have a respectable body in the 
jirsaj') he can go of before fighting and then we must not 
entertain the hope of oppressing and destroying all that 
army, but only of recovering Philadelphia. 

" 5° Supposing that we could go upon the ice we have only 
one way of attacking, for if we put the militia in first line, 
they will fall back upon the continental troops, and we can 
not depend enough upon our men to believe that we could 
maintain order and resolution among them, if the militia 
is in the rear, and the regulars were repulsed, certainly they 
will not advance where continental troops don't succeed, 
if amongs us, I don't believe it would do better, therefore 
our only way should be to make false attacks of militia, and 
true ones of continental troops, to have a curtain of troops 
(what we call in French un rideau) in the whole lenght of 
the Schulckill, and on this side of the redoubts, in order 
to cover the heads of our columns, and our points of attack, 
and to put the disorder amongs the ennemy by an eavy 
fire. I wishond [?] too a body should be in the jirsay in 
case it would be possible for the ennemy to retreat by the dela- 
ware. and does your excellency think that such a quantity 
of troops could be raised ? 

" 6° When I consider all the difliculties of turning out 
some militia in interesting occasions, I can't flatter myself 
that all that people could be sent to your army for such a 
day, without the utmost difliculties. each state will have 



260 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

an excuse for not sending as many men as they'l be desired, 
the cold, the rivers, the want of cloathes of every thing will 
seem sufficient reasons, if not to stay at home, at least to 
arrive after the time of the rendezvous, every one will 
trust upon the another, and if we do not succeed all will be 
against us. 

" 7° have we in the continent all the cloathes, arms am- 
munition, &c. &c. which would be necessary for so many 
soldiers. "Would it be possible to find subsistances enough 
in cattle, forage, &c. All things which I can't know, but 
however I think worthy of being mentioned, and that prin- 
cipally because the want of exactitude, the necessity of 
giving to them a light idea of what they are to do will en- 
gage us to keep them longer than we think. 

" 8. I know that all these inconveniences can not be 
together; because if we keep them some time, then we 
schall find an opportunity of going over the schulckill in 
case that we can prevent theyr braking the ice ; on the 
other hand if we have them only for a few days, difficulties 
of subsistence will be much lesser ; and if it is impossible 
for the ennemy to pass the delaware, certainly a body in 
jersay is quite useless. I can add that in case we could 
not go over the ice, it is possible to throw bridges upon the 
river, but. Sir, I have mentionned all the difficulties which 
strike me, because my opinion is not to begin such an enter- 
prize unless we shall be certain of succeeding. A great 
schame for our arms, a great mischief for our cause would 
attend our being repulsed when we schould attack a part of 
the british forces with all the united forces of America, 
europe has a great idea of our being able to raise when we 
please an immense army of militia, and it is looked upon 
as our last but certain ressource. if we fall this phantom 
will fall also, and you know that the American interest has 
alwais been since the beginning of this war to let the world 
believe that we are stronger than we can ever expect to be. 
if we destroy the euglish army, our generous effort will be 
admired everywhere, if we are rupulsed it will be called a 
rash and laughable expedition, therefore we musst not let a 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 261 

shining appearance and the pleasing charms of a bold fine 
enterprize, deceive us upon the inconveniences and dan- 
gers of a gigantesque and in the same time decisive expe- 
dition. 

" However perhaps the interest of america, the wish of 
all the states, the instruction of Congress, the necessity of 
finishing the war, all these circumstances which are un- 
known to me, make it necessary for your excellency to 
hazard something in this occasion, perhaps the difficulties 
in the physick and moral ressources of this country are not 
so great as I am affraid to find them, perhaps it is possible 
to raise, to arm, to cloath, to subsist, to keep together and 
give some instructions to that so considerable army which 
according to my opinion is necessary, perhaps the weather 
is not so changeable in this country as it is in europe, or 
some other means than going upon the ice could seem 
eligible to your excellency, but if the difficulties which I 
fear are indeed true (what you can judge, and I can not know 
myself) then I am not for that expedition in considering it 
as only a militar one. 

" if however I was deceived, or if politic circumstances 
schould make it necessary to try such an enterprise, the 
following precautions seem me to be taken. 

" 1" I do not ascertain the number of militia to be raised 

because it must be as large as we can arm, cloath and subsist. 

"2° All possible exertions are to be taken for havino- 

them at the appointed time which time must be now as 

soon as it is possible. 

" 3° Some instructions should take place before the opera- 
tion, only for some days, because if they were marched to 
the ennemy without the lest idea of marching together such 
a disorder would prevent the succes of the less difficult 
enterprize. 

" 4° the continental troops should be sent in theyr winter 
quarters as soon as possible, to take a good rest, to recom- 
fort themselves, to be reinforced by theyr men now scattered 
everywhere, by some recruits, and the whole to be managed 
and by theyr officers, under that point of vue. 



262 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

and principally cloathes should be delivered to them, and 
theyr arras put in a good order, it seems to me that this 
prospect could engage us to be nearer from the ennemy 
than lancaster is. 

"5° the soldiers and principally the officers of our array 
schould not be permitted to go home till it would be over. 

" 6° proper means for recruiting the army schould be 
taken as soon as possible, one of the best according to my 
opinion would be (after having suppressed the substitutes) 
to annex a part of the militia of each state to theyr conti- 
nental divisions in order to serve there for twelve months. 
I think such a regulation is eligible in all cases, for a 
strong continental army well managed and disciplined, and 
ready to begin an early campaign, and to make use of all 
the unforeseen and soudain occasions, would do much 
greater service than all the militia in the world, and their 
militia sliould be made use of only in a less great number 
or in particular circumstances. 

" The Mquis de Lafayette 

"Jf. (7." 

opinion of baron de kalb. 
"Sir 

" When your Excellency recommended some time ago 
the Consideration of tlie practicability of an attack on the 
Ennemy, I was already of opinion for such an attack if it 
was possible to make an attempt on the City behind the 
lines, either by sending troops in Boats down Delawar River 
to land on, or below the wharf, or by crossing Schuylkill 
river below middle ferry either by throwing over Bridges, 
or upon the ice in great frosts, to fall into the Ennemies 
rear at the same time the army was to attack the lines in 
front, with several Colums. 

" Sending down Troops Delawar river, seems at least 
very dangerous if not entirely impracticable. 

" The Passage over Schuj'lkill appears more eligible if 
attempted by a considerable body of militia, or other 
Troops. (I say militia, because I think the regulars would 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 263 

be all necessary for the chief attack in front.) Posted 
along the right bank of said river, on the best and most 
advantageous spots, from whence the artillerie & even 
small arms could annoy the Ennemy and protect the work- 
men for erecting Bridges, and in some places seemingly 
working, for the better drawing the Ennemy on that side, 
there ought to be made such seeming or reall attempts in 
several places at the same time. As this is the weak side, 
there is no doubt they would considerably divide their 
forces, and give room to break in upon them either in front 
or on this side, perhaps on both at once. 

" If the necessary Boats and Materials for such bridges 
could not be provided, or carried to the proper places to be 
employed, or if there was an impossibility of erecting 
Bridges, or preventing the Ennemies of cutting a Channel 
through the ice, in fine if a Passage over Schuylkill should 
be impracticable, it appears to me, that the attack ought 
rather to be dropped, then to attack the Ennemies in their 
strong hold, in front only, this would be running the risk 
of a repulse, or of a total defeat and the bad consequences 
thereof. 

" If on the contrary the river may be crossed especially 
upon the Ice, the principal attack could be made on this 
side with the best troops, and the Militia be drawn up in 
Battle or in Columns before the lines to make a show, and 
keep up the attention of the Ennemy. for that purpose a 
Large body of militia from all States should be drawn to- 
gether, and such measures taken for their march as to arrive 
all on the same day or very near, that on one hand, the 
expedition may take place immediately after their arrival, 
the Ennemies may be surprised or at least not have sufficient 
time to collect more forces or to add to their works, and on 
the other hand that the army may not be distress'd for 
Provisions, nor the Militia kept a long time in the field, 
for fear of sickness, or disgust, which is by all means to be 
avoided. 

" Upon the whole this attack is subject to many iucon- 
veniencies, and the greatest of all, will be the necessity of 



264 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

a winters campaign, this will ruin the army by sickness 
and discontent, perhaps too by desertion, and how will 
another almost new one be raised, except Congress take 
such measures as to oblige the militia to serve constantly 
at least for two years, and to be put into the regulars to 
compleat the regiments, in fixing a certain number for every 
State and to be all levied at a Limited time, and there is 
none to be lost, if your Excellency resolve for a Winter 
Campaign, the Troops ought to be immediately supplied 
with cloathing at any rate, if not Winter quarters to take 
place without loss of time. But in this case where and 
how to take them is a matter of the highest consideration, 
if real Winter quarters and rest are intended, they must be 
taken at a distance (as between Lancaster & Reading, or 
Reading and Easttown) from the Ennemy. But this would 
give up to the Ennemy the Jeseys, the whole State of 
Delawar, the eastern part of Maryland, Chester, Philadel- 
phia & Bucks Counties in this State of Pensilvania, the 
Ennemy would draw out of these lands, forrage, Provisions, 
live-stock, and what would be still worse, numbers of able 
men to bear arras against their country, either by consent, 
delusion, or by force, besides the bad Eflect it would have 
or produce in Political matters. This may partly be pre- 
vented by taking up Winter quarters at Wilmington and 
Environs with the addition of Hutts, but then there will 
be little or no rest, and no possibility of sending home 
many Officers & Soldiers for recruiting their regiments, and 
at the least movement of the Ennemy on Schuylkill, we 
must come up with them, in order not to be surprised in 
some of our quarters or cut off from the neighbouring 
States and from our Stores; the greatest alertness will be 
required from all Commanders in those quarters, and the 
fatigues the army would lie under and the Sicknesses they 
would be subject to, call aloud on Congress for recruits and 
Cloathing. 

"Baron de Kalb 

" Major General." 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 265 

OPINION OF MAJOR-GENERAL ARMSTRONG. 

"Camp at Whitemaesh, 4'" Dec' 1777 
"Sir 

"In regard to the Advisability of a Winters Campaign, 
I answer — In keeping the Field, the hardships on both 
officers and privates are manifestly great, nor is there an 
alternative presenting your Excellency with less incon- 
venience, at best you have but a choice of difficulties of 
which Hutting in the field is in my Opinion the least of the 
two, and most in charecter for the Army. 

" The only semblance of Quarters known to us being so 
remote from the Enemies Post as to leave a great part of 
Pennsylvania for several months fully in their power — an 
acquisition this, too great to be yielded to these cruel & 
haughty intruders, unless under a greater degree of necessity 
than has yet reached your Army — To the advantages of the 
Enemy we must here subjoin the piteous sufferings of the 
well minded populace, too many to enumerate, too tender 
to express — I wish Sir to be divested of every local preju- 
dice in the present enquiry where the publick weal is not 
clearly involved, but most certainly if in present or equal 
Circumstances the Whole of the Army shall retire to dis- 
tant Villiages already crowded with her own refugees, 
Pennsylvania is that moment a publick Sacrifice, her Spirits, 
her hopes & future exertions Civil & Military, are blasted at 
once ! unhappy State ! & well if her diseases do not con- 
taminate some of her neighbours — a mutillated victim cursed 
of the other twelve — and by Britain too, who for her many- 
fold services to Congress & to this Army, hath now made 
her the capital Seat of War. 

" To considerations of this sort may naturally be added a 
train of things relative to the great design uses & reputation 
of the Army, all pointing against the inelligible quarters, 
but at present shall omit these. 

" Discipline & (Economy will be better maintain'd in the 
field than in the villages, where quarters are so far detatched 
— Health & vigour better maintain'd than in bad Quarters, 



266 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

and liable to debaucherj'. Hutting in the field in a dry 
cold winter, is by no means incompatible with health — this 
hath been experienced. If our Arm}' is remote the lower 
Counties & some part of Maryland will probably be sub- 
ject to the like incursions of the Enemy with the uncovered 
parts of Pennsylvania — In the field favourable Openings for 
annoying the Enemy may happen & be improved — Great 
Quantities of Provisions and Forage now convenient to the 
Enemy may be saved — If in the Field the Enemy will be 
cautious, if in quarters they will triumph, and their small 
partys dispersed abroad will serve their purposes & do us 
much damage. — On the whole I am fully of Opinion how- 
ever arduous, that the present situation of our Affairs calls 
aloud for a Campaign, that it is advisable, practicable, hon- 
orable and will be found to be salutary. — But as far as pos- 
sible to reconcile jarring difficulties, suppose one half of the 
Continental Troops with some Militia alwais in the field, 
anil the other in quarters alternately, by which means some 
publick good may still be done, whilst all that ease that the 
nature of things can possibly admit will be granted to the 
Troops generally? 

" With respect to the practicability of an attack on Philad* 
with the aid of a Considerable body of Militia to be as- 
sembled at a certain time and place — 'tis a pleasing idea at 
first view, and ready to elate the anxious mind, in it there 
is something noble & consonant to the great points in view, 
and did they assemble in convenient time, the attack might 
doubtless be made with probable success — Or their very 
numbers occasion the Enemy to abscond, or a desertion in 
their Army — Cooper's Ferry wou'd best annoy the Enemy 
with carcasses — but the Engineers should be knowing, pro- 
vided with materials, & might throw light on the best means 
of attack, on whatever side of the Town it might be made. 
Notwithstanding these wishful things, so many are the con- 
tingencies attending the convention of a distant Militia, and 
the ice serving in proper time, together with the great 
prejudice of a disappointment, that a measure the efficacy 
of which must depend on such an exact coincidence of things 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 267 

can scarcely be advised, but must be given up as rather to 
be wished than expected. Such an attempt with the ad- 
vantage of Boats might perhaps be matter of consideration 
for the Spring. I am with perfect Submission 

" Y' Excellencys Most Obed' Serv'. 

"John Armstrong." 

opinion of brigadier-general maxwell. 
" Sir, 

" Your Excellencys Favour of yesterday I received con- 
cerning the Adviseability of a winter Campaign, and the 
practicability of an attack upon Philad", with the Aid of a 
considerable body of Militia assembled at an apointed time 
and place. I do ashure your Excellency I think the object 
a verry desirable one could it be put properly into execution 
and without taking a winter Campaign to it, which in our 
present circumstances would be sufficient to ruin us of 
itself. 

" It appears to me verry plain that General How does not 
think himself strong enough now to meet us in the field 
therefore will give us no opertunity of attacking him but to 
our great disadvantage. Our expectations have never been 
verry sanguine that we could prevent our Enemys from 
taking possession of some of our Seaports but if they can- 
not meet us in the field they will make verry slow work in 
conquering the Country. It appears verry plain we must 
have another Campaign next summer, and the sooner we 
begin to prepair for it the better by taking every method 
in our power to prepare our present Armey, and Increase it. 
" The Attack proposed on Philad" appears to me to be 
liable to so many Accidents that the success of it woud be 
verry doubtfull and should it fail our Armey would be 
ruined waiting for it. 

" I am therefore against the Attack and the Winter Cam- 
paign, and am your Excellency's 

" Most Obedient Humble Servant 

" W Maxwell. 
" White Marsh, 4"" December, 1777." 



268 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL SMALLWOOD. 

" Camp, December 4'" 1777 
"Sir 

" It will be uuuecessary to point out the sufferings of the 
Continental Troops, from their various hard Duty, & dis- 
tresses for want of Cloathing, particularly in the Articles of 
Blankets, Shoes & Stockings, the most essential part to 
enable them to encounter the severity of a Winter Cam- 
paign, and the improbability of procuring those necessary 
supplies, without which our prospect of success in an un- 
dertaking of this Nature must be unpromising and fruitless 
— The Array has already & is daily diminishing by sickness, 
which has in a great Measure proceeded from the want of 
these necessary Articles — The discontent, the disposition 
for resigning, & the complaints which so generally pre- 
vail among the Officers, arising in some Instances from the 
unsettled State of their Recruiting Accounts (which pre- 
vents the Draft of their Pay) of their Rank, in other In- 
stances the partial Promotions which have been made, & the 
exorbitant Prices paid for what they must unavoidably pur- 
chase (overrunning their Pay) renders them destitute & 
unable to appear suitable to their Rank, or even decent & 
comfortable, which call for redress & respite to regulate & 
remedy, this cannot be made or obtained in the course of a 
Winters Campaign. 

" Your Excellency can be no stranger to their Distress, 
and the justice & motives of their Complaints, & desire to 
resign, which if not speedily remedied must have a danger- 
ous Tendency, & a Winter Campaign must rather increase 
than diminish their Sufferings in, & Objections to the service 
— abstracted from which it must lessen, inervate, & render 
your troops less formidable, & may give an irretrievable 
check to your Advances in the Spring, at a Time when the 
Enemy will come out in high Spirits & Vigor, & perhaps 
may more than avail themselves of any acquisitions gained 
by it — from which, & sundry other Reasons which might 
be suggested, I am against a Winter Campaign, tho' at the 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 269 

same Time I shou'd object to the Troops being canton'd so 
remote as to aftbrd little or no cover to the Country, this 
might have a bad Tendency in several Respects, as it wou'd 
enable the Enemy to procure Supplies without any Risque 
at the same Time that it wou'd discourage the Inhabitants, 
& subject them to be insulted & plundered, & the Soldiery 
being lulled into Security wou'd be inattentive to Discipline, 
& in all probabilitj' so scattered over the Countr}^ as to 
render it difficult to draw them to a Point, in order to open 
the Campaign early in the Spring, & prosecute your Meas- 
ures with Vigor & Success. 

" An Attack on Philad* this Winter, I think neither ad- 
visable or practicable without subjecting the Army to too 
great a Loss, this cannot be effected in Front, & an Attempt 
in Rear & on the left Flank (the only probable way of 
making an impression) must depend upon Contingencies, 
which in all probability upon our taking a Position on the 
other side of the Schuylkill, will be sufficiently guarded 
against, nor in this cold, dead Season do I think the Aids 
expected from Militia are at all to be depended on. 

" I should therefore judge it more prudent, immediately 
to take the most eligible Position, for the Security, relief & 
discipline of the Ti'oops, having in View to cover as much 
as may be the Country, and awe the Enemy from making 
depredations, & should the States fall on Measures of filling 
up their Regiments or supplying you with a formidable 
Body of Militia early in the Spring, your Prospects of Suc- 
cess wou'd be enlarged & better'd, & it's likely a deep 
stroke might be made, before the Enemy cou'd possibly be 
reinforced. I have the Honor to be &c. 

" Your Excellency's most Obed' H'"^ Serv' 

" W. Smallwood." 

OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL KNOX. 

"Camp, White Maesh, 3* December 1777 
"Sir 

" I receiv'd your Excellencys orders to give my sentiments 

'upon the advisability of making a Winters Campaign, and 



270 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

Practicability of an attack upon Philadelphia, with the aid 
of a considerable body of militia to be assembled at an ap- 
pointed time & place.' Were it probable that S' W"" Howe's 
destruction would be the consequence of a Winter's Cam- 
paign I would most chearfully give my voice and opinion 
for one — I think a Winter's Campaign, under the present 
circumstances, will be the inevitable destruction, if not of 
the Liberties of the Country, yet of the present Army ; my 
opinion is founded on the following Reasons. 

" Our entire want of Cloathing to keep the men from 
Perishing by the cold winters season. 

" The improbability & impracticability of surprizing 10,000 
veteran troops in a well fortified city. 

" The impossibility of our keeping the field to besiege 
their works and city regularly, and being almost totally 
deficient of any warlike apparatus for so arduous an enter- 
prize. 

" The uncertainty of obtaining such a sufficient number 
of Militia as to make the enterprize warranted by reason, 
or common Military knowledge. 

" My Opinion is for putting the Army in good Winter 
Quarters, to repair the damages done : to recruit*^ reform 
the Army; to provide Magazines &c. In the Spring we 
may be enabled to strike the enemy a decisive blow, which 
by making a Winters Campaign I think improbable and 
impossible. 

" I am Sir with the greatest respect, Your 

" Excellency's Most Obed' H'ble Servant 

"H. Knox 
" B. G. Artillery." 

OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL POOR. 

" Camp, 4'" Decern' 1777 
"D« SiR 

" In answer to the question Recv'd by note from your 
Excellency yesterday — a winters Campain, I am sure it 
will be attended with Gruel loss of our numbers. 

" As to the Militia troops their is but little Dependence 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 271 

upon them in Case you make an Asolt upon Philid''" — 
besides if the Rivers should be froze over the Enemy Dout- 
less will Contract lines & make their Situation nearly as 
strong as it is now. 

" I think that if your Array should be Emediatly sent 
into winter Quarters — the Absentees Colected, that early 
next Spring you'd be able to take the field with Bubble the 
numbers that you'l have if a winters Campain is kept up. 

" as your men are much fatigued & numbers falling sick 
every day for want of Clothing and Comfertable habitations. 

" I am Clear of Opinion that it's Best to put your Army 
into winter quarters without Loss of time. 

" however am Ready to Compile with any Disposition 
that shall [be] Concluded upon. 

" I am Sir your Excellency's most obedient 
" B}' Serv'. 

" Enoch Poor, B. G." 

opinion of brigadier-general paterson. 
"Sir 

" The bad States of our Army at present destitute of 
Clothing and many other Necessaries, the Necessity of its 
being recruited this Winter, that we may be superior to 
M' How in the Spring, induces me to give my Opinion in 
favour of going to Winter Quarters. The Attack on Phila- 
delphia, from the best knowledge I can obtain of the 
Strength of their River Works, I must think woud fail, 
the Consequences of which would be a universal Discour- 
agement to the Country and Army, I find my Brigade 
falling sick ver}' fast, and am informed that others nigh me 
are equally unfortunate, should therefore think it adviseable 
to retire to some convenient Place for the Winter, and 
recruit the Army as much as possible, that we may at an 
early Day in Spring, take the Field & give Gen' How the 
so much desired Defeat. 

" I am your Excellencies most 

" humble Servant 

"Jn" Paterson. 
" Camp, 4 Decern' 1777." 



272 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

OPINION OF BEIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM. 

" Whitemaesh, 3'' Dec', 1777 
"Sir 

" Having been favored with your Excellencys commands 
of tbis day, I sball give ray sentiments respecting the sub- 
ject matters thereof, uninfluenced by any motives but the 
sincere dictates of my own mind. 

" Not being at Head Quarters when the subject of a 
' winters campaign was proposed,' in order ' to make an 
attack upon Philadelphia, aided by a considerable body of 
militia,' I cannot be acquainted with the reasons offered in 
support of the proposition : your Excellency will therefore 
excuse me, if I do not go so fully into the arguments as 
otherwise might be expected. 

"Winter campaigns have not, in modern times, been 
approved of or practised by great commanders, but upon 
the most important occasions — Among the ancients they 
were more common. Two reasons conspired to make them 
so ; the hardiness of the soldiery, from their abstemious 
manner of living; and the small preparations necessary to 
furnish their military apparatus. The modern use of gun 
powder, and the tedious preparations in the laboratory, 
added to the luxury and effeminacy of the times have con- 
cured, among other things, to form the modern taste. All 
Countries, in the same age, equally civilized seem to form 
their customs and manners upon a similar basis. It is not 
strange therefore that Americans have, in some measure, 
imbibed the vices of Europe. And, altho' the living of the 
American army is necessarily founded upon the strictest 
frugality, yet a few months service has not given them 
strength of constitution and patience of mind adequate to 
the severities of a winter's campaign. This will appear 
more evident, if your Excellency will be pleased to consider 
that the army is composed of men from the various parts of 
an extensive continent; born in different climates; accus- 
tomed, in some degree, to a different mode of living, and 
scarcely any of them acquainted with the manner of sub- 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 273 

sisting in camp. A considerable time is requisite to form 
them to the same standard. 'Till when, sickness will more 
or less prevail in iproportion to the irregularity of their 
duty. From this consideration it is in part, that so very 
great a proportion of the troops are unfit for duty. 

" Another and not inconsiderable Cause of the feeble 
state of the army, is their want of cloathing. From what- 
ever source it is, I shall not decide, but it is a melancholly 
truth, that the men are naked. And what can we expect 
from them, opposed to British veterans, well clad, well pro- 
vided with every necessary, when they are not in a situation 
to combat the severities of the season ? Permit me Sir for 
a moment to indulge a moral sentiment. The Soldiers, 
their nearest connections, the country at large, nay, God 
himself, has committed them to our charge ! We are an- 
swerable for their safety, their health, their comfort & their 
lives — If unnecessarily we deprive them of either, a con- 
sciousness thereof will plant daggers in our breasts that 
time cannot remove ! — I must therefore conclude that your 
men are not in a situation to keep the field. 

" Where are the magazines necessary for the execution 
of this great and extensive plan ? The commissary's de- 
partment is in such a situation, that provisions can scarcely 
be obtained from day to day. I know of nothing like 
preparations to subsist a large army near the enemy's lines. 
In that position, we cannot depend upon live stock. Salted 
provisions and hard bread must be had. Where are they ? 
In the eastern parts of Connecticutt. The horses are ex- 
tremely fatigued ; they want rest and keeping. But, sup- 
pose they were in good plight; from what quarter is forage 
to be drawn to feed them ? It is very difficult to obtain 
it in our present quiet camp. How much more so will it 
be when near the enemy ? In what condition is our labo- 
ratory? Where are our battering cannon? Where are 
our mortars, shells, carcases, &c. ? By a general assault 
upon the City, many of these objections would be ob- 
viated ; but that I esteem utterly impracticable. The col- 
lecting a large body of militia in aid of the continental 

20 



274 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

troops, I presume would be attended with uusurmountable 
difficulties. The distance from whence many of them must 
come, would either totally discourage them from attempting 
it, or protract the time in such a manner, that when they 
are assembled, arranged, & provided with ammunition 
&c., the winter season would be past, and your army ruined. 
They cannot be subsisted on the march, neither could they 
live here without great alterations. But suppose these 
difficulties were removed, & we provided with covering and 
other accommodations for a numerous army, of what ser- 
vice would they be in such a kind of attack as is proposed ? 
I will venture to say, that the scene of confusion. Horror 
and carnage that must ensue, would only heighten those 
miseries which result from a total defeat ! In this kind of 
war, I conceive of militia, promiscuously assembled, as an 
huge unanimated machine, incapable of regular motion or 
activity ; and must infallibly share the fate of that numerous 
host of undisciplined barbarians, who ventured to fight the 
Roman Marius. I will beg liberty to extend my Ideas 
further, and presume we had an army of regular, well 
appointed troops, sufficiently numerous to ensure victory in 
the field, even then the attack would appear to me imprac- 
ticable. It cannot be doubted but that General Howe has 
strongly fortified the front of the City by a chain of Re- 
doubts, connected by Abbatis, or lines. The flanks are 
secured by Rivers. The City itself is made up of houses, 
the walls of which are proof against small shot. Thus 
securely posted, what probability have we of success ? To 
rush impetuously on certain destruction, would be acting the 
part of madmen rather than of brave commanders. — It is 
the duty Sir, of all men to seek their own happiness. In 
military characters this is derived from glorious actions; 
from those exploits and successes which claim the approba- 
tion and applause of mankind. Rashness and timidity are 
alike unfriendly. Prudence and real magnanimity form 
the Hero. 

" In matters of great importance, it is the sentiment of 
byographical writers, that we call to our assistance the 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 275 

example of shining characters. It is from their experience 
we may form our own conduct ; and from the success at- 
tending their efforts, under similar circumstances, we may 
probably conjecture the event of our measures. What 
would a Marlborough have done on such an occasion? 
' He never besieged a town but he carried it;' but he never 
attacked a strong village or town by assault. "What would 
a Pyrrhus have attempted ? He undertook to storm a city — 
He lost his army and his own life. Thus, by one rash 
manoeuvre that dazzling Glory which astonished the uni- 
verse, was sullied and eclipsed ! As many instances of the 
like kind will be recent in your Excellency's memory I 
shall not trouble you with selecting more ; but observe, 
that, if your councils are to be formed upon popular opin- 
ions, & vulgar prejudices ; or even by bodies in high au- 
thority, you will be pleased to recollect the misfortune of 
the Martial Turenne, who, to gratify the court of Paris, 
attacked a town sword in hand; the Event proved their 
ignorance and folly. 

" Altho' Philadelphia is a splendid object, — altho' a total 
destruction of General Howe's army would compleat your 
Excellency's felicity in relieving the country from all her 
calamities ; yet, the consequences of a defeat, would be 
attended with miseries beyond Description. 

" The salvation of America does not depend upon a suc- 
cessful victory this winter; but a severe defeat would 
plunge us into difficulties, out of which we could scarcely 
extricate ourselves. In short, I dread the Consequences, 
and do esteem an attack, upon the principles proposed, in 
every respect unadviseable. However, should your Excel- 
lency order it, I shall be happy in relinquishing my own 
objections, knowing that if the worst should happen, we 
shall fall like the sacred band of Thebes. 

" I am obediently your Excellency's 

" most humble Servant 

" J. M. Varnum. 

"4"' Dec' 1777 



276 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

"Sir 

"Having only the last Evening to form, adjust & write 
my Opinion upon an important Question ; Being very much 
indisposed and full of Pain, I must apologize to your Excel- 
lency for the obscure manner in w'h my Ideas are conceived 
and expressed. But for the Circumstances mentioned, I 
should have added many more Arguments in support of 
my Sentiments. I have mentioned in a written Opinion 
lately, the Uneasiness of the Officers ; I hope that may be 
considered in Connection with this. 

" I am as before 

" J. M. V." 



OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL WOODFORD. 

" Camp 4'" December, 1777 
" Dear Gen'- 

" I did not receive j'our Excellency's Letter till my return 
from Head quarters last Evening, or I should have cora- 
ply'd with your requisition sooner. 

" I have before given my reasons for being against ex- 
poseing this Army to a Winters Campaign in their present 
condition. I would add to them the present Temper of the 
soldiery, who I am convinced are very gener'ly against it. 

" The practicability of an attack upon Philadelphia I have 
look'd upon to be entirely out of the question since your 
Excellency's return from viewing the Enemy's Works. 

" As to the Aid of the Militia, I cannot be brought to 
think they will be of any in such an attempt. I am inclined 
to think whilst this Boddy were assembling we should loose 
more Continental officers & soldiers by waiting for them in 
the Field, then double the value of them that would arrive. 
Experience shewes that few Militia can be brought to stand 
in the liue of Battle, & it would be deceiving ourselves to 
expect them upon this creation to march up to the attack 
of the Enemy's Works. 

" If such an attack is to be made, I would advise it to be 
put in execution Immediately with the Force we have in 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 277 

the Field, because I think we are stronger than we shall be 
any time this winter, it is possible our numbers may en- 
crease, but our real strength will diminish. 

" "Without some new light could be thrown upon this 
matter, or other reasons urged then I heard at the late 
Council, I am clearly against either making a winter's Cam- 
paign, or attacking the Enemy's works. 

" I have the Honour to be your Excellencys 

" Most Obed' humble Serv' 

"W Woodford." 



OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL WEEDON. 

" D« Sir 

" I have from the iirst moment it was suggested to your 
Excellency, ' that an attack on Philadelphia this winter 
with the aid of Militia was practicable and promised suc- 
cess,' kept in mind the desirable object; have compaired 
and viewed it in every light, and on every ground I could 
place it, and after mature consideration on the matter 
cannot promise a single Advantage that would justifie the 
measure, nor can I see the least prospect of anything honor- 
able or advantagious by adopting it. On the other hand I 
foresee numberless Obstacles to retard, and perplex that 
with sober reasoning stares any man in the face who views 
it with an impartial eye, places it on a military scale, and 
reflects on what human nature is. — It has been found, I 
believe, by most of your Officers who you have advised with 
on the matter, that your Continental Force is far, very 
far. Inadequate to an attack on the enemies lines, in their 
present strength and situation. — Operations like those pro- 
posed, are of too extensive a nature to carry into sudden 
execution. Reasons sufliciently cogent, must diminish your 
force every day you keep the Held at this season of the year, 
and to resolve on the measure, ensures a winters Campaign 
to this Army, which in their Circumstances also ensures 
certain destruction to great part of them, without the Aid 
of an enemy — your principle dependence must then be on 



278 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

the Militia, to carry this important matter into execution. 
Glory and our Countries good is no doubt what every up- 
right soldier would wish to obtain, but we may be too keen 
in pursuit of it, and like the Dogs in the fable, suffer the sub- 
stance to escape while we Grasp at the Shadow. — I would 
only mention to y' Excellency some Difficulties that occur 
in drawing a sufficient force of Militia together for this pur- 
pose, and providing for them ; particularly at a season of the 
year when our Fields, and Rivers are Ice & Snow. — Cov- 
ering we have not for them when they arrive, Hospital 
Stores we could not furnish for the numbers that would fall 
sick by being exposed to the severity of the winter, nor do 
I know that even provisions & forrage, could be procured 
with any degree of certainty, which shorely should be ren- 
dered beyond a doubt in such cases ; take the matter still 
on a more extensive scale. Every one that reflects on 
human nature and considers mankind at large must know 
how reluctantly they relinquish the ease and more calmer 
pleasures of domestick & social life to share the hardships 
& Fatigue of a Camp, even in more pleasant weather than 
what winter generally affords us. Men that are not taught 
and compelled to obey, will never render service, and Obe- 
dience & perseverance is not to be expected from a permis- 
cuous body of men drawn together from all Quarters of the 
Globe, ware they to assemble, but you would find one half 
would desert in their way to Camp, others probably might 
arive, a day or two before their time of service expired. 
No object on Earth would keep them afterwards, nor could 
an [ ] influence them after their time was out. What 

would follow must be distressing to an exalted mind. You 
would find your regular Troops by this time much Dimin- 
ished. They must bare the burthen of all necessary duties, in 
such cases, while this body of men are collecting, — expensive 
preparations are daily accumulating. The Eyes of the Con- 
tinent are turned towards you. Much speculation on the 
practicability of the expedition terminating with success, 
which you at last find yourself obliged to relinquish, leaving 
the unthinking world (who want nothing more to blast 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 279 

reputation than a miscarriage, without inquiring into it's 
causes,) at liberty to sensure boath you & army. — Your Ex- 
cellency is perfectly acquainted with my Sentiments respect- 
ing this Army — it is Sir the Bullwork of America and should 
be nursed and cherished as the salvator of her Liberties. 
The Troops that compose it are not more than mortal, and 
cannot work Maricles. The bravest spirits may be exausted 
by uncommon, and constant fatigue. And Sir, there is not 
in my Opinion an Object on the Continent that justifies 
subjecting them, at this particular time, to a winters Cam- 
paign, unless there was a moral certainty of obtaining that 
Object, and with it, a perminant and honorable end to any 
further Hostilities. I give it therefore as my clear Opinion, 
that keeping this Army in the Field for the purpose of 
attacking Philadelphia, under the uncertainty of sufficient 
aid and support of Militia, is by no means Advisable, and 
am Sir, with high esteem 

" Y' Excellencies most obed' Serv' 

" G. Weedon 

"JB. Gen'. 
" Camp White Maesh 
" Dec' 4, 1777" 



OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL MUHLENBERG. 

" Camp, Dec' 4", 1777 
"Sir 

" Your Excellency was pleas'd to desire the Opinion of 
your General Officers on ' The Adviseability of a Winters 
Campaign, & practicability of an Attack upon Philadelphia, 
with the Aid of a considerable Body of Militia to be Assem- 
bled at an appointed Time & place.' I must Confess that 
to me this Question seems so much interwoven, with the 
Question your Excellency was pleasd to put a few days ago, 
that I can hardly seperate them : The main point, I con- 
ceive, is still, whether a "Winters Campaign is practicable ; 
if not, the last Question falls of Course, unless the Time is 
the Spring. A Winter's Campaign to me, seems not only 



280 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

unadviseable, on account of our Situation, but impracticable, 
at least if I am to Judge of other Brigades by my own ; one 
single Reg' of mine have turned out Ninety Men untit for 
duty, on Account of Shoes & other Necessarys. The Sick 
become Numerous, & the Men, notwithstanding the utmost 
Care of their Officers, will be Frostbitten, & subject to 
many other disorders, if they are to keep the Field, until 
the Militia can be collected, which if we are to Judge from 
the past, cannot be done in less than two Months — in the 
meantime it cannot be expected that the Enemy will re- 
main Idle, Their Works will be Continued, Their Vesseils 
who are now before the Town, will not only furnish them 
with Cannon, but with Marines, Sailors &c., so that in all 
probability, before the Militia can be collected an Attack 
will be thought impracticable, upon the same Grounds & 
perhaps with more reason than at present. — At the Time 
when this Hint was first thrown out in Council, I was 
pleasd with it, there seemd a probability of success ; but 
I had no Idea, that a Winter's Campaign was so closely 
Connected with the plan, which in my Opinion would prove 
more fatal to the Army under your Excellencys CoiTiaud 
than an unfortunate Attack on the Town — but I am far 
from thinking the plan ought to be dropped entirely. If 
the Army was to go into Winter Quarters where the Men 
could be refreshd & Clothd, & remain there untill the 
latter end of March ; the Militia could be Collected in the 
meantime. Then a Vigorous Attack could be made with 
a probability of success. 

" Thus I have given your Excellency my Sentiments on 
the Question proposd, as Clear as the shortness of the time 
I had for Consideration would permit me, which was only 
a few Minutes this Morning. The utility of hearing a 
Question debated is great, at least to a Young Soldier — 
Should the Question be decided otherwise your Excellency 
may be assured that any part entrusted to rae shall be ex- 
ecuted with the greatest Chearfullness. 

" Your Excellencys Most Obed' & very humble Serv' 

" P : Muhlenberg." 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 281 

OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL SCOTT. 

" White Marsh, 4'" Dec' 1777 
"Sir 

" I rec* your Excellencys letter of yesterday. I well re- 
member the proposition made. I then thought there was 
a probability of Success in such au attempt, but after your 
Excellency returnd from Reconoitring the Enemy's Lines 
and hearing your oppiniou with regard to their strength, I 
lost every Idea of a Winters Campaign. I must confess I 
never Promised my self any Certainty of success In it. But 
the many Waity reasons then given for a Vigorous Execu- 
tion Induced me to think something possably might be 
done, but since your Return from the lines, as before meu- 
tiond, I have not had a single thaught of such a thing 
Ither with or without the Militia. 

" I am your Excellency's Ob' Serv' 

"Ch' Scott." 

opinion of brigadier-general cadwalader. 

"Head Quarters, 3'' Dec' 1777 
" Dear Sir 

" Whether the Army under your Excellency's command 
should continue in the field this winter ; and whether it is 
expedient to call to j'our assistance a great body of militia 
to make an attack on the Citty, are very important Questions 
— the determination of which may decide the fate of Amer- 
ica — they therefore require our most serious consideration. 

" It is certainly usual with all nations, in every cold 
climate, to retire with their armies into winter quarters — 
The men want cloathing & want rest; and the army is 
generally much reduced by inaction, sickness & a variety of 
casualties. To repair these losses, to nurse & recruit the 
Soldiers, & to make the necessary arrangements for an- 
other campaign are certainly great objects : but, Sir, if the 
practice of other nations, & the rules laid down in the 
books by military authors, are, implicitly, to regulate the 
armies of these States, I cannot help thinking our ruin is 



282 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

inevitable: — precedents may justify us to military pedants, 
but not to the sensible Citizen. — 

" The situation of the American States is very different 
from that of a nation whose independance is acknowledged 
& established. It requires great management to keep up 
the spirits of the well-aft'ected, & to subdue those who have 
taken a part against us — Imprisonment, confiscation & death 
are the punishments for those who engage in the support of 
a revolution — these are terrors not so much dreaded in 
common wars — To remove these fears, and to secure the 
inhabitants from danger, appears to me to be measures of 
the utmost importance. The people of this State had the 
greatest expectations that the Army under your Excel- 
lency's command would have prevented General How from 
penetrating thro' the country &, taking possession of the 
capital of this State. — They were disapointed ! — and it is 
very evident what conclusions the}- must have drawn — The 
superiority of the enemy was easily discovered, and it natu- 
rally affected their spirits. Our successes to the northward 
have enabled you to draw great reinforcements from thence 
— our whole force, now collected, gives them new hopes; 
and tho they may not expect a successful attack will be 
made on the city this winter, they expect to be protected. 
The withdrawing your army to a great distance will not 
only magnify the enemy's strength (in the Opinion of the 
Inhabitants) but will be construed into an acknowledgment 
of our own weakness. — The enemy may then detach a body 
of troops to take post at Bordenton or Mount Holly ; another 
to Newtown on this side, and a third to Wilmington — with 
these (having possession of the Capital) they have perfect 
command of an immense country ; from which they can 
draw provision, forage & men. — The State of delaware must 
be totally subjected — the eastern shore of maryland & Vir- 
ginia left open to be ravaged at will ; in short, the inhabit- 
ants within this great Circle, must come in for protection, 
must swear allegiance to the king, & deliver up their 
arms. Those men who are to compose a very considerable 
part of your army the next Campaign will be engaged 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 283 

against you ; the inhabitants of other States, who are event- 
iially concerned in these misfortunes, will feel very sensibly 
their dreadful effects — the power of Legislatures will be 
weakened & the States may find it impossible to enlist, 
draft, or, by any other means, to furnish their quota's for 
the ensuing Campaign. — All the manufactures that might 
be drawn from the Country you desert, will be lost to us. — 
The depreciation of our money will encrease ; and, in a 
short time, the Credit of the States will be totally ruined — 
Your army too, cantooned in a scattered manner, at so great 
a distance from the Enemy, will be dispersed thro' the 
States, by Leave-of-absence, Furlows, & Desertion — and in- 
stead of your troops coming into the Field better disci- 
plined (as some Gentlemen expect) they will become licen- 
tious, ungovernable & total strangers to military Discipline. 

" Last winter, after repeated ill-successes, you was obliged 
to retire from post to post, as the enemy advanced, and in 
addition to j'our misfortunes, your army was every day re- 
duced, by whole Brigades, leaving you, in sight of the 
Enemy — When you crossed the Delaware, tho' reinforced 
with the Philad'' Militia, you had but a handful of men, & 
these in a wretched ragged condition — What then would 
have been the consequence if you had retired to the back- 
country to nurse & recruit the miserable remnant of your 
army ; and to enlist men for the next Campaign. The Conse- 
quences are so evident they need no explanation. By 
having the river as a Barrier you kept the field till an 
opportunity offered; and by a well timed, well executed 
blow, you gave hopes again to all the States — in conse- 
quence of this, the Prince-town affair happened, which drew 
the enemy to one point ; and, at once, recovered N. Jersey 
& set America again on her Legs. 

" The King of Prussia (in the last war) overpowered by 
numbers, had almost lost all his Dominions during the 
Summer; but by a noble exertion, with those very troops 
that had been harrassed & almost torn to pieces by repeated 
actions and constant Marches, he recovered his Losses by a 
winter Campaign. 



284 Defences oj Philadelphia in 1777. 

" Your men, I know, Sir, are in great want of cloathing, 
but I conceive they will be sooner equipped by remaining 
in the field than in winter Quarters — because by being in 
the field, the necessity will appear more evident, will induce 
those employed to provide cloathing to exert themselves, 
and will justify measures that otherwise would disgust & 
exasperate those from whom they are taken. — Let the robust, 
& best cloathed, do the duty of Guards; let the Invalids be 
sent to the most comfortable Quarters; & let premiums be 
given to those who shall make the best Hutts. 

" If you are out of the reach of a surprize, the Duty will 
be easy ; and you may effectually annoy the enemy as if j'ou 
was nearer. 

" I am far from thinking that a winter Campaign will not 
be attended with great distress to the poor Soldiers, & do 
not mean to insinuate that good winter Quarters may not 
be more comfortable ; but I am obliged from the necessity 
of the case to declare, that I think, if your array was re- 
duced by action & sickness, to one half its present number, 
the consequences would not be so fatal, as if we were to 
take winter Quarters. 

" I have confined myself merely to the Question ' whether 
a "Winter Campaign is adviseable,' but beg leave to make a 
few remarks on the two Positions that have been proposed. 

" To cover our stores, to afford the most protection to 
the country, to procure the best shelter (& out of the reach 
of a surprize) where there is plenty of water, forage & pro- 
visions — these appear to me to be the considerations that 
should determine the choice of the position for winter quar- 
ters. — Lancaster & the line from thence to Easton, has 
been mentioned as a proper place for winter Quarters. — 
Others have mentioned Wilmington & its neighbourhood. 
— Let us compare them ! Lancaster &c., tis said, from the 
best information, are so crouded with Families from the 
City & its Invirons, that a traveller can with difliculty get 
a night's lodging. I cannot conceive that any person can 
seriously propose to turn out those inhabitants, while their 
Husbands, Fathers & Brothers are now, perhaps, in the 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 285 

Field — Hutts then must be substituted in the place of 
houses. — You have plenty of water, forage, & perhaps pro- 
visions, and you leave a vast country exposed as has been men- 
tioned above — You are to live on that country from whence 
you must draw your chief supplies in the next Campaign, 
& every article brought a great distance in waggons. 

" Wilmington has not its usual number of Inhabitants : & 
several other Towns in the neighbourhood are under the 
like circumstances; there are 9 or 10 mills at Brandywine, 
all these will afford shelter for a great body of troops. — 
This situation is out of the reach of surprize, & near enough 
to annoy the Enemy, cover your stores, & a great part of the 
country, which in the other case is left exposed. Wood, 
water & forage in great plenty and provisions, as the 
Com : General informs, may be had in large quantities from 
Maryland & Virginia by water, to the Head of Elk. — Hutts 
may be built, in such places as will best answer the pur- 
poses of defence, for that part of the Army that cannot find 
shelter in Houses. — 

" I am so perfectly convinced, that nothing but success, 
can keep up the spirits of our Friends, confirm the doubt- 
ful Characters, convert our Enemies & establish our Credit, 
(on which the bringing another army into the Field very 
much depends), that every Effort ought to be made to pro- 
cure it — I have not doubt but a successful attack could be 
made upon the City this winter by calling a considerable 
Body of Militia to your assistance if the enemy remain in 
their present position. — But I am apprehensive, that by de- 
claring your Intention (which will be necessary to induce 
the militia to turn out) it would immediately alarm the 
Enemy — they would find it necessary to surround the City 
with works, on the west side, and by drawing their force 
within a narrow compass, might defeat your Scheme — as 
they could only be carried by storm, at this season of the 
year. 

" It would probably take two months to collect the Militia 
from the distant States, which would bring us to the first 
of February, at which time the Ice is often gone, or at 



286 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

least, so weak as not to answer our purpose. — I am there- 
fore inclined to think it will not be proper to give the 
militia so fatiguing a march at this severe season, or put 
the States to so great an Expence without a greater pros- 
pect of success. 

" I am, D' Sir, with great respect & esteem, 

" Your Excellency's most ob' very h'ble Serv' 

"John Cadwalader." 

opinion op joseph reed, esq. 

"Dear Sir 

" Tho' the Consideration of a Winters Campaign, & Prac- 
ticability of an Attack on Philad' have been so lately pro- 
posed, every Gentleman who extended his views beyond the 
present Hour, must have turned his Thoughts upon these 
Subjects so as to be able to form something more than a 
sudden Opinion. There cannot be any Person, Sir, either 
on a publick or private Account, upon whom the Motives 
for a "Winters Campaign can operate more forcibly. I have 
every Reason to wish it — & yet in the State & Condition 
of our Army my Judgment is against it. — The History of 
every Winters Campaign made in Europe closely evinces 
how destructive they have ever proved : during the Course 
of the last War the allied Army under Prince Ferdinand 
was almost ruined tho' victorious, & pursuing the Enemy. 
— Charles the 12* failed & fell from the very Summit of 
Victory, & Success by keeping the Field a part of the 
Winter. It is true, these Climates were more severe than 
ours, but the Troops were so well appointed, or at least so 
much better than ours, as to give Force to the Argument. 
Nay the Experiences of the Enemy last Winter confirms 
the Observation — a great Mortality, Discontent among Offi- 
cers & Men, & considerable Desertions, were the Conse- 
quences, tho' they were much better provided than we are. 
The Nakedness of the Array, & Temper of the Troops seem 
to be insurmountable Objections, possibly the latter might 
subside if the former was removed, but as it is, from every 
Observation I have been able to make, unless a competent 



Defmces of Philadelphia in 1777. 287 

Supply of Cloathing can be procured all Argument is vain. 
— The Dissafection of the Country, Distress to the Whigs, re- 
cruiting & refreshing the British Array, a general Despond- 
ency & above all, — Depreciation of the Currency stare me 
in the Face as the Consequences of Retirement to distant 
Quarters : I shall share personally in this Distress — With a 
Family I have a Habitation to seek at this inclement Season, 
& every other Accommodation to provide, & yet I cannot 
desire the Array so unprovided to remain for my Protec- 
tion. The general Calamity I fear will not be removed by 
attempting it. The Credit of the Currency in my Opinion, 
will depend more upon an effective Army, than any other 
Circumstance. If Sickness, Discontent & Desertion should 
disperse or greatly reduce our Army ; I think the general 
Cause would suffer more than from the Evils I have noticed 
before : these Evils will admit of some Reraedy, but the 
other will not. With a recruited & refreshd Army, we 
raay recover what we lose, but with a fatigued worn out, 
dispirited one what can we expect but that General Howe 
will next Spring take the Field with every Superiority — But 
in this Case it appears to me, the true & proper Line may 
be between such a distant Cantonment as has been proposed, 
& taking Post so near the Enemy as to make a Winters 
Campaign. The Arguments of disciplining the Troops, re- 
cruiting the Army &c. at a distance have little weight with 
me; such a Security would afford, & be used as the best 
Excuse for going Home, & the Officers Commissions have 
not such an inherent Value as to make them fearful of 
losing them by Disobedience, or Neglect of Duty. The 
surest Pledge of Fidelity, & Attention, would be putting 
them in such a Situation as to require it. I do believe a 
partial Dispersion of the Array would follow, on putting it 
in any other Situation. Military Rules & Maxims laid down 
in long establish'd Armies do not allways apply to ours, & 
this Case I think is an Exception. 

"An Attack upon the Enemy in his Quarters when the 
River is froze, has been much thought of — if the Proba- 
bility of Success was in our Favour, no Exertion ought to 



288 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

be left untried, & even the present Situation of our Army 
should be made if possible to bend to it. But if after \cu(\ 
Efforts, the Chances will be still against us, Prudence for- 
bids our venturing upon a Measure, which if unsuccessful 
would be attended with very fatal Consequences. Gen' 
Howe from the best Calculation, has now 12000 Men on 
one side strongly posted with Redoubts & Abbatis, so for- 
midable as to discourage our most enterprizing Genius's, 
when a large Detachment seemed to favor an Attack — on 
the others two unfordable Rivers, I fear we cannot oppose 
a greater Number of Continental Troops to him ; but this is 
to be supplied with Militia from Jersey, Pennsylvania Mary- 
land & Virginia — as to the first they are very fully employed 
at Home, the second from a Variety of Circumstances we 
find will not turn out but in two or three Classes & even of 
these there are ITumbers allways unarm'd. — The two latter 
in Point of Arms are in the same Condition. They are at 
a Distance & will march in at different Times, those who 
come early will be impatient, of Delay & hard Service, their 
Subsistence will be diflicult, & after all the very Possi- 
bility of it will depend on the Weather — A South Wind 
with a little Rain will make the Ice impassable in a few 
Hours, But supposing them to come into Camp in great 
Numbers, & good Humour, well arra'd, & fed — the Frost to 
continue — from the Nature of the Thing it can be no Secret 
— the Enemy will probably throw up Works, or make up 
other Preparations. On the opposite Bank therefore you 
will meet with an equal Army ready to receive you : for 
every one acquainted with our Militia will allow, that the 
Nature of the Attack will require too much Firmness & 
Discipline, to expect them to be equal to it farther than as 
a Support. Upon the whole there are such a Variety of 
Circumstances each of which are important, indeed essen- 
tial, all to coincide, that I think it would be almost miracu- 
lous if no one of them should fail us. 

" We are so circumstanc'd, Sir, as to have only a Choice 
of Difficulties, true Wisdom will direct us to select that 
Plan which will be attended with the least. — As to the 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 289 

main Body of the Army laying on the East Side of Schuyl- 
kill, & taking Post between that & Delaware, it is not prac- 
ticable in my Opinion — as the Country does not supply 
Forage or Means of Subsistence. No Magazines being 
established but at a great Distance, nothing, or next to 
nothing now to be procured from the surrounding Country, 
the Supplies would be too precarious in the Winter Season. 
I therefore cannot but join in Opinion with those Gentle- 
men, who advise passing the Schuylkill with the greatest 
Part of the Army. The left Wing, & as much of it as 
could find Cover in Wilmington to take Post there, ex- 
tending as they can find Accommodation or good Ground 
to Hut, as far or farther than Downing-town. I would also 
propose that upon an exact Estimate of our present Force 
it be divided into 3 or 4 Parts or Classes. The most robust, 
healthy & well cloath'd to form the first Class ; & so on. 
The first Class to take the first Tour of Duty on this side 
Schuylkill, taking Post at such a Distance from Philadel- 
phia as not to risque a Surprize, having with them only 
their light Baggage or even bare Necessaries. I would 
have a Body of Militia advanced between them & the 
Enemy, their Line & Parties to extend to Delaware or as 
near it, as their Strength would admit. This Body of Men 
will not find Cover sufBcient I believe, without going too 
far or too near, they will therefore hut, or perhaps Boards 
may be procured. — I am very sensible that Objections & 
very plausible ones may be framed to this Plan & so there 
may be to every other, this answers the most valuable 
Purposes & such as appear to me to require our running 
'some Risque to obtain. — I will just enumerate a few. In 
the first Place, a very valuable Country, the three lower 
Counties & Chester will be covered, & a Degree of Protec- 
tion afforded to the Country on the East side of Schuylkill, 
2''. The Army will find some Cover ; a Country abounding 
in Forage, & many other Articles necessary for their 
Comfort, those Countries having suffered as yet very little 
by the War, & being very fertile. 3''. The Enemy will be 
deprived of this Supply which they will otherwise obtain. 

21 



290 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

4"". The Troops will be within striking Distance, if Circum- 
stances should favour that Measure without being exposed 
to a Winters Campaign. 5"". A Tour of Duty will not 
admit the Officers neglecting the service by going Home, 
or entering into Scenes of Dissipation, & Amusement, 
which will in the same Degree infect the Soldiery. 6"". 
Some Annoyances may be given to the Enemys Intercourse 
by Ships. 7*. It will prevent any Insurrection in those 
lower Counties, or the Eastern Shore of Maryland of which 
every Year has furnish'd us with an Instance. 8"". The 
Passage of the Enemy has occasioned Wilmington, & that 
Neighbourhood to be evacuated by the Friends to America, 
they with many others have retir'd to those very Places 
some Gentlemen propose to go & occupy — in the one Case 
you will have empty Houses, in the other you must exercise 
a Spirit of Hardship by turning Families out to experience 
every Species of Distress. 9"". You will reserve the Supplies 
of the back Country for the next Campaign which otherwise 
you will eat up in the Winter. 

" I would farther beg leave to add that the support of the 
Army, the Success of the Cause & even the Supply of 
Cloathing & Necessaries for the Troops depends very much 
on the Opinion & Spirits of the People, they rise or fall 
according to the Appearances of Success & of our Force ; 
abandoning a large Body of the Country to the Enemy, will 
to them be a sure Proof of our Inferiority & Inability to op- 
pose the British Army, of course they will seek Protection, 
take the Oaths, & throw themselves under the Enemys 
Government. — A Circle of 30 Miles at least including 
Jersey will be under the Command of the Enemy. 

" It is a great Objection & has much Weight that this 
Post may be liable to Affront from the Enemy & Disturb- 
ance in their Quarters, but I do not think our Affairs or 
Situation will admit of total Tranquillity.— 2^ The Schuyl- 
kill will affiard some Security after the Destruction of the 
Bridge which must be effected. 3. Some Works may be 
thrown up for Defence. 4"". The Array will be within sup- 
porting Distance of each other, so as to require a great 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 291 

Exertion & Movement of the Enemy, which they will not 
be fond of after being settled in their Quarters. These 
Circumstances in a Degree obviate this Objection. 

" 2^ Object. That Bucks County & Jersey will be exposed 
to the Depredations or Practices of the Enemy. 

"Answ. This Position will aftbrd a partial Cover & in 
my Opinion a better than the distant Cantonment. I am 
confident the Country will esteem it so. 

" 3. We have Hospitals in this Country & are establish- 
ing Magazines at Places that may be exposed by these 
Movements. 

"Answ. These Hospitals are scattered about, they hardly 
make an Object for an Enemy, but I should think they might 
be removed as fast as the Patients recover & no new ones 
sent, so that in a little Time the Difficulty will be removed. 

" Upon the whole. Sir, I can think of no other Expedient 
to reconcile the many Difficulties which present themselves 
in every view of this important Question. The shortness 
of Time & a sore Finger has obliged me to throw together 
these Sentiments with very little Accuracy — they may serve 
as Hints perhaps for better Heads to improve. 

" I am with the greatest Respect & Regard, D' Sir, 

" Your obed & aff' Hble Serv' 

"Jos: Reed." 
[December 4, 1777.] 

OPINION OF BRIOADIER-GENERAL DU PORTAIL. 

" 3* December, 1777 
"Sir 

" I have examined anew with all the attention of which I 
am capable, the Project of attacking the English and it 
still appears to me too dangerous — the great Body of Militia 
with which we might be reinforced for this purpose does 
not give me any additional hope of succeeding — it is not 
the number of Troops which is of importance in this case, 
but it is the quality, or rather their nature and manner of 
fighting. — The Troops wanted are such as are capable of 
attacking with the greatest vivacity, the greatest firmness. 



N 



292 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

— Troops that are not astonished at suffering a considerable 
Loss in the first onset, without causing any to the Enemy — 
for this must be the case in an Attack of Intrenchments — 
although when the Works are carried the Chance turns and 
the Loss is on the side of the intrenched. — Now, are the 
Militia or even Continentals capable of undergoing this 
Trial, in which the best Troops in the World cannot always 
support themselves — I am verj' sorry in giving the motives 
of my opinion to be obliged to speak so unfavorably of our 
Army — but the Battle of German Town ought to be a Les- 
son to us — if our Army had proceeded with vigour on that 
occasion, would not the English have been completely de- 
feated — The Disposition was excellent. — Your Excellency 
in that instance really conquer'd General How, but his 
Troops conquered yours. — if then notwithstanding the ad- 
vantage of a complete surprize, notwithstanding the ad- 
vantages of ground, we were repulsed, what would happen 
before a Line of Redoubts well disposed in all appearance, 
and the Intervals of which are closed with Abbatis. 

" There is however a case in which I think we might attack 
the Enemy with success — I mean if the Schuylkill should 
be sufficiently frozen below their left to admit of our throw- 
ing our greatest Force on their Rear at the same time that 
we should make an attack in front. Gentlemen acquainted 
with the Country must decide this point — if indeed the 
Schuylkill is sufficiently frozen every year to afford a pas- 
sage for Columns of Troops with Artillery — my opinion is 
fixed. I think the Army ought to be marched to the other 
side of Schuylkill, to be reinforced with all the militia that 
can be collected, while we wait for the favorable moment. 

" I would go more minutely into the Subject, if your Ex- 
cellency did not order me to send my Answer this morning. 
I did not receive your Excellency's Letter 'till half after 
twelve, and it is now half after one. 

" I am with great Respect, Sir, your &c 

" Le Chev» Du Portail." ' 

' Translated by Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens, 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 293 

opinion of brigadier-general irvine. 
"Sir 

" If posting the army in a position similar to that I ad- 
vised in my last letter, be to form a winter's campaign, the 
measure in my opinion is not only adviseable, but abso- 
lutely necessary, as the more I think on the subject the 
more I am convinced that retiring into winter quarters and 
leaving the country uncovered will be followed with the 
ruin of our friends, give ease and plenty to our enemies, 
and do an irreparable injury to the cause we are ingaged to 
defend ; the aids to be drawn from this State in future will 
be triiBing indeed, the inhabitants of new jirsey will be 
intimidated, the delaware state lost, and an opportunity 
given to the tories on the eastern shore of maryland once 
more to appear in arms against us. When I proposed 
hutting the army it was not so much with a view of annoy- 
ing the enemy in their present possessions as to prevent 
them from ravaging the country ; and to give our officers a 
better opportunity of attending to the discipline of the 
troops than they could possibly have were they dispersed 
in extensive cantonments ; — how far the former may be 
efl"ected by drawing together a large body of militia, is a 
question not easily determined — The idea I confess is a 
noble one, and could it be reduced to practice might be 
attended with the most happy consequences, but the great 
variety of circumstances that must concur to insure those 
consequences is a strong argument against making the 
experiment. — I take it for granted that not less than eighteen 
or twenty thousand militia would be called, it is uncertain 
whether so large a body could be collected on the short 
notice they will receive, it is equally uncertain whether the 
different states could arm their quotas, and their assembling 
at the place of rendezvous at or near the time to be fixed, 
still more so, as it may depend upon circumstances not in 
their power to foresee or prevent : allowing they came in 
time and properly armed, the ice or weather may be against 
our striking a capitol stroke for some time, and the diffi- 
culty of keeping such a body of militia in the field at that 



294 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777 , 

season of the year (when they expected to be discharged in 
a day or two) is easier to foresee than get over. Upon the 
whole, I am of opinion that tho' it is necessary for this 
army to remain somewhere between twenty and thirty miles 
of Philadelphia this winter, it is not adviseable to attempt 
collecting a large body of militia together with a view of 
attacking that place. 

" I am with the greatest respect Sir 

" Your most obedient & humb. Serv' 

"James Irvine. 

" Whitemarsh, Decern' 4"", 1777" 

opinion of brigadier-general potter. 
"Sir 

" Your excelancey by your letter of yesterday Requested 
my Sentements on two points — 

"first the advisability of a winter Campaign, secondly the 
Practicability of an Attact upon Philadelphia — Ass to the 
first of these points my Sentements is that a winter cam- 
paign is Practable. — I confess the verey thought of a win- 
ter Campaign in our Sircumstances appeers dredfull. But 
it is liek many other Evels, that befaul us in this life, before 
we under go them we are Redey to conclud the are unse- 
portable, but when the are over we dont find them so dred- 
full as we apprehended. I can from experance say so of a 
winter Campaign — I have not found it, to have so many 
Evels attending it as I have hard warmly Represented — But 
on suposition that those evels were Reale, how shall they be 
remeded the answer will be by goining into winter Quarters. 

" I assart winter Quarters is not to be found In the state 
of Pennsylvania my Reasons for this assartion is, the 
Capatale is in persession of the Enemy, and there is such 
large numbers fled from it, and the neghbourhood, adjasant, 
and the Towns and Viledges along the River Dalawer, that 
all the Towns and Viledges Back in the Country are full of 
Refugees all Redey. 

" What will be dun with those people Turn them out of 
Dores to make Room for the Solders, god for Bid it — that 
would be cruilty unaxamplyfied by General How himself. 



Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 295 

" then it Remains that we must Buld Huts, for our sol- 
diers go where we will, in this state — and I take it for 
granted we will not leave the State Entily to the marcey of 
the enemy. 

" I would Recommend the taking persision of Wilming- 
ton and Newport and what other Houses we could find in a 
Conveneant place in Chester County, and Rais Huts for the 
Remainder of our Troops, so as to prevent, the enemys fur- 
idging in that County by this Station being Ocqupied By us, 
we will get the furridge and provisions that our enemies 
would otherwise get, and the Back parts of the Countrey will 
be Resarved for the ensuing Campaign, and in Case the[y3 
should be able to force there way into our Countrey in the 
spring, the furridge and provisions being Acosted [ex- 
hausted] will retard there march, and will be mutch in our 
favour that our stars are safe in our Reer — Another advan- 
tige will follow by Quartering in the aforesaid maner it 
will be In your power to keep a number of men in Bucks 
and Philadelphia Countys to prevent the enemys coming 
out in small partys to force the Inhabitance to Take the 
Oath of Elegance to the King. Nor will the have it in there 
power to get that suckuer from the disaticted part of the 
community, if they are closley shut up in the City. I am 
Convinced a winter Campaign will give Spirits and Viger to 
all the Inhabitance of these United States and will do Hon- 
our to the Army and Good to our cause In genral. — 

" Ass to the Provibility of an Attact on the City of Phil- 
adelphia with the aid of a Bodey of Militia, it is unsartain 
when or at what time it would be possible to cross the 
Rivers to attact them, for that is the way that appeers most 
provable to me at present. 

" If your Enjineers are Confidant that they can set the 
City on fier from the other side of the Dalawer or Schuyl- 
kill in case the Ise did not answer I would be for cauling 
the Militia to aid the Army, if they could not set it on fier, 
I think we would be verey liable to a disapointment. 

" I am &c. 

" Camp, Dec' 4% 1777" " J^" Potter. 



296 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 

opinion of colonel lutterloh. 
" Remarks, 

" As the present Camp wants Wood & other comfords 
for the Men, in this Severe Weather, and the Enemys Situ- 
ation being to strong for an Attaque, I would propose to 
post our Army into Refreshing Quarters, (as We do abroad 
in such cases). I have been lucking out where you could 
forme such a Line, Sufficiently stocked with houses for that 
purpose & find we would form such a Line between the 
Two Rivers Schuylkill & Delawar, where we could effect- 
ually cover our Country, Stores, & provide the Necessary 
Supplyes easy, as allso prevent the Enemy from doing our 
Army any material hurt. To do this we should place our 
Right Wing allongst the Schuylkill & the left on the Dela- 
var. Our Van Troops in German Town & those bights 
&c. &c. in [ ] up towards Reading all the Army could lay. 
Head Quarter to be at Pots Grove which I find a good 
large Town for it. The great Magazin to be in Reading 
& in the Trap & Hickery Town the Mooving Magazines & 
Backerys must be established — to which those places are 
proper. All that Country is full of Forrage & these Sup- 
plyes can be got easy as allso over the Schuylkill. The 
Right Whing Melitia could be over the Schuylkill as from 
Mottrom's ford upwards I find the Country very advanta- 
gious with hills where no Surprise could happen to them 
at the Van postes & in each Division some poles must be 
fixed on it a Caske with Rich & Combustibles which are 
fired & lightered directly upon the Allarm Gun from the 
Commander of the Van, by which all the Troops march to 
their Larm-postes forwards, pointed out to them by their 
going into the Quarters. All Commanders do keep in the 
Nights their Troops in their houses together &c. &c. Over 
Schuylkill must be Two bridges more one by Wolley forge 
& one near Potsgrove to get quik Communications. When 
this is done directly we keep our Men in health & are re- 
freshed to stand any attaque & our Supplyes can be good 
& Regulair. 

" H. E. LUTTERLOH. 
" Decbr 1" 1777" 



INDEX. 



Alarm posts, 296. 

Ammunition for Fort Mifflin, 113. 

" Auiphitrite," cannon from, 47. 

Angeil, Israel, til. 

Arendt, Baron d', illness of, ^Q, 61, 104, 

116. Opinion on Fort Mifflin, 136. 
Armstrong, John, 45, 118. Opinions of, 

185, 226, 265. 
Army, British, in Philadelphia, 52, 180. 

Strength of, 52, 183, 207. Movements 
of, 169, 197. 
Army, Continental, liable to license, 30. 
To move southward or to the North 
River, 41. Condition and strength of, 
51, 52, 208. Must not risk destruction, 

186. Proposed distribution, 215. In 
need of rest and care, 219, 237, 257. 

Arnold, Benedict, 3. 

Artillery, nature of French, 48. 

** Augusta,'* wreck of the, 70, 75, 80, 81. 

Batteries, floating, 12, 25, 77, 103, 123. 
On shore, 144. 

Baylor, George, 68. 

Beef, trade in, with the enemy, 70, 79. 

Bell, William Dent, 142. 

Billingsport, works at, 8. Du Coudray 
on, 17, 37. Heed's views, 26. Wash- 
ington's opinion, 31, 34. Ease of de- 
fending, 44. British at, 55, 60, 66. 
Suggested assault on, 79. Approved 
by Washington, 82. Force at, 86, 95. 
Importance of, 89, 94. 

Block house, destruction of, 117, 125. 

Blodget, William, 202 n. 

Board of War, constitution, 173. Report 
of, 175. 

Bounty, height of, 221. 

Brandywine Mill, 71. 

Bridges, destruction of, 63. Bridge of 
boats taken, 67. Building of, inter- 
rupted, 119. Over the Schuylkill, 129. 

Bristol, express stationed at, 163. 

Bunker Hill, 196. 

Burgoyne, surrender of, 67, 208. 

Burlington, hospital at, 198, 203. 

Burnet, J., 202 n. 

Bush Island Fort, 44. 

Cadwalader, John, present at councils, 
49, 52. Mention of, 143. Opinion of, 
281. 

Campaign, winter, 247, 250, 264, 272. 

Cannon, loss of, 70. 

Carlisle, Earl of, 39 n. 

Carpenter's Island, 69, 77. 



Carter, Landon, on St. Clair, 4. 

Chains in river, 96, 107. 

Channel, closing o(. 128, 134. 

Charleston, probable object of British, 
41. 

Chesapeake, landing of enemy, 46. 

Chester, as a point of landing, 23. 

Chevau.x-de-frise, 6, 15, 32, 43, 97, 112. 

Clark, John, Jr., 65 n. 

Classes, division suggested. 289. 

Clinton, Henry, 208. 

Clothing for Fort Mifflin, 57, 72, 78, 83, 
89. For army, 214, 223. 

Clow, 68. 

Clymer, in charge of prisoners, 59. 

Commissaries denounced, 104. 

Commissioners in War Office, 176. 

Comstock, Adam, 59, 200. 

Congress, Continental, resolutions, 95. 
Orders inquiry into loss of Fort Mif- 
flin. 140, 159 n. And Gates, 174. 

Conway, Thomas, 102 n, 172. 

Cook, David, 61. 

Cooper, intelligencer, 146. 

Cornwallis, raid into New Jersey, 145, 
147, 152. 

Coryell's Ferry, 30. 

Council of war, June 12th, 2; August 
21st, 41 ; September 23d, 49 ; Septem- 
ber 28th, 51 ; October 29th, 207 ; No- 
vember 8th, 101 ; November 24th, 177. 
Indecision of, 177. 

Cox, 166. 

Craig, Charles, letters from, 99, 131, 145, 
152, 204. 

Crawford's militia, 85, 100. 

Crosswick'.-? Creek, fleet secured in, 109. 

Crum Creek, 23. 

Currency, depreciation of, 194. 

Cuylcr, Major, 79. 

Darby, 128. 

Darby Creek, 10, 24, 29. 

Delaware River, width of, 34, 40. 

Deserters from Continental navy, 127, 
140. Rewards for apprehending, 210, 

Dickinson, Edmund B., 142. 

Dickinson, Philemon, 50. Proposed de- 
scent on Staten Island, 117 n. 

Dis.affected persons, 216. Army, 246, 
208. 

Donaldson, 42. 

Du Coudray, projects of defence, 12, 42. 
Offers his services, 37, 47. Survey of 
river, 40, 46. On fortifying Billings- 
port, 44. 
22 297 



298 



Index. 



Du Portail, Chevalier, opinions of, 185 

241, 291. 
Duty and pleasure in army, 222. 

Easton, stores deposited at, 53. 
"Effingham," frigate, 58, 205. 
Eilis, Joseph, 165, 168. 
Enlistments, voluntary, at an end, 221. 
Establishment, the new, 1T4. 
Evans, George, 114, 115. 

Fat Land Ford, 51. 
Fenwicli, Captain, 96. 
Ferries on the Schuylliill, 76. 
Fire ships, 7, 25, 36. 
Flag, violation of, 160. 
Fleet, British, moving to the south, 41. 
Communication with, SO, 8.3,84. Oper- 
ation against, 86, 94. Moves up the 
river, 113, 115. Passes island, 119. 
Movement of. 144. 
Fleet, Continental, weakness of, 64. Di- 
rected to prevent descent on Mud 
Island, 73. Council, 130. 
Fleury, journal of siege, 74, SO, 98, 106, 
123. Complains of ignorant obstinacy, 
75, 82. Rank of, 83, 97. Letters from, 
97, 120. Engineer, 106. Wounded. 
132. 
Flour, no magazines, 204. 
Forman, David, questions Newcomb's 
rank, 54, 66. Letters from, 54, 65, 90. 
To CO ojierate with Varnum, 62. Re- 
signs, 89 n, 93. 
Fort Island. Reed's opinion of, 27. 
Knox's opinion, 29. Washington on, 
31, 32, 34. Du Coudray favors, 37. 
Further defences of, 40. 
Fort Jlercer, 64, 151. Bombproofs at, 
81. To be strengthened, 122. Evac- 
uated, 157, 159. 
Fort Mifflin, exposed position of, 42. 
"To be attacked, 55, 60. Reinforcing, 
62, 7S. Operations in, 74, Sil. To be 
att.acked, 9{l, 94, 99. Garrison at, 105. 
Attack opens, 107, 110. Damao-e to 
111, 115, 120, 123. Evacuation con- 
sidered, 115, 122. Fatigue of garri- 
son. 120. Removing cannon, 123. Bad 
condition of, 125, 133. Evacuation 
suggested, 130, 132. To be held, 134. 
Needs of, 134. Importance of main- 
taining. 136. The end approaching, 
139. Evacuated, UO. 
Forts, prejudicial, 10. 
France, war with, 206. 
Francis, Tench, 204. 
Fraser, Simon, 95 n. 
Frazer, Persifor, 207 n, 211. 
French Creek, 51. 

Frigates, condition, of, 58. Securing 
101,108. Scuttling of, 113. Used as 
barracks, 206. 
Frink, Colonel, 104. 



Galleys, Continental, condition of 13 
Disposition of, 25, 29, 57. Poor' con- 
duct of, 86, 87. Attack on the " Vi.'i- 
Iant,"141. Position of, 151. Burned 
158, 160, 164. 
Gates, Horatio, 172. Board of War, 174, 

176. 
George, John, 121. 
Germantown, 50, 215. Battle of, 134. 

For winter quarters, 197. 
Gloucester, enemy occupy, 201. 
Glover, John, 149. Brigade of' 161. 162 
164, 168. ' . . 

Gordon's Ford, 51. 
Gray, George, 100. 
Gray, James, 100. 
Gray's Ferry, indefensible, 47. 
Great Manto Creek, 86. 
Greene, Christopher, on night operations 
of British, 55. Question of command, 
56, 61, 63. Letter from, 139. 
Greene, Nathanael, opinions of, 5, 177 
219, 218. Letters from, 128, 158, 16l' 
165, 198, 199, 201, 203, 204. Directed 
to meet Cornwallis, 164. On public 
censure, 167. Ordered to join Wash- 
ington, 198. 
Grub's Landing, 70, 79. 

Hamilton, Alexander, 1, 37. 
Hazelwood, John, to cooperate with the 
forts, 65. Difference with Smith, 78, 
82. To break communication with fleet, 
84. Character of, 88. Chain, 107. 
Letter from, 129. To coiiperate with 
general plan, 150. 
Hazleton, bb. 
Health of men, 233. 
Heard, John, letter from, 146. 
Hessians, arms Uken from, 59. Drown- 
ing of, 100. 
Highlander's cross Cooper's Ferrv 152 
Hog's Island. 16. 

Hospitals, bad condition of, 168. At Bur- 
lington and Princeton, 198, 203. 
Howe, William, sails from New York, 3 
21. Objects in going south, 39 'n. 
Awkward position, 76. Forbids inter- 
course, 127. Misled as to Greene's 
force, 157. Intention to attack, 205. 
Huntington, Jed, 150. 
Huts, objections to and advantages, 213, 
218. 

Inspector-General, 210. 

Intelligence, 60, 65 n., 119, 132, 155, 159 

165,170,200. 
Intelligencers, conditions for selecting, 

163. 
Irvine, James, opinions of, 1S8. 243 

293. 



Jealousies, warning against, 64, 82. 
Jones, Whitehead, 115. 



Index. 



299 



Kalb, Baron de, opinions of, 187, 218, 

262. 
Kiss, Hesaisn, 200. 
Knox, Henry, opinions of, 29, 193, 229. 

269. 

Lafayette, good conduct at Gloucester, 
202. Opinions of, 216, 258. 

Lancaster, as winter quarters, 214, 217, 
22.3, 225, 230, 231, 235, 239. 

Landing places on the river, 22. 

Le BruD, Augustus, project for strength- 
ening Fort Mifflin, 43. 

Lee, Henry, 69, 72, 79, 96, 127. 

Lee, James, 126, 133. 

Lindsay, William, 96. 

Livingston, William, on Newoomb, 66 n. 

Lloyd, James, 202 n. 

Long, Island, 196. 

Loopholes in battery, 107. 

Loyd's mill, 71. 

Lutterloh, H. E., letter from, 296. 

McDougall, Alexander, 50, 52. 
McLane, Allen, letter from, 155. 
Marcus Hook, 20, 22. 
Maxwell, William, opinions of, 189, 227, 

267. 
Men for navy, 58. 
"Merlin," wreck, 80. 
Mifflin, Thomas, knowledge of country, 
47. Connection with Board of War 
173, 175. 
Militia, of Pennsylvania, 27. Costly for 
fortifying, 44. Not to be depended on, 
60, 243, 251. Delaware destroys pro- 
vision boats, 119. Prospect of collect- 
ing, 159, 165. Mortality of, 250. 
Millstones to bo removed, 71, 77, 85. 
Montgomery, Hugh, 115. 
Morris, Robert, tobacco vessel of, 109. 
Mortars, casting of, 49. 
Muhlenberg, P., opinions of, 239, 279. 

Navy Board, letters from, 58, 108, 164, 

Navy, Continental, reflections on, 159 

New Castle, trade at, 80. 

Newcomb, Silas, question of rank, 54. 
Refuses to make a return, 65. Livings- 
ton criticises, 66 n. Force and condi- 
tion, 89, 1 03. Council of Safety orders, 
90. Sent to defend himself, 118 n. 

New Jersey, militia, 165, 169. Opera- 
tions in, 187. 

Nicholas, Captain, 96. 

North River, defence of, 2, 42. 

Officers, rules of promotion, 3. Poor 
quality of, 85. Discontent among, 222, 

Oysters for Washington, 94 n. 

Palisades for Fort Mifflin, 75. 
Paoli, Paschal, 184. 



Parker's Ford, 51. 

Paterson, John, ordered to join the army 

155. Opinions of 190, 271. 
Peale Hall destroyed, 160. 
Pennibecker's Mills, headquarters, 51. 
Pennsylvania, call for militia, 208 
Pest House, 67. 
Peters, Richard, 173, 175. 
Philadelphia, importance of, to British, 
21. Occupied by the enemy, 52. Con- 
dition of, 169. Opinions on attacking, 
177. British return to, 198, 204. A 
second proposition to attack, 199 
Refugees from, 223, 236. Suggested 
firing of, 295. " 

Picket, capture of a, 154. 
Pinckney, Colonel, 45. 
Pomeroy, Captain, 206. 
Poor, Enoch, ordered to join army, 154 

Opinions of, 190, 231, 270. 
Potter, James, ordered to remove mill- 
stones, 71, 75. Failure, 85. Letters 
from, 69, 77, 85, 99, 113, 114 118 
119, 140, 146, 154, 170. Opinion ol 

Potts Grove camp, 51. 

Prices in Philadelphia, 160. 

Princeton, hospital at, 198, 203. 

Prisoners, 199. Exchange of, 211. 

Promotions, 3, 210. 

Province Island, British operations, 55 
Cutting of banks, 64. British works 
on. 88, 98. Diversion against, 113, 122, 
126, 135. 

Provision, trade in, 70, 77, 97, 100, 296 

Public, dissatisfaction of, 177. 

Pulaski, opinion, 240. 

Putnam, Israel, ordered to send reinforce- 
ments, 53. 

Quakers, Tory, supplies from, 89 Their 

idol, 160. 
Quarters, on selecting, 219. 

Radnor Meeting-House, 68. 

Rains, heavy, 50, 66. 

Randolph, Benjamin, 132. 

Randolph, Lieutenant, 68. 

Rank in navy, 25. Questions of, 50, 61, 
63. Complaints of, 222. 

Rankin's wager, 114. 

Rations, regulation of, 211. 

Read, George, 119. 

Read, Thomas, 19. 

Recruiting, effect of winter on, 217. 

Red Bank, Fort, 9. Wayne onj 20 
J'f'^'1'4 opinion, 27. Knox's opinion. 
-9. Washington advises its occupa- 
tion, 32. Small garrison, 55, 60. Re- 
inforcing, 61, 62. Stirling on import- 
ance of, 68. Defence, 93. Attack on, 
114, 147, 149. Bursting of gun, 116 
To be maintained, 151, 153. Evacu- 
ated, 156. Powder strewn at, 156, 163 
Destruction of, 169. 



300 



Index. 



Redoubts, British, in Philadelphia, 180, 

■1Q9 195 

Eeed?Jo3eph, letters from, 20, 142, 147. 
Present at eouncil, 52. On decision 
upon Red Banli, 151 n. Opinion of, 
286. 

Reed's house, 57. 

Refugees from Philadelphia, 223, 26b. 

Relaxation of army, 220. 

Resignation, alarming spirit ol, /4». 

Ridley Creek, 23. 

Robinson's Mill, 71. 

" Roebuck" forced to retire, 86. 

Rum wanted, 105. 

Rumlord, Jonathan, intelligence, 114, 
115. 

Russell, Giles, in command at Fort Mif- 
flin, 116, 121. 



St. Clair, Arthur, evacuates Ticonderoga, 

4 Present at council, 49. 
Schuylkill, cro.ssed by British, 60. Win- 
ter quarters in valley of, 212. 
Scott, Charles, opinions of, 100, 240, 281. 
Sellers, Nicholas, on treatment ot pris- 
oners, 147. 
Shaw's Mills, 71. 
Shepard, William, 198. 
Ship, loss of a British, 114. 
Shieve, Isr.-vc), 159, 162, 165. 
Sign i>f the Buck, 50. 
Smallwood, W., joins the mam army, 50, 
52. Opinions of, 191, 228, 208. 
■ Smith, Sam., question of command, 6b, 
61 63. Letters of, 56, 84, lOo, 106, 
111, 117, 120, 135, 142. Desires to be 
relieved, 105. Wounded, 116, 121. 
Proposes evacuation, 1 1 7. 
Smith, Thomas, deserts, 165. 
Smith (D. A. G.), death of, 08. 
" Somerset" forced to retire, 86. 
Stille, Dr., 135n. 

Stirling, Lord, sends reinforcements, b/. 
Letters from, 67, 76. Opinions of, 178, 
224,256. 
Stock, removal of, 28. 
Stores from Red Bank, 151. 
Success, eflect on public, 167. 
Sullivan, John, opinions of, liJ, -1-, 

244 

Surprise, guarding against, 65. Difficul- 
ties attending a, 181. 

Survey of country, 37, 40, 46. 



Talbut, death of, 139. 

Thayer, Simeon, in command at tort Mit- 

flin, 126, 127. Wounded, 132. Good 

conduct of, 144. 
Thoruton, 155. 
Timber Creek, 95, 161. 
Tinicum, 57. 
Trade with enemy, 127. 
Tranquillity in winter quarters, 230. 
Treat, Samuel, killed, 115, 121. 
Tredyffrin, hutting in, 225. 

Varnum, Jiimes M., instructions to, 62. 
At Woodbury, 78. Letters fro"^, '»- 
86 95, 102, 110, 115, 116, 120, 125, 
126, 132, 133, 140, 143, 153, 156, 15i. 
Cannonades British ships, 86, 94. Dis- 
tracted by many calls, 133. Opinions 
of, 233, 272. 

" Vigilant," attempt to capture, 140. 

Villngcs, storming of, 182, 255. 

Virginia, troops from, 53. 



Walls, George, 142. 

Ward, William, 104. 

War Office, commissioners in, 176. 

Warren Tavern, 50. 

Washington, George, letters from, 30, 40, 

61, 62^ 63, 64, 70, 71, 72, '"-^Sl- o '10?' 
80', 90, 93, 91, 101,108,11.3, 18 22, 

134 14.8 149, 150, lol, lo4, 156, 102, 
163! 164, 171, 197, 206, 244. On de- 
fence« 30 Rumor of determination to 
give battle, 39 n. On jealousies, 82. 
Alternaiives presented, 167. Conway s 
cabal, 172. Reputati.m, 194. 
"Washington" frigate, 68. 
Wayne, Anihony, not jmned army, oO. 
To lead an attempt on Province islana, 
136 n. Opinionsuf, 19, 191, 231. Let- 
ter from, 152. 

Weather, campaign and, 2o3 

Weedon, George, letters, 169, 2ob, 2//. 

Wheatley, 104 n. 

White Horse Tavern, 51. 

Wilmington, fortifying, 4^. As winter 
quartfrs, 213, 218, 224,226,228, 240, 

Wint'er campaign to be avoided, 214, 236. 
Winter quarters discussed, 212. 
Woodbury, 62, 63. _ 
Woodford, William, opinion of, 19-^, -5J, 

I 276. 



